The Persian Puzzle: The Conflict Between Iran and America (Hardcover)

~ Kenneth Pollack (Author) "To understand the labyrinth of U.S.-Iranian relations, there are at least three things that you need to know about the seven millennia of Iranian history..." (more)
Key Phrases: unelected hands, former senior administration official, containment regime, United States, Reza Shah, Middle East (more...)

Editorial Reviews

From Publishers Weekly

When Pollack, formerly director for Gulf affairs at the National Security Council and a military analyst for the CIA, wrote The Threatening Storm: The Case for Invading Iraq in September 2002, he both shaped the debate over the imminent invasion and helped persuade many reluctant Democratic policy makers to support the war. This time around, he is much more cautious, concluding that although "Iran is on the wrong path and marching down it quickly," invasion would be a serious mistake. Part history lesson, part current affairs primer and part party policy memo, Pollack's new book about the second Axis of Evil member revolves around an extremely pressing question: would the acquisition of nuclear capabilities prompt the Iranians to disregard the threat of American intervention and pursue a more aggressive, destabilizing and dangerous foreign policy? Pollack cautions that there are two ticking clocks: the first is internal regime change in Iran and the second is how long it will take Iran to go nuclear. Ultimately, and with many codicils, Pollack decides that the U.S. can live with a nuclear Iran, postulating that through strong multilateral engagement we can effectively deter Iran, if not yet welcome the country into the world community. Analyzing the assumptions behind both American and Iranian foreign policy, Pollack reminds us that behind Iran's tendency to blame "everything but the weather on foreign subversion" lies a kernel of truth. The CIA did, in fact, overthrow Mossaddeq in 1953, although Americans, conveniently, "are serial amnesiacs; as a nation, we forget what we have done almost immediately after doing it." For anyone wanting to understand the stark choices the U.S. faces concerning Iran, and how to respond to them, this is the place to start.
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From The Washington Post

Rarely has a policy wonk made such a splash as Kenneth M. Pollack did two winters ago. His 2002 bestseller The Threatening Storm convinced hundreds of otherwise liberal opinion leaders -- and, in turn, thousands and possibly millions of their readers and viewers -- that invading Iraq was a good thing to do. Few read the book's final section, which laid out the steps Pollack insisted the United States take before roaring toward Baghdad (smashing al Qaeda and tamping down the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, among others). But Pollack too brushed aside his caveats, appearing on innumerable TV news shows to argue eloquently for war -- a campaign for which he has since apologized, claiming that he, too, had been snookered by bad intelligence.

Now the specter of Iran, whose nuclear ambitions and resources seem very real, looms before us. Another debate rages over what is to be done. And here comes Pollack with another all-too-pertinent book, The Persian Puzzle.

Many will be relieved, and others dismayed, that Pollack opposes war this time out. (In a clear reference to his earlier book, which was subtitled The Case for Invading Iraq, he labels one section of this new work "The Case Against Invading Iran.") An invasion, he notes, is impractical. Iran is four times as large as Iraq and three times as populous, and its terrain is forbiddingly mountainous; besides, as long as the United States is stuck in Iraq, there aren't enough troops. As for launching a coup, the CIA lacks assets; Iran's security apparatus is impenetrable; and, bitterly as most Iranians detest their regime, they hate interlopers even more.

The most tempting option is to bomb Iran's nuclear reactors, as the Israelis did with Iraq's Osiraq facility in 1981. But, Pollack laments, the Iranians -- precisely to avoid a repetition -- have dispersed their facilities in underground sites whose locations are unknown.

So what should we do? Alas, Pollack is as uncertain as everyone else. "There are no easy answers," he cautions in the book's introduction. It's "a problem from Hell. There simply is no school solution," he sighs on the penultimate page.

The Persian Puzzle is mainly a history, and Pollack -- a former Persian Gulf analyst for the CIA and the National Security Council -- grippingly narrates the last 50 years of U.S.-Iranian relations, a loopy psychodrama of mutual suspicion and tragic stumblings. Iran's behavior has been marked by deep paranoia. But Pollack recites an old saw: " 'Just because you're paranoid doesn't mean that someone's not out to get you.' And we were out to get them."

The dynamic was set in 1953, when the CIA helped overthrow Iran's president, Mohammad Mossadeq, and install Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. Pollack recounts this episode in absorbing detail, blaming both sides for the ensuing tensions. Mossadeq, "a true eccentric," rejected generous offers on oil profits that might have kept him in power for the sake of martyrdom. President Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles played into this weird complex and elevated Iranians' traditional xenophobia to an all-consuming passion.

Over the next half-century, Mossadeq's ghost has haunted the Iranian landscape, animating every crisis, not least the Islamic revolution of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in 1979 and the subsequent seizure of the U.S. embassy, a trauma that, in turn, molded our own attitude toward Tehran.

Pollack heaps particular scorn on two presidents: Jimmy Carter, whose ill-timed embrace of the shah enraged and radicalized Iranian students; and George W. Bush, who muffed a serious opportunity for a breakthrough after 9/11. Both countries saw the Taliban as a threat and cooperated to oust it from Afghanistan. For the first time, U.S. and Iranian officials met face-to-face at conferences in Geneva. But the Americans were low-level; Bush seemed unaware of the meetings, much less of their significance. In early 2002, just as things "were starting to really get interesting," as an inside source put it to Pollack, Bush delivered his State of the Union address branding Iran, Iraq and North Korea as an "axis of evil." The Geneva talks ended, and Iran's nuclear program accelerated.

Yet Pollack holds the Iranians -- with their "impractical ideology" and "dysfunctional government" -- most responsible for the continued deadlock. Bush's father and Bill Clinton both made genuine overtures, but they were repeatedly dashed by the mullahs, whose control has only tightened over the years.

Pollack argues that the Iranians want the bomb in order to deter an American attack, which they genuinely fear. Still, the prospect of nuclear-armed Islamic fundamentalists is a prima facie threat, even if their motives are defensive. The United States "must address Iran's pursuit of nuclear weapons," Pollack acknowledges, at the expense of other concerns.

If his analysis is correct, the current talks between Iran and the European Union are probably a snare and a delusion. Iran does fear sanctions, which the U.N. Security Council is scheduled to consider and may impose if diplomacy seems hopeless. Once that threat passes, Iran will probably return to its intransigence. (If the talks do produce results, Pollack will need to rewrite whole chapters for the paperback edition.)

In the last chapter, Pollack proposes a true "carrot-and-stick approach," in which the United States and its Western allies offer Iran rewards if it backs away from its nuclear-arms program, and penalties -- mainly sanctions -- if it persists. But he doubts that U.S. allies, whose "paramount desire" is "to make money off Iran regardless of its actions," would really enforce sanctions. So he proposes broadening the approach to cover not just Iran but all nuclear aspirants. He calls for a conference to revise the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty to forbid signatories to revoke it and to impose harsh sanctions on any country that violates it. In many countries that resist, their populations "could be mobilized to compel their governments . . . to join the effort."

How is all this supposed to happen? And how quickly? Pollack correctly notes that a clock is ticking; Iran will soon have a self-contained program to build nuclear weapons. Any preventive measures would have to take hold before that threshold is crossed. Yet Pollack's vision of a new international order, assuming the best intentions, would take many years to hammer out.

If diplomacy fails, Pollack gloomily grasps at two opposing poles. One is to take "a much harder look" at a preemptive air strike on Iran's facilities. If we had "very solid intelligence" on where they are (which Pollack thinks unlikely), "the costs might well be worth the payoff." The other is to figure out a way of "living with a nuclear Iran." He adds, "Iran's behavior over the past fifteen years suggests that it can probably be deterred from taking the most harmful offensive actions even after it has acquired nuclear weapons." Yet his phrasing here is far from reassuring, and he barely tries to back up the sentiment.

The final chapter, then, only dramatizes the lesson spelled out in the preceding chapters: that this "Persian puzzle" is a tough nut, and one that may simply be uncrackable. If an analyst as expert as Pollack can't figure a way out, we may have no choice but to live with -- and contain -- a nuclear Iran. If somebody has a better idea, write it fast.

Reviewed by Fred Kaplan
Copyright 2004, The Washington Post Co. All Rights Reserved.

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Product Details

• Hardcover: 576 pages
• Publisher: Random House; First edition. edition (November 2, 2004)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 1400063159
• ISBN-13: 978-1400063154
• Product Dimensions: 9.3 x 6.5 x 2 inches
• Shipping Weight: 1.9 pounds
• Average Customer Review: 4.0 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (38 customer reviews)
• Amazon.com Sales Rank: #479,218 in Books (See Bestsellers in Books)

Customer Reviews

Most Helpful Customer Reviews

18 of 23 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars A standard for foreign policy books, January 5, 2006

By	Alejandro Contreras - See all my reviews (REAL NAME)

Kenneth Pollack worked for 7 years as a Persian Gulf military analyst at the CIA and for 3 years as Director for Gulf affairs at the National Security Council official.

As the reader may know, Pollack's previous work was "The Threatening Storm". In it, he provided a historical perspective to the relations between Iraq and the U.S., and thoroughly analyzed alternatives for engagement based on the information available.

With "The Persian Puzzle", Pollack sets again the standard in foreign policy books. He offers a technical and non-partisan perspective to the history of Iran, its relation with other countries (especially the UK, the USSR/Russia, the US and its Middle Eastern neighbors) and its internal political struggles and infighting. This takes almost 90% of the text. The remaining 10% (around 50 pages) is invested to detailing alternatives for future engagement with Iran. Different than with Iraq, Pollack suggest a combination of approaches might be the the best option to deal with Iran from an American standpoint.

I have found this a truly top-notch work. Here is why:
- Historical perspective: Pollack provides a historical background to Iran, starting with the Elamites (the first people to civilize what is Iran today, more than 1000 BC), and including the chaos brought by Gengis Khan, the ascendence of Shi'ism, the difficult relation with Russia and Great Britain in the first half of the XX century, Reza Khan and his son the Shah, the involvement of the US (positive and negative) starting mainly from World War II, Khomeini's revolution and the Embassy incident, the Rafsanjani, Khatami administrations and how they interacted with the US (and viceversa).
- Non-biased, non-partisan view: Pollack acknowledges what now in hindsight were mistakes of US policy regarding Iraq, but does not seem to put the blame on a party, administration or person in particular. He also provides a context and tries to come with a rational explanation for them. In addition, he does not try either to put Iran or its government (or its people) as culprits or bad-intentioned. He goes the extra mile to understand their world view.
- Structure: this is a well thought book. It was not written in a rush. And the author has a clearly structured mind. The flow is very easy. There is a good sense of purpose for everything. The story is built in such a way that makes sense. The history of Iran comes first, with more intensity and details as the text brings us to the present.
- Rationality: it does not seem that Pollack wants to "prove us a point" and has written a book to "sell us his plan". He thoroughly analyzes the issue and presents all its details, complexities and paradoxes. Yes, he comes with a proposed solution, but it is not the main point of the book; it just comes as a final chapter and as his personal tack on how to solve a very difficult problem.

Notwithstanding the above, my only concern with this work is the content of Pollack's suggested proposal. Its somehow convoluted and has many "ifs". I realize this is not completely his fault. Actually, it reflects the complexity of the Iranian situation and how difficult it is in this case to find a clear-cut solution. This concern of mine does not, however, affects in any way my conclusion that this book is truly a most for anybody interested in learning more about the true facts of Iran.

In short, if the reader has a strong view about Iran and its relation with the world and wants to find a "confirmation" to his/her opinions, this book probably is not for him/her. However, if the reader is open to learning more about the topic and is willing to see the issue with all of its complexity and gray zones, this book is definitively for him/her.

15 of 19 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars Great Intro to US-Iran Conflict, July 22, 2007

By	Kirk H Sowell (Washington D.C.) - See all my reviews (REAL NAME)

This review is from: The Persian Puzzle: The Conflict Between Iran and America (Paperback)

This is an excellent introduction to both the history of US-Iranian relations and the current conflict between the two countries. It is not a history of Iran, or a book about Iran per se. I say that, for while the 428-page text packs loads of information, it is selected to emphasize facts relevant to US-Iranian relations and ignore other issues, so one looking for a history of Iran should look elsewhere.

The book is premised on the belief that Americans know too little about Iran and Iranians know to much about what they think is the truth about America. That is, in a wonderful phrase, Pollack says that Americans are "serial amnesiacs" who are blissfully ignorant of the outside world until a country like Iran does something bad, then we "learn" that a country out there is angry at us, and then we forget again when the crisis passes. Yet while Americans care nothing for Iran, Iranians are obsessed with the U.S. and are constantly replaying for themselves a version of history which is a mix of fact and fiction, and this makes it hard for them to deal with the present.

The book does contain a lot of relevant historical background. In fact, the first 12 chapters trace relations between Iran and first Britain and then the U.S. up through the Bush administration in 2004 (the book was published at the beginning of 2005 and the information cut-off appears to be early 2004). Only the last chapter analyzes the current situation and the options available to the U.S. The value of this book is indeed the background. I take five broad points away from Pollack's analysis.

First, the first five chapters running up through the Islamic revolution in 1979 are invaluable to understanding why Iranians, including many of the majority who do not support the current regime, are distrustful of the U.S. Britain exploited Iran ruthlessly during the colonial period, and the 1953 coup happened mainly because Britain wouldn't accept a 50/50 division of profits on oil royalties. Although the U.S. pressured Britain to compromise, we did engineer the coup of Mossadeq, and this fact gave rise to the myth that the U.S. controlled the Iranian government from then on out. This bred an obsession with foreign influence which is ably exploited by the current regime in Tehran.

Second, the behavior of revolutionary (post-1979) Iran can be modified by deterrence in tactical matters but not strategic ones. Reagan's failure to strike back at Iran for the various hostage takings and killings of Americans during the 1980s emboldened them, while a rout of the Iranian navy and the 1991 defeat of Iraq restored that deterrent posture partially. Iran was also worried in the late 1990s that European public opinion would cause Europe to launch U.S.-style economic sanctions, and combined with the threat of massive retaliation to the Khobar Towers attack (the Saudis wanted the U.S. to bomb Iran back to the Stone Age after that 1996 attack), this caused Iran to moderate its terror sponsorship in terms of murdering dissidents inside Europe and attempts to overthrow the Arab Gulf states. Yet at no time has the Iranian regime halted its support for global terrorism or its nuclear weapons program.

Third, during the 1990s there were two "engagement" policies with Iran, one U.S. and one European, and they both failed. The EU policy was called "critical engagement," and it mean lecturing Iran over human rights and terrorism but never seriously threatening economic sanctions, much less military action. The U.S. approach, begun after the 1997 election of Muhammad Khatami, was to make selected concessions to Iran in hopes of strengthening any attempt by Khatami to change Iranian policy. Yet when the people rose against the regime in 1999, Khatami sided with the regime, and a final attempt at engaging Iran by the Clinton administration was simply laughed at in Tehran. Pollack says that Clinton's engagement policy was worth trying, even though it never really had a chance of success given what happened inside Iran.

Fourth, Iranian conduct toward to West is often driven more by internal Iranian dynamics than anything the West could do or has done. Pollack shows that the 1979 hostage crisis at the U.S. embassy was dragged out by Khomeini as a tool for internal control, and the 1989 fatwa against Salman Rushdie was likewise a Khomeini ploy to strengthen his attempt to freeze Iranian policy in an anti-Western stance after he died.

Fifth, the Iranian regime's bad behavior continued right up to 9/11 and afterward, with that momentous event marking no substantive change vis-à-vis terrorism or nuclear development (they did tone down the rhetoric immediately after the attacks, and work with the U.S. on Afghanistan, but I think this was only because the Shia are a minority in Afghanistan, and they don't want chaos there). Prior to the "Axis of Evil" statement in the 2002 SOTU, Pollack notes events including (1) the Karine A incident (supplying weapons to Palestinian terrorists), (2) safe haven given to al-Qaeda fleeing from Afghanistan and (3) reports of uranium enrichment and nuclear weapons development. This is not to say that it is a good idea for American presidents to call other governments evil, and Pollack certainly does not endorse this approach, but aside from some helpful conduct in Afghanistan, one may reject the notion that the "Axis" statement (or any action by any U.S. president) caused Iran's bad behavior.

Further facts coming to light after this book apparently went to press are worth noting. One, indications came to light that Iran helped the 9/11 hijackers travel from Saudi Arabia to Afghanistan so as to make it appear that they went to Lebanon rather than to visit al-Qaeda camps in Afghanistan. Two, it became clear a couple years ago that Iran was fueling Shia radicalism in Iraq through the militias. I believe this was the case from 2003 as part of a grand strategy to radicalize the Iraqi Shia, but this wasn't clear in 2004.

Overall, I give this book a strong recommend.

14 of 18 people found the following review helpful:

4.0 out of 5 stars Robust analysis, February 3, 2005

By	Wise Farzine - See all my reviews

Most of the historical background, except maybe for the Mossadegh period is accurate. Dr. Mossadegh legacy in the modern Iranian politics is enormous. This popular and freely elected leader was overthrown in 1953 with the help of the C.I.A. and was replaced by the late Shah. This event traumatized Iranians for the last 50 years and increased their suspicion on foreign influence in Iranian affairs.

Pollack's analysis of the Iranian psyche is also very accurate. Iranians might have an exaggerated perception of the geopolitical importance of their country, but this is a common character in countries where people have a strong national pride.

Finally, I fully agree with Pollack's multi-facet approach to resolve the current issues. The last thing the region needs is an additional conflict that would further complicate the already entangled situation.