Customer Reviews

Patton's gap: An account of the Battle of Normandy, 1944

5 star:		(1)
4 star:		(0)
3 star:		(1)
2 star:		(2)
1 star:		(0)

 

 

First, I have to agree with other reviewers that this book (originally published in 1981) is a mish-mash of personal recollections of a WW2 Fighter Pilot (flying Mustangs) with the Royal Canadian Air Force combined with an analysis of the failure to close the "Falaise Gap" in August 1944 to fully encircle units of the retreating German army. As such, the author's personal recollections are indeed interesting and would have formed the basis for a good book in itself. The second part, the analysis of the failure to close the "Falaise Gap", comes across as much more of a conspiracy theory. Either topic in itself would make a good book. Together, they come across as disjointed and the book fails in this, as well as in the author's analysis of the Falaise Gap battle.

The Falaise Gap is certainly an interesting subject, but the author also fails to do this justice and, as other reviewers have pointed out, his analysis seems flawed in a number of areas. There's quite a number of other books which treat the Falaise Gap far more credibly. Overall, the books OK, not enthralling, and his writing style doesn't hold this reader either. I'd read it for the personal recollections of a Mustang Pilot and not for the military history aspect. Two stars.

And just for reference, here's the Front and Back inside cover blurbs:

Front: This is Richard Rohmer's autobiographical and historical story of the Invasion told from the viewpoint of a young fighter pilot who was there. By August 12, 1944, the whole of the German Seventh Army and the remnants of the Fifth Panzer Army had been nearly encircled by the combined forces of the allies. The pocket in which they were apparently trapped was enormous. Hundreds of thousands of men, thousands of vehicles, hundreds of tanks, an entire army, all were in a pocket with only one avenue of escape, the Falaise Gap. The Gap was twenty miles wide and through it the first of the retreating German vehicles were beginning to move.

For nearly a week, the Gap remained open. And by the time the decision had finally been made to close the Gap and trap the fleeing enemy, between 200,000 and 250,000 German soldiers, taking with them all their equipment, had escaped capture and certain defeat. There is no question that this enormous military blunder not only served in prolonging the agony of WW2, this attested to by the German Generals themselves after the war, but it was also a blunder that could have and should have been prevented. Who was ultimately responsible for the decision that kept open the Gap. Which of the leading Generals - Patton, Montgomery, Bradley, Eisenhower - gave the order? What was the reasoning behind the bizarre and costly lapse in Allied command? In his research, Rohmer has discovered the true answer, never before published, from the only man alive who had the information.

Back: Richard Rohmer served with the RCAF as a fighter-reconnaissance pilot during the period 1942-45. He took part in the D-Day operations, serving in France, Belgium and Holland, completing a 135 mission tour of operations in November 1944. He was awarded the Distinguished Flying Cross in 1945. On January 1978, after more than thirty years of distinguished post-war service in the Canadian military, he was promoted to the rank of Major-General. In January 1979, he was made Chief of Reserves of the Canadian Armed Forces. He retired from that post on 31 January 1981.

This author of this book seemingly couldn't make up his mind what he wanted to write about. The author was a Recce pilot flying a Mustang over Normandy taking photos for allied intelligence, and parts of the book are bog-standard "flying experience" tales of dog-fights, flak and narrow-escapes. Yet the author is also trying to give us the story of the failure by Allied Generals to best utilise the "Falaise Gap" in August 1944 to fully encircle the retreating German amy. This part of the book should be the most interesting, the author clearly did lots of research and clearly has a firm idea about who was responsible - not the General referred to in the title by the way!! But somehow Rohmer's writing failed to grip me, and frustratingly throughout the book I had to put up with his annoying two-page write-ups of subjects beyond the scope of subject. For example we are treated to a full description of the Mulberry Harbours - WHY? this has nothing to do with the subject matter and just gets in the way of the purpose of the book.

Re-edited with lots of the filler taken out, this would be a pretty good book, but somehow the many ingredients failed to make this the cracking read I thought it would be.

Major General Rohmer's account of the Battle of the Falaise Gap is far more credible than his reviewers are giving him credit for. While I agree that research is not one of Rohmer's strong suits in his book, there is plenty of information to support his major point. One gentleman suggests that there is not one credible source which confirms Rohmer's claim that British General Bernard L. Montgomery was the man behind the 'halt order' Bradley gave to Patton at Argentan on the morning of August 13, 1944. I strongly beg to differ. There are five very credible sources which say exactly that.

1. There is no one more credible in American military history than Dr. Forrest C. Pogue. In May 1947 Dr. Pogue interviewed Montgomery's intelligence officer, Brigadier E.T. Williams. Pogue quotes Williams as telling him when Bradleys troops came up to the inter-army group boundary line, "Monty said tell Bradley they ought to get back. Bradley was indignant. We [Williams and Freddie De Guingand, Montgomery's Chielf of Staff] were indignant on Bradley's behalf." Quoted in Rohmer's "Patton's Gap" and in Carlo D'Este's "Decision in Normandy," p. 449,450.

2. Major General Francis De Guingand confirms this statement in his own book, "Operation Victory." "My impressions at the time were that he [Montgomery] had been a little to optimistic about the probable progress of 21st Army Group... It is just possible that the gap might have been closed a little earlier if no restrictions had been imposed upon the 12th Army Group commander [Bradley] as to the limit of his northward movement." Francis De Guingand, "Operation Victory," p. 407. Since De Guingand was unaware of any discussions Eisenhower and Bradley may have had, the order limiting Bradley's northward movement must have come from Montgomery.

3. Air Vice Marshal Stephen C. Strafford was SHAEF's Chief of Air Operations and Plans. He was a British Officer with no ax to grind. He also kept a diary and on 14 August 1944, he recorded this statement from General Bradley at a meeting: "He [Bradley] states that the American forces had little opposition between ALENCON and ARGENTAN and had started toward FALAISE, but had been instructed by the C-in-C, 21st Army Group [Montgomery] to halt on the inter-army group boundary." Stafford Diary from Carlo D'Este, "Decision in Normandy," p. 441.

4. Chester B. Hansen was an aide to General Bradley and kept a war diary. Part of Hansen's diary entry for August 13, 1944 reads: "It is suggested in G-3 [Operations] that we were ordered to hold at Argentan rather than continue the drive to Falaise since our capture of that objective would infringe on the prestige of forces driving south [British/Canadians] ... Accordingly, our forces were held at Argentan and subsequently refueled while the British were still short of their objective [and] permitted much of the strength in the pocket to escape eastward toward the Seine." Hansen Diaries, Sunday, August 13, 1944.

5. Ralph Ingersoll, in his book, "Top Secret," writes about Patton's Third Army and the Falaise Gap: "Montgomery, who was still nominally in charge of all ground forces, now chose to exercise his authority and ordered Patton back to his side of the ... boundary line." Ralph Ingersoll, Top Secret, p. 190. George Patton and others said the same thing. He was guessing that the reason Montgomery halted the Americans was a combination of jealousy and ignorance of the situation. As it turned out, it was a pretty accurate guess.

Although he did not explain his point very well, Major General Rohmer is right on the money. For a fuller explanation of why Montgomery ordered the Americans to halt at Argentan you might want to read "Eisenhower & Montgomery at the Falaise Gap." I have given Richard Rohmer five (5) stars because he was the first historian to take on the slings and arrows from the fans of Field Marshal, the Viscount Montgomery of Alamein. Anything even remotely critical of the good field marshall is instantly discredited with the label "Montgomery bashing." His book was first published in 1981. He was the first historian to get the Battle of the Falaise Gap right. His 5 stars are long overdue.

This is not a bad volume when viewed simply as a recollection of Mr Rohmer's experiences. It struggles up to two stars for that, and that alone.

However when it comes to the question of the Falaise Gap, Mr Rohmer's exceptionally biased book has been shown up by later scholarship as inaccurate and badly researched.

It is likely that Mr Rohmer swallowed the self-serving revisionism in Bradley's post war memoirs, and missed Bradley's quite candid admission elsewhere that he and he alone stopped Patton from advancing to close the gap without reference to Monty (who is quite unfairly the target of Rohmer's scorn). Bradley's reasoning (better a firm shoulder at Argentan than a broken neck at Falaise) may or may not appeal to you, but it certainly cannot be attributed to Monty.

The preposterous allegations that Monty deliberately forced Bradley and Patton to stay where they were out of personal spite, nationalistic vanity and a desire to take all the credit have not a shred of evidence behind them, and probably say more about the author than the subject.

The level of research that (did not) go into this work can be seen in the inflated figures for the number of Germans that escaped through the Falaise Gap, estimated by Mr Rohmer at 200-250,000 with "enormous" of tanks and other vehicles. In fact German records record that barely 20,000 escaped, mostly non-combatant troops at that....six panzer divisions were left with barely a hundred tanks between them. A mere 1,000% error in accuracy.

Carlo D'Este's "Decision in Normandy", perhaps the equal top work of scholarship on the Normandy campaign, does an excellent job of comprehensively tearing Mr Rohmer's shabby conclusions to pieces. Only the personal recollections have value. Students of the Normandy campaign should avoid this book at all costs.