Patton At Bay: The Lorraine Campaign, 1944 [Paperback]

John Nelson Rickard (Author)

Book Description

Publication Date: June 30, 2004

For Lt. Gen. George S. Patton, Jr., the battle for Lorraine during the fall and winter of 1944 was a frustrating and grueling experience of static warfare. Plagued by supply shortages, critical interference from superiors, flooded rivers, fortified cities, and the highly determined German army, Patton had little opportunity to wage the type of fast armored campaign of which he was so enamored. Author John Rickard examines Patton’s generalship during these bitter battles and suggests that Patton was unable to adapt to the new realities of the campaign, thereby failing to wage the most effective warfare possible. Relying on a broad range of historical sources, including personal papers and division after-action reports, this treatment of Patton’s operational performance in Lorraine goes beyond the official history. It describes Patton’s philosophy of war and explains why it failed him in Lorraine. Supplemented by full orders of battle, casualty and equipment loses, and excellent maps based on Hugh M. Cole’s official U.S. Army history of the campaign, Patton at Bay,/i> is a penetrating study of one of America’s best fighting generals.

Editorial Reviews

From Kirkus Reviews

A detailed analysis of one of the few WWII campaigns led by General George S. Patton that could be called a failure. Rickard, a Ph.D. candidate in military history at the University of New Brunswick, looks at the period from September through December, 1944, when Patton, fresh from his successes in Normandy, attempted to race through the French province of Lorraine and cross the Rhine river into the German homeland. Contested by various forces throughout history in endless wars, Lorraine was held in 1942 by the Nazis; Patton was delayed in getting there by inclement weather, stronger-than-anticipated German resistance, and a countryside not well suited to the large, offensive tank campaigns Patton favored. Rickards writing is ponderous and academic, but he makes many relevant points. Revered for his bold and decisive strategic armored troop maneuvers, in which he swiftly swept through large amounts of enemy territory with a flair for capturing headlines and enemy troops, Patton in this case didnt adapt his usually successful style to a new situation. The author faults the general for failing to learn how to wage war on a static battlefield where the enemy was firmly entrenched, and for failing to fully see that his forces engagement in Lorraine was in part intended as a diversionary tactic while the Allies captured the German industrial heartland of the Ruhr. The campaign ended when Patton pulled out of Lorraine to come to the aid of the beleaguered American army at Bastogne in the famed Battle of the Bulge; the general died a year later after a car crash in occupied Germany. A strictly academic study of Pattons generalship in one significant battle. (maps) -- Copyright ©1999, Kirkus Associates, LP. All rights reserved. --This text refers to the Hardcover edition.

Book Description

Examines General Patton's inability to adapt to the static warfare of the Lorraine campaign in the fall of 1944.

--This text refers to the Hardcover edition.

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Product Details

• Paperback: 336 pages
• Publisher: Potomac Books Inc. (June 30, 2004)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 1574887823
• ISBN-13: 978-1574887822
• Product Dimensions: 8.9 x 6 x 1 inches
• Shipping Weight: 1.1 pounds (View shipping rates and policies)
• Average Customer Review: 4.0 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (7 customer reviews)
• Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #674,592 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)

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Most Helpful Customer Reviews

9 of 11 people found the following review helpful:

4.0 out of 5 stars Academic yes, all swoon for Patton no, but fair representation and analysis of a less famous period of Third Army action, April 20, 2006

By 

Mannie Liscum (Columbia, MO United States) - See all my reviews
(VINE VOICE)   

This review is from: Patton at Bay: The Lorraine Campaign, September to December, 1944 (Praeger Series in War Studies) (Hardcover)

John N. Rickard's "Patton At Bay: Lorraine Campaign, September to December, 1944" is certainly an academic tour-de-force examination of the Lorraine Campaign and the role of US Third Army. Readers should not expect descriptions of small-unit actions but rather Corps (sometimes Division) level action, as well as analysis of decisions made by Patton and his subordinate commanders that dictated the pace and 'style' of combat in the Lorraine region in the fall of 1944. In particular "Patton At Bay" mainly covers the period from Sept to early Dec as the Third Army's mobile armored drive of Aug shifted to several, often disjoined, ground to a largely attritional and mostly static push against defensive positions to which the Germans fell back during their rout from France. Rickard not only provides the reader with a considerable amount of historical detail but also attempts to inject perspective and unbiased analysis.

At least one reviewer has criticized "Patton At Bay" as being 'overly academic' and 'lacking in true understanding of military tactics and strategy' - this reviewer certainly cannot argue against "Patton At Bay" being a serious piece of academic historiography, but it is a bit strong to flatly state that Rickard misses the boat on the real outcome of Patton's leadership in the Lorraine Campaign. In fact Rickard is up front in saying that despite problems that arose, as Rickard concludes, largely from Patton's over optimism, underestimation of German resilience, and decision to set siege to Metz and associated 'forts', the campaign was largely successful in that the Germans lost proportionately larger numbers of men, machines and equipment and were ultimately forced all the way to the West Wall (Siegfried Line). What Rickard does is criticize the venerated Patton and Third Army as not being faultless - this upsets some. It is in fact the duty of the historian to provide a fair and balanced judgment and assessment of events and decisions, and in this Rickard fully succeeds.

"Patton At Bay" is a solid piece of historical literature that is recommended highly for those who want a more "academic" less "visceral and parochial" view of the US Third Army in NW Europe during one of its less press-popular periods of action. 4 solid stars.

2 of 3 people found the following review helpful:

4.0 out of 5 stars Excellent history of a little-known WWII campaign, August 6, 2011

By 

L. S. Reed "roadrunner" (Virginia) - See all my reviews
(REAL NAME)   

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This review is from: Patton At Bay: The Lorraine Campaign, 1944 (Paperback)

There's a standard narrative of Patton's WWII "exploits," perhaps mainly formed by the George C. Scott movie: North Africa, Sicily, slapping incident, FUSAG deception, Normandy breakout, Bulge. In the movie, the only real mentions of the Lorraine campaign are its beginning and end: Ike's decision to take Patton's gasoline away, which magnified the logistics problem that was already bringing the chase across France to a halt, and the December plan to cross the Westwall, which was cancelled by the need to shift north to relieve the forces in the Ardennes.

While it wasn't glamorous, Lorraine was an important campaign that deserves more attention. This book gives it that attention, and it's a good effort.

Basically, the Allies were trapped only a few miles from the Normandy beaches for nearly two months until Patton's 3rd army led the breakout. After the American, Canadian, and Polish forces cut off the German forces in the "Falaise pocket," the remaining German forces abandoned most of their equipment and made a disorderly retreat all the way across France, chased by Patton's army.

By the end of August, a number of things happened that changed the character of the campaign. Patton's army was now at the end of a 400-mile supply line, and the thin flow of supplies was almost completely cut off for a critical week while priority was given to Montgomery for the infamous "Market Garden." The Germans made good use of this delay by beefing up their defenses. These were generally inferior troops and under-strength units, but they were stronger than they had been and now they were on the border of their "Fatherland" and ready to fight.

These problems were compounded by two other factors. First, Patton's intelligence declined as the Germans increasingly relied on telephones and the flow of "Ultra" information fell off and as the growing number of German sympathizers in the area cut off the flow of local intelligence. Patton's military power was also less than it had been during the glorious days of August because of reduced air support and transfers of nearly half his divisions to other units.

The Lorraine campaign was dominated by the fortified city of Metz, the crossings of the Moselle, Seille, and other rivers, and fights over a series of hills east of the Moselle. The weather during the campaign was atrocious, which made the rivers even more difficult to cross and slowed the going on land as well. The book gives an excellent account of the basics of the campaign as well as an analysis of Patton's strategy, tactics, and leadership. It is critical of all three, arguing that Patton a) failed to recognize that his armor-led pursuit tactics no longer were effective, b) failed to supervise his somewhat slow-moving corps and division commanders, c) got bogged down in questionable and poorly planned attacks on the heavily fortified city of Metz, and, perhaps most critically, d) spread his forces out widely in an "attack on all fronts" plan that his army wasn't strong enough to execute. The result was a 2-month-long slugfest at and east of the Moselle crossings. Then, just as they were about to launch into the Westwall, the German attack in the Ardennes changed everything and created opportunities for even greater glory for Patton and 3rd Army.

It's an excellent summary of a campaign that deserves more attention.

8 of 13 people found the following review helpful:

4.0 out of 5 stars An Academic critique of an American icon, November 16, 1999

By A Customer

This review is from: Patton at Bay: The Lorraine Campaign, September to December, 1944 (Praeger Series in War Studies) (Hardcover)

This is one of the only books I've ever read that critique General Patton. This book, to me the layman seems extremely well researched, and worthy of academic exaltations. The author is brave to look at the Lorraine Campaign with such a critical eye, not always welcome on American icons of war.