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Pearl Harbor: Final Judgement

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This book is misnamed, but otherwise an outstanding and essential work regrading the causes of and responsibility for the Pearl Harbor debacle. It sinks outright the majority of the Pearl Harbor conspiracy theories, and destroys most of the supports for the remainder.

Henry Clausen, at the time a major in the Army JAG corps, was appointed by Secretary of War Stimson in 1944 to reinvestigate the disaster at Pearl Harbor when it became apparent that the Army Board investigating Pearl Harbor received tainted testimony designed to prevent disclosure of the secret of Magic. Magic--information gained by breaking Japanese codes--was considered absolutely vital to the war effort and false testimony was given to prevent its disclosure. When it became apparent that these measures were distorting the proper evaluation of what took place at Pearl Harbor, Stimson ordered a new investigation by Clausen.

In order to circumvent the veil of secrecy around Magic, Clausen was granted access to Magic and permitted to carry certain pertinent Magic documents in an incendiary pouch to aid in deposing witnesses in his investigation. Presentation of the documents as Clausen's bona fides of being in on Magic club permitted witnesses to speak freely to him. But Clausen found not only lies designed to protect Magic, but to cover up individual failings.

What Clausen does best in this narrative of his investigation and testimony before the Congressional Pearl Harbor investigation is explain why General Short and Admiral Kimmel lack any semblance of a legitimate defense. Having had access to Magic, as well as War and Navy Department communications logs, Clausen lays out in sequence the warnings that Short and Kimmel received from their superiors, but later claimed they had lacked. He clearly draws an analogy between their performance of their duties and those of a sentry asleep at his post. This very effectively yanks the rug out from under the growing sympathy campaign for these two historical figures.

Clausen then goes farther and identifies twelve more individuals who contributed to the debacle, uncovering some little-known details of certain persons' roles and actions. He is on target in these evaluations which set on edge a number of revisionist "truths" that have come to light in recent years. The credibility of the late Rear Admiral Layton is particularly damaged.

However, although he cites Colonel Bratton for his failure to ensure that his deputy, Colonel Dusenbury, performed properly, Clausen fails to take the point far enough and misses a few contributory players. This might be a result of Clausen's freely admitted status as "a civilian lawyer in uniform" with no military officer training. As a result he misses the larger application of the principle he applies to Bratton, in which officers at higher levels of organization bear responsibility for the proper organization of subordinate levels.

Thus, General Marshall, General Miles, Admiral Stark, Admiral Noyes, Admiral Wilkinson, and Admiral Bloch escape Clausen's list of parties whose contributory negligence helped make the disaster through poor organization of the War and Navy Departments for war, and more particularly the poor organization of their Intelligence, Communications and War Plans divisions. However, he does successfully demonstrate that General Marshall and Admiral Stark were not guilty of any criminal negligence in the fashion of Short and Kimmel, both officers having transmitted appropriate warnings to their subordinates in Hawaii.

Hence, Clausen's work cannot be the "Final Judgement" claimed in the title.

It does, however, admit a breeze to clear away some of the smoke that obscures the truth about Pearl Harbor and permits conspiracy theories to thrive. It graphically demostrates that Pearl Harbor resulted from a systemic gaffe, personal failings and mundane events. By ordering and condensing the information received by Short and Kimmel, it becomes readily apparent exactly what they received in the way of warnings. By including previous correspondence discussing the hazard of air attack on Pearl Harbor, and anxiety about the issue,from the War and Navy Secretaries down to the Hawaiian commanders, Clausen dispels the notion that such an attack was inconceivable to the American leadership. Rather, it was a foremost concern.

Clausen also brings out the essential irrelevance of the "Winds Code Messages" by revealing that they governed a contingency that did not occur: disruption of communications with Japanese diplomatic posts before the onset of hostilities. Thus, looking for the Winds Code activation message as a precursor for war was faulty logic. Communications with Japanese diplomatic posts were not disrupted before hostilities and therefor there was no need to transmit the activation message. This did not, however, prevent US command and intelligence personnel from fooling themselves into looking for said message as an essential precursor to war.

Clausen also exposes the awkward arrangements made for decoding intercepted messages and the even more amateurish method of their distribution, tracking and routine destruction for security reasons. He further reveals the extent of stove-piping in the Army and Navy Intelligence divisions and the inter-service politics and rivalries that impeded the proper sharing and dissemination of priceless Magic-derived information.

Clausen's work is an essential one for understanding what happened to make Pearl Harbor an easy target. Do not be put off by its seeming Army-bias at times (Clausen's actually very fair if you read him impassively), or Clausen's causal and almost flip narrative, or Lee's imperfect editorial effort: pay attention to the facts being laid out and the conclusions being drawn. Then ask yourself if they make sense. I suspect after reading this work, you won't give a Pearl Harbor conspiracy theorist the time of day.

Also recommended: Prange's "At Dawn We Slept" and supporting volumes by Prange and his research staff, as well as Lord's more poetic narrative "Day of Infamy" and Layton's sometimes self-serving insider perspective "And I was there..." Toland's "Infamy" can be read for familiarity with the underpinnings of the conspiracy theories. ....

I originally read this book about eight years ago, but I recently finished reading it for the second time, and I got much more out of it than the first time through. Henry C. Clausen, a San Francisco lawyer with his own practice, was appointed by Secretary of War Henry Stimson to conduct a thorough investigation of the Pearl Harbor disaster after it was discovered that there may have been some tainted testimony with the recently completed Army Pearl Harbor Board investigation. Armed with "Magic" decrypts in a "bomb pouch" which Clausen was to detonate if captured, he set off to take affidavits from the key personnel involved in the Pearl Harbor disaster.

According to the book, from November, 1944 to September, 1945, Clausen traveled more than 55,000 miles and interviewed over one hundred U.S. and British Army, Navy, and civilian personnel. Clausen had the authority from Stimson to go anywhere and interview anyone under oath from enlisted personnel up to General George C. Marshall. After completing his investigation, Clausen presented an 800 page report which revealed a massive failure by the United States to use the intelligence obtained months before the Pearl Harbor attack.

The crux of Clausen's investigation centered on the failure of the Army and Navy to share intelligence. It was the Navy's responsibility to share their intelligence with the Army, but, according to Clausen's investigation, this did not happen. Clausen also faulted Admiral Kimmel and General Short for failing to correctly interpret Washington's war warning message dated November 27, 1941. Among the other charges leveled by Clausen against Kimmel and Short were Kimmel's failure to share intelligence with the Army and his own staff, while Short was charged with failing to defend the fleet, failing to adequately prepare to assume command in Hawaii, failing to alert his forces of the probability of a surprise attack, failing to conduct reconnaissance, and failing to communicate effectively with Kimmel.

Clausen names others who were responsible in his investigation, from Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner's attempt to take over Naval intelligence and assuming that Pearl Harbor had a "Purple" machine, to Fleet Intelligence Officer Edwin Layton, who failed to keep the Army abreast of intelligence developments by not following Kimmel's directive to deliver intelligence to the Army in person. Others are listed as well, but these four men, especially Kimmel and Short, bear much of the responsibility for Pearl Harbor, according to Clausen.

Clausen was called as a witness before the Congressional hearings to testify about his findings. He did a masterful job of handling the committee's questions, and managed to sway the thinking of several of the committee members.

I highly recommend this fine book. Written in the first person by Clausen himself, he takes the reader on an incredible journey that uncovered many falsehoods and half-truths while, in my opinion, accurately identifying the persons directly responsible for the disaster at Pearl Harbor. The only part of the book where I felt Clausen spent too much time on was the "Winds" message. He admitted himself that he devoted perhaps too much time to this one issue, but this is a minor point which does not take anything away from the book. Colonel Clausen did his country a remarkable service by completing such a fine investigation. His methods were precise and produced the desired results. I believe that Clausen's report accurately identifed who was to blame for the attack. There is an excellent appendix section in the book which contains many of the "Magic" intercepts which Clausen used in his investigation. Read this excellent work of history and find out who was responsible for the attack on Pearl Harbor.

This book is a major contribution to the understanding of who was really responsible for Pearl Harbor. Although Clausen's report (and his subsequent testimony) are part of the record of the Congressional investigation, his description of how he actually pursued his inquiry helps to fit each witness's affidavit into context. Clausen's colorful (and sometimes humorous) narrative of the course of his investigation makes this book highly readable, and his insightful and lawyerly evaluation of his witnesses and their testimony is a great aid to those who truly seek answers about why America was surprised at Pearl Harbor.

The book is not without its flaws, however. Clausen was conducting an Army investigation; thus the majority of his witnesses are from the Army, and when he did interview Navy personnel, his lines of inquiry were limited to obtaining information that was relevent to mistakes that might have been made by the Army. Thus, his point of view is necessarily limited. In his list of the 14 people most responsible for Pearl Harbor, he has Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner in a tie for fourth-place on the list, but Clausen never even interviewed the Admiral--this great level of culpability is not satisfactorily explained in either the text or the list. Clausen does refer to the subsequent Congressional investigation's having answered that question, however, and reading the Congressional report does explain it. Also, amazingly, Clausen fails to assign any significant blame to Admiral Claude Bloch, who was commandant of the 14th Naval District (Hawaii) and Base Defense Officer for Pearl Harbor. Clausen also gets a few minor facts wrong that make it clear he's not a professional historian--for example, the Army did not have any P-39s at Pearl Harbor, and General Short did not attend West Point.

In answer to some of the criticisms raised by other reviewers: Clausen does have some biases, but he's very open about them. He explains, in his Congressional testimony, why he couldn't investigate Stimson--Congress directed Stimson to conduct the investigation. As for protecting Marshall, Clausen quotes Stimson's endorsement to the Army Board report--Marshall was not responsible for the day-to-day management of the War Plans Division(it is worth noting, however, that Marshall still accepted the blame for not noticing that Short had not gone to the proper state of alert, even though he couldn't recall having seen Short's reply, and General Gerow had previously admitted to making the error). Clausen's story should also put to rest, once and for all, the revisionist canard that Stimson sent him around the world to browbeat witnesses into reversing their testimony in order to protect the Chief of Staff. I would also point out that one of the other reviewers seems to have confused the terms "anecdote" and "sworn statement."

Finally, on the subject of Clausen's giving the "government version," is it unreasonable to expect one of the chief government investigators to give that version? The whole statement is loaded, and has clear revisionist implications. Kimmel and Short were not "scapegoats"; as Prang states, this word implies that they were blameless. They were clearly not, and Clausen proves it with sworn testimony. The evidence against Short is frankly damning, though I'm sure some revisionists will attempt to explain it away. Short failed to read the extensive briefing materials that his predecessor, General Herron, had carefully prepared for him to study during his 5-day voyage to Hawaii in February 1941. Furthermore, he chose an officer with no intelligence experience or training to be his intelligence chief, rather than the officer with intelligence training and experience (who was recommended by Herron), simply because Short didn't want an unwashed reservist as part of his inner circle. Had Short bothered to study the material (or simply asked around) he would have discovered that alerts did not alarm the civilian population, and that Herron considered the risk of sabotage to be minimal. Kimmel failed to share crucial intelligence with Short (as he'd been directed). Finally, the two commanders had been ordered to confer and cooperate, but Short simply assumed that the Navy knew where the Japanese carriers were, and was conducting reconnaisance patrols; Kimmel assumed that Short was alert against air attack, and using his radar.

This book should be on the shelf of everyone who's interested in Pearl Harbor--right next to At Dawn We Slept.

Pearl Harbor - Final Judgement is a behind the scenes view of the War Department's efforts to address deficiencies in the separate Army and Navy commissions that studied the failures prior and on December 7, 1941.

The Author, Henry Clausen was appointed by the Secretary of War to address deficiencies noted in the earlier investigations. Assisting Clausen was Bruce Lee who assisted Admiral Layton in writing "At Dawn We Slept" and other historical examinations of the Pearl Harbor disaster.

"Final Judgement" is about Clausen's efforts to find out what was our intelligence posture and what did we do with what was available. Clausen's investigation and the journey to find the truth is fascinating. Many significant findings in this book has never been addressed before.

I read the book as a retired Army officer familiar with inter-service rivalries. Clausen's "civilian" perspective assisted him greatly. If Clausen had viewed the events as a career military person, I doubt he would have taken the chances he did. I can only imagine the consternation his investigation certainly caused because he could not be touched.

Final Judgement rings of truth finally brought to light. One suspects a "911" report will come out 50 years later and reveal what our contemporaries did not want us to know. This is what Final Judgement is all about. Great read with real insights.

First of all, it should be stated what this book isn't: it isn't a detailed account of the attack or an introduction to the subject matter of the Pearl Harbor. It does not touch upon the Japanese planning, strategic thinking, or preparations. Nor is it a comprehensive account of all the errors which contributed to the disaster. For this reason, it would not be a good choice for a first read on the subject of Pearl Harbor. It requires some background, and familiarity with the events and characters involved.

For those who have read several books on the subject, it is an invaluable source for information regarding the attack, and an intelligent and honest assessment of blame for US unpreparedness to meet the challenge. This book sheds light on, and reveals facts and circumstances previously unpublished. Clausen was in a unique position in history, appointed by Secretary of War Stimson to investigate the causes of the defeat, and make recommendations to prevent its repetition. Empowered with broad orders commanding all officers to fully cooperate with his investigation, Clausen was able to conduct interviews and take affadavits of any commander he chose. Many of his witnesses testified before no other investigation. He also had access to documents, orders and correspondence which other histories do not mention.

For example, in assessing Gen. Short's performance, he includes excerpts of correspondence in early 1941 from Marshall specifically touching upon the danger of a Japanese air or submarine strike against Oahu, reminding Short that his primary task was to defend against these dangers. If the assessments contained in the Martin-Bellinger report were not enough to wake Short up, surely letters from the Chief of Staff should have been. Clausen also details the blunt assessment of Gen. Herron, Short's predecessor, as to Short's disinterest, lack of preparedness and poor performance in the job.

Clausen's assessments are frank and sometimes brutal. Contrary to suggestions that this book has an apologist bent toward the Army, Clausen spreads blame towards Marshall, Gerow, and the rest of the top brass, particularly within the intelligence apparatus. He similarly faults the Navy, for mishandling or in some cases hoarding intelligence. He casts a pox on both houses in Oahu, for failing to meaningfully liason and discuss the implications of the rapidly deteriorating US-Japanese relations, and the import of the warnings and information those commands had at their disposal.

Possessed of keen analytic skill, Clausen's work, sources and insights demolish currently-published conspiracy theories as both venal and banal, based on false information, incomplete understanding, and in some cases even perjured testimony. As detailed in this book, the flaws in the system of handling and interpreting intelligence, coupled with the human flaws in command, are more than enough explanation without relying on an intellectually vapid pablum of deceit and simplistic bogeymen.

Pearl Harbor: Final Judgement was written by the Secretary of War's Special Investigator, Henry C. Clausen. In his investigation Clausen had access to all of the Department of War's Top Secret decoded documents and interviewed 92 individuals under oath. Clausen shows that several "war alerts" were sent to all of the Pacific commanders in late November and early December 1941, and Hawaii had been specifically ordered to conduct reconnaissance. Then on December 6, Roosevelt was shown 13 Japanese messages sent to the Japanese embassy that had been intercepted and decoded. FDR realized that it meant Japan was going to war with the US. FDR did not know where the Japanese fleet was nor where Japan would strike, but he called General Short in Hawaii that night. The problem was that Admiral Kimmel was not sharing intelligence with General Short and both of the Hawaii commanders had concluded on November 28 that Japan would strike in the Far East, Thailand, Malaya, the Netherlands East Indies, or the Philippines and "no immediate activity beyond possible sabotage was to be expected in Hawaii."

It was a very interesting story as Clausen was an experienced attorney and prosecutor. He was very skillful in putting all of the evidence together and then questioning the witnesses while showing them pertinent documents that would prevent them from giving a BS story. It was fascinating how Clausen pieced it all together to determine who was culpable in the Pearl Harbor tragedy.

Note that this book was released by several publishers. Other copies of the book and more reviews can be found at Pearl Harbor : Final Judgement.

Pearl Harbor: Final Judgement was written by the Secretary of War's Special Investigator, Henry C. Clausen. In his investigation Clausen had access to all of the Department of War's Top Secret decoded documents and interviewed 92 individuals under oath. Clausen shows that several "war alerts" were sent to all of the Pacific commanders in late November and early December 1941, and Hawaii had been specifically ordered to conduct reconnaissance. Then on December 6, Roosevelt was shown 13 Japanese messages sent to the Japanese embassy that had been intercepted and decoded. FDR realized that it meant Japan was going to war with the US. FDR did not know where the Japanese fleet was nor where Japan would strike, but he called General Short in Hawaii that night. The problem was that Admiral Kimmel was not sharing intelligence with General Short and both of the Hawaii commanders had concluded on November 28 that Japan would strike in the Far East, Thailand, Malaya, the Netherlands East Indies, or the Philippines and "no immediate activity beyond possible sabotage was to be expected in Hawaii."

It was a very interesting story as Clausen was an experienced attorney and prosecutor. He was very skillful in putting all of the evidence together and then questioning the witnesses while showing them pertinent documents that would prevent them from giving a BS story. It was fascinating how Clausen pieced it all together to determine who was culpable in the Pearl Harbor tragedy.

Note that this book was released by several publishers. Other copies of the book and more reviews can be found at Pearl Harbor : Final Judgement.

Henry C. Clausen was a special investigator for Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson during World War II, with authority to question anyone, anywhere, to get to the bottom of what happened at Pearl Harbor ... and, more specifically, to determine whether any military officials lied to the various Congressional investigations of the attack. He presented his boss with an 800-page report, later published as Volume 35 of the official government report on the attack. Five decades later (this book was first published in 1992), Clausen is still defending the approved, government-issue-circa-1946 interpretation of events.

Clausen himself identifies what's wrong with his book in his Foreword: 'In writing the behind-the-scenes story of my investigations at Pearl Harbor, I do so not as a historian but as an insider. I also do so as a lawyer... Facts are the nails that the prosecutor uses to seal his case for the jury.'

It's precisely because Clausen is (was?) an attorney and an insider that he believes he can render a 'Final Judgement' about the attack. Historians, on the other hand, recognize that history is never 'sealed.' Like any prosecutor -- especially a self-proclaimed insider -- Clausen's goal is to represent his employer, the government. This is particularly evident in the zeal with which he defends the government's decades long fingering of Admiral Kimmel and General Short as the men primarily responsible for the disaster on December 7.

Clausen's objectivity is also brought into question by his frequent praise of his boss Secretary Stimson ('one of the greatest public servants in the history of America' [p. 238]). How clear-sighted is Clausen likely to be when pronouncing 'final judgment' on circumstances where his mentor and friend played a key role and arguably bears a share of guilt?

To give credit where it's due, Clausen is a skilled attorney. The first-person story of his investigations is an interesting one, and a useful addition to Pearl Harbor historiography. Add his contributions to the larger picture of the attack, but don't let him convince you that he's come anywhere near a 'final judgment.'

While it has a notable title, and with its co-author being Bruce Lee (he being the editor of another Pearl Harbor work), the text is simply a re-hash of prior materials.

But, having set that as a datum, there are several items which might be of profit for some who are less inquisitive. These items include, for example:

A. Pages 136-136 - Message No. 519 as triggered by the "Winds Execute" receipt, the destruction by burning of enormous numbers of message traffic, and the Japanese attack on the A-3 scrambler telephone.

B. Pages 191-193 - Massive perjury, including that old chestnut of Marshall's whereabouts on the night of December 6, 1941.

C. Page 270 - The "higher oath" that led to conflicted testimony before various investigations, the whole truth and nothing but the truth - but not quite. Imagine US military personnel lying and admitting it to Clasen.

D. Pages 353 and 373 - Note that Japanese Naval Codes are in Singapore and Bangkok.

E. Page 367 - Ribbentrop's (from November 28, 1941) comment that Germany will go to war if Japan goes to war with America, and not seek a separate piece with England. So, FDR knew that Germany would declare war. [And so did Churchill, who upon seeing this PURPLE message, noted that comment in red ink.]

F. Page 410 - The note pointing to the numbers of messages that had to be gotten from British copies of traffic - so complete was the purposeful housecleaning done on the US archives. [This should be a flag to some: The "Winds Execute" will not be found in a US file, but rather in that of the Allies.]

Overall, a text to be aware of - warts and all.

Henry Clausen, now exposed by new research, will be remembered as another "company man" who tried to cover-up, and in some cases, shut-up, some of the principals involved in the scandal and protect the careers of Marshall and Stark.

He picked up where Rear Admiral Leigh Noyes started. Noyes, the Navy's Director of Communications, was the individual responsible for instituting a 54 year censorship policy that consigned all radio intercepts and memoranda to the Navy vaults...and he did this on December 11, 1941. Then, he put out the directive, "Destroy all notes and anything in writing."

The clean-up continued with Henry Clausen contacting every key witness and coercing and threatening them to change their testimony.

An interesting book...but a fatally flawed judgment, and definitely not final by any means.