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Phantom Soldier: The Enemy's Answer to U.S. Firepower

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A "must-read" for anyone who truly wants to understand small unit tactics. Studying the western way of war is only half of the equation. Reading and absorbing the lessons in this book is the other half - the most important half.

This well-written and well-researched book is sorely needed in today's U.S. military. To all those blinded by the technologies involved in transforming the U.S. military, or the so-called "revolution in military affairs," this book should serve as a 'reality check.' Poole repeatedly shows how the Western over-reliance on ordnance and technological superiority was effectively countered by adversaries who recognized the West's strengths and consciously decided to focus on small unit tactics and training.

Poole's message (some may call it a warning) is clear: the West will never live up to its military potential (or up to its over-inflated militarily superior opinion of itself) if it continues to ignore pursuing the tactical excellence needed to complement its unquestioned technological superiority. The real transformation or revolution in military affairs should be the paradigm shift to ensuring that our individuals and small units are as tactically proficient as they are technologically advanced.

This book can help all Western military decision-makers think differently about warfighting and can help save lives on the battlefield.

Retired Marine Lieutenant Colonel John Poole has written a timely book to help soldiers understand the enemy and to learn how to fight in the post-911 wars. Based on ancient Chinese writings, some only recently made available, historical example, and his own experiences, Poole takes away a large part of the mysticism surrounding the tactics and thinking of the armies of the shadows. Further, he has the audacity to suggest that the American combat forces adapt to, if not adopt, many of these ideas.

One of the most chilling passages in Poole's book is a reflection from the 36 Stratagems, a Chinese work relatively new to the West, which translates to: "Kill with a borrowed knife or sword". Further, it is not a big stretch to link the Japanese Kamikazes in World War II to the terrorists' crashing of airliners into buildings at the beginning of this new war.

This is not a book for the advocates of the Revolution in Military Affairs. While Poole does not reject the RMA, he is clearly down in the weeds where the American fighting man will be. Nor will this book please the cognoscenti who have never seen the face of war, but this is a book that will save American lives.

How can these third world armies of the night stand up to the might of the American military machine? Poole's answer is that by using maneuver against an attrition-oriented army, these enemies have been able to wreak havoc. The focus of our asymmetric enemies is squad level tactics and low tech weapons. American Special Forces in Afghanistan have perhaps taken a page from Poole's book in applying the American Way of War asymmetrically to the elusive Taliban and Al Qaeda enemies. Operating from the ground and with indiginous forces, the Special Operations teams adapted to the environment, advised alliance forces, and provided timely direction of some very effective precision air power enabling the ground war to succeed. Clearly, however, as Poole warns, the illusive enemy is still underground, both literally and figuratively, and this is but Phase I of a long war.

It is time to revisit the long-enduring fascination with Clausewitz. The new face of war has little relation to Clausewitz, but there are many parallels with Sun Tsu. Before we can begin to fathom the terrorist or the Eastern way of war, we should be compelled to learn more about Sun Tsu and his progenies. Poole points out the major differences between the Sun Tsu and Clausewitz approaches: "While the Eastern commander avoids combat wherever possible, his Western counterpart seeks it". Moreover, the reader is led into a practical description of the Eastern philosophy of the I Ching (Book of Changes), and how it applies to Eastern tactics in a way that is easily understood by the average Joe.

Lieutenant Colonel Poole is clearly in the maneuver warfare camp. His mentors include the late Colonel John Boyd, USAF of OODA Loop fame, William S. Lind, author of The Maneuver Warfare Handbook, and Colonel David Hackworth USA (Ret). Lieutenant Colonel Poole's experience includes both enlisted and officer service in the USMC in war and peace. Whatever one's predilections for or against the philosophy of maneuver warfare, this book illuminates many perceptions and practices of the Eastern fighter. This affordable book needs to be read by all combat arms soldiers, all special operators, and all generals as a companion piece to William S. Lind's Maneuver Warfare Handbook for an appreciation of this new, and yet old, face of war and how to fight it.

Phantom soldier" clearly brings the lessons of recent military history to our vision. In these new wars, the lonely American soldier, the nineteen-year-old infantryman carrying rifles with bayonets fixed and grenades dangling from his web gear, must go into the very foreign deadly tall grass and trees, the dark-canopied jungle, the high and incredibly tough mountains, the dense confusing deadly maze of the teeming cities of Asia, and as individuals, in squads and in platoons find the enemy and fight him in his backyard, with this rifle, grenade and bayonet. This is extremely foreign to a young American soldier's experience. These strange tactics, effectively blunts our strength in firepower and forces us to operate in a small-unit infantry war of soldier to soldier, rifle to rifle, bayonet to bayonet; which requires the basic small units, squads and platoons, to be very effectively trained.

War stories and movies are very popular, because history and adventure come together, with the thrill of rolling the dice in the most ancient of all of man's activities - war. "Phantom Soldier" vividly presents the actions the infantryman takes to build bunkers, set-up ambushes, attack a fortified and entrenched position covered by machine guns, and react when ambushed. In "Phantom Soldier" these Sergeants and Privates are soldiers of the countries that we fight: Japanese, Somalians, Arabians, Vietnamese, and German. "Phantom Soldier" explains in great detail the very different historical perspectives, living conditions, terrain, resources and worldviews that have produced different ways of warfare. This very interesting and unusual book is about the warfare of these oriental peoples', a war of camouflage, hit and run tactics, ambush, booby traps, sniping and of the "Phantom Soldier", the one we cannot seem to find, but finds us all the time.

"Phantom Soldier" dispels the commonly believed myth that battles go to the toughest soldiers, with the most resources. Rather it brings reality to the fore, by showing that it is usually the side that fights the smartest that wins and it is the military strategies and tactics that create these winning methods. "Military strategy" is the overall direction followed in fighting the war, and "military tactics" are the ways the fighting is actually implemented on the ground by the fighting soldiers. This fact is the major intellectual contribution of "Phantom Soldier".

John Poole is a recognized and noted expert on the history of small unit battlefield tactics. He explains, that the current American military strategy consists of massing a strong enough contingent of troops and supporting firepower in the form of artillery, air support and naval gunfire to completely crush and overwhelm the enemy in face-to-face confrontations. The famous "set-piece' battle, in which our strategy is simply to blow the enemy up and win. Our current military leaders believe that our industrial might and technological advantage, combined with the massive size of our military is the answer to all military problems we face. Unfortunately, in our current enemy is not obliging enough to sit still and face us in massed formations to slug it out, where our overwhelming firepower will prevail. Instead, the new enemy hides, he is a phantom. He lives in the hidden jungle fastnesses, treacherous mountains, and maze-like cities; where he organizes his military into decentralized, small mobile units and politically controls the population in support of his war. We therefore cannot destroy the whole country to get him. The French learned this in defeat in Vietnam and Algiers. The Americans saw the effect in Lebanon, Somalia and Vietnam. Moreover, the British and more recently the Russians were defeated in Afghanistan.

John Poole builds a very convincing case that the American military leaders have steadfastly refused to understand the need for effectively making independent and decentralized-unit tactics at the squad and platoon level part of our overall military strategy. Instead, we look to the infantry as maneuver elements at the front of the massive firepower that we deliver to crush the enemy and then infantry's job is to clean up the stragglers and debree that is left over. Because of this lack of understanding, our soldiers are not trained at the squad and platoon level for independent operations, like the enemy. We make the repetitive mistake of sending many conventionally trained maneuver battalions of seven to eight hundred men into combat with all their supporting firepower, where they are unable to effectively fight and therefore are needlessly killed. He urges our government and military to change their perception of war and therefore the training of our troops.

Every reader now gets a chance to dig in and prepare to fight. It necessarily has been written to the soldiers who carry out those tactics, the U.S. Infantryman of every rank, both past and present. Readers devoid of military experience may find some of the content overly technical. Nevertheless, sticking with the detail will create a rewarding experience of understanding and enjoyment of what a battle consists of, as if you were a soldier, digging, carrying a rifle down a jungle trail or in pathless mountains

Overall, "Phantom Soldier" is well worth reading, to see the world through the soldiers eyes on both sides of the battlefield, who have fought in such famous battles as Iwo Jima, the Battle of the Bulge, Chosin Reservoir, Hue, and the Ia Drang Valley. It makes the reader appreciate the courage needed to go to war and the skill required to win and come home. Just like the soldier who has to carry the rifle and take the bayonet charge. This reviewer served in Vietnam in the 101st Airborne and 1st Infantry Divisions and "Phantom Soldier" was reliving that time.

RE: The Phantom Soldier,
I spent over 15 years of my life with the US Army Armor Recon, known as Armored Cavalry. Three overseas tours including the Gulf War, I wish this book had been written then. The problem with today's military is that we forget the lessons of the past wars and we don't keep comprehensive records of tactics and hard earned lessons - Part One, -The Eastern Way of Attack-, Chapter 14, -How Much Has War Changed? Chapter Three, - The False Face and the Art of Delay-. Are some of the exceptional pieces of work in his book, among the chapters.
The Phantom soldier points out our strengths and weakness, as well as enemy's on the battlefields of World War II, Korea, and Vietnam. Korea was one of the most painful wars that the US fought, The Vietnam War, a few short months of training and you were off to war, and that training was mostly marching and polishing boots. The enemy today as seen in Afghanistan, fighting has been a way of life as soon as they can walk. A strong knowledge base is needed more so now that ever. This book will be an asset on the today's battlefield as much as the rifle.
I think the ancient Philosopher and Military General Sun -Tzu said it best " One seeks victory before the battle, by knowing oneself and the enemy -. does one defeat the enemy"
The author continues to provide hard learned information in his book series, paid for in the lives of Americans. For the worst thing in battle is , How does the enemy fight, and how can I fight him?
Stephen E Hughes

"Phantom Soldier" should be on the reading list of every force professional in America--despite author Poole's almost arrogant assertion that Americans do everything wrong. As with most prophets, he overstates the case. For example, Poole keeps harping on how America is focused on "technology" when he means "hardware." Technology is much more than hardware--it is the practical application of knowledge. The tactics and techniques discussed in "Phantom Soldier" are knowledge, practically applied. It is true that American military people brag about "American initiative" while tightening top-down control over the individual front-line infantryman. It is also true that infantry training could be better. The current wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are changing the military--with large numbers of Internet-savvy soldiers and Marines on-line, tips and tactical techniques are being swapped with a speed that makes the ossified TRADOC (Training and Doctrine Command) seem AWOL. Many of Poole's recommendations are being put into practice already. There's still a lot to be done.

The descriptions of how the Oriental warrior thinks and fights are accurate. As for the details on the battles, there is a lot of room for doubt. Poole said it himself--the Oriental warrior shows a false face, letting us see only what he wants us to see, which is often merely reinforcing our own false premises. But saying that the East is behind the West in technology is inaccurate. Oh, perhaps the hardware in the East isn't as new, but quite often the hardware isn't appropriate to the battlefield. Displaying a false face is a technology. Avoiding the use of electronic communications is a technology to defeat our mastery of the air waves. Hardware always brings new problems to the situation it was supposed to solve--using these new problems to defeat the hardware's advantage is an old technique.

The United States infantry has always suffered disadvantages and had advantages over its foes. In the French and Indian Wars, the colonial militia was famous for adopting Indian techniques and beating the Indian at his own game. These techniques were wrongly credited with defeating the world's then-finest army, the British Royal Army--not true. The difference between victory and defeat is often just a matter of perception. Poole brings this out on the chapters concerning Vietnam. It was often the case that both the American and communist forces involved in a battle could declare victory--which flies in the face of zero-sum common sense. Most people would logically conclude that one side would lose and the other would win--and that's that! A significant minority will concede that perhaps both sides can emerge as losers from the same battle. Victory in battle is a matter of achieving specific "successes," such as the western notions of seizing real estate, capturing weapons and personnel, and counting enemy dead. By these metrics, the United States lost the Revolutionary War--and the War of 1812.

Even during the dark days of World War Two, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War, American military units could and did fight the Oriental way and win. That wasn't the norm, and in fact successful programs that had been developed during America's long war against the Indian nations and the "Banana Wars" of the 20's and 30's did see some success in the Vietnam War--but these programs were ended from the top. Marines were exposed to Sun Tsu during the 1930's, and several Marine officers served with Mao. The problems that led to the termination of these programs were lack of media savvy, lack of "success indicators" for the innovators, and the sad fact of ego clashes between rather junior innovators and senior leadership. You cannot "win" when everyone else thinks that you've lost--and you can still lose when everyone else thought you were winning--winning and losing are often merely a matter of perception. The Soviet Union was "winning" the Cold War right up to the moment that the Berlin Wall fell down because the American media had been seduced and the "warmonging" American administration had little credibility. A large part of this was the lack of indicators about who was winning and losing in the Cold War. How could the United States be winning with severe drug problems, rampant crime, unemployment, and widespread poverty? These problems were successfully concealed by the Soviet Union--until their house of cards collapsed. Innovators often lack social skills. Being a little monkey, rather than one of the 500-pound gorillas, also hurts. Senior leaders define "success" and "failure." When the little monkeys clash with the big monkeys--or the 500-pound gorilla--the little monkeys lose. It's a problem that Poole will have getting his ideas accepted as doctrine--he's stepping on senior toes.

I recommend "Phantom Soldier," warts and all, because the emphasis on deception in war, on decentralized control, on training first-class infantry are the keys to winning the peace in places like Afghanistan, Iraq, and the "war on crime" in the United States. Poole mentions it in his other books--we've got a homefront war against terrorists from the Middle East who are constantly trying to destroy the Great Satan. China has a vested interest in harming America. There are many nations that would like to see the United States knocked down several notches. Our own news media downplays American successes and Middle Eastern excesses and plays up the "underdog" Islamic "insurgency" and American "atrocities"--the reason is the nature of news as entertainment and the economics of a "free press." Fortunately, Osama bin Laden and his cronies are more interested in winning the hearts and minds of Middle Easterners and Muslims than Americans, so their announcements don't always play well in this country. They do a better job than Saddam Hussain did!

Poole's appendix includes a thoughtful explaination of Sun Tzu's principled of war for practical application. I liked his index and bibliography--and I am in the process of checking his sources. That's the soul of the scientific method--independant verification.

Too bad that performance in war games counts for so much careerwise. In a zero-defect military, the textbook answer is the only right one during military exercises. This led to poor performance for the American submarine service during the initial part of World War Two, but fortunately, the Japanese practiced Sun Tzu only on the tactical level and not strategically. With a fixation on warriors (and war ships) the Japanese not only failed to successfully interdict the American logistics system, but failed to protect their own. The place to make mistakes is in training. Making them in battle cost lives. Poole rightfully criticizes the mainstream American military mindset, but doesn't identify its source. Even so, Poole's insight into the tactical mindset of the Oriental warrior makes this book a valuable addition to our society's force professional's library.

H. John Poole's first two books were profoundly valuable. The first was a handbook of high-skill small unit infantry technique. The second was his ethical and religious philosophy of warfighting, in which he points out that the ethical point in a just fight is to *win*, not simply to kill. The only key to winning without excessive killing is *skill*, not technology, although appropriate technology supplements skill.

Now comes _Phantom Soldier: The Enemy's Answer to US Firepower_. We owe it to our military service members to study and absorb this book in ALL services and ALL military and civilian levels, even if it means that readers in sea and air forces, and in diplomacy and economic warfare have to make their own translations from ground combat. _Phantom Soldier_ shows that skill has trumped technology-our technology-in the wars of the 20th century. Specific, detailed, professional analyses of the Japanese defense of Iwo Jima, the Chinese at the Chosin Reservoir, the Vietnamese against landing U.S. Marines at Than Tham Khe in late December 1967, illustrate many of the maxims of the ancient Chinese military philosopher Sun Tzu [lucidly summarized and explained in the Appendix] and show how again and again, Americans attempt to substitute technology for skill, shedding rivers of American blood in the process.

This is the most lucid and enlightening readily-available account of Sun Tzu's and his disciples' military philosophy, and will generate one "ah-ha!" experience after another, in understanding both maneuver warfare, and 4th generation or "asymmetric" warfare, such as the attack launched against us in September, 2001.

It is our duty as a nation to only send Americans into fights in cohesive, *skilled* units, led by practiced, competent leaders, because only this wins the fights, sparing their lives and spirits.

Devour this book and then give copies to all your friends. ...

Phantom Soldier is the natural follow-up to John Poole's book "Another Bridge to Cross".
In Phantom Soldier he continuous his effort to explain the right way to fight - this time with more clarity and easy-to-read style. I find the way he mixes the old, and still true, theories of war fighting with real world examples to be most helpful.

Every person slightest interested in learning the ways of war is probably familiar with Sun-Tzu, but in this book the author also introduces us to some of the less know Asian theorists like Sun Bin. For the uninitiated "The Art of War" by Sun-Wu (or Sun-Zi) seams to be the reference work to read, but the truth is that "The Art of War" is only one in the ancient collection "Seven books of war". A less well-known work, the Liu Tao, or Six Strategies for War, was also highly regarded by rulers of ancient China. The six strategies (Civil, Military, Dragon, Tiger, Leopard, and Hound) each deal with a different subject and corresponding plan for success.

In Phantom Soldier the Battle Arrays of Sun Bin are explained so they are applicable to modern units right now.

I don't agree with J R Dunn on his critic on John Poole's writing. J R Dunn referrers to him self as a military historian, if he really is this, he should know better than to confuse efforts that use history as example with absolute truths. I doubt that Mr. Dunn ever participated in a battle or even a fire-fight. If he had he would know that fighting is complex and very fluid, you cannot make science of art. What John Poole really does is to try and make use think the right way.

If a force with all its modern weapons, support, intelligence assets and the overall technological superiority would be able to adopt this way of thinking it would be unstoppable.

If you keep one eye on history and the other on the future - you will be blind on one eye.
If you keep two eyes on the future you will be blind on both.

"Obsessed with American superiority in all things, Americans may have failed to appreciate what other cultures can accomplish" a quote from Colonel Poole's recent essay in Blood Treasure and Spirit.

"The first casualty of war is the truth," he says, and he proceeds to dispel the idea that America won every single tactical engagement in its three major wars in Asia. Lessons that could have been learned by examining Asian tactics were washed over in the need to protect American morale.

Poole argues convincingly that the Japanese, Koreans and Vietnamese were holders of great tactical and strategic insight, every bit the equal of our own. Many times, we claimed victory when the evidence for those victories was lacking. The Asian he argues could be a model for American small unit tactics.

Poole's thesis, in his own words is simple "The soldier of the future must be a phantom --remaining invisible in the defense, on patrol, and during the assault -- or he will be dead. Those that do the fighting are the ones best qualified to refine these techniques. Western military organizations seldom see their role as one of disseminating lessons learned from lower ranks."

Poole fears America's obsession with firepower, stand off weapons and the admiration for high command curtail the option for self-directed learning at the small unit level.

I admire Poole's work. Poole's train of thought seems to mirror those of his mentor, Colonel Michael Duncan Wyly (co-author of William S. Lind's Maneuver Warfare Handbook.) Colonel Wyly in many ways presented similar information in his tenure as the head of the Marine Corps Amphibious Warfare School. Here are Col. Wyly's thoughts on his inclusion of Korean/Chinese tactics into his curriculum:

"I study the Korean War ... because the problems of the 50's have not yet been played out. It was in Korea that we see a very low-tech army doing quite well against the highest tech army (including the Marines) in the world. Even now, I am not comfortable with how either the Army or Marine Corps have faced up to preparing their "warriors." Our adversaries in the Far East had to be warriors; that is, they had to apply the art of war because they had no other option. I am neither holding them (North Korean, Chinese, and North Vietnamese) to be the premier soldiers in the world, nor am I condemning technology. I am simply pointing out that for years we neglected the essence of good tactics. Even though we have the best technology in the world, there is nothing wrong about having the best tactics as well."

Colonel Wyly's calm, even-tempered lectures on tactics form the nucleus of Poole's work.

What a fantastic collection of small-unit lessons learned (or ones that should have been learned) from the history of U.S. armed forces military successes and failures for the last 60+ years!

John Poole has "taken the road less traveled, and that has made all the difference." Poole's emphasis on the importance of small unit dominance on the battlefield is definitely less traveled than the mistaken U.S. over-reliance on superior technologies. The convincing discussion and analysis in this book can make all the difference in how the military decides to prepare for the future: tactical parity with our enemies to augment our technological superiority, or technological advances to complement our superior tactical expertise over our enemies.

Poole's thought-provoking book provides insights and answers to some very important questions: When our enemies or the environment neutralize our vast technological advantages, can our small-units still fight and win on the battlefield? How easy is it for our enemies to minimize our technological advantages? What are the differences and similarities between the eastern and western approaches to warfighting? How well has our training prepared our small-units to fight since WWII? Is it an advantage for our enemies to willingly train and fight with little to no reliance on modern technologies? How well do our small-units record and pass on tactical lessons learned as compared to what our adversaries have done? Are there better ways to fight and minimize the costs of war?

Today's changing face and nature of conflict demand an even greater understanding of the different styles and approaches to warfighting. This book challenges our traditional understandings of battlefield prowess and deserves, at a minimum, serious study and discussion.

John Poole continues to do our nation and the military great service. Phantom Soldier is the third in an evolution of books--Last Hundred Yards, One More Bridge to Cross--that gets it right on future battlefield tactics. This book must be read and implemented.

What if there was no Northern Alliance to provide ground forces in the current war in Afganistan? If the U.S. does not commit ground forces to provide the necessary dimension, to force an enemy to look two ways, then the scenario in the future would be like the 99 war in Kosovo. Here, a Serbian Army withdrew unscathed from the area of operations, despite three months of constant bombing. Poole's book provides the blue print to reforming the U.S. ground forces that has to be a necessary part of the 21st Century "Transformation." We will pay with lives if we do not reform our military from a Second Generation warfare force to one that can deal with threats in the 3rd and 4th Generation (...) (...).