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Persons and Causes: The Metaphysics of Free Will

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Timothy O'Connor explores (as many have not) the metaphysical underpinnings of agent-causation, the common-sensical idea that our actions are caused by ourselves, rather than by events. He sees that agent-causation requires an analysis of event-causation in terms of the powers of things as released or inhibited by circumstances, and of agents as beings that cannot be explained by physical science. He thinks that agents may be emergent beings whose existence depends on neural structures, but these agents have got to be more than epiphenomenally supervenient states; they have got to be a new kind of being, with causal powers of its own that physical science cannot fully explain.

O'Connor is aware of modern-day alternatives to agent-causation, such as indeterminism and under-determinism. (Laura Ekstrom's recent _Free Will_ makes a good companion volume here.) He meets the common criticisms that agent causation results in an endless regress of acts of will, which he thinks rests on a misunderstanding of what agent causation is.

O'Connor's style is clear and concise, and the book has the great virtue of being both thorough and short.