Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power: The Emergence of Revolutionary China, 1937-1945 [Paperback]

Chalmers Johnson (Author)

Book Description

ISBN-10: 0804700745 | ISBN-13: 978-0804700740 | Publication Date: June 1, 1962 | Edition: 1

"Mr. Johnson's research on the Chinese Communists' wartime expansion, according to the documentation recorded by Japanese intelligence and his comparison of it with that of the Yugoslav Communists, is a pathbreaking work in comparative history."--John K. Fairbank.

Product Details

• Paperback: 268 pages
• Publisher: Stanford University Press; 1 edition (June 1, 1962)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 0804700745
• ISBN-13: 978-0804700740
• Product Dimensions: 8.5 x 5.5 x 1 inches
• Shipping Weight: 12.8 ounces (View shipping rates and policies)
• Average Customer Review: 3.7 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (3 customer reviews)
• Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #475,423 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)
  • #49 in Books > History > Europe > Yugoslavia

Customer Reviews

Most Helpful Customer Reviews

11 of 11 people found the following review helpful:

4.0 out of 5 stars Communism or Nationalism?, April 9, 2000

By 

Peter M. Waldvogel (Woodhaven, New York United States, and sometimes China) - See all my reviews
(REAL NAME)   

This review is from: Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power: The Emergence of Revolutionary China, 1937-1945 (Paperback)

In this well written thoughtful work Chalmers Johnson makes a strong case for what he sees as a more accurate approach to Chinese Communist history and the reasons for the success of the CCP where the KMT failed. For those of you who may be wondering how it was possible for the CCP to go from nearly being wiped out in Jiangxi to conquering all of China, this text has many feasible answers. It is also a clear study of the use of social mobilization and Nationalism in communist propaganda in both China and Yugoslavia. Johnson uses many Japanese sources, supporting his claim for the influence of the Japanese invasion of China(1931 or 1937 depending on your point of view) as a leading cause for the success of the CCP. For those who are interested in contemporary Chinese history and Asian geo-politics this book is GREAT! I would recomend it to any student of Asian studies.

5 of 5 people found the following review helpful:

3.0 out of 5 stars Great book, but a bit short-sided, November 2, 2005

By 

Lynnae Burns (Portland, OR) - See all my reviews
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This review is from: Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power: The Emergence of Revolutionary China, 1937-1945 (Paperback)

Since the Communist Party took power in 1949 several "theories" have been advanced in an attempt to understand what factors contributed to their success. Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power: The Emergence of Revolutionary China 1937-1945 by Chalmers A. Johnson advances a plausible and scholarly scenario. Johnson contends that a direct line can be drawn between the commencement of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937 and the Communist Party's ascension in 1949. According to Johnson the Communist Party failed to win popular support through Marxist ideology and economic reforms, and was in decline at the time of the Japanese invasion. The invasion caused a "mass awakening", and Chinese peasants suddenly saw themselves as a nation in the face of a foreign invader. Johnson calls this newfound sense of nationalism "Social Mobilization", and he claims that the Communist Party was the beneficiary of these new nationalistic tendencies.
Johnson gives several reasons why it was the Communist Party that benefited from social mobilization. He contends that the Japanese overextend their forces- taking large swaths of land that they could not occupy effectively. This initial drive pushed out Nationalist troops and civilian authorities- leaving behind a power vacuum. Because the Communist guerilla forces were more mobile they were able to enter these chaotic regions and provide organization and guidance for the peasantry. Additionally, Johnson argues that the Japanese identified the Communists as the primary enemy while the Kuomintang was courted as potential friends. This strengthened Communist claims that the Kuomintang were "collaborators", and increased Communist Party legitimacy in the eyes of many peasants. Finally, Johnson sites the brutality of Japanese soldiers toward Chinese peasants as a crucial factor in social mobilization. The Japanese repeatedly launched "mopping up" campaigns intended to find and kill Communists, but because they had no means to definitively identify Communists they arbitrarily murdered countless peasants. Naturally, the Chinese peasants utilized the Communist Party for aid and organization, further legitimizing their claims to authority and power.
Chalmers Johnson does set up a plausible scenario. Unfortunately he does not provide adequate support for his claims- making his argument less compelling than it could be. Firstly, Johnson relies principally on Japanese intelligence as primary sources- a questionable decision. A more complete set of sources including those of Chinese origin (Communist and KMT) would make his theory more persuasive. Secondly, the Chinese peasants did experience chaos and violence at the hands of the Japanese, and naturally wanted to fight back, but Johnson does not adequately explain how anti-Japanese sentiment resulted in de facto Chinese nationalism- hatred for an invading power does not necessarily result in a "mass awakening". Even if we accept that anti-Japanese sentiment resulted in Chinese nationalism, his theory does not explain Party support following the war when the Japanese were no longer a threat. Johnson explains post-war support by citing the legitimacy that the Communist Party gained through equating themselves with the nation as the true defenders of China, but he does not really explain how this translated into concrete Party support. Johnson proposes a narrow theory that fails to account for the overwhelming and sustained support necessary to propel the Chinese Communist Party to power. By ignoring complex factors such as economic reforms, charismatic leadership, and effective propaganda- Johnson's theory falls short.

3 of 3 people found the following review helpful:

4.0 out of 5 stars Review, August 16, 2005

By 

Gareth Davey (Britain) - See all my reviews

This review is from: Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power: The Emergence of Revolutionary China, 1937-1945 (Paperback)

This is an interesting book, well worth reading, and considered by many to be a "classic" amongst the Chinese Revolution literature. Although dated, it is still an important read for anyone endeavoring to fully comprehend the Chinese Communist victory in 1949. In this book, Chalmers Johnson argues that the peasants' nationalist orientation, in response to the Japanese invasion, underpinned the Communist Party's success. In other words, he contends that a peasant nationalist movement established the Chinese state, rather than a socialist one, and that nationalism outweighed other factors that may have also played a role.
Johnson supports his theory with two main lines of evidence; first, he argues that the Japanese occupation was a major factor because prior to invasion (the Jiangxi Soviet of the 1920s and 30s), the Party's land reform policies and Marxist-Leninist ideology did not win enough support. Johnson explains that the Communist Party's anti-Japanese response was considered, in rural areas, to be more successful than the Kuomintang's activities. Consequently, when the Japanese were defeated, a large proportion of the rural population (particularly in former occupied areas where Japanese savagery was witnessed first-hand) supported overwhelmingly the CCP during the civil war. According to this view, the term Communist was perhaps synonymous with the word patriot; thus joining the Communists was viewed as patriotic resistance to the Japanese. Second, Johnston compared the CCP victory with another nationalist victory, in former Yugoslavia, in which the German invasion was crucial for Communist success (comparisons were made between the resistance party in that country and the strategy of the CCP).
However, Johnson's argument remains controversial, and the book must be read with this in mind. Scholars (particularly those on the left in the 1970s) have challenged several aspects of Johnson's theory and methodology, and limit the book's theoretical underpinning. In particular, it has been claimed that the book is a complete reinterpretation of events, and there is a lack of factual evidence (Johnson relies on evidence such as Japanese intelligence, rather than Chinese communist sources). Johnson has also been regarded as an "elitist" because the book lacks focus on the mass majority. For these reasons, his book is perhaps less persuasive now than it once was. Moreover, the book's sole focus on peasant nationalism seems unbalanced, and therefore not necessarily a general academic overview of the revolution. Nonetheless, a good read for those interested in the debate about the factors that fuelled the Chinese Revolution.