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Philosophy in the Flesh : The Embodied Mind and Its Challenge to Western Thought

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Lakoff and Johnson make strong claims for second-generation cognitive science as a potential revolution in philosophy. By and large, they are right in their general claims. (And they are not "reifying science," only telling us what's current in one branch of one science.) Indeed, the mind is in the body, and we use metaphors. The actual way we think is very different from what most philosophers assumed, and that is an important realization. However, they could do a better job with the execution. The other reviews have covered a lot of this ground, so I will stick to a few important issues. 1. Damasio. In spite of a couple of references to rather dated Damasio work, they do not take into account the genuinely revolutionary importance of A. and H. Damasio's findings about the inseparability of emotion and cognition in the human brain. This absolutely epochal finding has been largely ignored, due in part to Damasio's less than philosophically sophisticated writeup of it in DESCARTE'S ERROR. One would hope that L and J would supply the sophistication rather than joining in the ignoring. 2. Darwinian psychology. L and J's writeup on Darwin confines itself to an attack on pop-Darwinism of the TIME and NEWSWEEK species. Yet, their whole book would be enormously improved by consideration of serious evolutionary psychology (Cosmides, Tooby, David Buss, et al). The brain isn't just in the body; it, and the body it is in, have been shaped by a few million years of natural selection. That has created particular, and interesting, problems, such as: 3. Built-in biases. People find it exceedingly difficult to think according to the tenets of formal rationality, because our minds love to take shortcuts and make plausible assumptions. This makes sense in the context of everyday life (see Gert Gigerenzer on this) but sure plays hell with the sort of "rational thought" that economists claim we do all the time. Yet, no serious discussion of this in L and J. 4. Kant. Kant is badly misrepresented in the book. He (unlike most of his followers--I admit) was quite aware of the embodiment of mind and the physical limits on thought, and worked hard to figure out how we could reason in spite of all. He pointed out that we do somehow manage to carry out abstract reason when it comes to math, formal logic, and much else. So, why shouldn't we try to apply it to morals? And he was hardly a "strict father" in his morality; he was the architect of the arguments for freedom of speech and many of the other civil liberties we now take for granted (in the US). 5. Metaphors. Are we the slaves of our metaphors, or their masters? If we metaphorize "love" (read: amorous relationships) as a journey, does that mean we seriously think love is a journey? Relationships also "blow up," "break," "fold," "die," "strengthen," etc. We deploy metaphors strategically; we are sometimes their slaves but usually their masters, as Elizabethan writer and blues lyricists well know. Thus, when we try, we can think rather more accurately and abstractly than L and J allow.

I read the editors reviews above and the top customer reviews for this text. I don't feel I need to cover the same ground and I'm not going to. However, I have some personal thoughts that may be useful to add.

In my opinion, Philosophy in the Flesh is a monumental undertaking because it is an attempt to topple an existing paradigm marked by many unexamined assumptions about the nature of the mind, consciousness and the mind-body relationship. This is a very tall order and while the book has some shortcomings, it successfully makes a dent in this direction.

I agree with one reviewer's comments about not including and integrating work from researchers on the relationship between consciousness, the body and emotions such as Damasio. To get this background on your own, I would consider reading "The Feeling of What Happens" and other research in the field. I also agree with this same reviewer's comment about neglecting an evolutionary perspective and to get this I would start by reading David Buss. Understanding our cognitive biases is important and many of these do come from evolutionary psychology. For dramatic examples of these, you might try reading THE EVOLUTION OF DESIRE on sexual mating strategies or JEALOUSY by David Buss. There are also other many good books in this general genre and David Buss has written more than a few of them.

With respect to PHILOSOPHY IN THE FLESH itself, I found the first 136 pages most useful. This justifies the cost of the book because it lays out the author's basic theories, the disconnects between what we know about the mind and what is assumed to be true because of an enduring, but outdated concept of the mind-body relationship. In other words, the first 136 pages are like a nitty-gritty short book on the "must know" concepts.

The remainder of the book goes more deeply into specific examples of how the mind is embodied, the role of unconscious condition as the "hidden hand" that influences our actions, etc. It basically amounts to a defense of the first 136 pages, which in itself is convincing and compelling.

This book has implications for anyone who is interested in the mind-body relation and the body's role in cognition. Not everyone will want to read all of it, but I found that picking it up periodically and diving deeper into specific areas useful. It's not a bedtime story, so plowing through all 600 pages over a week or two might be a bit too much for someone who isn't a specialist in this area.

Lakoff has also written some interesting things on metaphor in dreams. If you have an interest in dreams, this book might be thought provoking and if so, you might also be interested in some of Lakoff's articles on interpreting dreams. If you want a nice introduction to dream interpretation that has a good article by Lakoff, consider DREAMS edited by Kelly Bulkeley. (Kelly also has a lot of other excellent books on dreaming and is quite a scholar in that area.)

I liked this book and I think it made a good dent in bringing down an outdated paradigm. I think anyone who is a cognitive therapist should read this and consider the implications. This would also be a good book for people who are more somatically-oriented therapists or who have a strong interest in mind-body medicine. I think Feldenkrais practioners and Rosen Bodyworks people would also benefit greatly from understanding this material.

Lastly, if you like this book, you might also like AWARENESS THROUGH MOVEMENT (Feldenkrais), the EMBODIED MIND (Varela), THE ANATOMY OF CHANGE and The Body (Yuasa Yasuo). Some of these books are less mainstream than others, but they are ALL thought provoking in different ways.

First of all, despite the reference to 'flesh' in the title, the word 'sex' doesn't appear in the index. Maybe Freud said all there was to say about sex and philosophy.

Second, readers should know something of the relationship between Lakoff and Chomsky. About 35 years ago, Chomsky and Lakoff were having a cross town battle (Harvard versus MIT) over the fate of linguistics. Chomsky was the father of 'generative syntax' (aka universal grammar). Lakoff was the vociferous advocate of 'generative semantics.' Chomsky won.

Lakoff is now on the west coast, Chomsky on the east. Lakoff hasn't stopped fighting. In Philosophy in the Flesh, we read (pg 470) that Chomsky's work is an amalgam of old fashioned Cartesianism and ideas lifted from people that disagree with him (Lakoff explicitly included). In 1972, Lakoff wrote that Chomsky will "fight dirty when he argues. He uses every trick in the book." It doesn't look like Lakoff has changed his opinion, nor his book on arguing.

I suspect some of the fire directed by Philosophy in the Flesh at those horrible 'disembodied' logicians (Decartes, Kant, etc), is really aimed at Chomsky. This book might be about linguistics, not philosophy.

All this said, I still enjoyed the book, though it is an uneven read. The case for sensory-motor metaphors is done well and represents an important insight. There are a great number of philosophers convinced 'meaning' and 'mind' cannot be found 'from the skin in'(see Putnam, McDowell, Kripke, etc) so an argument for embodied logic is timely.

I found the first third of the book very intriguing. The early outline of an embodied logic has a lot of emotional punch. The first third was well worth the price of admission. The later sections seem to drift a bit, though. Once one recognizes the idea of an 'embodied logic,' it seems we should find a detailed set of scientific evidence describing the specific microscopic foundations for it. Unfortunately, the book stays in the linguistic domain, seeming a bit disembodied itself. Perhaps, Lakoff's vociferous character makes it hard to work his ideas into a larger system.

For over two millenia, nearly all worldly knowledge was regarded as falling under the general heading of philosophy. Physics, psychology, politics, and even economics were all regarded as various branches of study growing out of a single, philosophical trunk. Aristotle, the most systematic of the ancient philosophers, even dabbled in biology. But as human knowledge advanced, these various branches of study broke off from the philosophic stem and established themselves as independent sciences in their own right. Philosophy soon found itself reduced to metaphysics, morals, aesthetics, and epistemology. But now even epistemology is trying to break away. "Philosophy in the Flesh" documents the attempt of "cognitive science" to make epistemology an empirical science separate from philosophy. Its authors, Lakoff and Johnson, seek to challenge the largely introspective and "a priori" speculations of philosophical epistemology, which they regard as discreditable.

"Philosophy in the Flesh" commences by laying down three major findings of cognitive science: (1) that the mind is inherently embodied; (2) that thought is mostly unconscious; and (3) that abstract concepts are largely metaphorical. Assuming that these three findings are true (and, according to Lakoff & Johnson, they are empirically validated beyond any question), then it follows that many of the central tenets of the major philosophic traditions must be dismissed as hopelessly inadequate. "Once we understand the importance of the cognitive unconscious, the embodiment of mind, and metaphorical thought," our intrepid authors advice us, "we can never go back to a priori philosophizing about mind and language or to philosophical ideas of what a person is that are inconsistent with what we are learning about the mind."

All this is very important. If true, it constitutes one of the great revolutions in philosophy and science. But are Lakoff & Johnson the men to carry it out? No, I do not think so. They may be competent scholars and solid citizens within the academic fold, but their philosophical interpretation of the empirical data of cognitive science definitely leaves something to be desired. While I whole-heartedly agree with their contention that philosophy needs to become more empirically responsible, empiricism, though vital and necessary, is not enough. The empirical facts must by synthesized into a grand interpretive vision, and this can only be done by a philosopher of genius. And indeed, in some respects, it already has been done. Most of the valid points in Lakoff's & Johnson's book have been made by philosophers working within the critical realist tradition, especially the philosopher George Santayana. Lakoff and Johnson operate under the illusion that the findings of cognitive science are radically new, but they are not: they simply are new to those whose philosophical knowledge doesn't extend beyond the major traditions taught within academia. Yet well before second generation cognitive science, Santayana had been arguing that the mind has a natural locus within the body, that it contains a large "vegatative" (i.e., unconscious) component, and that concepts (and, indeed, all knowledge) are essentially metaphorical. Cognitive science, in discovering and validating these great truths, merely affirms what Santayana contended throughout his long philosophic career. If we could but merge the findings of cognitive science on the one hand with Santayana's philosophic vision of man and his spirit, we might at last have the honest, empirically responsible philosophy which Lakoff & Johnson are so eager to provide for us and which, thanks to analytic and rationalist philosophy, we have so desparately lacked.

Lakoff and Johnson's book "Philosophy in the Flesh" adds the voice of cognitive linguistics to the growing chorus of voices from science of mind that have informed philosophers: the Platonic World View is nearing the end of its reign over Western philosophy. The human mind is a product of its physical embodiment in the flesh, not some non-physical mystery.

In addition to its main story line, "Philosophy in the Flesh" also has a meta-story line. Lakoff and Johnson were well aware of the fact that many philosophers who remain bewitched by the West's Platonic legacy do not want to listen to what the science of mind has discovered. As Lakoff and Johnson clearly explain the situation, Platonic Idealism, Cartesian Dualism, and Anglo-American analytic philosophy are the natural products of a priori philosophical assumptions that are based on certain common sense metaphors such as 'seeing is believing'. Lakoff and Johnson carefully explain how the science of cognitive linguistics has accumulated data that show the limitations of such Folk Psychological views.

Within "Philosophy in the Flesh", Lakoff and Johnson included an anticipatory critique of their critics, explaining why these critics remain trapped in a dead-end philosophical world view. The key point is that many philosophers are still trained in the belief that science can have nothing useful to say about the mind. This attitude towards science is a fundamental part of the philosophical tradition that is invalidated by modern science of mind. Thus, we are dealing with the latest installment in the rather intriguing situation of an entire intellectual nation being declared intellectually bankrupt by another intellectual tribe. A perfect setting for a protracted battle! In addition, Lakoff and Johnson explicitly explain what is wrong with postmodernism and why it is at odds with their views. Amazingly, this has not stopped some from calling Lakoff's and Johnson's approach postmodern. There is exceptional irony in this kind of desperate attack on the ideas expressed in "Philosophy in the Flesh".

The meta-story line within "Philosophy in the Flesh" serves a useful role for potential buyers of the book. Many critics of "Philosophy in the Flesh" are adherents to the Platonic World View and they have voiced exactly the complaints about "Philosophy in the Flesh" that Lakoff and Johnson explicitly anticipated and accounted for with their meta-story line. What can we conclude when these critics of "Philosophy in the Flesh" fail to mention the meta-story line and how it anticipated their complaints? Most likely, such critics of this book did not read it. If they had, they would have seen the meta-story line and addressed IT in their reviews of the book.

If you are a member of the anti-science tribe of philosophers of mind and language, you will have been trained to ignore the arguments and scientific data that are presented by Lakoff and Johnson. If you are already devoted to an investigation of mind and language by making use of scientific studies of brains and human behavior, then you will enjoy this book as it explores the philosophical implications of physically embodied minds. If you are still thinking about mind and language with an open mind, this book will be useful to you. It presents a strong argument for a new way of doing philosophy that is rooted in the science of mind.

Here are some challenges to the philosophers who are upset by "Philosophy in the Flesh". Take the time to actually read the book. Come back and tell us what you think of how Lakoff and Johnson explained why you are upset. There is a close parallel to how the current philosophical debate over mind is playing out and how the debate over Vitalism played out in the last century. Many philosophers of mind argue that the mind is a special case in philosophy because of the mystery of subjective experience. In "Philosophy in the Flesh" Lakoff and Johnson explain why the old dualistic distinction between objective and subjective is bogus. The response of critics to this specific issue would be a good place to begin a dialog about the actual content of the book.

Having followed the authors' work for over ten years, I was pleased to see Lakoff and Johnson come around once again to tackle the philosophical implications their research entails. As expansive as Women..., but explicated in a clear and precise manner, Philosophy in the Flesh presents the bulk of experiments and observations detailing the embodied roles language and imagination play in our lives. That concepts have a basic logic which is neither a representation of mind-independent categories in the world nor a product of individual minds only, they have offered the philosophical community a middle path between Objectivism and Solipsism. Their own work, supported by people such as Antonio Damasio, Mark Turner, and Ronald Langaker, has reached a maturity most philosophers only dream of. Unfortunately, rather than being seriously attacked by mainstream philosophy or cognitive science, they have been largely ignored. Not entirely unlike their colleagues in vision, people such as Evan Thompson and Francisco Varela, they have been marginalized by the very figures they critique. Happily, however, there is a growing core of linguists and philosophers who have grown up wary of the traditional camps, and who have added to the core belief that the function of our perceptual and motor system creates the very particular cognitive system we have in place. If there is a complaint about this book, it is in the challenge that they fail to give to the bulk of philosophical work being done today. Work that would greatly benefit from their insights.

Good Elaboration and Verification -- Be sure to read ''Metaphors We Live By''

I am reviewing this book together with ''Metaphors We Live By'', since ''Philosophy in the Flesh'' stands as useful elaboration on the ideas developed in ''Metaphors''. In ''Philosophy in the Flesh'', Lakoff and Johnson make a good presentation of empirical verification which followed the publication of their landmark ''Metaphors We Live By''. I think in ''Philosophy in the Flesh'' the authors become a little too ambitious, falling into broad speculation in attempts to cover far more ground than the empirical confirmation justifies.

In their exuberance, they also write a book that comes up far too lengthy in its attempts to cover even in a cursory fashion the entire territory of western philosophy. I think a more modest attempt to follow up on ''Metaphors'' would have proved better. Maybe that would have better piqued the interest in continuing future publications and ongoing research that might in the long run eventually better cover more ground less speculatively than they shoot for here. Professional philosophers will probably remain thoroughly unconvinced though possibly intrigued by this speculative cognitive science foray into their field. Finishing this book may prove a major project for anyone with less than a professional interest at stake. Those less invested in this subject might be better advised to read ''Metaphors'', though after reading that you may have more motivation to read ''Philosophy''.

I therefore include below my review for ''Metaphors We Live By'', since it also refers to both of these books. I give ''Philosophy in the Flesh'' five stars. I would give ''Metaphors'' six if Amazon permitted it.

''Metaphors We Live By'' Landmark! - A sense of recognition sets in

Many of the examples oversimplify. The authors provide no formal empirical basis for their claims. However, upon reading this book, a sense of recognition sets in. They have succeeded in illuminating as much as one can through discourse alone, the cognitive underpinnings of our language and the way we think. Very little if anything in the way of ideological bias clouds the mirror through which the reader can recognize the authors' thesis. Although not explicitly written for purposes of self-development or consciousness raising, the very act of consciously recognizing these metaphorical cognitive mechanisms may give the reader a greater sensitivity to and command of the language. It certainly has for me.

The authors later went on to write ''Philosophy in the Flesh.'' If you are a stickler for more formal empirical verification, in that tome you will find good discussions about, and references to some empirical confirmation which followed on the thesis developed in this book. In ''Philosophy in the Flesh'', however, the authors inevitably allow more play with their ideological leanings (liberal) which may prove a distraction to some readers who would find ''Metaphors We Live By'' much freer from these ideological musings. Clearly the revelations we find in ''Metaphors We Live By'', transcend ideology, including the authors' ideologies.

The implications of widespread cognitive metaphor throughout our language, culture, and even our sciences, presents us with the landmark tip of an iceberg, whose deeper implications spread far beyond and below the more obviously poetical uses that we typically recognize when we think of the metaphorical. This causes us to rethink everything in ways which I am sure even exceed the authors' scope of speculation, though they have done an excellent job in pointing the way. The ideas developed here, cry out for -- even demand -- further elaboration. This book itself only points to the tip of the iceberg and calls it what it is -- an iceberg. In this job, it proves remarkably easy to read, explanatory, to-the-point, and no longer than necessary. Anyone literate can read and understand it, though exploring and understanding all of its ramifications could easily become a whole science yet to be born.

If you have either a professional or an intense lay interest in cognitive science, this book provides an excellent introduction to ''Philosophy in the Flesh'', though ''Philosophy . . .'' certainly does not provide a conclusion to ''Metaphors We Live By.'' If you find ''Philosophy'' a difficult read, you may try this instead. If you find this book intriguing, then more illuminating speculations lie ahead in ''Philosophy'', but don't expect a grand satisfying conclusion. The authors try for too much there, overshooting themselves and thus occasionally slipping into more ideological speculations where the empirical presentation leaves off. I highly recommend both books, but this one first and foremost.

Having followed the authors' work for over ten years, I was pleased to see Lakoff and Johnson come around once again to tackle the philosophical implications their research entails. As expansive as Women..., but explicated in a clear and precise manner, Philosophy in the Flesh presents the bulk of experiments and observations detailing the embodied roles language and imagination play in our lives. That concepts have a basic logic which is neither a representation of mind-independent categories in the world nor a product of individual minds only, they have offered the philosophical community a middle path between Objectivism and Solipsism. Their own work, supported by people such as Antonio Damasio, Mark Turner, and Ronald Langaker, has reached a maturity most philosophers only dream of. Unfortunately, rather than being seriously attacked by mainstream philosophy or cognitive science, they have been largely ignored. Not entirely unlike their colleagues in vision, people such as Evan Thompson and Francisco Varela, they have been marginalized by the very figures they critique. Happily, however, there is a growing core of linguists and philosophers who have grown up wary of the traditional camps, and who have added to the core belief that the function of our perceptual and motor system creates the very particular cognitive system we have in place. If there is a complaint about this book, it is in the challenge that they fail to give to the bulk of philosophical work being done today. Work that would greatly benefit from their insights.

This book puts forth a lot of interesting ideas about the nature of human thought, and it is a helpful tool for critically analyzing writing and language. It also provides an in depth look into Western philosophy by showing the core assumptions that philosophers have made and the basic metaphors they have relied on. I think Lakoff is right that when it comes to language, humans rely heavily on metaphor. It is hard to express abstract ideas without using metaphor, and in this sense metaphor is a great human ability. Yet, as the authors show, metaphor is also something to be critical of because it can lead to faulty conclusions. Indeed, this book shows how pretty much every philosopher reached false (yet logical) conclusions because their premises consisted of metaphors that did not properly correspond to the abstraction they were trying to understand. For example, Descarte's premises that the mind is a stage or theatre, and that consciousness is a light shining on the stage, led him to some seriously false conclusions about the mind (such as that all mental activity is conscious).

Most scientists would take the errors of philosophy as evidence for the necessity of running experiments and generating data. Lakoff, however, goes a bit far in concluding that human thought is irrevocably confined to metaphor. He goes beyond philosophy and language and applies his metaphor theory in areas where it simply does not apply. For example, he contends that even mathematics is constrained by metaphor and that the theory of relativity only works because certain metaphors "allow" it to. I am inclined to believe that mathematics is a tool that allows humans to figure out objective things about reality. Only real, objective knowledge about the world could have allowed humans to build a rocket and launch astronauts to the moon.

Another area where I feel Lakoff goes too far is in his discussion of evolution. He claims that the common idea that evolution is based on violence and competition ("nature red in tooth and claw") is based on the metaphor "Evolution is Survival of the Best Competitor." This metaphor, he argues, leads people to believe that self interest is rational, that competition and ruthlessness is good, and therefore *causes* them to act this way. There are two problems here. One is the assertion that people's understanding of evolution is based primarily on metaphor. I personally believe that evolution is fairly nasty because I have read books about animal behavior. Infanticide, for example, is an evolutionary strategy used by lions, gorillas, and baboons. Evolution selected for males in these species (and others) to murder babies. This is a fact. Without consulting actual facts about evolution and ethology, Lakoff proceeds to put forth the competing metaphor "Evolution is the Survival of the Best Nurtured," as if this adds insight into the issue, when in fact it offers ZERO insight. Understanding evolution requires careful observations of animals in the wild--not concocting metaphors and doing linguistic analysis. Whereas metaphor theory adds insight to philosophy--which is comprised of words written in books--it actually hinders insight into evolution, which is comprised of animals that exist objectively and can be empirically observed. Lakoff is stuck in the world of books and language, and estranged from the reality that exists outside of our minds--a reality that our minds are capable of apprehending with a certain degree of accuracy.

Lakoff goes way, way too far when he says that people *can't* act self-interestedly because it is impossible to conceptualize self-interest (he uses a bunch of confusing jargon when making this point, which I will spare you). Here's a question for Lakoff: what about slugs? Yes, slugs. Are slugs unable to act in their own self-interest, since surely they are unable to conceptualize the intricate details of their self-interest? I think we can all agree that slugs do in fact pursue what is best for them, based on the primitive sensory mechanisms and instincts evolution endowed them with. It is not necessary to conceptualize self-interest in the abstract to act self-interestedly. This is a fundamental point that Lakoff does not seem to understand, which is ironic because he spends a good deal of time emphasizing the role of unconscious mechanisms in human thought. Going back to Lakoff's confused notion of evolution, it seems highly improbable that people's abstract, metaphoric understanding of evolution as "Survival of the Best Competitor" would cause them to act competitively, whereas Lakoff's nurture metaphor would cause them to act benevolent. Abstract metaphors do not form the basis of human behavior, nor of any other animal's behavior.

Metaphor theory: interesting, but not universally applicable.

This book argues that human abstract thinking is built upon sensory-motor and concrete thinking, which form the universal foundations of human cognitive activity, and that all abstract thinking is comprised of metaphors for these foundations. The writers presume that since the early development of human intelligence takes place within the context of our bodies and our interactions with the physical environment the cognitive mechanisms for abstract thinking are based on neurological layers built above the sensory motor modes on to which they are mapped. These are not new ideas, of course. The developmental stages of Piaget provide a parallel perspective on human cognitive ontology. Contemporary research in artificial intelligence presuppose the same. Lakoff and Johnson, while presuming the same, are not concerned with marshalling the evidence to justify this position. It becomes the ideological foundation of their broadside against the entire body of western thought.

The evidence presented by Lakoff and Johnson for their hypothesis is entirely comprised of a linguistic analyses of the metaphors we use when talking about abstract ideas. They argue that since we are usually not aware of the sensory- motor and concrete origins of our abstract thinking the borrowed logic of the metaphors prevent us from engaging in true abstract thinking. Neither we nor any of the great philosophical forefathers of Western thought are or were aware of that. We cannot think what we think when we are are thinking, and neither could they. The entire body of Western philosophy can be reduced to a collection of metaphors for the embodied sensory-motor mind.

The broadest criticism of Lakoff and Johnson must refer to the negative self reference inherent in their main argument. Their deconstruction of human thinking and all of Western philosophy is itself abstract. If their method gives us a valid critical method that leads to knowledge about the function of human minds and its habits of thinking, then Western philosophy too must preserve its claim to yield valid arguments and true knowledge.

Despite this, however, these authors do make a valid point. Much of our language about abstract concepts is metaphorical. This insight is not new. Besides the usual favorites of postmodern writers such as Neitzche and Freud who both discussed (besides using) metaphor, the issues is not new to philosophical debate. Even Aristotle, the linguistic essentialist par excellence, talked about the use of metaphor. Besides the evidence offered by Lakoff and Johnson, there is a large body of evidence from evolutionary psychology, cognitive psychology and the study of artificial intelligence which contribute to the view of human intelligence, broadly speaking, as having been shaped by embodied sensory motor mechanisms and experiences. Unfortunately, very little of this evidence was marshaled by these authors. Lakoff and Johnson's chief conclusion does not follow from the data they present.

Metaphorical thinking may be a barrier to pure abstract thinking but at another level it may be the bridge which enables us to grapple with concepts outside the sensory-motor and concrete operations of everyday life. Why it should not be possible to meaningfully map systems of abstract ideas onto the metaphors is not explained by Lakoff and Johnson. Simply to point out that the language of abstract thinking is metaphorical does not prevent it from being the language of abstract thinking. Lakoff and Johnson's rather cavalier dismissal of the entire body of Western philosophy is not convincing. The corpus of Kant's work, for example, cannot be reduced to the "strict father" metaphor which Lakoff and Johnson claim to find underlying almost everything he said; a description which in any case is dubious at best. Where these metaphors can be found, they do not invalidate Kant's systematic and monumental works, which have their own meaning. In some places, the metaphors seem to be found more strongly in Lakoff and Johnson's presentation than in the original works. Kant was mistaken in some central aspects of epistemology. His synthetic a priori judgments, which he took to be certain and necessary truths, became shaky with the development of electrodynamic theory in the 19th Century and lost all credibility after general relativity was discovered in the early part of the 20th. But Western thought moved on. Einstein freely used spatial metaphors to describe the formalism of relativity but these in no way invalidate his theory. It is interesting to note that the most abstract of contemporary theories of matter employ terms such as "spin", "color" and "charm" to designate formal entities which we know can have no such physical meaning; they are merely terms in equations describing properties of quantum waves. The use of these metaphors, as distinct from calling them "particle a", "particle b" and so one, has no impact on the truth or validity of quantum formalism.

Where Lakoff and Johnson are able to demonstrate that philosophers have systematically used metaphors in their language, they have failed to demonstrate that the logic of the metaphors is carried over to the thinking of the philosophers in question to such a degree that their works are invalidated. Perhaps this happens some times - but not all the time to everyone. Lakoff and Johnson's arguments are often forced and not convincing. They are indubitably post-modern critics of traditional philosophy and need to be taken with a large pinch of salt (metaphor intended).