Customer Reviews

Partners in Command: George Marshall and Dwight Eisenhower in War and Peace

5 star:		(14)
4 star:		(8)
3 star:		(2)
2 star:		(2)
1 star:		(1)

 

 

Partners in Command fits into the somewhat recent trend in history books of focusing in on an historical specific - a battle, a speech, a pivotal month or as in this case, the relationship between two men, George Marshall and Dwight Eisenhower, during a pivotal time in history - and filling in a narrative - with anecdotes, flashbacks, etc - around it. (I don't view this as an inherently bad thing - different readers have different interests). First the good news, in this reader's humble opinion any continued investigation or chronicle of the challenges these two men faced either together or separately and their successes, (and failures), in meeting them is valuable. For whatever reason George Marshall is not only underappreciated today, he seems to have been forgotten. And in hindsight it's very difficult to imagine anyone else on either side of the Atlantic assuming the role Eisenhower did as capably as he did. (This is something FDR intuitively understood.) This book does a very good job in detailing the difficulties faced and the decisions made by these two generals during WWII, often while they were thousands of miles apart with few face to face meetings and under extreme pressure to win the war in Europe.

Which brings me to the down side - the author may have bit off more than he could chew in a book of this type, and it might have been a better idea to conclude with the success of D-Day. (Although selling a publisher at this time on "yet another" D-Day book is probably a difficult task.) Many important topics - build-up of the pre-WWII US military into a fighting force, NATO, the Cold War, the Marshall Plan & post WWII Europe - and individuals - Churchill, FDR, Truman among others - are given, at best, cursory treatment. (The post WWII "peace" part of this book is minimal.) This is understandable in keeping the book to a "readable" length but comes up short of its billing (War & Peace). There are also some unforgivable errors in this book with two whoppers contained within the first 20 pages - the dates of the Battle of Stalingrad and Germany's declaration of war on the US. Hard to comprehend how these slipped through any editing process.

If you are looking for a starting point in understanding these two men and the US High Command/military management of the European theater in WWII, you've found it. This book is entertaining and very readable. If you are familiar with this period of history and the players, there is really nothing new here.

"Partners in Command" is the story of the two most important American military commanders of World War II - George Marshall and Dwight D. Eisenhower.

It was Marshall, the powerful Chief of Staff of the United States military, that groomed Eisenhower for his role as the American Army's senior leader in Europe in World War II. And it was Eisenhower who devised the global strategy the United States would follow throughout the war. That strategy focused on defeating Germany first.

Marshall and Eisenhower agreed early in the war that, once committed to fighting, the United States should fight as part of a grand coalition and avoid, to the greatest extent possible, peripheral operations to focus on striking the German heartland as soon as possible.

"Partners in Command" is the brilliantly told story of two men and their seminal contribution in directing America's military machine in the defeat of Nazi Germany. Their path was not an easy one. Marshall, who detested the British, frequently had his strategic aims dislocated by Prime Minister Winston Churchill, while Eisenhower was responsible for keeping the Allied coalition working together effectively toward a single aim.

In the end, however, both Marshall and Eisenhower succeeded in directing the Allied war effort toward an invasion of France in 1944, despite attempts by Churchill and the British to focus the Allied main effort in Italy and the Balkans.

Author Mark Perry dispels a number of myths about Americans at war throughout this book. He discusses, for example, the huge numbers of deserters in Europe by the end of the war and the concern they caused Eisenhower, contradicting George Patton's claim that Americans love war.

This is American military history at its very best!

On page 14 of this ambitious dual biography, Mark Perry writes ". . . the Red Army was fighting for its life amid the ruins of Stalingrad." Unfortunately the passage is referring to mid-December 1941. The Battle of Stalingrad started on August 21, 1942, some nine months later. This kind of error is lamentable. It indicates sloppy or worse research by the author and poor fact-checking by the editor(s). It's a red-flag for the reader, of course: how many other errors are lurking in the remaining 385 pages or so?

Happily not many. But the book is a bit of a slog and slow reading.

Most of the details will be familiar to any student of WWII. Some of Perry's comments are grating in a way that I can't quite put a name to, such as "Eisenhower was pleased and extolled Patton's successes, though he knew that sooner or later, his best tank commander's profane personality would lead to problems." There is no footnorte, no source for this and it strikes me as gratuitous.

I'm not sure either that Perry really adds anything to our knowledge of the relationship between Eisenhower and Marshall. All the way through, I had a feeling of "been there, done that".

On the whole, not a bad book, but not one that I found compellingly interesting. A better choice, I think, is 15 Stars: Eisenhower, MacArthur, Marshall: Three Generals Who Saved the American Century which is even more expansive in its subject matter, covering Eisenhower, Marshall and MacArthur. I must add a caveat: I have been a student of WWII for decades. The newcomer to the study of this conflict may indeed find much more of value in this volume than I.

Jerry

This is well written and readable, but is based primarily on secondary sources and presents no new information. Anybody at all familiar with Eisenhower and Marshall will instantly recognize the basic facts presented in this book. If you already know the story, don't spend too much time with this book, because it really doesn't have anything to add.

Even more disappointing, Perry does not present any new interpretations of the familiar facts - he largely recycles the interpretations found elsewhere. He uncritically accepts the rather stale and naive notion that the innocent Americans, who were only interested in winning the war, were constantly swindled by the conniving British, who wanted to use American power in the service of their devious schemes. Perry pours scorn on British generals like Brooke and Montgomery, yet never comes to terms with the fact that at certain critical junctures, Brooke was right and Marshall was wrong. For example, a Second Front in 1942, which Marshall and Eisenhower urgently agitated for but which Brooke prevented, would have been a complete disaster. Perry is in general uncritical of Marshall and Eisenhower, even when criticism is deserved, and one is not certain that Perry understands the campaign in Europe well enough to venture such criticism.

The weakest part of the book is the period after 1945, which is covered in a mere 30 pages. Perry doesn't have much to say about Marshall's role in the early Cold War and the construction of containment, and I feel sure that there was more to the postwar Eisenhower-Marshall relationship than Perry admits.

This book shows the strength of the Marshall/Eisenhower relationship, and in particular how that relationship contributed to success in WWII ETO. It also highlights their shared values. (Both individuals owed a lot to Fox Conner, one of the must under-appreciated people in US Military History.)

A previous reviewer recommended "15 Stars" 15 Stars: Eisenhower, MacArthur, Marshall: Three Generals Who Saved the American Century over this book. I completely disagree. I disliked "15 Stars" is mostly anecdotes/gossip, that fails to show the impact of the relationships. "Partners in Command" succeeds for that very reason.

One thing to keep in mind as you read either "Partners in Command" or "15 Stars" is to compare the Marshall/Ike relationship (including Marshall's interactions with Henry Stimpson and FDR) to our two most recent examples of senior leadership in the Gulf wars (Desert Storm and our current efforts...)

Strongly recommended, one of the best books I've read in a long time (and I have several shelves of stuff on Ike and Marshall.)

dave

The minute I saw this book I knew I had to read it. Not only am I satisified with the additional perspective it has given me on Eisenhower and Marshall, I am stunned and appreciative at the expanded perspective it has provided on Americans and democracies at war.

The author Mark Perry weighs in early introducing a third historical personsage, Fox Conner, who, characterized as a mentor of both Dwight Eisenhower and George Marshall, told them: "Never fight unless you have to, never fight alone, and never fight for long." In the latter half of the book Perry adds, Conner knew that Americans didn't like war and weren't good at it. The aphorisms were to teach Eisenhower and Marshall how to WIN a war, given the temperament of Americans. What a turnaround on traditional perspectives, and what a thought-provoking prescience, looking now at Vietnam and Iraq in recent history!

The theme of the book is the long-term successful partnership of Eisenhower the "people-person diplomat soldier", and Marshall the "people-chooser and organizer of victory". Both had decades of experience before being called to their wartime posts. War with Germany and Japan were predictable since Versailles, and both spent their early careers, in hindsight, preparing for the new kind of organization required in modern global warring of allies. Both continued with major roles AFter WWII, including Secretary of State and the Marshall Plan for Marshall, and NATO and the US Presidency for Eisenhower.

Much is reported on the British manipulations of American participation by Churchill, Brooke, and Montgomery. The Brits were accurate: Americans were green and unblooded at the start of the war. Short satisfaction for them: They were also accurate America would take over the running of the war, brunting the majority of manpower and materials. Yet.. Yet.. Marshall and Eisenhower KNEW America alone could never win the war and needed Great Britain. That is where the new discipline of "soldier diplomat" came in.

This book is a most satisfying piece of history telling that covers the time of WWII and places it in context from the Civil War and War of Independence to present day. If you've seen the movie Patton you've seen only one colourful character of those times. This book tells the stories of the most colourful characters of all, the ones who diplomated and organized democracies not so good at war to victory.

Many times "dual biographies" of contempories do not work, primarily because the personalities selected are not even from the same continent, much less the same country or even the same field of endeavor.

"Partners in Command" by Mark Perry works because it takes a close look at how the colloboration of America's first and third 5-star generals, George C. Marshall (elevated to this rank 12-16-44) and Dwight D. Eisenhower (elevated 12-20-44)[in between was Douglas MacArthur, elevated 12-18-44], worked together: first to forge victory in the European theatre in World War II and then, after the war, to help create the Western alliance that thwarted the juggernaut of Soviet power that came about as consequence of Germany's defeat.

Interestingly, although both men were career officers with over 20 years of service each neither man had ever met the other until after Japan attacked Pearl Harbor. Their meeting came about because at the time of Pearl Harbor Marshall was head of the Army's War Plans Division and friends recommended Eisenhower to Marshall as a capable and competent leader. Eisenhower, though, whose career had long been kept on hold (including a long tenure as MacArthur's chief of staff -- the bombastic, and jealous, MacArthur later derisively referred to Eisenhower as his best clerk ever) did not want another staff position and hoped for an assignment where he could command combat troops.

Both men,however, had a common mentor in U.S. Army Major General Fox Connor, a little known (at least to the general public) strategist who was regarded in military circles as one of the Army's most brillant thinkers. Marshall worked under him in World War I when Connor was operations officer under U.S. General John J. Pershing, who headed America's Expeditionary Forces. Later, in the 1920s, Eisenhower was Connor's executive officer in Panama. (Eisenhower later called Connor the outstanding soldier of his era.) Connor taught both Marshall and Eisenhower about the necessity, and vicissitudes, of multinational alliances to achieve victory in any war that crossed multiple boundaries, like the First World War. Connor ingrained in both of them the maxim: "Never fight unless you have to, never fight alone, and never fight for long."

"Partners in Command" is the story of how these two soldiers (whom many consider to be the two best overall leaders in the U.S. Army in World War II, see e.g., "15 Stars" by Stanley Weintraub) implemented Connor's mentoring to help achieve America's success in World War II and therafter.

Although the author tells this story quite ably, there are what appear to be some glaring mistakes:

First, the author repeatedly refers to Marshall and Eisenhower as the best American military duo since Robert E. Lee and "Stonewall" Jackson, however, Jackson, who died in 1863 (from pneumonia after being shot three times by his own men and having an arm amputated), was only involved in localized engagements, not the sweeping, multinational conflicts Eisenhower directed. (On another level this analogy also fails because in actuality Lee and Jackson were fighting against the U.S., not for it, and, at least from their perspective, were no longer Americans but Confederates.)

Second, the author attributes an almost "flawless" D-Day plan, Operation Overlord, to British Field Marshal Mongomery but this plan is actually considered by most historians to be a joint effort and no one but hagiographers of Montgomery refer to it as his plan, much less a "flawless" one (e.g., the 1,000 or more men believed to have been killed by a single German machinegunner who became known as the Beast of Omaha after firing 12,000 rounds at American soldiers as they landed on the beach, which came about due to inadequate shelling of the beaches beforehand). Moreover, this assertion is particularly questionable given how much time the author spends portraying the British-U.S. alliance as one of constant friction and give and take such that under leaders less able than Marshall (who provided calmness and common sense) and Eisenhower (who added diplomacy and tact) the alliance may have foundered.

Another flaw is that the book fails to provide sufficient attribution to Marshall's work in theatres other than Europe (i.e., the Pacific and, especially, dealing with MacArthur) that obviously contributed to winning the Second World War.

These drawbacks aside, the book is a very well told explanation of how America's top two soldiers worked together to achieve victory in Europe in World War II.

Can't imagine how anyone gave this book five stars. Are they friends of the author? Did they actually read the book?

I must respectfully disagree with another reviewer who gave two stars, who called the book well-written. At first I would have agreed -- there's a smooth narrative flow -- but this impression was overwhelmed by what can only be described as hack writing. Perry repeats point after point, turning sentences into paragraphs or even sections. How many times do we need to be told that Eisenhower was Marshall's alter-ego? How many times does it need to be explained that Anvil was meant to protect Overlord's (sometimes right, sometimes southern) flank? How many times do we need to be told that Montgomery was vain, arrogant, etc. etc.? How many times do we need the ESP that Marshall/Eisenhower could hardly contain his anger over this or that?

The redundancy gets ridiculous, as in this whopper: "Marshall decided...to speak at the Academy of Political Sciences, an association of political science thinkers, teachers and theorists...." There's also the tiresome repetition of names as if newly introduced -- "Winston Churchill" in successive sentences -- or the repetition of full titles for familiar names, like "Field Marshall Sir Bernard Law Montgomery," when a simple "Montgomery" will suffice.

Perry gratuitously uses nicknames, calling the U.S. navy chief, "Ernie" King, or Eisenhower's deputy Bedell Smith, "Beetle," which is like calling MacArthur, "Doug". Eisenhower's nickname "Ike" was such a popular and useful abbreviation that its use is excusable, but even here Perry manages to overdo it in order to form clumsy passages like, "Accompanying Eisenhower was Ike's new friend Hap Arnold...."

And then, there are the factual errors which have already been mentioned by others. To these I should add that midst all the padding (which I estimate inflates the book by 30%), Perry makes no mention of the Dieppe Raid, one of the most notorious and disastrous fiascos of World War II, which Eisenhower and Marshall certainly were involved with and whose aftermath they certainly responded to. Did Perry just forget about Dieppe? The errors of commission and omission further reinforce my impression that the author is more hack than historian.

The story of the Eisenhower-Marshall collaboration certainly deserves at least a long essay and, with some kind of editing, even a short book. But this glaringly padded cut-and-paste job makes it easy to conclude that between manuscript and book there was little more than a spell check.

Unfortunately, the absence of editing is becoming the rule rather than the exception in today's publishing. So-called "editors" are nothing more than flacks. I have no idea what the purpose of the editor assigned to this book was. But obviously it was not that of editing. I give two stars only because of the interesting subject and because Perry makes some interesting character studies, which are endlessly milked.

Mark Perry, an experienced author ("Grant and Twain" etc), has written an infomative and very readable double biography of two human and great men. All of us that have an interest in the history of WWII and the period immediately afterward, have read, perhaps a fair amount, about Marshall and Eisenhower. Perry follows the normal historical outline of the period, however the book is unique in its depth about the human side of the two men and the relationship between them. In approximately 400 pages of narrative there is insufficient room to go into a biography of each man in depth; this is not attempted. The book begins with quick discussions of Marshall and Eisenhower's education, training and military service prior to WWII and then proceeds to the War years with modest coverage of the years afterward. The War years were a heroic and profound period, and Perry treats it accordingly. If there are any surprises in the book, it is the author's discussion of the level of contention and disagreement between Marshall and Eisenhower on the one side and various members of British war leadership on the other.

This book is a good job. It meets my tests for a good piece of non-fiction: interesting, well researched, and readable. I only have one complaint. The proof reading was marginally poor, e.g."The Citadel Military Academy",is mistakenly used for "The Citadel". The book, however, is a five star piece of work.

Positive, revealing and sympathetic to the trials of working with a coalition within a politically charged time. Less negative than the recent "15 Stars". Takes a far less biased interpretation of Eisenhower's and Marshall's personal papers. "15 Stars" is too much biased in favor of the British command staff and war cabinet. A story of a professional relationship between Marshall's astute political savvy and blunt defense of the American military, and Eisenhower's balancing act between the leaders of the allied command and his own generals who were very different in their view of conducting a war. Marshall became a good cabinet member for Truman and Eisenhower was elected president with the trust of the American people.