Persons, Rights, and the Moral Community [Paperback]

Loren E. Lomasky (Author)

Book Description

Publication Date: July 26, 1990 | ISBN-10: 0195064747 | ISBN-13: 978-0195064742

This book provides a complete and convincing account of what rights we do and do not have, who has them, and why. Presenting the foundations of a liberal, individualistic theory of rights, Lomasky explains the place of rights within the overall structure of morality, arguing for the moral importance of individual commitments to and pursuit of "projects." After developing his theory of basic rights, Lomasky demonstrates its implications for a variety of problems and issues, including property rights, the rights of children, and the status of the unborn, defective persons, animals, and even the dead. Arguing for a fundamental reshaping of philosophical ethics, Lomasky develops a credible alternative to currently fashionable views.

Editorial Reviews

From Library Journal

This account of basic moral rights concerns whether they are necessary, to what kind of being they can be ascribed, their nature, and to whom they extend. Lomansky contends that rights are a kind of shorthand category for well-entrenched moral intuitions, principles, and standards whose aim is to support individualism as of paramount moral significance. The category is useful, he thinks, even though we lack a fully adequate theory generating these rights. They derive from a person's identity as a purposive agent, but must be sensitive also to ends that are not his exclusively. Intended primarily for professional philosophers, the book includes interesting discussions of welfare liberalism and of the (alleged) rights of children, fetuses, animals, etc. Robert Hoffman, Philosophy Department, York College, CUNY
Copyright 1987 Reed Business Information, Inc. --This text refers to an out of print or unavailable edition of this title.

Review

"Clear, careful, and well structured, with occasional wit and even passion. Lomasky's arguments are original and important. His book is the only convincing defense, that I know of, of the moderate libertarianism which so often lies undefended and even unexpressed behind contemporary philosophical arguements in applied ethics, political, and legal philosophy. The book promises to inspire other fruitful efforts to advance beyond the shaky starting point of most traditional rights theories."--John Simmons, University of Virginia

"A tough-minded, intricately worked out philosophical argument, in many respects superior to Nozick's well-known libertarian defense. Highly recommended for advanced undergraduate and graduate courses."--Religious Studies Review

"An important event in the philosophical development of classical liberal theory....Readable, entertaining, and far too full of moral truths to be confined to the artificial world of the academic."--Reason

"An important work. Even those disagreeing with its central thesis will find it challenging."--American Political Science Review

"Imaginative and elegantly presented."--The Philosophical Review

See all Editorial Reviews

Product Details

• Paperback: 296 pages
• Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA (July 26, 1990)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 0195064747
• ISBN-13: 978-0195064742
• Product Dimensions: 8.2 x 5.5 x 0.8 inches
• Shipping Weight: 13.4 ounces (View shipping rates and policies)
• Average Customer Review: 5.0 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (2 customer reviews)
• Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #752,864 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)

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13 of 16 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars Brilliant derivation of libertarian "basic rights.", June 15, 2000

By 

John S. Ryan "Scott Ryan" (Cuyahoga Falls, OH) - See all my reviews
(REAL NAME)   

This review is from: Persons, Rights, and the Moral Community (Paperback)

In this excellent volume, Loren Lomasky offers a new argument for libertarian "basic rights" that may well be the sort of thing Ayn Rand had in mind but failed to execute competently and intelligibly. And it is brilliantly argued. My sole major objection concerns not what is there, but what is missing.

Lomasky differentiates between "univalent" and "multivalent" theories of rights -- the former being those that single out one feature that qualifies certain beings as rights-bearers, the latter allowing for more than one feature that might do so. His own theory is technically "multivalent" but depends fundamentally on just one feature: the ability to "pursue projects" -- i.e. to have aims and ends that have a specially motivating status for oneself because they are one's own.

That human beings are "project pursuers" is, for Lomasky, the point that does in utilitarianism and other overarching-common-end sorts of ethic; he takes it that such theories are unable to give sufficient account of the fact that agents have special reasons for pursuing their _own_ ends.

Frankly, this is a questionable beginning. He is surely on firm ground in basing our rights against one another on the fundamentally teleological features of human life. But that my "projects" pose special reasons for _me_ to act does not in any way imply that they pose no reason for you _at all_. It seems entirely meaningful to speak of a "common end" shared by rational agents as such, coherently inclusive of the "projects" of all such individuals; that each individual has a unique _prioritization_ of reasons does not mean that each individual has a distinct _set_ of reasons.

Perhaps your self-actualization as a brilliant jazz drummer is supremely important to you and only marginally important to me. But if even one of my goals as a rational agent is to help bring "good things" into the world, can we say that -- other things equal -- your goal is simply _irrelevant_ to me?

No matter how many other actual goals I may have that (quite properly) take precedence over my helping you to become a self-actualized jazz drummer, it is still the case that, if I had no conflicting goals of my own, I _would_ have reason to pursue your actualization. It also, therefore, seems to be the case that I have such reason even when it is not my controlling reason, i.e. when it is outweighed by my legitimate pursuit of my own "projects." My reasons, like W.D. Ross's "_prima facie_ duties," do not simply disappear merely because they are outweighed by other reasons.

Some versions of utilitarianism and idealism, then, remain standing even after Lomasky's attack; a defender of either could easily argue that Lomasky is entirely right without abandoning his/her own position. The utilitarian could say that, _therefore_, utilitarianism should make it a(n impartial!) "rule" that each person should pursue primarily his or her own "projects." The idealist could say that, _therefore_, an ethic of ideal self-actualization should take care to regard the ideal common end of humanity as coherently (and impartially!) inclusive of, not a replacement for, the individual project-pursuits of individual persons.

In either case, Lomasky has not said anything that ultimately tells against the theory in question; he has simply pointed out an important feature that must not be omitted from either account if it is to remain credible. This is of course no small achievement in its own right. But it leaves room for -- say -- Brand Blanshard to argue that human beings do indeed have a common ideal end which they nevertheless "serve" or "promote" by becoming most completely themselves.

Lomasky implicitly acknowledges this point in a great deal of his discussion. He acknowledges, for example, that the well-being of other project pursuers is an _intrinsic_ good, _ceteris paribus_ worthy of pursuit for its own sake. (Indeed he just about has to acknowledge this in order to make his argument for rights, else no single project pursuer could have reason to respect rights _as_ rights.) And he grants that the well-being of one project-pursuer _does_, in and of itself, provide a reason for another project-pursuer to act (at least under conditions which guarantee that the other project-pursuer can understand what is at issue).

But in that case, it is entirely meaningful to say that our rights against one another depend on a common end, so long as we are careful to understand that end in the proper way. What Lomasky has shown -- and shown very well -- is that we cannot take that "common end" as somehow imposed from the top down and as superseding our individual projects; we must argue _up_ to it by starting with individual projects and seeing what is involved in rendering them ideally coherent. Our common "transcendent" end does not trump our individual "immanent" ends but incorporates, informs, and delimits them.

To my own mind, bringing out this point would have provided a more solid reply to the variety of liberalism that recognizes a nonlibertarian role for the territorial State. And it would have vastly improved on Ayn Rand's dismissal of the entire concept of a "common good."

But none of this tells against Lomasky's arguments for rights themselves -- only against his characterization of what he calls the "Foil" position. And much of his characterization of this Foil is altogether apt. His main worry is that it insists that all moral decisions are to be made "impartially" and therefore leaves no room for agents to be "partial" to their own projects. In this he is surely raising a crucially important point, at least about what "impartiality" means.

What I think is missing is a full recognition of Lomasky's own insight -- that the fulfillment of individual projects by project-pursuers "partial" to their own success is, in and of itself, an intrinsic good worthy of promotion on quite impartial grounds. And to reach this point, we need only follow Lomasky's own clear and cogent arguments to their logical conclusions.

1 of 13 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars Extraordinary derivation of rights., April 26, 1999

By A Customer

This review is from: Persons, Rights, and the Moral Community (Paperback)

It is about time that such a book was made available