This historic book may have numerous typos, missing text or index. Purchasers can download a free scanned copy of the original book (without typos) from the publisher. 1919. Not illustrated. Excerpt: ... of external objects he denies the existence of any other self."1 To this objection a pluralistic idealist of Berkeley's type has, in the opinion of the writer of this book, no conclusive answer. On the other hand, the monistic or Hegelian idealist, believing that all finite selves are expressions and parts of the Absolute Self, denies the very premiss of the realist's argument. Not by inference from his own ideas but in a sense directly -- so he claims -- he knows both himself and other self.2 The main arguments against neo-realism as a positive theory -- or rather, group of theories -- is the fact that, one and all, neo-realists assume their startingpoint. Thus, the dualists among them assume the existence of 'entities,' physical or logical or both, which they coordinate with mental realities; and monistic neorealists assume the existence of those 'neutral entities' under which they subsume selves, or minds -- thereby describing the immediately known in terms of an artificial construct. B. Contemporary Systems Of Idealism I. Phenomenalism (numerically Pluralistic) Phenomenalistic idealism is the doctrine of Hume: the conception of the universe as a succession of complex psychic 1 Cf. G. E. Moore, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 1905-1906, VI., "The Nature and Reality of Objects of Perception"; H. W. Carr, ibid., 1007-1908. 2 Cf. pp. 410s f.; also pp. 138, 144 (4). * The doctrine, common to many neo-realists, of the 'externality' of relations -- and, in particular, of the knowledge-relation -- is not a necessarily realistic but rather a numerically pluralistic doctrine. It is virtually held by those pluralistic personalists who conceive of selves as entirely distinct from each other. For more extended criticism of neo-realism cf. A. O. Lovejoy, "Error a...
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