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Philosophical Investigations

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Just a few comments on this 50th anniversary--supposedly FINAL--edition of the translation:
1) After 50 years Anscombe STILL did not fix the snafu in section 412 where she forgot to translate a parenthetical. She was informed of this in the 1950's!
2) To change the translation of "Lebensform" from "form of life" to "life-form" after all these years is unnecessary and stupid. It rings too much of biology and Star Trek.
3) To change the pagination, by which all references to Part II and inserts to Part I have been made for 50 years, is an unnecessary bother.
4) The translation has NEWLY-INTRODUCED typos in sections 38, 41, 47, and then I stopped counting. How is this an improvement?
Please bring the older editions back in print!

`Philosophical Investigations' by Ludwig Wittgenstein is arguably the most important philosophical work of the 20th century, followed close behind by Wittgenstein's earlier work, the `Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus'. While the earlier work was heavily influenced and endorsed by Bertrand Russell, who was always better known than his Austrian colleague in the world at large, the latter work is a complete departure from the logic based philosophy of Russell and the Logical Positivists, for whom the Tractatus was their bible. Although I have never seen this in any philosophical or historical analysis of Wittgenstein's work, the `Philosophical Investigations' were much closer to the `common sense' style of philosophy of G. E. Moore than to the thinking of Russell. All three were Cambridge dons and it is certain that Wittgenstein and Moore knew one another very well. The only thing which may have prevented Moore's ideas from influencing Wittgenstein is that the latter man was a much deeper thinker whose ideas still shape modern philosophy while Moore has become something of a footnote in the history of philosophy, best known for his common sense defense of the real world and his `naturalistic fallacy' invention in his pretentiously titled `Principia Ethica'.

Wittgenstein and Moore certainly were the joint parents of modern English and American academic philosophical style and doctrines. While Wittgenstein did not publish very much in his lifetime, his influence is widespread and deep due to his long tenure as a teacher at Cambridge, from the early thirties to his death in 1955. As abstruse as Wittgenstein's philosophy may seem at first look, it is really exceptionally applicable to everyday thinking. One of my favorite stories about Wittgenstein is in a memoir written by the American philosopher and Wittgenstein student, Norman Malcolm. During World War II, Wittgenstein and Malcolm were chatting about something the Germans had done and Malcolm said it was against the English character to do any similar action. At this comment, Wittgenstein lost his temper at how his student, Malcolm could make such a statement which so totally went against Wittgenstein's teachings. A much less anecdotal application of his thought is his notion of `family resemblences' expounded early in the `Philosophical Investigations' as a tool for analyzing the meanings of words. His example was the notion of games. Try as you might, someone can probably find a counterexample to virtually any definition of games which will fit into a reasonably sized dictionary definition. Wittgenstein's solution was that everything which can be called a game has a `family resemblance' to other games and does not have a family resemblance to most things which are not games.

This is just one tool and two examples of the extreme empiricism in Wittgenstein's thought. While there is a world of difference in the styles of Wittgenstein and the great Scottish philosopher David Hume, there is a strong `family resemblance' between their doctrines in that neither was in the least congenial to generalizations of any sort. The biggest difference between the doctrines of Wittgenstein and Hume is that while Hume was concerned with what we can know, Wittgenstein was concerned with the meanings of what we say and write.

Wittgenstein's most famous doctrine in the `Investigations' is that to determine the meaning of words and ideas, look at how they are used. This became his E=mc squared. All his students wielded this doctrine like a bludgeon to beat any `old school' position into submission.

Although the doctrines of the Tractatus and the Investigations are quite different, Wittgenstein's style of writing in aphorisms appears in both works and appears in virtually every posthumous collection of his notes which have been published in the last 60 years. Unlike Nietzsche, this style was not an artifice or merely done for effect. Wittgenstein's thinking was so intense I think he simply did not have the patience to connect the dots between his primary inspirations.

After the notion of `use' and `family resemblences, the most important position in the Investigations may be his arguments against the notion of a private language. While no one in everyday life has the slightest notion that they may be talking in a private language, the concept is central to the refutation of many older philosophical positions as diverse as those of Bishop Berkeley and Rene Descartes. The concept simply was that a language that is by its nature understandable by only its creator is not possible. It is not a language.

While Wittgenstein's own works stayed close to everyday language or mathematical thinking, the great virtue of the `Philosophical Investigations' over the system of the Tractatus is that the later work creates tools which may intelligently be applied to all kinds of discourse, from Ethics to Aesthetics to Politics to Religion. The later work does not turn its back on these things as some may have seen in the earlier work when it relegated virtually all discourse not about the natural world to the bin of meaninglessness. Since Wittgenstein's intention was to show the emptiness of metaphysics, he followed his thinking to its logical conclusion and threw the baby out with the bathwater in the Tractatus.

One of the most indelible images imprinted on my thinking from my study of the `Philosophical Investigations' is the comment that the search for the solution to a philosophical problem is often like trying to force open a locked door, when all you need to do is turn around to see the open window. This is the notion of thinking outside the box writ large.

Some of Wittgenstein's ideas can be very easy to grasp, like the notion of `family resemblences'. Others like the concept of a private language may be very, very hard. This means that even a nonprofessional can come away with something from this very, very important book.

it would probably say something about The Tao. What does the Tao have to do with Wittgenstein? Very little. I bring it up because there are three books of philosophy which I believe everyone should struggle with at some point in their lives. The first is Plato's Republic, for what I hope are obvious reasons. The other two are The Tao Te Ching and Philosophical Investigations. These two books have common threads that are often unremarked on, but perhaps the most pertinant point to this review is the fact that both are often mistaken, by people who should know better, for being much more esoteric than they actually. The Tao Te Ching is in many ways a manual for surviving in tumultuous times, and most of it's advice, stripped of it's poetry, is nothing if not practical.

Similarly, Philosophical Investigations is a user's guide for the urge to philosophize. Throughout the book, Wittgenstein instructs the reader on not what to think, but how to go about thinking. If there is a thesis at all in this book, it is that we must be cautious about how we use language. He goes to great lengths to illustrate why this is, and exactly what sort of nonsense happens "when language goes on holiday."

Unfortunately, it is not a lesson that everyone in the philosophical community learned from Uncle Ludwig. One suspects that the history of philosophy in the 20th century might have gone quite differently if folks like Quine, Lewis, Nagel, Harman, and Ryle had spent a little more time putting together Wittgenstein's puzzles. There is a great deal of confusion in the world of philosophy, a great deal of disagreement, and a great deal of nonsense. Wittgenstein's legacy is that he realized that this was the first problem that must be faced by anyone at all tempted by the questions of philosophy.

Was he right? Are all philosophical problems reducible to linguistic puzzles? Are we led astray by our picture of the world as it is presented to us by our language? Is there an important distinction between an empirical and a grammatical truth?

I, for one, was convinced by this book. Others are not. But to possess an interest in philosophy at all and to not have at least engaged this book is unforgivable.

I must respectfully disagree with the person who gave this book one star and called it one of the greatest intellectual frauds of the 20th century.
This book is beyond doubt one of the greatest works of philosophy not only of the 20th century but ever.
Without going deeply into the details here, it should be apparent that difficult and persistent problems require radical solutions. While Wittgenstein's solutions to age old philosophical problems may infuriate those with a vested interested in continuing to discuss them endlessly, anyone with an open mind will immediately see the value in his work. If you think that a good deal of philosophizing thoroughout its history has been the utterly misguided search for so-called real essences, then Wittgenstein's later philosophy provides an interesting and insightful response to that history of philosophy.
After reading this book you will never think the same way again.

Originally published in 1953 the `Philosophical Investigations' was the latter of Wittgenstein's two influential philosophical texts (the Tractatus being the offer). This Fiftieth Anniversary edition provides the original German text and Anscombe's English translation on opposing pages.

The Investigations is widely considered to be one of the most influential philosophical texts of the last century. Although it touches on a range of issues including logic and philosophy of the mind it is largely focused on issues pertaining to the philosophy of language. That said, I share the view that Wittgenstein is difficult to categorize - in many ways he stands outside the mainstream of philosophy.

I have occasionally heard it said that Wittgenstein is appealing and accessible to non-philosophers. Undoubtedly this will vary from reader to reader, however, I think a good understanding of the philosophical questions of the time is essential to getting the most out of Wittgenstein - he spends little time framing the issues under discussion and without this background many of his musings may seem meaningless.

From a historic perspective this is one of the most important works in twentieth century philosophy, on a more basic level it is a choppy and poorly constructed work. I struggle with Wittgenstein, sometimes viewing him as trivial other times as profound. Clearly, many great thinkers are in the latter camp, as are ironically many neophytes who want to appear as if they understand Wittgenstein.

Overall, this is an excellent edition of a modern day classic - an essential addition to any serous student's library. I would not, however, recommend this as an entry point to the world of philosophy.

Why aren't dual language editions this easy to find with other philosophical authors? I love this work because it offers the constant opportunity to brush up on German as I'm reading the English text, or, should I choose to approach Wittgenstein in the original, a constant source of clarity with the English translation. It's totally unsurprising that Anselm is the classic edition of Wittgenstein used by scholars. It's great!

While this edition does not solve all problems, no edition could. It is a beautiful piece of work. This is one of the great philosophical books of all time having changed philosophy and culture as well. The book was intended to put an end to academic philosophy which is one reason that it has divided academicians into two camps - religious followers and those who despise the book. But you have to read it for yourself to be even within the domain of literate. It is a well written collection of sometimes aphoristic remarks, many of which have crept into literature and even scientific thought. Brilliantly original, highly readable and certain to change the way you think.Philosophical Investigations: The German Text, with a Revised English Translation 50th Anniversary Commemorative Edition

Wittgenstein's importance to philosophy has, paradoxically, been overstated and understated at the same time.
It is overstated when individuals attach themselves to particular arguments and use them to justify dubious claims - and, I might add, this is what happens more often than not. Half understood, some of these arguments seem to carry a weight that they do not have, and muddy things up more than they help.
But understood in its entirety, W.'s philosophy is the most powerful and innovative (and I would say, correct) philosophy in recent times.

Thisd just is the key text of 20th century philosophy. Written in aphoristic style and heavily reactive to the conversation between Frege Russell and the early Wittgenstein that gave birth to contemporary analytic philosophy it is a must read (in company with some of the texts from those three authors). Nobody should remain unchanged in their thinking by reading and striving to understand this work.

B. Marnold gives an excellent review. I agree that Wittgenstein is the most "seminal" philosopher of the 20th C., but I disagree with the view that he's the most important. Unlike Marnold, I like Moore. I think he's underestimated. His "Principia" is extraordinary. My own favorite philosopher is Karl Popper. So this review is deliberately contrarian.

Wittgenstein is very difficult to understand, with which everyone agrees. His best exegete is David Stern, who has studied LW for decades and written the best overview of his philosophy. And, once you see what LW seems to write, much of it isn't very significant.

Yes, "language games," "private language," "family resemblance," "use determines meaning," and other LW phrases have entered the academic parlor game. But even those who use LW don't agree with what LW meant. The problem is obvious. Aphorisms are quaint, but they are difficult to distill into an argument (ditto: Nietzsche), simply because there aren't any. By reading LW one is supposed to have "eureka" or "insights." Well, by golly, everyone has, but they they don't all seem to agree. Wonder why? If LW's point was that language is polysemous, well the medievalist knew that centuries ago. The clash between nominalism and essentialism (family resemblances) goes back to the thirteenth century (Occham/Aquinas), if not before. If language is stable/unstable, you can get better arguments from Saul Kripke and I. A. Richards than you can from LW. If you see a pattern here (and I hope you do), the problems that concerned LW go back centuries, but at least back then, they spoke coherently and argued intelligently about the claims they were making. LW's aphorisms lead to all kinds of equivocation, which is precisely what he was trying to avoid (we think).

If that's not confusing enough, LW had a "Pauline on the way to Damascus" conversion between co-writing the Tractatus and the Investigations. Everyone agrees there's a wide difference, but over what they cannot pin down. The Tractatus is arcane and obscure, but patient (believe me) reading and reflection reveals the semblance of an argument (in philosophy's use). The Investigations, on the other hand, require a Brahman; does this belong to that, or is it a part of this over here? Even the most astute scholars don't agree. So where does that leave us?

Yes (II), language was the preoccupation of the 20th C. And honestly, we've learned a lot. It all started with LW, so for that we're all grateful. Some "seminal" philosophers of the 20th C. are indebted to LW's linguistic turn, e.g., Austin, Ayer, Russell, Ryle, Searle, Putnam, Taylor, Rorty, Gadamer, Ricouer, et alia. Yet I think English philosopher Roger Scruton makes the convincing point that German philosopher Gotlieb Frege was more instrumental in that focus than LW. And, Frege, while challenging, is intelligible.

Philosophy often asks the arcane, difficult, and opaque questions that concern all of us. Unfortunately, as challenging as those questions are--and they are challenging, the last thing philosophers need is someone who is unintelligible himself. It's difficult enough to try to "wrap yourself around" a particular issue, even when the person is writing coherently, so why have people gravitated to LW (another case is Jacques Derrida), in which convolution and opacity are the hallmarks? Frankly, I think it is an intelligentsia embargo. If YOU can't understand what we're doing, how dare you question what it is that we do? (Reply:) Simply because no one understands.

Difficult thought can be difficult. Even David Hume, the most accessible English-speaking philosopher of all time, has widely different exegetes. Which proves the point. So why invest in an author whose aphorisms continue to confuse, rather than in writers who write plain English. And if philosophy is your game, as it is mine, then write in coherent arguments. You know: If a is B, and B is C, then A is C (that's Aristotle's syllogism, for those who don't know). Boolean logic has largely replaced Aristotle's, but the same general concept applies. Why would a computer programmer, for example, write a software program that her hardware couldn't understand? We are the hardware, and LW as software doesn't seem to get us very far.

If one is really interested in the philosophy of language (which frankly I find boring), Frege and Austin are the writers to read. But if your "game" is chess without a board, then maybe LW will titillate your neurons.