2003's "Paradoxes of Strategic Intelligence" is one of several books of essays commemorating the life and work of the late Michael I. Handel, a specialist in the study of strategy. This particular volume contains seven essays dealing with the still very relevant topic of intelligence and strategic surprise.
Handel's introductory essay on "Intelligence and the Problem of Strategic Surprise" lays out the basic terms of the topic and outlines a theory of surprise as an problem for the intelligence community. In the second essay, Richard Betts discusses the costs and benefits of the alleged politicization of intelligence. Woodrow Kuhns explores the basis for so-called Intelligence failures; James Wirtz expands on Handel's theory of surprise.
The last three essays provide historical context for surprise and its sometime reciprocal, deception. John Frerris explores the evolution of British technique for strategic deception in World War II. Uri Bar-Joseph examines Israeli intelligence failures in the Yom Kippur War. Mark Lowenthal brings the discussion of intelligence and surprise to the American Civil War.
These essays provide a brutally honest assessment of the inevitability of surprise, and the limits of intelligence and intelligence reform. They will be of most interest to practicing intelligence professionals and consumers of intelligence. "Paradoxes of Strategic Intelligence" is very highly recommended to that audience.