Customer Reviews

The Path to Victory: America's Army and the Revolution in Human Affairs

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Donald Vandergriff is one of those rare men who live their beliefs. Now, he has written a fine, clear-thinking, heartfelt book detailing the deep flaws in the Army's (and our military's) personnel system. But the book is much broader than that. Although he does not use quite these terms, the text constitutes a demand for a sensible post-modern personnel system that rewards the core military virtues, in place of our current, long-outdated, poorly-performing industrial-age system, a legacy of both Henry Ford's assembly line mentality, in which all parts, even the human ones, are interchangeable, and a bizarre, inchoate conviction within the Army that, really, it's still 1944 and the draft will supply the needed talent to replace that which is squandered. Even now, in 2002, there is a bizarre belief among the Army's hierarchy that every officer (and soldier) is easily replaceable, if not perfectly interchangeable. Well, tell that to corporate America, or the scientific community, or to the arts community. America has achieved its paramount position because we recognize and reward the unique talents of the individual--but our military resists excellence whenever it can (what passes for excellence is a polished conformity to superficial forms). Our broken-down, morally-bankrupt personnel system may be well-suited for the ten-million-man military with which we ended WWII, but it is a travesty when it comes to developing the right Army for the 21st century. Critics may respond that the military is not about individual excellence, but about teamwork--but teamwork based upon excellence is far more impressive than group-think and timid acquiescence based upon lowest-common-denominator professional values. There is not inherent tension between building a team and rewarding talent honestly employed; on the contrary, men and women crave leaders who earn their respect through performance, rather than through currying favor (or simply being born a general's son, the surest path there is to a general's stars). At the very least, we should recognize that a post-modern military does have some different demands placed upon it--a greater requirement for individual initiative and battlefield autonomy--than did our earlier armies of massed infantry divisions. We still need courage and clarity, but the recognition and exploitation of the unique worth of the individual officer may be our greatest potential combat multiplier.
Of course, it is easy to be too pessimistic. We still have the finest Army--and military--in the world. Not all dissent is suppressed, fine ideas, such as Major Vandergriff's, still emerge, despite institutional resistance (more a matter of defensiveness and mental sloth than of maliciousness), and not every officer promoted is a shallow careerist (indeed, in some military specialties the trends are encouraging). In the end, it is not that we are doing so badly, but that we could do far better. For all our might and virtues, our personnel system remains less than the sum of its often remarkable parts. Major Vandergriff has laid out a worthy road map for building the Army of the future, instead of clinging to the Army of the past. We may not wish to drive down every lane he recommends, but he certainly has signposted the main highway with accuracy and clarity.
In my own military career, I slowly came to the realization that, if I could control the personnel system, I could change any organization, but that if I controlled everything but the personnel system, all meaningful change could still by stymied by the bureaucracy (and our military is, above all, a vast bureaucracy). Donald Vandergriff understands this profoundly. This is a worthy, even heroic book by an officer genuinely dedicated to selfless service. We Americans should be proud that such men remain committed to serving our country in uniform.
I strongly recommend this book to military men and women, but also to policy-makers and to the business community, for which it has especially relevant lessons in these days of Worldcom, Enron and Put-on.
This is the work of an officer with whom any soldier would be honored to serve.

This work is a tour de force, perhaps best shown by Secretary of the Army Tom White's enthusiastic adoption of its ideas. Vandergriff ably identifies the Army's longest-lasting and most serious systemic problem -- human resources mismanagement as it affects training, deployment, cohesion, and effectiveness in battle. Based on extremely extensive research (meticulously documented), he ably describes the evolution of the problem and presents the promised "path to victory."

Despite the effectiveness and timeliness of this book, it does have a couple of significant (and related) weaknesses. First, despite the meticulous endnoting, it is difficult to sort out which ideas are Vandergriff's own and which derive from his multitude of sources. The sorting can be done, but, if done thoroughly, would require the reader actually to construct an "idea matrix" from the endnotes as he goes along.

Second, this is a work with 796 (!) endnotes -- but with no bibliography at all. All in all, Presidio Press has made the book quite difficult -- unnecessarily difficult -- to use as a reference. This does detract somewhat from its value as a synthesis of ideas and guide for follow-on work. Fortunately, these weaknesses detract very little from the overall message.

Highly recommended. (But if there's a second edition, could we please have a good solid bibliography?)

While I have a great many disagreements with the author over the specifics of how the personnel management system of the army should be rebuilt, I still recommend this book highly. I have been greatly concerned with the lack of professional developement and professionalism in the US army officer corps ever since I joined the Army in early 1997. This book goes far inexpleining th situation, and then proposes some radical solutions.

The first part of the book, detailing how the army developed its current unprofessional officer corps is insightful and useful, if a tad repetitive. Anyone who wants to understand how the current system developed needs look no further.

Vandergriff's subsequent arguments about fixing it are where I disagree. They are based around building a far more effective "heavy" army designed to defeat other armies in high intensity conflict. For the most part he does an excellent job of this, but he falls into the normal Army trap of assuming that the high-intensity portion of war needs to be the primary focus of the Active Componant (AC), and that the Guard (NG) and Reserve (AR) can carry the burden of the "constabulatory" and peacekeeping missions. Unfortunately, the modern threat environment is composed of mostly low-intensity and transitional intensity conflict potential (a major land war against China is unlikely, and all the other scenarios seem even less plausable).

Additionally, Vandergriff makes the normal Armor officer mistake of trying to keep the heavy forces in the AC and making the NG and AR "light". This has three flaws:
1) it results in the AR and NG bearing the brunt of deployments, since most call for light or medium (at most) forces.
2) More importantly, it fails to take into account the fact that light forces are almost impossible to maintain at high levels of readiness in the NG and AR. The type of continual day-in and day-out training that only the AC can carry out is precisely what makes light forces viable. Tankers and Mech on the other hand can maintain their skills better in an AC and NG environment than lighter forces.
3) It fails to take into account that any future conflict that requires a large amount of heavy forces will have to involve a large buildup period a la Desert Storm. That build-up time can be used to refresh the training of AR and NG units. Deployement s for light and medium forces are far mor likely to be "be there tomorrow" missions, requiring troops that are ready yesterday, not next month.

I still highly recommend this book despite my differences with it. It is refreshing enough to see a US Army officer exmine how the existing officer corps got into its present prediciment, and then propose some radical solutions. It is only through academic debate by military professionals that the problems will be fixed, and this book is a big step in the right direction.

Don Vandergriff has written the next cult management classic. In the guise of how to transform the Army-... - MAJ Vandergriff displays the results of eighteen years of thinking about, researching, practicing, and writing about how to get groups of ordinary people to perform extraordinary feats in times of crisis and confusion. ...P>"Why did the army leadership," he asked himself as he began to write this book, "preach terms like selfless service', `decentralization,' and `trust,' but practice careerism, selfish service, and centralized control?" Who among us has not sat through corporate potentates droning on about "empowerment," " risk-taking,"' and "initiative," while in the real world they promote sycophants, second guess every decision, and personally approve all purchases more expensive than a paper clip?

... ... Readers with an ounce of imagination can easily draw parallels between MAJ Vandergriff's recommendations for strengthening unit cohesion - the prime determinant of how well a group of soldiers does in combat - and how their companies are organized and run. His suggestions for improving the selection, retention, and promotion of officers could also, with just a little wordsmithing, make any corporation more competitive.

People, not technologies and not lines on the org chart, are the first duty of any CEO...

It takes considerable courage for a serving officer in the U.S. Army to criticize the institution as well as the culture to which he belongs. But that is the very point that Major Vandergriff makes in his book. He loves the Army, but he is compelled to speak out against the personnel management system which is at the heart of the culture of micromanagement, officer retention problems, and overstaffing as well as impacting the operational art. In Major Vandergriff's mind, a professional can do no less than speak out and tell the truth as he sees it. Shades of Sam Dameon! On the other hand, the careerists bred by over three generations of applied personnel management formulae are unlikely to read this book - lest they see themselves in the mirror. Central to Vandergriff's arguments are the personnel management system's focus on issues of "equality", "individual replacement system", and "taylorism" or the science of management -- all counter to good military operational art. He lays out, detail by detail,how the Army has fallen into the hands of the personnel managers - who definitely affect how the Army fights wars. Why is it that not all our professional officers are more critical? As Major Vandergriff explains, criticism and questioning, no matter how limited, is not welcomed within the ranks. Conformity is the value expected, with little interest in honest debate. Major Don Vandergriff has thrown down the gauntlet in this major work, and he does not expect to win any popularity contests. Although this book directly addresses the Army, all military and naval institutions must feel some of his heat. What is most interesting is that there appears to be some recent interest at very high levels in what Major Vandergriff is saying. The Vice Chief of Staff of the Army has noted Major Vandergriff's arguments, and Mr. David Chu, Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, spoke to reporters about personnel management reform in May 2002. Whether Mr. Chu read this book or not is not important. The message is getting out, and with men like Major Don Vandergriff in the ranks, it is beginning to get heard. It is unfortunate that it has taken this long. Kudos to Major Don Vandergriff, and read his book!

Once Again, Donald Vandergriff has written an insightful and provocative book detailing the problems facing the US military. The fact that he is a serving officer and placing his career at risk shows his moral courage in facing up to very real problems. He gives a very detailed historical look at how the current US officer corps developed and how it has brought us to where we are today. He shows how our current military is still mired in a 2nd Generation Warfare mindset, still ready to fight the Cold War. While it is easy to show where things are wrong, he also offers a solution to the problem, a well thought out solution, showing step-by-step how to change the current culture into one better prepared to face the challenges of 4th Generation Warfare. The timing of this book couldn't be better, as reports are already trickling out of Afghanistan that so many of the lessons of Vietnam are being replayed.

In his new book - THE PATH TO VICTORY - MAJ Don Vandergriff, Georgetown University ROTC instructor, offers solutions to problems so ingrained as to masquerade as tradition. In a no-holds-barred assessment of the U.S. Army's personnel management system, he provides a blue print for fewer casualties in the next war. Those who might see his diligent research as disruptive could usefully reassess their own priorities. America is at war. One cannot adequately support the fighters without fulfilling what they perceive to be needs.

To value each life is also to acknowledge the importance of each assignment. MAJ Vandergriff reiterates what U.S. veterans have been saying for years. Too rapidly rotating the key personnel in a unit will destroy its proficiency and cohesion. He says that entire 2,500-soldier brigades must be allowed to remain together for as long as three years. He points out that the Army's "up-or-out" policy unwisely weeds out those who might achieve an exceptional level of proficiency at a lower echelon. He claims "up or out" is a manifestation of a plan by Gen. George C. Marshall after WWII to ensure the constant infusion of youth and rapid mobilization for the next world war. A large officer corps could lead such a mobilization, and rapid job rotation could ensure that those officers had the necessary skills. But the world has changed since 1946. MAJ Vandergriff claims that what may have been a realistic plan at its inception has now produced a top-heavy Army with 50 percent more generals than necessary and officers obsessed with promotions. He goes on to say that those promotions are based more on pristine personnel files, than character, leadership, and war-fighting capabilities. No longer productive would be a fitness report system favoring those easiest to lead over those good at their job. MAJ Vandergriff says that Army officers live with "promotion anxiety" and the "need to constantly please their bosses." He points out the potential dichotomy between always pleasing one's boss and still doing the right thing. While he agrees to the importance of "team spirit," he warns that careerism can easily mimic organizational loyalty. In a 4th-generation war against a highly skilled but loosely controlled enemy, he says that the revolution in human affairs must take precedence over that of technology. He suggests that its suppression could spell ultimate defeat on the battlefield.

The military is a profession of honor. Any who would put their own welfare above those they are sworn to support should look for other employment. The service does not promise promotion or retirement, only the chance to serve America by doing the right thing. Personnel management heads should more closely study the legal ramifications of indiscriminately lowering end strength to save money. For example, by legal precedent, forcing an enlisted member (or mustang) out after 15 years violates the organization's inherent obligation to him (or her). Similarly, not promoting someone willing to risk his career for the welfare of the lower ranks is tantamount to dooming those lower ranks to unacceptable risk in the next war.

Personnel problems tend to lack the appeal of more "warlike" topics. But, MAJ Vandergriff - a tanker by trade - succeeds in making their solutions highly readable. The much smaller Marine Corps suffers - possibly to a lesser degree - from the same syndrome as the Army. For those charged with lowering the Marine Corps' casualty rate in the next war, the reading of THE PATH TO VICTORY should been viewed as a professional obligation.

While fortunately, I have had few, if any attacks on my work, just "tweaks," but nothing like by Brian Vile "Brian." What bothers me about his review, if you can call it that, is that he attacks my character, and not my ideas or research (book won an academic history award in 2002 for its research). I have been and remain very open to anyone who will approach or contact me to talk about my ideas, in both the books as well as number of studies posted on www.d-n-i.net. It is apparent that when someone attacks the author's character, that they do not have the knowledge to attack his ideas. Also, Brian Vile does not know why I HAD to remain at Georgetown so long, so another error, assuming that I remained in order to avoid troop serving assignments. This is always been a flaw in the culture of the Army created by up or out, if one does not get promoted or selected, they must have done something wrong?
[...]

If you care about real military reform and transformation-this is an absolute must-read book!!

Although this book is primarily written to an Army audience it has applicability to all the Services. No other book has hit the target like this book. Many other books have alluded to problems, but Vandergriff digs deep to find the underlying reasons and causes of this dysfunctional system. He also provides solutions.

"The responsibility for military planning, direction and execution falls most heavily on the officer corps. The officer corps is critical to combat operations. It is the officer corps that reflects the values and characteristics of the military. If the corps is corrupt or incompetent, the whole army [military] will be also." As the Duke of Wellington supposedly remarked: "There are no bad troops--only bad officers." "Military excellence has always depended upon an officer corps which could think creatively about war--one that understood and practiced the art of war." Many of the deficiencies in our defense must be traced to problems in the officer corps.
Although, one can argue that many of the egregious problems of the officer corps in the Vietnam War have been corrected, many of the systemic problems have not. Several surveys done by the Army and the USAF since 1970 indicate there are still significant problems in the officer corps. Certainly, civilians in the Defense Department, the Congress (DOPMA) and the Executive Branch share the responsibility for our defense inadequacies, but a significant portion of these problems must be traceable to deficiencies in the organizational structure and within culture which officers are created, developed, and promoted.
That does NOT mean that most officers are individually to blame. The problems are generally systemic in nature. For the most part, officers in all services are victims of the current system. The problems are rooted in bureaucracy, the officer surplus, how we promote our officers, and in the way we educate them--matters over which only the most senior officers have any significant control. That is why many younger officers are dissatisfied and cynical about the Pentagon and other centers of bureaucracy. They know the shortcomings are NOT due to laziness, disinterest, or lack of dedication on their part. Few other groups put as much effort into their work as our military officers. Physical discomfort and danger, separation from family, and inadequacy of material and authority to do the job are the rule, not the exception. Unfortunately, we have promotion systems that often reward careerism and the courtier--not the truly selfless and those with moral courage
One of the most detrimental aspects of the current military culture is the up-or-out promotion system.

Instead of just analyzing the problem, Vandergriff gives us the foundation for a new system. Vandergriff states that the Army should adopt an up-or-stay (tracked) promotion system.

Vandergriff highlights that the promotion system(s) that drive military culture have a negative effect on our military capabilities. Moreover, some of the effects of the up-or-out system could be described as "corruptio optimi pessima"--the corruption of the best is the worst. As Shakespeare put it, "Lilies that fester smell far worse than weeds." We need promotion systems that rewards those of strong and honorable character, people who have the moral courage to speak the truth--not the courtiers who are interested only in self. A promotion system should NOT reinforce the Peter Principle, where every person tends to rise to his level of incompetence.
Instead of using promotion as the sole positive incentive, we should seek alternatives that would link performance with pay and longevity, but reduce the link between rank and pay. Officers performing well should be allowed to stay in positions where they are competent. There would be a tracked system that would allow officers to stay in their main specialty longer. There would not be enough officers to perform all the current jobs, which would be to the good: many make-work jobs would be eliminated. Unit commanders would rotate less frequently, and many decisions made by officers would be delegated to NCOs.

This book is tremdously researched and footnoted. There is no doubt that Vandergriff's "heart and soul" went into this masterpiece. For those hesitant, it will provide cognitive dissonance and more. A great book!

Path to Victory is extensively researched, concisely written, and wonderfully appropriate to the current debate over the future transformation of the Army. MAJ Vandergriff has written a book that all senior Army leaders should read, and anyone who follows civil-military relations or current events should own.

Ed Cox
Author of Grey Eminence: Fox Conner and the Art of Mentorship