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The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present (Cornell Studies in Security Affairs)

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The Peace of Illusions may be the most important book on America's security strategy published in the last decade. Layne accomplishes three difficult feats, when achieving even one would have been impressive. He provides a controversial yet well-documented interpetation of U.S. grand strategy since the end of the 1930s. At the same time, he shows convincingly that Washington's current approach to world affairs does not serve the best interests of the American people and is ultimately doomed to failure. Finally, he articulates an alternative grand strategy--"offshore balancing"--that would reduce America's costs and risks and prove to be far more sustainable.

In his historical analysis, Layne argues that the United States has consistently pursued global dominance since the early days of World War II. Probably the most controversial thesis in the Peace of Illusions is the argument that Washington would have embraced such a strategy during the Cold War era even if the Soviet Union had not existed. Layne attributes much of the U.S. drive for global hegemony to the goal of maintaining a liberal world economic order--the "open door." In advancing that thesis, he builds on the work of a number of "revisionist" historians and economists, most notably William Appleman Williams. Critics may contend, with some justification, that Layne overstates the open door thesis and does not give sufficient weight to other factors, including the impact of crusading idealism on U.S. policymakers. Nevertheless, it is hard to rebut his case that the United States, instead of adopting a more sober and restrained foreign policy following the demise of the USSR, has expanded both the definition of its interests and the aggressivness of its pursuit of those interests. Washington's conduct since 1989 tracks perfectly with a strategy of global hegemony.

Layne does an even better job of demonstrating how Washington's current security strategy is needlessly costly in blood and treasure. His analysis of the Iraq debacle is especially devastating, but he shows that Iraq is not an aberration. The current imperial overstretch is now, and promises to be in the future, a bipartisan folly. Layne builds a compelling case that a hegemonic strategy has invariably led to the demise of previous great powers, and that a similar fate awaits the United States unless there is a change in course.

And Layne has an appealing alternative security strategy--America as offshore balancer. Other scholars have used different terms, such as strategic independence and balancer of last resort, to describe such a strategy, but the principles remain the same. Instead of trying to be the global policeman (or even worse, the global armed social worker), the United States needs to adopt a more selective and restrained foreign policy. Contrary to proponents of the current policy, this alternative is not "isolationism"--a vacuous slur designed to stifle intelligent debate. It is, however, a policy that focuses on defending America's vital interests instead of trying to remake the entire planet in America's image at the point of bayonets or cruise missiles. Layne does an extremely good job of building the case for an alternative grand strategy.

The Peace of Illusions is one of those rare books that anyone who is interested in America's future in the international system needs to read. It is a book that should spark a badly overdue debate on the direction of U.S. foreign policy.

Many of the problems stemming from George W. Bush's grand

neoconservative crusade are practical, resulting from the sort of

mistakes to be expected from a gaggle of arrogant incompetents.

Iraq, of course, is the most obvious example, but by no means the

only one.

Also fundamentally flawed, however, are the principles

behind the Bush program. At these the redoubtable Chris Layne

takes aim.

Layne is a professor at Texas A&M University. He has long

been writing trenchant articles and studies attacking the

imperialist temptation, and especially the idea that the end of

the Cold War allows--no, mandates--that Washington manage the

rest of the globe down to the most insignificant civil war and

local disturbance.

The culmination of Layne's work is The Peace of Illusions,

which focuses on matters of American grand strategy. The book is

a serious read, but a necessary one if you want to understand why

current policy would still have been a disaster even if Bush &

Company hadn't been guided by fantasies when attempting to

implement their vision. It is the imperialist vision itself that

is flawed.

Layne's analysis is thoroughly substantive, a sharp contrast

especially with so much of the junk pouring forth from alleged

"conservative thinkers." And the work is historical, recognizing

that what happened yesterday still matters today. Layne explores

the relationship between current controversies, past events,

current players, and past strategies.

It is a modern cliche to term books a "must read," but The

Peace of Illusions surely is a must read for anyone who wants to

understand and especially to change U.S. foreign policy.

Christopher Layne's work The Peace of Illusions is a book published on the onset of a new millennium. It is a book about hegemony and preponderance and equally a book about grand strategies. More precisely, it is about US hegemony and US grand strategy. Layne argues that in order for the US to preserve its preponderant role in the world affairs a strategy of off-shore balancing is required. America could remain the main player in international affairs without necessarily engaging in costly and dangerous wars of expansion.

In order to convince the reader that he is right, Layne wrote a book whose intellectual foundation is three-fold. First, at the theoretical level Layne offers probably the best taxonomy of realist theories. In the present academic world in which notions such as defensive or offensive realism are often open to debate and more often not clearly understood or, by the same token, not clearly defined, Layne's book brings precious theoretical clarifications. The author does not seek to find out what the foundation of a certain theoretical approach is or may have promised to be. Layne already knows all that. He shares his theoretical knowledge with the reader in a clear and direct language which makes his sophisticated analysis of theories of international politics accesible to the intellectual reader, regardless of his background. Layne's theoretical analysis is at the same time a taxonomy and a superb in-depth analysis of realism.

Second, for those readers out there, political scientists, as well as, historians who believe that America's grand strategy since 1940s until the present was driven only by the noble purpose of saving the world from all sorts of -isms such as communism, totalitarianism. authoritarianism, or terrorism, Layne's interpretation of historical accounts would seem at the least bizarre. Some of the readers, possible, will be left with a bitter taste in their mouth. Layne's historical accounts are mostly drawn from primary sources. By doing so Layne comes to the conclusion that open door policy considerations ans liberal ideologies have pushed the US on a dangerous way of expansion. Those two factors have become the driving engine behind America's strategy of expansion. Certainly, those who believe that the US joined NATO solely for the noble purpose of defending Western Europe, or got involved in Iraq for the purpose of defending its citizens and the whole "free" world from terrorists who were not there to begin with before the US invasion, Layne's argument may seem outrageous. However, for those readers who are willing to pose and think twice, Layne's argument makes perfect sense.

Third, in order to preserve American preponderance in the world for a longer period of time, Layne proposes a strategy of off-shore balancing. Layne's claim is based on the propositions that the US has the best military in the world and, at the same time, a sheltered geographical position. Therefore America can defend itself at any time from any kind of massive invasion, or to use a new security studies' jargon, from any kind of existential threat. That is to say that the US is two oceans away from any possible serious competitor, which can make a bid for hegemony. And in a metaphorical sense, the US is "two oceans way" from WWI Europe whose appetite for war could be very well explained by offensive realism. Bringing theory and history together in a masterful way, Layne's concludes his work with a plea for a strategy of off-shore balancing aimed at preserving US preponderance in the world. Let me be clear. Layne does not believe that US primacy will last forever. He certainly heard about the law of entropy and read Paul Kennedy's work. However, Layne believes that by following an off-shore balancing strategy America can maintain its preponderance in the world for a longer period of time, and, very importantly could be much safer.

Layne's book is a masterpiece: a work of intelligence and creativity - based on impressive research - that must be applauded; however, before all that it must be read.

Layne's analysis is well-researched, and his conclusions - basically to heed the logic of balance of power - are typical and parsimonious realist fare, to which the U.S. might very well need to somewhat take onboard. Unfortunately, here's hoping U.S. policy-makers don't read too much into Layne's rather hyperbolic version of realism. With a much too heavy use of counterfactuals, Layne seems to contend that all of U.S. grand strategy since 1940 has been fundamentally flawed, and that we would have been better off to do as another like-minded realist has quipped: "liberalism at home, Machiavelli abroad."

This conclusion is reached through a fundamentally flawed conflation between description and explanation. Realism is a good explanation of realpolitik behavior, but it is not a description of such behavior in the world. As Layne's book shows - and though I fear he fails to realize this - realpolitik behavior is not inevitable. Thus, the reasoning for acting so crumbles under Layne's own evidence. He thinks we need to be more realistic because that's the way the world works. But, his evidence shows that the world doesn't actually work this way. Ah, so much wasted ink and paper.

For a much more nuanced and cogent book on the same topic see Nau's 2002 book "At Home Abroad." He deftly combines the insights of realism as explanation with the empirical realities of a sometimes non-realist world. Layne would do well to pick it up as well, or to re-read the realist fore-fathers (early) Morgenthau and Carr to see where he has gone so wrong.