Customer Reviews

Paris 1919: Six Months That Changed the World

5 star:		(96)
4 star:		(40)
3 star:		(14)
2 star:		(6)
1 star:		(10)

 

 

For the last couple of weeks, since finishing "Paris 1919", I have grappled with writing a review that would do justice to a book that is not only excellent reading, but also has the potential to reshape the way a reader views current events. Rather than wait longer for the writing muse who refuses to appear, I will take the more direct approach and simply write, "Buy this book and read it. It will afford you a greater understanding of international events unfolding in the world today."

Margaret Macmillan is an exceptional history writer: engaging, direct and interesting (sometimes even funny), but also a wide-ranging thinker who see and explains the vast sweep of history as well as the apparently minor ripples. She juggles the enormous cast of characters in the drama that unfolded in Paris, 1919 and explicate the myriad brought to the major players at the peace conference. Her knowledge of world history and her ability to explain it concisely are fully illustrated in her explanations of the various ethnic claims for land and self-rule individual; her ability to compare and contrast these claims is extraordinary.

She quickly reduces the Big Five to the Big Four, as the Four themselves did when they eliminated the Japanese representative from most of the debate and negotiation - he could barely follow the mostly English conversation anyway. Her descriptions of the Big Four (who eventually operated, without Italy, as the three), though apparently honest and precise, are hardly flattering:

*Wilson, preoccupied with his Fourteen Points and convinced that all would be well if the peoples of the world were allowed to practice self-determination (even though the definition varied depending upon the case and people)
*Lloyd George, determined to expand the British Empire at all costs, but who proved, ultimately, to be the mediator between Wilson and Clemenceu
*Clemenceu, torn between extracting vengeance on Germany (in the form of reparations and a land buffer) and expanding French holdings
*Orlando, whose overwrought, weeping behavior eventually embarrassed the other three and led them to exclude him from many major decisions, eliciting further weeping and an eventual walk-out (followed by a less-than-noble return)

That these four thought they could accomplish the multi-pronged task they assigned themselves - to deal with the defeated Germany, to establish national boundaries that would help ensure future world peace and to establish an organization to help enforce that peace - now seems naïve. As Ms. Macmillan illustrates, the participants appear to believe they could accomplish their goals. However, as she also illustrates, time and again, as each the discussion on question reached a stalemate, the Four either delayed a final decision or deferred the question to a committee for further study. As a result, many decisions remained unresolved while others had less-than-satisfactory solutions.

She neatly and convincingly debunks the theory that the financial burden placed on Germany as part of the war reparations was a major factor leading to Hitler's rise and WWII. Not only were the reparations significantly less than those Germany extracted from France after the 1870s Franco-Prussian War, but Germany never paid the WWI reparations and, indeed, indulged itself in such tactics as scuttling part of its navy rather than turn it over to Britain. On the other hand, she reinforces the argument that Germany did not feel compelled to accept terms of an agreement that were enforced rather than negotiated - and were determined to avenge the humiliation their representatives endured during the conference.

This is an extremely interesting book and, as another reviewer has mentioned, a real page-turner. Read it.

(Do note that Wilson's Fourteen Points are in an appendix at the back of the book. Ms. McMillan refers to them often and it is very helpful to have them close at hand.)

This book is highly interesting due to the rich detail in which the author relates the history of the peace-making after World War I. Much to the reader's joy she devotes a lot of attention to the settlements in the non-European parts of the world, in what is a lively treatment of the issues in 1919 and the subsequent events.

What in my opinion is the major shortcoming of the book, is that the purpose it has been written for becomes so apparent all along. The book should be termed "Paris 1919. An apology". Highly critical on all other settlements (the farther away from Europe, the more critical the author allows herself to be: see Turkey, Palestine, China), she asserts that "Versailles is not to blame".

Indeed, the author too easily jumps to conclusions. The most widely cited conclusion of her book is that the reparations forced upon Germany are not to blame for the rise of Hitler and WW II. Indeed events of 1919 never can be fully the reason for subsequent events say in 1933 or 1939. But it would be interesting to learn how much these events in 1919 were responsible for later developments. This would require a detailed study of the period 1919 to 1939 and one can only wonder how an author writing about a few months of peace negotiations in 1919 could ever come to a sensible conclusion about this issue! It is appalling to see that the author is even being applauded for this "research".

In fact, the only supportive argument the author offers, is that Germany until 1932 only had paid a comparatively small amount of its reparations - as if any debtor would relish about the (small) amount paid so far instead of the (much larger) sum outstanding! The facts are never presented by the author, only her conclusions. Indeed every study of this issue shows the devastating impact on German public opinion, as the reparations were constantly present due to endless negotiations - 24 conferences alone until 1924 - and new plans for repayment. E.g. the plan of 1929 still asked for yearly instalments that would have continued until 1988 (!). One can imagine what would happen to Iraqi oil reserves in the next 70 years - i.e. until 2073 - if the Big Three had a say.

The peacemakers in Paris in 1919 were a failure. Contrary to the hopes and inspirations of all the people of their age (victorious and defeated alike), they failed to establish new principles for peacemaking choosing to follow Wilson's principles where they fit the victors and to ignore them where they might have fit the defeated.

There are two sets of piece treaties: the "just treaties", those that enforce the will of the victors according to certain, broadly fair principles and those that are imposed largely against the will of the defeated and which subsequently have to be kept with force.

The "just peace" was not achieved, indeed there were not even negotiations with the defeated nations (producing calamities such as this, where Wilson only finds out after having agreed to the Czechoslovak borders that some 3 million Germans were also living there, indeed even more numerous than the name-giving ethnic Slovaks! "Why Masaryk - the Czech president - has not told me", Wilson famously asked).

So the peace had to be a forced one, one that needed to be kept with force. The author actually mourns that Germany was not more severely defeated in 1918 and expresses regret that the allies have not marched upon Berlin. With the same reason she might asked herself who actually won the first World War? Was it really France, which on its own would have been defeated in 1914 already? Or in other words: Why at all should US-soldiers fight for France having coal mines in the Saar area?

No new world order was established in Paris in 1919, instead the principle that the stronger nation imposes its will on others was once again confirmed. A discussion of the peacemakers of Paris 1919 should also include a reference to these other peacemakers (or "appeasers" as they now are called), those of 1938. Applying exactly the same principles as their fellows in 1919 Chamberlain & Co. gave away what was "just" in terms of the then prevailing equilibrium of power: E.g: exactly those 3 million Germans of the Sudetenland about which Wilson only learned so late in 1919.

The Treaty of Versailles is indeed to blame. Like this other Treaty with the Turks at Sèvres it called for a revision. In the case of Turkey, due to the swift recovery of Turkish forces under Attatürk, the dictated Treaty of 1919 was never implemented and later on was substituted with a negotiated one, leaving Turkey intact in almost exactly its present borders. Unfortunately for Europe and for Germany especially, the person that - as Attatürk undid the Sèvres treaty - undertook to undo the Versailles treaty was Adolf Hitler.

The Versailles Treaty asked for its revision, through war (WWII) or negotiations, so out of line it was with the actual balance of power and broad principles of justice. This is its ultimate failure and it is for this that "Versailles" and the peacemakers of 1919 can be blamed. But certainly they cannot be blamed for Hitler and his mass murders - nobody actually ever did.

So the book is a must read due to the facts presented and the lively picture it draws of those critical months, but should be read with great care when it comes to the far-reaching conclusions, not supported neither by facts nor by subsequent history.

There's an old adage that posits that the real outcome of a war is to teach one to hate one's allies more than than opne's enemies. Paris 1919: Six Months That Changed the World by Margaret Olwen MacMillan and Richard Holbrooke outlines why this old adage exists. The book covers the 6 month period in mid 1919 where the victorious allies of WW I converged to carve up the spoils of war and how this exercise set the stage for most of the subsequent conflicts of the 20th century.

While the book focuses on the Big Three Personalities of this exercise--Wilson (United States), Lloyd George (Great Britain), and Clemenceau (France) who dominated the critical aspects of the Paris Peace Conference-this focus doesn't detract from providing an encompassing review of the entire process as well as a detailed analysis of the devastating results of the conference. It delineates all too clearly how the best intentions can be overwhelmed by both insatiable avarice as well as unencumbered and unchecked egos in conflict.

This is a timely book. As we are poised to invade Iraq and effect "regime change" it would be wise to look at a previous exercise in managing post war victory to be reminded of both the complexities as well as the risks involved in such an undertaking.

Although an expressly historical tome, this is a well written and fast paced read.

Probably the best historical work I read in 2002. Highly recommended.

This book is another fine narrative history in same vein as Robert Massey's Dreadnought, and Alistair Horne's The Price of Glory: Verdun 1916. If you have an interest in the Great War and want history to come alive on the page, this book is one for you.

In the introduction Professor MacMillan says; "For six months in 1919, Paris was the capital of the world. The Peace Conference was the world's most important business, the peacemakers its most important people." The six-month session in Paris that took place between January and June1919 and involved representatives of 29 countries drew many of the boundaries of Africa, the Middle East and the Balkans that exist to this day, recreated Poland, set the terms by which the major powers would attempt to live with one another and forged the model for the future United Nations, among many other things.

MacMillan tells the story by getting under the skins of the three primary actors, Woodrow Wilson, David Lloyd George and Georges Clemenceau. She presents them with all their flaws and qualities and does not judge whether they were good men or evil fools as they struggled with a task of monumental difficulty as best they could.

In the end, the author is writing what we may call a revisionist history of the subject. It has long been felt that the Peace Conference was a miserable failure, that narrow national and partisan interests ruled the peacemakers, that the terms offered to Germany were too harsh and contained within them the seeds of the next war. Wilson, George and Clemenceau have been excoriated over the years but Professor MacMillan holds that they have unfairly been made the scapegoats for the mistakes of those who came later. She refutes received ideas about the path from Versailles to World War II and debunks the widely accepted notion that reparations imposed on the Germans were in large part responsible for the Second World War. "Hitler did not wage war because of the Treaty of Versailles," MacMillan writes in her concluding chapter. Even if Germany had retained everything that was taken from it at Versailles, he would have wanted more: "the destruction of Poland, control of Czechoslovakia, above all the conquest of the Soviet Union" as well of course as the annihilation of the Jews.

This is true but it is incomplete. The issue isn't whether Hitler would have been less cruel and bloodthirsty if Versailles had been more equitable, but whether he and his maniacal regime would have come to power at all.

Margaret MacMillan is professor of history at the University of Toronto and the great-granddaughter of David Lloyd George.

I believe I was misled by other reviews into believing this book is something it was not. I wanted to clarify a little bit about this book.

First off what it was. This book IS an excellect collection of history involving the major players at the Paris peace conference. It also goes very in depth into the problems facing each of the delegations involved. How to deal with the Balkan states, Russia, Germany et cetera.

This book is MOST DEFINETLY NOT a book that debunks the myth of Versailles ushering in the Nazi era in Germany. She spends less than a page towards the end of the book dedicated to this subject. While it is true that Germany more or less forfeited on the reparations they were to pay, they were still saddled with the war guilt clause, loss of territory, etc. Margaret MacMillan claims that Hitler still would have sought conquest in the 30's and 40's despite the Versailles treaty's clauses. We could agree with this idea if we assume that Hitler could have still assumed power in a Germany less damaged by a more lenient peace. MacMillan's premise is flawed, and not only that, it's barely covered in this book.

Paris 1919: Six Months That Changed the World

This book is another fine narrative history in same vein as Robert Massey's Dreadnought, and Alistair Horne's The Price of Glory: Verdun 1916. If you have an interest in the Great War and want history to come alive on the page, this book is one for you.

In the introduction Professor MacMillan says; "For six months in 1919, Paris was the capital of the world. The Peace Conference was the world's most important business, the peacemakers its most important people." The six-month session in Paris that took place between January and June1919 and involved representatives of 29 countries drew many of the boundaries of Africa, the Middle East and the Balkans that exist to this day, recreated Poland, set the terms by which the major powers would attempt to live with one another and forged the model for the future United Nations, among many other things.

MacMillan tells the story by getting under the skins of the three primary actors, Woodrow Wilson, David Lloyd George and Georges Clemenceau. She presents them with all their flaws and qualities and does not judge whether they were good men or evil fools as they struggled with a task of monumental difficulty as best they could.

In the end, the author is writing what we may call a revisionist history of the subject. It has long been felt that the Peace Conference was a miserable failure, that narrow national and partisan interests ruled the peacemakers, that the terms offered to Germany were too harsh and contained within them the seeds of the next war. Wilson, George and Clemenceau have been excoriated over the years but Professor MacMillan holds that they have unfairly been made the scapegoats for the mistakes of those who came later. She refutes received ideas about the path from Versailles to World War II and debunks the widely accepted notion that reparations imposed on the Germans were in large part responsible for the Second World War. "Hitler did not wage war because of the Treaty of Versailles," MacMillan writes in her concluding chapter. Even if Germany had retained everything that was taken from it at Versailles, he would have wanted more: "the destruction of Poland, control of Czechoslovakia, above all the conquest of the Soviet Union" as well of course as the annihilation of the Jews.

This is true but it is incomplete. The issue isn't whether Hitler would have been less cruel and bloodthirsty if Versailles had been more equitable, but whether he and his maniacal regime would have come to power at all.

Margaret MacMillan is professor of history at the University of Toronto and the great-granddaughter of David Lloyd George.

I finally finished MacMillan's book yesterday and I'm sad that I've done so. Such an engaging, thoughtful, well-written, and enlightening book is hard to finally close. The subject is the Paris Peace Conference which followed the end of World War I. As I've told a few friends of mine, I've been on a World War I kick for about the last year or so. The Great War, as it was known in the inter-war period, was a cataclysmic event. It marked the end of era in history, and signaled the beginning of the modern and post-modern world not only in global politics, but in Western culture in general. It set the stage for the Second World War, for the Arab-Israeli conflict, for the conflicts in Lebanon and Iraq (Iraq was created in the aftermath of the war). The great empires that had held their world order in place for centuries were either destroyed, in the cases of Austria-Hungary and the Ottomans, or shaken to their cores, as the British and French were. The resulting chaos left the peacemakers, Lloyd George of Great Britain, Clemenceau of France, Woodrow Wilson, and Orlando of Italy with the Herculean task of creating a new Europe, a new Middle East, a new world. It was a task to which perhaps no 4 men in the history of civilization have ever been equal. Given the forces arrayed against them -- the stunning ascent of Bolshevism in Russia, the unexpected collapses of the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires and the rekindling of long suppressed nationalist sentiments among their subject peoples, the tension between China and Japan over territory and favor with the West, and of course, the question of how to deal with a defeated Germany -- the peacemakers cobbled together a peace that most certainly could have been better, but as MacMillan argues, could have been a whole lot worse.

Arguably, Wilson threw a giant wrench into the works by publishing his 14 Points before the Conference began. A visionary plan for a new world order it was, a blueprint for an eventual peace it was not. Wilson's closely held ideal of self-determination -- that subject peoples should decide their political and national future -- was greeted around the world with enthusiasm, optimism, and in some cases, near reverence. The 14 Points gave the world (including Germany) the hope that with peace would come renewed dignity and international cooperation, reconstruction and not revenge. Representatives from all over Europe, Asia, and Africa went to Paris to seek the blessing and aid of the Conference for their particular political struggle. Sadly, those who received attention were mostly those who were of strategic importance (location, natural resources, etc) to the peacemakers or to whom they were particularly sympathetic. Wilson compromised on self-determination in the face of pressure from Britain and France to secure what was necessary to their security and advantage (for Britain - to keep its empire alive; for France: to rebuild its shattered country and make sure that the Germans would never be able to threaten them again).

The war also ushered in a new day in the United States. For, while his internationalist policies were ultimately repudiated in his own country, and in his own right he had neither the political savvy nor the power to bring his ideas to life, Woodrow Wilson conceived the idea of America the World Power, the World Policeman, the World Leader. It was an idea that would not be given birth until after the Second World War, and with which we are still grappling today.

This was a fascinating book and an excellent introduction to the world we live in today. So many questions answered, so many dots connected... MacMillan doesn't write with the plodding style typical of too many historians. She is brisk, engaging and witty.

At the end of World War I, between January and July 1919, many of the world's leaders gathered In Paris to draw up a peace treaty and to plan the formation of a League of Nations. Although hundreds of delegates arrived from nearly every would-be state in Europe and from as far away as Australia, Japan, and Vietnam, most of the important decisions at the Paris Conference were made by Woodrow Wilson, England's Lloyd George, and France's Georges Clemenceau, with Vittorio Orlando of Italy playing a secondary role.

In spite of (or, perhaps, because of) Wilson's uncompromising idealism, Lloyd George's lack of confidence, and Clemenceau's fears of German reemergence, the Conference assembled a treaty that "grappled with huge and difficult questions," and, MacMillan argues, "if they could have done better, they certainly could have done much worse." One thing is clear, however: regardless of their rightness or wrongness, expertise or incompetence, the peacemakers made decisions that resonated for the rest of the century and still echo in the 21st century: between Serbia and Croatia; among Turkey, Greece, and Cyprus; throughout the Middle East (especially Iraq and Palestine); across the African continent; and in the Korean peninsula. Because of the importance of the Treaty of Versailles on subsequent events, "Paris 1919" is essential--and riveting--reading for understanding the world today.

At times, the conference proceedings display all the gravity of a game of Risk. The major participants repeatedly exhibit an appalling ignorance of geography, an artlessness in dealing with non-European powers, and (for all their talk of self-determination) a callousness towards territorial viability. During one of the Conference's nadirs, when the future of Asia Minor was thrashed out, Arthur Balfour exclaimed in disgust: "I have three all-powerful, all-ignorant men sitting there and partitioning continents with only a child to take notes for them." MacMillan acknowledges that the "offhand treatment of the non-European world" caused serious problems that we are still paying for today. And, among many other examples, she indicates how actions taken at the Peace Conference led to the horrifying destruction of Smyrna three years later.

By the end of such a fascinating narrative, one that almost insistently seems to portray the superpower leaders as unsophisticatedly idealistic and patronizingly egocentric, it is still startling for the reader to come across this argument: "The Treaty of Versailles is not to blame" for World War II and the subsequent rise of Germany.

True, MacMillan makes a strong and convincing case (as have other historians before her) that German reparations were not as injurious as many have claimed. She further argues that the real problem was not the treaty itself but that it "was never consistently enforced." But this begs the question: what good is a treaty that, as she repeatedly indicates, never had a chance of enforcement?

I think what MacMillan truly means here is simpler: given the mess that was Europe in 1919, it's probable that no treaty would have prevented the rise of Hitler and the Second World War. She never quite says this, but she comes close when she defines what was surely the Conference's most insurmountable problem: "The Allied victory had not been decisive enough and Germany remained too strong." To blame the treaty, then, is to ignore both German strength at the end of World War I and "the actions of everyone--political leaders, diplomats, soldiers, ordinary voters--for twenty years between 1919 and 1939."

But she is mistaken, I think, to insist so absolutely that World War II "was a result of twenty years of decisions taken or not taken, not of arrangements made in 1919." Her own evidence (not to mention the arguments and predictions she cites by Keynes, Balfour, Foch, and others who were dissatisfied with the treaty in 1919) proves it must be seen as a mixture of what happened (or didn't happen) before, during, and after the Peace Conference. The Treaty may not have "caused" World War II, but it's difficult to see how it helped prevent it.

Fortunately for the reader, however, it matters little whether or not you agree entirely with the categorical nature of her underlying thesis. "Paris 1919" is the type of "big picture" narrative history that is both enlightening and engrossing, and it must be regarded as the now-definitive work about the Treaty of Versailles.

Six months that changed the world, indeed. It is not often these days that a subtitle for a work of history that claims so much (and they often do) is actually accurate. Margaret Macmillan, in Paris 1919, backs up her subtitle completely in this brilliant work of history. The book examines the Paris Peace Conference in all its glory and all its infamy. Four, and sometime only three, men sat in a room and decided the future of the countries of the world and the fate of millions of people. It is both that simple and, equally, that complicated. This book brilliantly portrays these men but also, with just as much genius, many of the lesser officials who attended on behalf of either themselves or their (sometimes prospective) nations. So many sources are used, from either official documents to private letters, from so many countries that the book feels all-encompassing which is appropriate considering its vast topic, even, god bless the author, the little colony of Newfoundland finds space for a mention. This book will be the one to challenge in this new century concerning the peace conference as Keynes' was the one last century. A very impressive work and highly recommended.

This book has so many things going for it. Outside of giving a detailed account of the Paris Peace Conference in the summer of 1919, I learned a great deal about the history of a number of European countries, their relevance toward the war and the Peace Conference (raise your hand if you knew that Armenia had something to do with World War I), as well as many of the key players' personalities and conflicts that they had to reconcile not only within themselves, but for their countries.

I was really taken aback by how many of the decisions by the Paris Peace Conference (ie. "The Big Three," after Japan and Italy were more or less muscled out, of the United States, Great Britain, and France) still resonate today. For example, the decision to move Israelis to Palestine (where there was supposedly, "more land than the Arabs could populate.") and how one diplomat characterized the move as a "great experiment." It is really incredible to think of the power the three heads of each country (Wilson, Lloyd George, and Clemenceau) had, not to mention the delicate and potentially dangerous risks they had to balance.

Macmillan does a wonderul job of making potentially dull material interesting. She writes of how the French, eager to bury the Germans no matter what the cost, made sure that the Germans' train ride to Paris (through the heart of Europe and her WWI battlefields and shattered towns) was ridiculously slow in order to allow the Germans to see what "they" had done to Europe. In addition, the French made sure the Germans' signing of the Treaty of Versailles was indeed a most humiliating experience.

An additional incentive to read this book is that I honestly learned more about the actual battles and goings on of World War I through this book than many other dryly written books on the war itself (see John Keegan's "The First World War"). We learn of many independent treaties signed between European countries prior to the war that not only played a part during choosing war alliances, but also in deciding what land should go to who and why after the war was over.

There were two main problems among many other minor ones that weighed on "the Big Three": because Germany was never really "defeated" in World War I (they signed an armistice on November 11, 1918), what was the proper punishment? Should the Allied forces militarily go into Germany and bury the country to the point where they couldn't become a future threat, or should they impose incredibly harsh "peace" sanctions on Germany regarding war reparations, loss of land, and a significant loss of munitions. Obviously, The Big Three opted for the latter. The other problem The Big Three had was that it was hard to draw nation-state boundaries when natives, nationalities, and religions were so spread out throughout Europe. As a result, major European countries (Germany, for example) were forced to deal with minorities that could not be geographically placed, and the result often lead to anti-semitism, extreme nationalism, and death or oppression for many.

The only difference I had with the book was in its conclusion. Macmillan's purpose is to show that the results and the mismanagement of the Peace Conference could not have led to World War II as some historians have claimed. To take on that thinking, Macmillan writes, would be to disregard every move from a diplomat, politician, ambassador, etc. etc. from 1919 to 1939. And while I agree with this assertion, I cannot agree entirely with her claim that had Germany been appeased by "The Big Three" and some of the more harsh penalties not been imposed on the Germans (such as war reparations), that Hitler still would have come to power and carried out his ideas for Germany. From all that I have learned about post-WWI Germany, Hitler's coming to power was a direct result of anger on behalf of the German people due to the harsh "peace" sanctions of the Treaty of Versailles. If you take away essentially what the Treaty of Versailles was attempting to do through its peace sanctions- if you appease Germany - I am led to believe that the German people would have been less inclined to provide a young, angry Adolf Hitler the political platform to stand on. The German people believed the Treaty to be incredibly unfair- and maybe it was - but if you take out the heart of what it was trying to do then, in my opinion, you take out the heart of Hitler's argument (and propaganda) he presented to the German people. Just an opinion.....

A very well-written book whose subject, though nearly eighty-five years behind us, still holds shocking relevance today. While reading this book I often thought of the circumstances some historical figures are put in and the incredible ramifications of how one (or in this case, three) man's decisions can effect millions. I also thought of how different the Conference (indeed, the world) might look today had Teddy Roosevelt represented the United States instead of Woodrow Wilson.

An interesting side-note that you may overlook (located in her bio) is that Macmillan is the great-grand daughter of Great Britain's Lloyd George.