The Path to Blitzkrieg: Doctrine and Training in the German Army, 1920-1939 [Hardcover]

Robert M. Citino (Author)

Product Details

• Hardcover: 281 pages
• Publisher: Lynne Rienner Pub (April 1999)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 1555877141
• ISBN-13: 978-1555877149
• Product Dimensions: 9.1 x 6.2 x 0.9 inches
• Shipping Weight: 1.3 pounds
• Average Customer Review: 5.0 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (1 customer review)
• Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #2,955,592 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)

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5 of 5 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars Specialist Book -- But Informative, July 20, 2008

By 

David M. Dougherty (Arkansas) - See all my reviews
(VINE VOICE)   

This review is from: The Path to Blitzkrieg: Doctrine and Training in the German Army, 1920-1939 (Hardcover)

This is a book that is not recommended for the average reader, but is highly informative concerning the evolution of German Army tactics particularly from 1924 through 1936. During that time the Reichswehr and its successor the Wehrmacht discarded the losing trench warfare doctrine of WWI and developed a mobile "Bewegungs" doctrine for both offense and defense.

Equally important with the tactical doctrine was the development of a reliance on company grade officers, highly trained and able to make decisions in fluid situations -- exactly the opposite of that being developed in other European armies at the time (& in the US.)

Using dummy tanks, bicycles and trucks, the maneuvers during this period proved the demise of the cavalry and the necessity of being motorized. Tanks were already in production before Hitler came into power, and although he espoused the use of tanks, the panzer divisions were not his creation. Unfortunately for the US, American observers of these maneuvers dutifully reported on them and their meaning, but this information was not acted upon until after WWII when the US Army adopted German tactics and leadership training methods on a wholesale basis, and then primarily because it had been demonstrated so vividly that American small unit tactics and officer training had been so deficient during the war.

The book is a sleep-inducer when concentrating on the details of the maneuvers, but nonetheless very instructive. Early in the Weimar Republic the maneuver designers assumed a situation of Polish aggression against East Prussia and the eastern provinces, then later Czech aggression northwards, and finally French aggression eastwards in support of Poland or Czechoslovakia. This may seem unrealistic to Americans today, but at the time Germany was limited to a 100,000 man army, Poland had successfully defeated Soviet Russia in the early 20s, and Czechoslovakia was anything but friendly. During the Weimar Republic, German military leaders were faced with the near-hopeless situation of being surrounded by unfriendly powers and at their mercy with a League of Nations that was unable to stop aggressive action by anyone. New tactics and strong leadership were Germany's only hopes. Strong leadership was emphasized as far down as the assistant squad leader under the principle of "Nach mir" (After Me -- which became "Follow Me" later in the US Infantry.) Leading from the front was expected -- with the result that more German generals died in WWII than the generals in all other armies combined (for example, only one American division commander was killed - Maurice Rose in 1945.) Even the Foreign Ministry was brought into observe and help design realistic situations by offering comments -- something that is yet to occur in the United States.

There are many lessons to be learned in this book that apply today. Hopefully those who should read it, will, but as Napoleon supposedly said about Jomini's book, "The old generals who command against me will never read it, and the young men who will read it do not command." (Dupuy & Dupuy, "Military Heritage of America, pp 178.) The lessons were there for all to observe and understand, but the Western Democracies failed to learn and paid the price later in defeats and high casualties. Only the Soviet Union took the German lessons to heart. Unfortunately, it goes without saying that if professional military personnel can't learn and adjust, politicians and media propagandists will have absolutely no clue and be worse than counter-productive.