Customer Reviews

Patton's Air Force

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Spires writes an excellent account of Otto Weyland's XIX TAC during World War II. Spires writes that Weyland had to deviate from army air corps doctrine which stated that TAC operation had to be centralized rather he allowed his command to be decentralized due to the chaotic nature of the Western Front in the summer of 1944. The XIX TAC proved effective not only in close air support missions but armed reconnaissance and interdiction missions as well. Spires contends that XIX TAC's resources were wasted on bombing stationary military targets in Brest when it would be more effective in attacking movable targets such as tanks in support of Patton's Third Army. During the seige of Metz, Patton allowed Weyland to put most of XIX's resources on interdiction mission and not attacking stationary targets. Spires is slightly critical of Weyland for using too many aircraft as air protection of bases after the Luftwaffe attacked XIX TAC's air fields during the Battle of the Bulge, Spires believes that XIX TAC could have been put more assets in close air support missions and interdiction rather than air defense. After the Battle of the Bulge, XIX TAC's missions became even more decentralized. The army air force liason officer could call the armed reconnaissance TAC squadrons to reccomend air strikes immediately rather the having the missions approved at XIX TAC headquarters. Spires belives that the high casualties that XIX TAC faced had little to do with it's close air support role which were similiar to interdiction missions but rather it was the amount of missions that XIX TAC flew, and the vulnerability of it's small fighter-bombers to flak. I would reccomend this book for anyone interested in close air support operations on the Western Front during World War II.