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The Pearl Harbor Myth: Rethinking the Unthinkable (Military Controversies)

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The author asks a series of questions about Pearl Harbor:

Did U.S. intelligence know of Japan's coming attack on Pearl Harbor? His answer is, Yes. There were a lot of warnings. This question, however, really needs to be expanded. Yes, there were a lot of warnings, or maybe you'd call them hints of warnings. These were received by lots of people, mostly at a lower level. After the war they reported that they had passed these warnings along to upper management. (What else could you expect them to say?) Upper management said they never got them. (What else could you expect them to say?) So my answer is: Some people had warnings. U.S. Intelligence did not at a senior level have a solid consensus.

He asks: Did President Roosevelt know? If he did, he took it to the grave with him. I think he expected an attack by Japan somewhere in the pacific but he didn't expect it to hurt as much as it did. Did he know Pearl Harbor, I think he expected elsewhere.

Was there a coverup? Absolutely. Would you admit knowing in advance and not doing anything? Only if you had some desire to spend some time in Leavenworth.

Did the US have disguised combat operations that began six months before the Pearl Harbor attack? I don't know about them being disguised, but we were escorting merchant ships part way across the Atlantic.

Conclusion. Mr. Victor believes a conspiracy was responsible for Pearl Harbor. I tend to not believe in a conspiracy when simple incompetence can account for what happened. Especially in this case where the Americans believed that the Japanese were so inferior. Mr. Victor does though present some very strong arguments that make his book interesting reading.

A text published for the sixty-fifith anniversary of the Pearl Harbor attack, Victor gives us a solid and balanced portrayal of the tensions in the world around that time, depicts the major geo-political actors, and provides excellent background information on their respective goals and constraints, particularly the dynamics of the Japanese governmental system.

This book is a very ambitious undertaking which approaches this period with a reasoned viewpoint. It has a clear structure, a logical flow for the reader, and brings to bear a broad set of citations as supportive references.

While stressing that his position is not to pass "moral" judgments, particularly on FDR and his War Cabinet, Victor does overtly rationalize their purpose in using the Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor as bait, and hence the over-arching need to keep Kimmel and Short "in the dark" regarding the known pending attack on Pearl Harbor. That this is so is clearly demonstrated by the very well-known comment in the Knox Report (delivered December 15, 1941), the so-called "Knox December 6, 1941 midnight" Washington message, intended ONLY for Kimmel in Hawaii. That the message was never sent is the "smoking gun" and a stain on America's history and the credibility of those "court" historians who ignore its significance, if they are aware of it at all. And, wonder of wonders, that Knox message has never been found - imagine that!

The risk of alerting the Kido Butai was too great, the Japanese had to unambiguously "fire the first shot" ... and that deliberately thousands of lives were lost, that deliberately the Pacific Fleet was crippled, ... Well, the US just had to get into the war against Germany. If this sounds familar, kinda' like the "back door" theory - it should, as it was voiced well over a half-century ago. And, that thesis is correct.

For readers who do not know how the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor is linked to Germany's declaration of war against the US - a bit more noddling might help. The signal, via a 11.29.41 PURPLE message, of the German action was known to FDR, Churchill, and others days prior to Pearl Harbor - and had nothing to do with the terms of the Axis Tri-Partite Pact.

What Victor presents is old news for some. For those many others some revelations might include: (a) many offiicers are named who openly pointed to Pearl Harbor as the Japanese target, (b) the true reason Admiral "JO" Richardson was replaced, (c) that British DIP traffic was being read by the Japanese, (d) more than adequate resources, on a world-wide basis, to handle Japanese traffic (DIP and IJN), adding to what SRH-149 and SRH-255 already shows (d) highly competent deliberations and high-level decision-making to mask pending attack from Kimmel and Short, (e) the woes that were visited upon DugOut Doug and why, (f) FDR's personal quest to save Stalin and USSR, (g) whereabouts of FDR and his War Cabinet the night of December 6, 1941, ..., etc.

Today, as recent books such as Stinnett and Wilford have found their mark, the indefensible positions of "maintained absolute radio silence" and "could not read any of the IJN operational traffic" are clearly apparent. The current "fall back" position being pandered is akin to "noise" or a bureaucratic maze that interferred with actionable intelligence reaching the Washington decision-makers. Victor's text is the "Closing of the Door" on those excuses. That Kimmel and Short were "blinded" by Washington was INTENTIONAL!

Victor's (page 302) "Whether intentionally or not, Roosevelt exposed the fleet to a Japanese attack by stationing it in Hawaii. Then he intentionally used naval units as lures by ordering them on various expeditions in the Pacific. Withholding key information from Kimmel and Short increased the fleet's exposure greatly and it was most glaringly increased by not sending a warning on December 6, 1941.

Despite the history of war, the idea that Roosevelt withheld warnings from Kimmel and Short for the purpose of getting the United States openly into a European war is still unthinkable to many people, but to fewer and fewer as the years past. As has happened over time with other unthinkable acts, the repugnance aroused by the idea of using the Pacific Fleet as a lure will probably continue to fade."

Kimmel and Short need to be set free from the injustice of their bondage and of the tyranny against them. To do otherwise bespeaks the lack of integrity within the US government and the command structure of its military.

Has "Truth, Justice, and the Ameican Way" gone the way of the dodo?

Victor's book on the 'facts' of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor is certainly interesting and worth reading. His writing style leaves a bit to be desired, and his references are somewhat difficult to trace. However, on the whole, I'd recommend this book to those interested in this important event leading to the US entry into WW II.

As others have noted, Victor argues that FDR pushed Japan into war to save the USSR, stationed the fleet at Pearl as both a deterrent and bait, and "withheld warnings from Kimmel and Short for the purpose of getting the United States openly into the European war".

Before judging the merits of this position I wanted to get a feel for the basis the author was arguing from. The best way I know to do that is to examine his handling of the facts he presents to support his arguments. At best I found his handling of facts sloppy; at worst one could consider the presentation intellectually dishonest. Let's look at a set of examples from the book:

- "[Yamamoto's] idea was that planes would leave their carriers so far from Pearl Harbor that they could not return - that all the pilots, including Yamamoto, would give their lives. (Later he was persuaded to drop that idea.)" (pg 220)

This is an astonishing claim. Yamamoto was an important force in the creation of Japanese naval aviation. The Japanese training pipeline was geared towards turning out relatively small numbers of very skilled pilots and so could not recover from large losses quickly. Does it seem reasonable to assert Yamamoto would plan to throw this precious asset away on the first day of a war? There is no cite for this claim from Victor.

- "Seaman Robert Ogg of the navy's San Francisco office provided information.." (pg 47)

Ogg is the famous (infamous?) "Seaman Z" referenced by Toland (1982). Ogg might have some useful information to contribute, but he also brings much baggage. His original statements to Toland have not been fully released (AFAIK). He has subsequently made statements that cast significant doubt on Toland's claims, most notably in a 1983 interview with the Naval Security Group (available in the national archives). Victor's cite for the Ogg information is Toland. Victor is using a problematical secondary source here, and ignoring the conflicting primary source (Ogg NSG interview).

- "If - as it appears from the absence of records - Roosevelt made the decision [in July 1941] to arm the Philippines without staff work, then there was no feasibility study. And if so, there was no basis for deciding how many troops, planes, and so on were needed in the Philippines. (A study of how many planes were needed for defense was done after the decision)." (pg 197)

But there were numerous studies. The first of several relevant studies was submitted to the War Department from the Air Corps in October, 1939. The War Plans division submitted an updated version in February 1940. Other studies were done in both Washington and the PI. All of these are documented in Bartsch (2003). The disturbing point is that Victor cites Bartsch when it serves his purpose, but ignores the extensive information in Bartsch on the plans created. Asserting that information doesn't exist while at the same time having access to a reference with that information - well, that don't sound right.

- Victor notes that 1 PM in Washington was 7:30 AM in Hawaii. In one case he quotes LtCdr Kramer as pointing this out to Stark et. al. (pg 284)

The cite for this is the congressional Pearl Harbor Attack, vol 8. However, what Victor does not mention is that the same volume contains testimony that ONI worked out the time for not just Hawaii, but also the West Coast, Manila, and Tokyo. Kramer he also worked out the time for Kota Bharu, where it was just before dawn - "the normal time to institute amphibious operations". (Again, PHA, vol 8.) So while 1 PM in Washington was an 'interesting' time in Hawaii, it was if anything 'MORE interesting' in the Far East. Victor tells half the story here.

These are just a few of the examples that illustrate the sloppy/selective use of facts in this book. The extensive list of sources and footnotes appear impressive, but they need to be taken with a large grain of salt. Read the book if you will, but stop after every declarative sentence and decide for yourself if facts checked from other sources substantiate the claim.

There is no doubt that FDR recognized early the need/inevitability of the US becoming involved in WW2, and that he was less than honest with the US people about our actions preparing for that day (and our less than wholesome "neutrality"). However, I personally don't find the extreme claims of this book to be supported by accepted evidence or reasoning.

I enjoyed reading this book for way it gave a probable timeline of how things occurred around the time leading up to Pearl Harbor. Unfortunately, it is not able to add anything to the discussion of what happened to allow Pearl Harbor to occur.

The author is unable to give any support to his second guesses as to why things happened they way they did. My favorite is the supposed intercept by a German listening station of a message from Winston Churchill to President Roosevelt warning him about the attack. The only problem is that the expert the author quotes indicates that the intercept cannot be verified as being authentic and is most probably a fake. If you are going to include something in a book, at least have someone try to support the item.

I have read many books about Pearl Harbor since it is a very interesting point of history for our country. This book definitely falls into the "Revisionist" camp since it assumes Roosevelt knew the attack was happening, but did nothing to stop it or warn the commanders there.

As I said, this book is interesting to read as long as you think of it as alternate history and not true verifiable history.

Over the years, a group of revisionists (John Toland et. al) have developed a theory that President Roosevelt somehow knew in advance that Pearl Harbor was going to be attacked, yet he failed to give Admiral Kimmel and General Short ample warning. Add author George Victor to the list of revisionists, for that is what this book is; pure revisionist theory.

This book contains all of the usual occurances which revisionists refer to when trying to pin the blame on FDR (the Winds Execute message, the three ships incident, the Lurline, etc). Granted, Victor makes complelling arguments regarding each instance, but there is very little information supporting his arguments. The main thesis is that Kimmel and Short were withheld vital information, and that may be partially true, but, the fact is, Kimmel and Short were woefully unprepared, and much of it was their own doing.

Victor devotes an entire chapter to the Novemebr 27th "War Warning" message. He argues that Kimmel and Short did exactly what they were supposed to do as far as their orders were concerned, yet, the attack was still successful. Victor also argues that the message itself was unclear. How unclear could it have been? The message stated directly at the top that it was to be considered a war warning. Its not FRD's fault that his top two commanders could not interpret a message directing them to be on alert for a possible attack! Despite not being provided with every bit of intelligence available, I believe that Kimmel and Short received enough information to deduce that an attack was a distinct possibility.

The book itself is well-researched and well-written, and much of the information contained within has just been recently made available. I, however, do not believe that FDR knew that Pearl Harbor was going to be attacked and deliberately kept his commanders in the dark. The author makes a point for this possibility by describing acts by presidents Polk, Lincoln, and McKinley which drew the U.S. into war. However, I believe Victor is incorrect in his analysis of FDR. I believe that Roosevelt had a pretty good idea that the U.S. was going to be attacked. I also believe that he didn't know exactly where the attack was going to occur. There were many more distinct possibilities than Pearl Harbor (Kra peninsula, Philippines, Panama Canal to mention a few). The sad fact is, and this wasn't really pointed out by Victor, is that the Japanese executed a completely flawless attack. We cannot blame FDR for Japan's perfect execution.

I did enjoy reading this book; I just don't agree with its conclusion.

The notion that FDR knew Pearl Harbor would be attacked and failed to advise military commanders in the Pacific has been debated now for over 60 years. This book is nothing more than another revisitation of the same topic. No earth shattering smoking gun exists. Rather, the credible evidence still suggests nothing more than that there was some information to suggest an attack could occur, somewhere, at some indefinite time, but the information was disregarded, never looked at in time, and/or failed to make its way up the chain of command.

Like 9/11, it is one thing to say that the signs were there but nobody managed to "connect the dots," but to suggest that the president silently but knowingly allowed the near-total destruction of our Pacific naval fleet is a stretch of grassy knoll proportions.

There is nothing wrong with arguing and debating this issue, but there is nothing here that would or should change any minds.

I've not yet read George Victor's book, "The Pearl Harbor Myth: Rethinking the Unthinkable." Indeed, I only found out about this book yesterday, Saturday, 26 May 2007, while reading a review on the book by Rear Admiral T.A. Brooks, USN (Ret.). Admiral Brooks' review is found on page 170 in the May 2007 issue of Naval Institute PROCEEDINGS.

Admiral Brooks is a 33 year veteran of the Navy. He retired in 1991 as Director of Naval Intelligence. (There were four DNI's in 1941, starting with RADM Walter S. Anderson and ending with Captain, later Vice Admiral Theodore S. Wilkinson.)

According to Admiral Brooks: "[Victor's] book presents three primary arguments: that FDR knew that a Japanese attack was coming and knew the target to be Pearl Harbor; that he deliberately provoked the Japanese into attacking; and there was a massive cover-up."

Having studied Pearl Harbor thoroughly---as my only job for over 13 years---I fully concur with the three primary conclusions listed above. There are a number of other books on Pearl Harbor that made these same conclusions over the years.

Admiral Brooks also states that "The Pearl Harbor Myth" is "one of the most scholarly and extensively footnoted works on the subject" published since Roberta Wohlstetter's "Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision" and Gordon W. Prange's "At Dawn We Slept." ("Prange's" ADWS was actually written by Donald M. Goldstein and Katherine V. Dillon, see Professor Goldstein's article in the December 2006 issue of Naval Institute PROCEEDINGS.)

This researcher began his own serious study of Pearl Harbor (on a part time basis) in the fall of 1983. He's still working on this very same subject 27 years later.

The undersigned believes that someday someone will "Close the Loop on Pearl Harbor." Intelligence isn't always used the way the average citizen (or typical historian) assumes it is used. Senior officials have many different matters to factor into the way they use intelligence (to say nothing of diplomacy).

I welcome yet another book on Pearl Harbor. This is a subject that every American should know about because the more we learn about our entry into World War II, the more we'll learn about the Greatest Good. We Americans need to think beyond self.

Andrew McKane IV, Missoula, Montana, 27 May 2007

When I wrote the above review--prior to reading Victor's book--I had not read the book. I knew what Victor did NOT say in his book. Therefore, I gave it only a two-star rating. I've since read Victor's book. I still give it just a two star rating. There are some great books on Pearl Harbor. But NO book or article yet published on Pearl Harbor has closed the loop on this topic. Three great books are R.B. Stinnett's DAY OF DECEIT, Professor G.W. Prange's, Professor D.M. Goldstein's and Katherine V. Dillon's AT DAWN WE SLEPT, and Paul Stillwell's AIR RAID: PEARL HARBOR! But keep in mind that these three books do NOT give their readers the full conclusion of just how good our (U.S.) intelligence was, and who all had that intelligence. Had they done so, they would have "closed the loop on Pearl Harbor."

One of my conclusions, and this one I will state without running it past DOD, is that, in my opinion, some of the books and articles published on Pearl Harbor (mostly by retired naval officers) are more disinformation than misinformation. Four such titles, and I can name others, are: "AND I WAS THERE": PEARL HARBOR AND MIDWAY - BREAKING THE SECRETS, by Layton, Pineau and Costello (1984); Captain Edward L. Beach's SCAPEGOATS: A DEFENSE OF KIMMEL AND SHORT AT PEARL HARBOR (1995); Fuzzy Theobald's THE FINAL SECRET OF PEARL HARBOR (1954), and ADMIRAL KIMMEL'S STORY (1955). I have very great respect for the late RADM E.T. Layton, Captain "Ned" Beach, RADM R.A. Theobald, and RADM H.E. Kimmel. It is my respect for these men that helps me beleive that our people may never be ready for all the facts related to just how good our intelligence was and how we developed our war plans (prior to 7 Dec. 1941).

My late father was a Navy doctor when I was growing up. I twice lived in Hawaii and went to school there while my dad was in the Navy. I served as a hospital corpsman in the Navy (1970-1971). I dearly love the United States Navy. I mean no offense to anyone who has written about Pearl Harbor.

Andrew McKane IV, Missoula, Montana, 0152, Sunday, 6 March 2011