Customer Reviews

Patriot Battles: How the War of Independence Was Fought

5 star:		(8)
4 star:		(6)
3 star:		(5)
2 star:		(9)
1 star:		(12)

 

 

One would expect to be able to pick up a book on the Revolutionary war and not be lectured to about the war in Iraq, but, there you go. Mr. Stevenson's breezy book is not so much a popular military history of the American Revolution, as it is a basic primer on soldiering in the 18th century and a cursory review of key battles of the war. It concentrates on the tactical while largely ignoring the operational and strategic aspects. He does a good job of describing what life was like for a soldier of this period. The first half of the book discusses the opposing soldiers and armies of the Revolutionary war, written in the modern iconoclastic historical manner. His writing style is a little too chatty for my taste. Washington, we are told, found his militia troops "aggravatingly bolshie", for example. He relies heavily on secondary sources and breaks no new ground. Christopher Duffy's "Military Experience in the Age of Reason" addresses this topic much more fully.

The second half of the book provides brief, and well written, descriptions of key battles of the war, with excellent maps, and is thankfully free of the author's modern political opinions. However, Savas & Dameron's "Guide to Battles of the American Revolution" does it much better (and covers more battles).

If you know nothing about 18th century military history and want a primer on key battles of the Revolution, this book may be a good choice for you, but if you already know the basics, you'll be disappointed.

I really can't recommend this book and regret buying it.

Of all the wars that Americans have fought my knowledge of the War for Independence was most lacking. I looked to this volume to fill that gap for me. It is obvious that there was a lot of research done, almost 20% of the book is notes, bibliography and index. And the information is staggering--everything from rates of pay, types of weaponry, the sort of shoes the contending armies wore, the food, medical care... the list goes on. The first couple of chapters are dry in the extreme but the author does better in the following chapters of the first section. The latter part of the book, with synopses of the various battles and thoughtfully provided maps, was interesting.

But, and it's a major "but" for what was supposed to have been a book on how a past war was fought, the author cannot resist throwing in statements that reflect his personal and modern ideologies. There are gratuitous swipes at the policies in Iraq and Vietnam, right wing talk radio, Christians, and the way Indians were treated by those living in the 1700's and later. Some comparisons might be valid, but this was not a "compare/contrast" book. It was marketed and titled to reflect how something was done in the past, a recitation of facts. The author's asides mean that it is not what good history should be: objective. The comments are not extensive but they are jarring and in context apprear snide. Applying contemporary standards to those living in the past can be instructive in a classroom setting to show how civilization has grown or declined. In books it's more problematic. History books should say simply "here's what happened as best as can be determined." Readers can draw their own conclusions.

Finally, the ending paragraphs are spoiled by poor editing. It's the surrender at Yorktown and a British soldier is bitterly throwing his musket, referred to previously as a "firelock," on the ground. The text says that he threw his "forelock" on the ground. Yet one more casualty to machines editing text rather than giving them a look with the Mark One Mod Zero eyeball of a knowledgeable editor.

Thanks for the information, Mr. Stephenson, but save the commentary for some other venue.

This volume is a great disappointment. It had all the promise of an outstanding work that presented a different view of the War of the Revolution However, none of the opportunities available to pursue that approach to the war and the fascinating characters that populate the period on both sides were attempted.

The basic premise and outline are credible: the first half of the book concerns the armies, weapons, and such seldom covered topics as the women who followed the armies and the Indians. The second half covers selected battles more or less competently, but the book seems to be to be trying to combine the approach of two outstanding works on the Revolution: Harold Peterson's indispensable The Book of the Continental Soldier and WJ Wood's outstanding Battles of the Revolutionary War 1775-1781, and doesn't do it as well as either Peterson or Wood, and we are left with a second-rate account of the war.

The text is riddled with errors. Nathaniel Greene is accused of war profiteering with little or no proof. Monmouth is portrayed as an American loss. Numbers throughout the text are suspect-Rochambeau's French Expeditionary force that was sent to North America in 1780 numbered 5,000 French regulars; the author numbers them around 4,000 which is nothing but sloppy research. Lafayette's numbers in Virginia in 1781 are inflated to 5,000, which is again incorrect. The author's portrayal of the Continentals relies heavily on secondary accounts of what social class the rank and file came from instead of what type of soldiers they were and became. The expertise of the British regular is downplayed considerably, as are the military attributes of the assorted German mercenaries hired by the British government and sent to North America starting in 1776. The chapter on artillery is near-useless. Grapeshot is labelled canister, the usual, accurate artillery terms are not employed by the author (such as 'trajectory' instead of 'elevation') which leads to confusion, and siege artillery is not covered at all in the chapter. This is curious as the sieges in the Revolution were significant. The last one, Yorktown, led to the end of the war.

There are few primary sources listed in the bibliography. I found only fifteen entries that were either primary source material or anthologies which held mostly primary materia in ten pages of listed sources. That is less than ten percent of the total. Excellent material wasn't listed and apparently not used, material that is readily available, such as Johann Ewald's excellent Diary of the American War (the Diary is quoted-but from another book with some of Ewald's material in it). Some dubious references are listed and used such as Neimeyer's America Goes to War and Higginbotham's The War of American Independence (which this reviewer had as a text in college in a course taught by the author-it wasn't impressive and only 'enlightening' in the negative sense).

The greatest fault of the book, however, is the parallels which the author attempts to make with the War in Vietnam and the current war in Iraq. Whatever the author was attempting to show using this vehicle is irrelevant. The attempted parallels all fail and only appear to be a furthering of the author's political agenda for whatever reason. It detracts from the book and is very annoying historically, as well as being grossly inaccurate. The most egregious is the author attempting to equate President Bush with George III, the reigning British monarch during the Revolution. It is ridiculous and just plain silly. A book on the Revolution which is supposed to be a serious work is no place for present-day political rhetoric, comment, or bias. There are proper venues for that type of writing, but this isn't it.

The author failed in his attempt at a valid book on the War of the Revolution. The potential is there, but it was not acted upon. The book is poorly written, poorly researched, and is fatally flawed by preent-day political comment and invalid historical comparisons. This book is not recommended and cannot be used for research because of its inherent flaws and frequent errors in fact.

Patriot Battles
How the War of Independence Was Fought
by
Michael Stephenson

As an editor of The Military Book Club, an editor and contributor to the National Geographic's "Battlegrounds: Geography and the History of Warfare", and as a coauthor of "The Nuclear Case-book", I had great expectations for this book. It was most disappointing that it did not rise to any where near my hopes.

As is all too common with books printed today, thanks to the use of Spell-Check rather than spending any money on a real live thinking editor, I found quite a number of grammatical and spelling errors - "it would too dangerous" (how about - "it would be too dangerous"), the use of "to", or "too" instead of "two", or (my absolute all time personal favorite found on page 284) the single word (no spaces): "particularlyoutspokenagainstwhathesawasadisastrouslyoverambitious attack".

But, passing on the cheapness of book publishers today, and speaking only of the author's efforts I found much to withhold applause on. Although stating very laudable goals, such as: Who fought; Why did they fight; How did they sustain themselves; With what did they fight; and, How did they fight? I had expected far better answers.

This book is just full of the author's rather dull opinions (like the magnificent Blenheim Palace that is visited by millions every year is, in his superior opinion, just a "lumpy and unlovely McMansion"). Like that has anything to do with the topic. And then there is his elusive "Tolstoyan" reference to explosive shells - I'm not quite sure what that means, considering the definition of "Tolstoyan"??? Or why it was elusive "for him", considering his background? And then he shows his (not even slightly humorous) modern political leanings in both the text and the 778 footnotes - none of which is what one buys a book like this for - as they rarely actually explain anything about what was written other than from whence he borrowed the quotation of another author (without any reference to who actually said it). There is an eleven page bibliography - just in case you'd like to read some the books he alleges to have read (but didn't seem to gain much knowledge from).

And some times his numbers don't add up - pg 46. 560 R&F (his #) plus 20 fifes & drums, 20 Serjeants (only two per Company, not three) and 32 officers = 632 - not the 642 he suggests.

Of course he also takes up the rather PC banner (only slipping once or twice) of calling the battle which was fought in two counties (then and three now) by the name of what was then just a rather small village (Brooklyn), instead of by the name it had been called by both the participants at the time and by nearly everyone else for 200 years afterwards. Yea, I know, that's one of my personal pet peeves and not yours.

Part One on the American Soldier (who and what he was) was all too brief for the subject - and the title? "A Choaky Mouthful"??

And did you know that the December 31st assault on Quebec "may have been forced on the commanders by the imminent expiration" of the militia at midnight"? May have been??

Some of his examples aren't exactly on the mark either - noting that officers were expected to lead from the front, he sights Washington's near capture at Kips Bay - where he wasn't ever in the front (or suppose to be), but rather in the rear when the militia ran away and he was so upset that he became endangered because he did not notice the British troops following up on their retreating enemy. I guess at that point was then in front?

He blames the "inability to follow up victory" (at Long Island, Brandywine, and Camden) "with vigorous pursuit" on the general's "nervous system (being) burnt out, like an electrical surge frazzling a computer's motherboard" - and nothing to do with the condition of their men after having fought hard won battles without food or rest all day. At least he defends some of Lord Howe's tactics based on the concepts of 18th-century European warfare of the time.

The author's attention to detail often only goes to point out just how little he actually knows of the topic - for example (pg 125), in describing how a flintlock is loaded he states that "the soldier raised the gun vertically until the hammer was about level with his shoulder and pulled back the hammer to the half-cock position, which opened the pan by activating a spring that lifted the frizzen." (He has obviously never actually seen or tried this mechanism.) "He lowered the gun until the butt was grounded somewhat behind him... Next he reached into his cartridge box... and took out a paper roll (cartridge)... He bit off the soft end... and poured a little of the powder into the pan." Of course by this description, the soldier would have to bend over to do that, and most of the powder would fall out of the pan which was tipped towards the ground in this position. But just to add to the success of this loading sequence, our friend waits until after the ball has been rammed down before closing the frizzen - the part that covers the pan and holds the powder in place. (How much powder do you think would be left in it by then?). But then again, he claims that the soldiers put their ram rods into the ground while firing in such a way that it would than carry dirt into the barrel when loaded next, "fouling it". Mr. Stephenson then goes on to quote another author - and states that "waxed paper cartridges" were used and that there was a "distinctive ping" when "charges of buck and ball were forced home against the breech plug..." - ah, and this came from the paper wad? The gunpowder? The lead balls? A "distinctive ping" comes only when the barrel was clean and empty and a metal ramrod hits the metal of the breech plug - not during loading! Oh yes - did you know that the Pennsylvania-Kentucky rifle is credited here with an over sized 69 caliber ball (same as a Brown Bess)?

Of Henry Lee's "massacre" of Col John Pyle's Loyalists in 1781 he eulogizes that this "may be simply Loyalist propaganda" - even though it was Lee, himself, who wrote about it.

Mr. Stephenson complains as if it was British bullheadedness that a "soldier was prohibited from drinking water when he perspired. If he did and felt bad, he was given whiskey." Apparently the author knows nothing of common ground water and pollution in the 18th-c (something being experienced today on lettuce and spinach grown near cattle and pig farms). It wasn't until 1776 that the Surgeon General of the British Army ordered that the men not drawn water down stream from where their latrines were dug.

As to the actions on Manhattan, he writes: "certainly one question raises its awkward head: where was the British cavalry... in a scouting role they would have been invaluable at this juncture, yet they seem to have been entirely absent." He apparently has no concept of what it would have taken, in the face of expected opposition, to transport and land horses on Manhattan - especially as most of the King's dragoons were off in other parts after the Battle of "Brooklyn", in Queens, Kings and later Nassau counties) rounding up patriots, securing forage, and protecting the British rear at the time.

Regarding the Battle of Trenton, (and I'm sure that all of the hard working historians everywhere will appreciate this attitude) he concludes that it was a "fine example of what might be called the `organic' evolution of strategy: the role of happenstance as an important factor in warfare (much to the chagrin of those historians who prefer to ascribe intention and planning that only hindsight lends to what in reality is the chaotic ricochet of events)." Now aren't we a know-all superior A__!

The Battle of Monmouth - page 284 - "Washington's favoring of (Lafayette) and his clumsy handling of Lee show a leader whose command effectiveness had been compromised by equivocation". He also blames Lafayette's "shifting of position (unauthorized by Lee) which was mistakenly interpreted as a retreat and triggered a panicked response in other regiments." In addition, the author suggests that Washington planned it all to "set up the unfortunate and unsympathetic Lee for failure..." (I'm sure our friend Mr. Stone from Monmouth Battlefield Park would love a conversation with this `enlightened gentleman'.)

And for those that had always thought that General Carlton with few troops and even fewer resources in Canada, eroneously "let Burgoyne stew" - well you've found a friend here. And did you know that, despite reduced rations and days of nonstop action, all Burgoyne needed to be successful was a "quick strike" after the battles of Freeman's Farm, to brake "open the way to Albany"? That's all, nothing to it with exausted troops who had been fighting all day and without meals - the dummy!

Attention all Polish-Americans who have looked up to Count Casimir Pulaski who gave his life to save the lives of countless retreating American and French infantry when he attacked the fortifications at Savannah (after "all the arcane business of approaches...") - please note that our esteemed author knows that that was "not something for which cavalry is best adapted." A duh! This bright light just doesn't understand any of it.

According to our all knowing author, at Guilford Courthouse, Cornwallis turned his guns on his own men because he realized "the Guards were on the point of breaking"!!! And that his decision had nothing to do with the Guards and the 1st Maryland Regt being locked in a bayonet melee to the death of all involved on both sides and that he wanted to break it up before they all died for nothing.

His concepts of naval tactics are just as bad as his views of land warfare.

Yes, there are some good points, quite a few in fact, but it is most unfortunate that they are over shadowed by so much ill conceived and unsubstantiated opinion and misdirection of fact.

Would I recommend this book? No more than I would suggest that anyone wanting to portray a British officer of the period carry a "hanger" rather than a gentleman's sword. It's just too incorrect!


PS - and let's leave the absurd comparisons of President Bush to King George III for something else (like the trash bin it belongs in!

Under the guise of exploding hoary myths about the Revolutionary War, Stephenson renames it "War of Independence" because, according to him, there was nothing revolutionary in either a social or military sense. Really? I guess he missed popular voting, a common-law judiciary, some elected, some appointed by elected officials, government without a king or emperor following a constitution based in law emating from the people and many other ideas actually put into practice successfully for the first time as a result of the Revolutionary War. He dismisses the American political regime that resulted as an oligarchy like the British, just domestic rather than foreign.

The author points out Bush's failures to understand history (why is this in a book about 1775-1783?), and makes the point that Bush and George III have much in common. And, of course, he makes the comparisons that Vietnam & Iraq are like our Revolutionary War but with America in the role of the British. None of his facts lead to new revelations or analyses, and his treatise seems designed to make Americans feel that our nation was founded by venal and opportunistic individuals, using the common man for their own enrichment, and that we should be more ashamed than proud of our origins. This is standard BAFE (Blame America For Everything) stuff, but what is really upsetting is that Stephenson was the editor of the Military Book Club and a contributor to National Geographic. He is one of those individuals in a position to do real harm.

The author uses repetition as well as Goebbels -- as an example he repeatedly states that riflemen were not useful in battle. Gee, I guess Morgan's men weren't effective in the two battles of Freeman's Farm and Saratoga, and riflemen didn't win the battle of King's Mountain. His point is correct only in the situation when riflemen were used in line against British regulars at close range and their slow rate of fire and lack of bayonets spelled their doom. Stephenson apparently doesn't delve deeply enough when such analysis might lead to a conclusion he doesn't want to reach.

Stephenson reminds me of the professor at Emory who made up data and misinterpreted other to "prove" that guns were not common among the colonial citizenry. Another instance of Stephenson's lack of depth is that he is aware of the Scotch-Irish element in the militia and Continental ranks, but doesn't understand what that means. Yes, 40% of the Pennsylvania riflemen on the Quebec expedition were Scotch-Irish born in Northern Ireland, but apparently unknown to Stephenson, another 30% were men born in the American colonies of Scotch-Irish parents. There was a reason the British tended to look at the war as a Presbyterian revolt, but Stephenson apparently doesn't understand it or it doesn't fit into his politically correct contemporary mindset.

All in all, this book is not worth reading, and is definitely not worth buying.

Patriot Battles is an easy read that provides nothing new regarding the American War of Independence (AWI). Despite Michael Stephenson's claim to challenge myths and assumptions, his book merely uses already existing secondary and tertiary sources; if you're going to challenge arguments based on primary sources, you need to support your own argument with the same, and not selectively use information from other secondary sources with a sprinkling of anecdotal quotes.

Also, the book is a bit schizophrenic - on the one hand the bulk of the book is a pretty good narrative on what it was like to be a soldier in both armies and it provides a nice account of the war's major battles; although none of this is new, it's a nice readable summary of events. On the other hand Stephenson tries to argue that the AWI was similar to the current war in Iraq, but, since the book is not about this theme, it comes across as awkward unsubstantiated opinion that will only serve to quickly date the book.

There's no real theme and no real analysis of the information. Normally you'd find this in the introduction or conclusion; the problem is that his intro is really an editorial where he tries to compare the AWI to Iraq - which has no relationship to the body of his book. At the same time, there's no conclusion -- the book just ends with the British surrender at Yorktown.

For someone who criticizes the arguments of historians, he has his own intellectual gaffs. For example, he tries to compare Iraq to the AWI because it's about suppressing insurgents; but then he proceeds to argue that American guerrilla tactics were a myth because the Americans, led by Washington, really fought as regulars or tried to fight regular battles.

If you're interested in a simple narrative summary of a soldier's life and the battles fought in the Revolutionary War, then this book is worth reading. However, you'll have to put up with occasional out-of-context comments about the war in Iraq that detracts from what the book is really about - the American War of Independence.

This book is proves that getting published is about who you know. Stephenson cobbled together an amateurish collection of thinly researched anecdotal residue. Cleverly arranged analytic chapters precede event-oriented chapters that fail to support the author's up front assessment. He compounds the disappointment persistently comparing the American Revolution to the Iraq war, showing he buys into the most simplistic characterizations of that war. In an early chapter, he explains that people join today's professional Army for the same primary reason they joined with the Continentals - lack of alternatives. Another sheltered Manhattan notion. I wonder what he knows about armies. His chapter on equipment , "The Things they Carried" gives the impression that the author derives his insight from looking at picture books. Stephenson pretends to dispel myths already discredited many times over. There are many better books on the Revolution, without the run-on sentences.

I really wanted to like this book. I thought I was getting something along the lines of Nosworthy or Paddy Griffith, instead I got a rehash of secondary sources and a surplus of snide non sequitors regarding President Bush, Halliburton, Iraq, Cheney, neo-Cons, etc, etc.. How pathetic, tedious and, in the end, boorish.

As to the neo-marxist class analysis of Rev War soldiers: just baffleing. I thought this went out of fashion years ago. Valley Forge, Morristown and that little hike through Maine to Canada were done for better pay?

Sorry, but the modern look at the motivations, logistics, tactics and battle experience of the soldiers of the Revolution still waits to be written.

(In the meantime do read J.P. Martin's "Private Yankee Doodle".)

While this is a very well written book, like many of the others writing reviews, I don't think the authors political views and comparisons of the war for independence to the Iraq War belong in a history book, at least not yet. The author compares George W. Bush to King George and mentions that both of them had no real military career to speak of, but had fathers that did. The author then dedicates the book to his father, who he says was a WW2 soldier. This leaves me to wonder what effect the author's lack of military experience had on him as he wrote it, and how much his political views were influenced by his failure to live up to his own father's military background.

Instead I got the author's opinion on current politics. There is some useful interesting information but the author can't seem to make it more than a page or two without comparing the Revolution to Vietnam or Iraq. He lets you know his dislike for George Bush often. That would be fine if I had bought a book on current world affairs and not the American Revolution.

The second half of the book is descriptions of battles. This is the only redeeming factor. The order of battle is easy to follow and the maps are very nice.

Overall I was disappointed with the book.