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P'eng Te-huai: The Man and the Image

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"PENG TE-HUAI: THE MAN AND THE IMAGE" is a translation of the biography by Jurgen Domes, Stanford University Press, 165 pages hardback, 1985 and the book I grabbed to read in the airports and jetliners during a trip to China. Most Americans would recognize the name of General Douglass MacArthur but not his counterpart, General Peng, in the Korean conflict. Today, Peng Te-huai (Peng Dehuai in pinyin) has been justly restored as a national hero but his life was a hard lesson in the vagaries of party politics. Domes profiles his rise through the ranks in early warlord armies based on merit, his compassion for the peasants, his joining of the CCP armies, his role in the Long March, the battle against the Japanese, and the victory against the KMT. When the North Korean invasion of South Korea was repelled and MacArthur appeared likely to push to the border with China and wipe out the allied regime, Peng Te-huai was placed in charge of the People's Volunteer Army 400,000 strong which crossed into Korea and rapidly pushed back UN forces to a line below Seoul. At this point more American reinforcements halted the retreat. General Matt Ridgeway replaced General MacArthur and the battle eventually stalemated near the original border at the 38th parallel. [For those who watched the M*A*S*H programs, General Peng was the supreme general of the "enemy" forces.] His success, due to "human sea" tactics, was successful against better armed troops and total air control by UN forces--but with terrible loss of life. The new People's Republic of China considered the Korean War their first test at defense, and a success.
General Peng was a hero, granted "Marshal" status and became supreme commander of China's armed forces. However, during the Great Leap Forward of 1958-59 (impossible crop quotas, backyard smelting), Peng saw conditions in the countryside that contradicted the rosy reports being made to Beijing. When he spoke openly of the need to recognize and correct policy errors, this was taken as a challenge to Mao's authority. Mao threatened to step outside the political structure and begin the revolution again. Moderates, such as Chou En-lai, saw that Peng was correct but also did not want to split the Party. Peng was moved out. Lin Piao replaced him as the head of the military. Peng lived in severe hardship, with a slight respite before persecution by the Red Guards during the Cultural Revolution. He died a non-person in November 29, 1974. Mao died in 1976. By December 1978, with the "cult of four" denounced and the tragedy of the Cultural Revolution recognized, Peng was officially rehabilitated when Deng Xiaoping returned to power.
I have no reason to initiate political discussions while lecturing in China, but when I mentioned to some students that I was reading this biography of Peng, they were surprisingly knowledgeable: "Yes, how sad. Such a good man. Victim of the personality cult. That must never happen again." If this awareness is indeed a widespread feeling, I suspect that Peng would consider this a good legacy.