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The Past as Prologue: The Importance of History to the Military Profession

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The editors of this book have put together an outstanding series of essays derived from a conference at the Royal Military College, Sandhurst, and later presented at the Marine Corps University, Quantico. The book's theme is stated in the subtitle; "The Importance of History to the Military Profession;" its view point is that the study of military history is critical for the military. There are two introductory chapters. The first, by Editor Williamson Murray, argues that only by studying military history can a soldier begin to understand war. Not that there aren't pitfalls and, "for history to be of any use, its very complexities demand skeptical inquiry rather than reliance on a smattering of inevitably oversimplified historical anecdotes." The second chapter, by eminent military historian Sir Michael Howard, argues that only military history can provide contextual understanding for many more conventional historians in explaining many issues, such as the impact of World War's I and II on society.

The rest of the book is divided into two sections; the first focuses on the relationship of military history to the military profession, and the second looks at historical cases that illustrate recurring military problems. The essays rely on academics and on military officers both of whom provide insight into history's role in understanding war. The authors include many familiar names such as LTG (R) Paul Van Riper, USMC, MG (R) Jonathan Bailey, British Army, John Gooch, Colin S. Gray, and the two editors themselves.

If you believe military history allows a better understanding of war, or if you just enjoy military history, this book will give you insight into the positive aspects of the field and its pitfalls - and there are many. At the same time, if you tend to believe today's problems are unique, read the book so that you can find the true path.

American strategic thought is cyclic. Ever since the end of the Civil War the study of military history has fallen in and out of style, even within U.S. Military War Colleges and Command and Staff Colleges. During the 1960s, the organizational and business accounting theories of Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and his "whiz kid" advisors stated that war could be reduced to number crunching and statistical analysis. As a result military history suffered. By the 1980s, military history was reborn with the wide acceptance of the writing of Carl von Clausewitz. The application of his theories played a major part in the complete rebuilding of American military operational art and the success of Operation Desert Storm. By the mid-1990s, the tide began to shift. "New" theorists began to opine on the wonders of "network-centric" warfare and "effects-based operations". Once again the study of history was replaced by computer networks and mathematical formulas.

"The Past as Prologue" is a brilliant defense of the need for military officers and policymakers to continue to vigorous and constant study of military history and resist attempts to reduce warfare to scientific analysis. The book is a collection of essays from some of the top military theorists and historians of our time. The famous historian Michael Howard's essay on the role of military history in warfare is worth the price of the book alone. LtGen Paul Van Riper's essay demonstrates that military history is not for other academics, but was a critical element in his success as a battlefield commander. His respect for the topic lead him to be a major force in the rebirth of professional military education within the United States Marine Corps.

The essays on Thucydides and Clausewitz clearly show their continued relevance in today's post 9/11 world. The second half of the book is a collection of essays that demonstrate how ignoring the lessons of history led to eventual battlefield defeat. While excellent, essays they did seem to drift a bit away from the central themes of the book and often got bogged down in detail.

The first 2/3 of the book were outstanding and should be required reading during the first week of all major defense colleges and universities, not to mention the need for policy makers to take the time to delve into these critical topics.

This book is an intriguing collection of essays from American and British civilian and military thinkers on the importance of history to the military profession. Included among this book's essays are thoughtful examinations of the relationship between military history and the history of war, British and American Marine views on he relevance of history to serving military professionals, the sometimes awkward relationship between history and the military education, the role of Thucydides as an educator, a subtle and excellent examination of Clausewitz's views on history and the future strategic world, as well s some intriguing case studies on the Victorian Royal Navy, the Russo-Japanese War, the British army's readiness between WWI and WWII, and terrorism. The closing essay of the book, a frightening examination of the gaps between history and the future of civil-military relations, gives plenty of food for thought in this well-thought out and relevant work.

We all think that our times are unique. And little makes this as clear as the opening few pages of this book.

After getting rid of the leader of a country, there were difficult challenges in getting a new regime in power -- Panama after Noriega.

There were great difficulties in learning to recognize and deal with an insurgency -- Vietnam.

Couldn't these have taught us something about going into Iraq?

After World War I, the Germans looked for new methods to prevent a repetition of the deadlock of the trenches. The French looked at the trenches of World War I and decided to build the untimate trenches, the Maginot Line.

No senior German leader expressed any doubt about the invasion of Russia until the days began to lengthen, then they looked as some of the memoirs of Napoleon.

This is not to say that learning from history is easy. Douhet learned from World War I that the 'bomber would always get through.' This exactly fit what the bomber boys of the RAF and the US Army Air Corp wanted to hear. And a lot of young men died in the skies over Germany.

This book is a series of historical articles from a wide range of thinkers of and about history. It presents a clear analysis of why history is so important if we are not to keep repeating ourselves.

This volume of essays edited by scholars Williamson Murray and Richard Sinnreich provides an excellent review of why and how military history in particular, and history in general, adds value to the professional development of those interested in or working in military and security issues. Covering general topics as well as specific campaigns the study of which would add greatly developing professionals, this volume covers all bases with regard to military history.