Customer Reviews

The Persian Puzzle: The Conflict Between Iran and America

5 star:		(18)
4 star:		(10)
3 star:		(7)
2 star:		(2)
1 star:		(2)

 

 

Just finished reading it -- great book!

The author's analysis is objective & professional. Probably 50% of policy books today have some kind of serious bias, but I found Mr Pollack's assumptions to be fair & his conclusions to be well-reasoned. He seems to have a good command on different sociological, psychological, political and religious aspects of the Iranian society, and he presents his case without relying on guess work or unsubstainted/dishonest assertions.

I do think, however, that Mr. Pollack should have included more material on the role of Sunni-Shiite tension within the Islamic world, and its effect on Iran's policies. In addition, the author could have focused more on the perceptions Muslims in other countries have about the US & Israel. After all, while devising a strategy for relations with Iran, it is imperative that such basic complexities are considered.

Kenneth Pollack worked for 7 years as a Persian Gulf military analyst at the CIA and for 3 years as Director for Gulf affairs at the National Security Council official.

As the reader may know, Pollack's previous work was "The Threatening Storm". In it, he provided a historical perspective to the relations between Iraq and the U.S., and thoroughly analyzed alternatives for engagement based on the information available.

With "The Persian Puzzle", Pollack sets again the standard in foreign policy books. He offers a technical and non-partisan perspective to the history of Iran, its relation with other countries (especially the UK, the USSR/Russia, the US and its Middle Eastern neighbors) and its internal political struggles and infighting. This takes almost 90% of the text. The remaining 10% (around 50 pages) is invested to detailing alternatives for future engagement with Iran. Different than with Iraq, Pollack suggest a combination of approaches might be the the best option to deal with Iran from an American standpoint.

I have found this a truly top-notch work. Here is why:
- Historical perspective: Pollack provides a historical background to Iran, starting with the Elamites (the first people to civilize what is Iran today, more than 1000 BC), and including the chaos brought by Gengis Khan, the ascendence of Shi'ism, the difficult relation with Russia and Great Britain in the first half of the XX century, Reza Khan and his son the Shah, the involvement of the US (positive and negative) starting mainly from World War II, Khomeini's revolution and the Embassy incident, the Rafsanjani, Khatami administrations and how they interacted with the US (and viceversa).
- Non-biased, non-partisan view: Pollack acknowledges what now in hindsight were mistakes of US policy regarding Iraq, but does not seem to put the blame on a party, administration or person in particular. He also provides a context and tries to come with a rational explanation for them. In addition, he does not try either to put Iran or its government (or its people) as culprits or bad-intentioned. He goes the extra mile to understand their world view.
- Structure: this is a well thought book. It was not written in a rush. And the author has a clearly structured mind. The flow is very easy. There is a good sense of purpose for everything. The story is built in such a way that makes sense. The history of Iran comes first, with more intensity and details as the text brings us to the present.
- Rationality: it does not seem that Pollack wants to "prove us a point" and has written a book to "sell us his plan". He thoroughly analyzes the issue and presents all its details, complexities and paradoxes. Yes, he comes with a proposed solution, but it is not the main point of the book; it just comes as a final chapter and as his personal tack on how to solve a very difficult problem.

Notwithstanding the above, my only concern with this work is the content of Pollack's suggested proposal. Its somehow convoluted and has many "ifs". I realize this is not completely his fault. Actually, it reflects the complexity of the Iranian situation and how difficult it is in this case to find a clear-cut solution. This concern of mine does not, however, affects in any way my conclusion that this book is truly a most for anybody interested in learning more about the true facts of Iran.

In short, if the reader has a strong view about Iran and its relation with the world and wants to find a "confirmation" to his/her opinions, this book probably is not for him/her. However, if the reader is open to learning more about the topic and is willing to see the issue with all of its complexity and gray zones, this book is definitively for him/her.

This is a great book. Overall, this book is excellent, informative, educational and certainly worthwhile to read.

THE PERSIAN PUZZLE provides a clear and balanced overview and description of the historical and evolving relationship between the U.S. and Iran (this is not a book about the history of Iran, but instead its relationship with America), as well as each side's perception of the other and related world events.

Took off one star in the rating for two reasons:

(1). though the author does an excellent job in giving the reader an understanding of the historical U.S.-Iran relationship, he does not necessarily tell this story in the broader context of other world events, e.g., the Cold War, to name just one, and the interplay between these other events/actors and the U.S.-Iran relationship [the U.S.'s relationship with Iran is just one of many, but the reader is given a somewhat narrow lense to interpret events described in the book]; for a book that's 425 pages, too much of it "leads the reader to believe" that this bilateral relationship occurred in a vacuum -- external factors aren't brought in to the equation (at least not in-depth) to possibly give perspective to decisions or actions.

(2). the book concludes (50 pages) with the author's strategy for U.S. policy towards Iran. This isn't so much a criticism of the author's conclusions or suggestions -- it's more that his recommendations aren't very bold or enlightening. He recommends a 3-track approach, with each track nothing more than a small/large increase of the preceding track (almost "just more of the same"). At a minimum, not sure why this last chapter took up 50 pages when most of its conclusions and recommendations were gradually outlined in prior chapters.

This is a book that everyone should read. As the author himself notes in the book, Americans just don't know much, if anything at all, of the historical relationship between these two nations over the last 50+ years.

I approached this book not knowing really what to expect, i.e.: does the book try to justify past US policies or is it a rational discussion. It is the latter. The author tries to clear the political air in the introduction and set the record straight on why we have problems with Iran. He uses a direct quote from the Iranians regarding a speech from Secretary Albright who acknowledges the over 25 years of US interference in the politics and leadership of Iran starting with the shah in 1953 and ending with the aid to Iraq during the Iran-Iraq conflict in the 1980's. This of course is contrary to public posture at home that our actions are about promoting democracy abroad. It is clear that past actions against Iran were to promote US commercial, trade, and strategic defense interests at the expense of the Iranians. So that admission up front is refreshing. Many Iranians had expected help from the US, not a new imperial power to replace Britain and Russia that had dominated Iran for most of the 19th century and half of the 20th century. So the question now is simply this: can we build a new relationship, especially with that 200 history of mistrust with Russia, Britain, and America?

The book is somewhat long and can be described as comprehensive; it is well written suitable for the average reader and it is a fairly quick and light read. The pages seem to whiz by like a Jack London novel. It has about 428 pages of main text with five maps, and is followed by 60 pages of notes and a bibliography approximately 25 pages in length. It covers 13 subjects including a history of Iran, the shah, the rise of US influence in Iran, the hostage crisis, the Iran-Iraq war, and the post 1980 political developments in Iran.

The first chapter - about 30 pages long - presents a short history of Iran including the dealings between Iran and Britain and Russia. That takes the reader to approximately the year 1900 - 1914. After that there are two chapters that lead us through the events surrounding the ousting of the Iranian leader Mosaddeq by royalist troops in 1953. The author thinks that a certain myth has developed about the coup that overstate the American-British role and, in Iranian mind's at least, to exaggerate the role of the CIA. In the next 70 to 80 pages the author takes us through the 25 year reign of the shah, his spending, his use of terror, and the inequities in Iranian society which finally trigger the fall of the shah. The Iranians tend to equate America with the reign of the shah, and the failure of the US to apply human rights standards to that country while espousing them at home, especially by Carter.

The next 200 pages describe the developments related to Iran from 1980 going forward including many details on the primary Iranian political figures, the long and exhausting war with Iraq, the current and past Iranian views of the US in the 1990's, Islamic fundamentalism, supporting terrorism against mainly Israel, Iranian designs on controlling the Gulf region, suport of some Al Qaeda members by Iran, the Karine A incident, Hamas, the Geneva working group on Afghanistan, the Axis of Evil speech, Iranian nuclear weapons, etc.

Finally we have perhaps the most interesting chapter, a chapter on developing future US strategies. That is in fact the reason for the title of the book, The Persian Puzzle. Can we do anything to solve the problems short of a war? It is a puzzle that can be solved by either attacking Iran or more rationally attempting to develop a long term relationship with Iran, possibly following many paths in parallel. In the final analysis short of war it will be a decision to be made by Iran.

Whether you agree with everything the author presents in the book, or do not, one will find the book to be informative and stimulating. Easily 5 stars.

I am halfway through this book and find it quite fascinating. The history of how Iran was abused through the ages is unheard of in our hemisphere.

Knowing how England and Russia played games with Iran helps understand the paranoia that Iran had thinking that we were pulling the strings of the Shah: Iranians had a right to be paranoid.

I just wish we were as powerful as they thought, we would have either propped up the Shah or brought down Khomeni.

This book is an easy read, well written, filled with facts and quotes from the time periods mentioned.

It is a scholarly book, not one for a sunny day unless you want to sit down and study it, it is a serious history, not a novel.

http://rescueattempt.tripod.com

Most of the historical background, except maybe for the Mossadegh period is accurate. Dr. Mossadegh legacy in the modern Iranian politics is enormous. This popular and freely elected leader was overthrown in 1953 with the help of the C.I.A. and was replaced by the late Shah. This event traumatized Iranians for the last 50 years and increased their suspicion on foreign influence in Iranian affairs.

Pollack's analysis of the Iranian psyche is also very accurate. Iranians might have an exaggerated perception of the geopolitical importance of their country, but this is a common character in countries where people have a strong national pride.

Finally, I fully agree with Pollack's multi-facet approach to resolve the current issues. The last thing the region needs is an additional conflict that would further complicate the already entangled situation.

This is an excellent introduction to both the history of US-Iranian relations and the current conflict between the two countries. It is not a history of Iran, or a book about Iran per se. I say that, for while the 428-page text packs loads of information, it is selected to emphasize facts relevant to US-Iranian relations and ignore other issues, so one looking for a history of Iran should look elsewhere.

The book is premised on the belief that Americans know too little about Iran and Iranians know to much about what they think is the truth about America. That is, in a wonderful phrase, Pollack says that Americans are "serial amnesiacs" who are blissfully ignorant of the outside world until a country like Iran does something bad, then we "learn" that a country out there is angry at us, and then we forget again when the crisis passes. Yet while Americans care nothing for Iran, Iranians are obsessed with the U.S. and are constantly replaying for themselves a version of history which is a mix of fact and fiction, and this makes it hard for them to deal with the present.

The book does contain a lot of relevant historical background. In fact, the first 12 chapters trace relations between Iran and first Britain and then the U.S. up through the Bush administration in 2004 (the book was published at the beginning of 2005 and the information cut-off appears to be early 2004). Only the last chapter analyzes the current situation and the options available to the U.S. The value of this book is indeed the background. I take five broad points away from Pollack's analysis.

First, the first five chapters running up through the Islamic revolution in 1979 are invaluable to understanding why Iranians, including many of the majority who do not support the current regime, are distrustful of the U.S. Britain exploited Iran ruthlessly during the colonial period, and the 1953 coup happened mainly because Britain wouldn't accept a 50/50 division of profits on oil royalties. Although the U.S. pressured Britain to compromise, we did engineer the coup of Mossadeq, and this fact gave rise to the myth that the U.S. controlled the Iranian government from then on out. This bred an obsession with foreign influence which is ably exploited by the current regime in Tehran.

Second, the behavior of revolutionary (post-1979) Iran can be modified by deterrence in tactical matters but not strategic ones. Reagan's failure to strike back at Iran for the various hostage takings and killings of Americans during the 1980s emboldened them, while a rout of the Iranian navy and the 1991 defeat of Iraq restored that deterrent posture partially. Iran was also worried in the late 1990s that European public opinion would cause Europe to launch U.S.-style economic sanctions, and combined with the threat of massive retaliation to the Khobar Towers attack (the Saudis wanted the U.S. to bomb Iran back to the Stone Age after that 1996 attack), this caused Iran to moderate its terror sponsorship in terms of murdering dissidents inside Europe and attempts to overthrow the Arab Gulf states. Yet at no time has the Iranian regime halted its support for global terrorism or its nuclear weapons program.

Third, during the 1990s there were two "engagement" policies with Iran, one U.S. and one European, and they both failed. The EU policy was called "critical engagement," and it mean lecturing Iran over human rights and terrorism but never seriously threatening economic sanctions, much less military action. The U.S. approach, begun after the 1997 election of Muhammad Khatami, was to make selected concessions to Iran in hopes of strengthening any attempt by Khatami to change Iranian policy. Yet when the people rose against the regime in 1999, Khatami sided with the regime, and a final attempt at engaging Iran by the Clinton administration was simply laughed at in Tehran. Pollack says that Clinton's engagement policy was worth trying, even though it never really had a chance of success given what happened inside Iran.

Fourth, Iranian conduct toward to West is often driven more by internal Iranian dynamics than anything the West could do or has done. Pollack shows that the 1979 hostage crisis at the U.S. embassy was dragged out by Khomeini as a tool for internal control, and the 1989 fatwa against Salman Rushdie was likewise a Khomeini ploy to strengthen his attempt to freeze Iranian policy in an anti-Western stance after he died.

Fifth, the Iranian regime's bad behavior continued right up to 9/11 and afterward, with that momentous event marking no substantive change vis-à-vis terrorism or nuclear development (they did tone down the rhetoric immediately after the attacks, and work with the U.S. on Afghanistan, but I think this was only because the Shia are a minority in Afghanistan, and they don't want chaos there). Prior to the "Axis of Evil" statement in the 2002 SOTU, Pollack notes events including (1) the Karine A incident (supplying weapons to Palestinian terrorists), (2) safe haven given to al-Qaeda fleeing from Afghanistan and (3) reports of uranium enrichment and nuclear weapons development. This is not to say that it is a good idea for American presidents to call other governments evil, and Pollack certainly does not endorse this approach, but aside from some helpful conduct in Afghanistan, one may reject the notion that the "Axis" statement (or any action by any U.S. president) caused Iran's bad behavior.

Further facts coming to light after this book apparently went to press are worth noting. One, indications came to light that Iran helped the 9/11 hijackers travel from Saudi Arabia to Afghanistan so as to make it appear that they went to Lebanon rather than to visit al-Qaeda camps in Afghanistan. Two, it became clear a couple years ago that Iran was fueling Shia radicalism in Iraq through the militias. I believe this was the case from 2003 as part of a grand strategy to radicalize the Iraqi Shia, but this wasn't clear in 2004.

Overall, I give this book a strong recommend.

Reading Pollack's book there are some conclusions that I came to.He makes a good case arguing why it would be dangerous for Iran to acquire nuclear weapons.Not only have they been supporters of terrorism,they have also been directly involved in committing terroristic acts against Western countries,including the United States.Considering the track record of the regime in Tehran there is no way that they should be allowed to get their hands on an atomic bomb.
BUT!From my reading of Pollacks' book,the only way that you could guarantee that Iran would not develop nuclear weapons would be to remove the present government.That means either orchestrating a coup (which Pollack explains is unlikely to happen),or invading Iran and deposing the government by force.Given what happened to the U.S. in Iraq,invading Iran is not a likely option.The problem isn't that the US military wouldn't be able to defeat Iran's armed forces,the problem is that they'd have to occupy the country afterward.Iran is 4 times the size of Iraq with 3 times the population.Given that in the estimate of General Eric Shinseki you needed several hundred thousand troops to occupy Iraq (between 300 and 400 thousand troops)* you would need at least the same number to occupy Iran and probably even more.So we're talking about a force of several hundred thousand troops possibly even up to a million.How long could the United States keep a force that size in Iran?
Nor does bombing Iran seem to be the answer.Iran has over 2 dozen nuclear facilities (that we know about) scattered throughout the country.Pollack argues that you wouldn't be able to destroy them all in a sneak attack.Instead,any air attack would have to be sustained and conducted over several weeks-perhaps even longer.Of course the Iranians have their own air-defense system which, unlike the Iraqi one,is not in a state of disrepair.So if you were planning a bombing campaign,you'd have to take out Iran's air defenses first.This raises the possibility that while the United States attacked Iran's defenses,the Iranians might dismantle some of their equipment and move it to secret locations.As Pollack points out,in the end,even after you'd destroyed all of Iran's nuclear facilities you couldn't be guaranteed that you'd destroyed all of their equipment.
The bottom line is that there are no good solutions for dealing with the threat of a nuclear-armed Iran.Any military option you consider is likely to create as many problems as it solves.Pollack's aim I think,in writing this book is to be upfront with the American public and warn them that there is no quick and easy answer.

* PBS Frontline.James Fallows quoted in "The Invasion of Iraq".Interview conducted Jan.28,2004.Available at www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/invasion/interviews/fallows.html

I have mixed feelings about this book. On the one hand it represents an enormous amount of research. Parts of it are well written and constitute an important resource for anyone who wants to better understand the US-Iran relationship. But the reader should be aware that it's also a flawed book. The author can't seem to make up his mind if he's a progressive or a conservative. He supported the US invasion of Iraq -- and continually attempts to justify that failed policy in this, his latest opus. The reader therefore needs to be alert.

There are numerous problems with the book. Here are some:
*The author contradicts himself on the second page of his introduction when he arrogantly states "I will say very bluntly that I don't think the US needs Iran..." The author then spends the better part of the next 500 pages presenting powerful evidence that the US in fact does need Iran, very much. For how in heaven's name will we ever succeed in resolving the matter of Iran's nuclear ambitions, what the author refers to as the "problem from hell" without the cooperation -- if not the good will -- of Iran? Answer: we won't.

*The author seriously underestimates the figure of Mossadegh, the vastly popular Prime Minister of Iran overthrown by the US CIA in 1953. Pollack refers to him as reckless and thinks he was an extremist -- not true. The reader would do better to check out Stephen Kinzer's excellent book All the Shah's Men for a clearer look at Mossadegh. In fact he was the Iranian Gandhi, and while he made mistakes he was never the tyrant or dictator described by Pollack. Nor was he inept as a lawyer, which Pollack also implies. Mossadegh was capable enough to plead his case against the Anglo-Persian oil company in the world court -- and to win it in grand fashion. Not bad. Pollack just can't seem to grasp the essential fact that Iran had every right to control its own oil. Mossadegh's biggest mistake was in trusting the treacherous Americans.

*The author continually understates or ignores altogether Israel's role in perpetuating the horrible US-Iran relations. Pollack never mentions the war of words in the Israeli Hebrew press, which started immediately after the 1991 Gulf War (see Israel Shahak, Open Secrets), when Israel began preparing its people for a future war against Iran, the new nemesis, and also began pressing the Americans for regime change. Sharon called for it in the fall of 2002, then Daniel Ayalon the Israeli ambassador to the US repeated the call in April 2003 as the Iraq invasion was winding down. The point is that so far the Israelis have had it their way. They wanted the war against Iraq and now they want a war against Iran. These are facts that Pollack seems never to have heard. His naivete regarding Israel undermines his credibility as a serious scholar.

*The case of the Karine A is another similar example. This was the boat load of Iranian arms headed to Gaza intercepted early in 2002 by Israel. The incident became the smoking gun and supposed proof of Iran's support for terrorism -- and it killed the Iran-US talks that blossomed after 911 and held such promise for improved relations. But Pollack never mentions that at this time the Palestinians were facing a holocaust -- daily bloody incursions by the IDF, targeted assassinations, curfews, checkpoints, Apache rocket attacks, and the destruction of the infrastructure built up during the Oslo peace process. Israel reduced much of the W Bank to smoking rubble during this time, and Pollack completely misses the obvious point: that the Palestinians had every right to arm and defend themselves. The incident should never have been allowed to destroy the US-Iran talks. The case only shows that US talk about freedom is a cruel lie. The truth is that the US does not support the right of the oppressed to fight for their freedom. And in this regard Pollack just doesn't get it.

*The author rambles on about Iran's nuke program, which he correctly identifies as the most serious issue. Yet it never occurs to him that the real solution would require the US to press Israel also to give up its nukes. The only way the US will lead the region is via example, and the matter of Israel -- not just iran -- is the stumbling block. The author also fails to mention one of the principal dangers should the situation go south, for example, if Israel decides to pre empt and surgically hit Iran's nuclear sites. And this vacuole is weird, because Pollack does mention, in his closing remarks, about Iran's great interest in anti-ship missiles. But again, he doesn't get it. If we or Israel hit Iran they will respond by attacking our Navy sitting like ducks in the Gulf. In that case, the entire Gulf will become a killing field, and will run red with the blood of US sailors. This is why we must work for a peaceful resolution!

There are other flaws. But this should be enough to make the reader appropriately chary.

This book is a great place to start to better understand current US/Iranian relations. The emphasis is on the last 50 years, but there is a brief overview of Iranian history starting in ancient times. The book is more than a history lesson as Pollock offers specific policy recommendations and analysis. Interestingly Pollock was an advocate for the Iraq war, but he argues against any military intervention in Iran at the current time. The book kept my attention but it is jam packed with information, so I found it somewhat slow going at times to digest it all. Highly recommended to gain a more informed view of the issues in Iran today.