Philosophy's Cool Place [Hardcover]

D. Z. Phillips (Author)

Book Description

Publication Date: May 1999

Ludwig Wittgenstein established a "cool" stance for philosophy, contemplating the world without meddling in it. D. Z. Phillips explores this position, focusing on its implications for philosophical authorship and the philosophical investigation of the nature of reality. Influenced by the views of Wittgenstein and his pupil Rush Rhees, Phillips--who is one of Rhees's own students--first contrasts Wittgenstein's methods with Kierkegaard's religiously oriented dialectic. He describes the difficulty in sustaining a contemplative view of philosophy and discusses efforts to go beyond it in the work of Richard Rorty, Stanley Cavell, Annette Baier, and Martha Nussbaum, who, in different ways, propose to make philosophy a guide to living. A provocative and challenging work, Philosophy's Cool Place is one of the few books that addresses the discipline as an enterprise and explores its relation to moral values, religious belief, and the nature of Reality. By advancing the cause of neutrality, it will stimulate debate and foster discussion of what philosophy is to become in the postmodern era.

Product Details

• Hardcover: 170 pages
• Publisher: Cornell Univ Pr (May 1999)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 0801436001
• ISBN-13: 978-0801436000
• Product Dimensions: 9.3 x 6.2 x 0.8 inches
• Shipping Weight: 14.6 ounces (View shipping rates and policies)
• Average Customer Review: 5.0 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (1 customer review)
• Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #2,178,510 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)

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11 of 11 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars D. Z. Phillips Contemplative Conception of Philosophy, July 26, 2000

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Art Hurtado (San Benrardino, CA) - See all my reviews

This review is from: Philosophy's Cool Place (Hardcover)

In "Philosophy's Cool Place" D. Z. Phillips sets out in the footsteps of Ludwig Wittgenstein to show what he considers to be the fundamental stance of philosophy and proceeds to show how difficult it is to achieve. In describing his approach to philosophy, Wittgenstein states in Culture and Value, "My ideal is a certain coolness. A temple providing a setting for the passions without meddling with them." According to Phillips, this ideal stance involves a "contemplative conception" of philosophy where the philosopher "reflects on our discourse, our understandings of the real world, endeavoring to let them be themselves in the face of deep tendencies to confuse them" (166). In other words, a contemplative conception of philosophy marvels at the possibility of discourse, not just what we mean by our words but what it means to say something at all. To illustrate these different approaches to philosophy, Phillips contrasts Soren Kierkegaard's insightful observations of the world and it various "spheres" (aesthetic, ethical and religious) with Wittgenstein's method of conceptual clarification. Despite Kierkegaard's exceptional philosophical/ dialectical ability, his work (by his own admission) was fundamentally religious and argued positively for a religious outlook. Wittgenstein, on the other hand, wanted to remain more circumspect, believing that a philosopher should be the citizen of no community, at least when philosophizing. Wittgenstein acknowledged this stance of philosophical detachment is an ideal and held it out as one way to help avoid what all philosophers struggle against: the bewitchment of our thinking by means of our language. One form this bewitchment takes is to suggest a picture of "the way things really are" which philosophy may turn into a general thesis or metaphysical assumption in religion or ethics. Following Wittgenstein, Phillips states that philosophical reflection does not underwrite any specific form of moral appropriation" and that the desire to do so is a corruption of philosophical contemplation. There are many kinds of moralities and no general theory of discourse can unify this variety, just as all that is said in a language cannot be reduced to one big conversation. Likewise, no single set of moral criteria can be established to settle all moral conflicts or establish one moral view indisputably above the others. Yet in chapter after chapter, Phillips detects various examples of moral foundationalism in prominent thinkers (e. g., Richard Rorty, Stanley Cavell, Annette Baier, Martha Nussbaum) who succumb to the tendency in their own philosophical analyses to explain the variety in general terms, even as they argue against foundationalism. In seeking to get behind our words, clear up disagreements or justify positions, each may occasionally fall into the trap of imposing his or her own theory on the religious concepts and moral views of others, frequently confusing concepts that Phillips argues should be kept distinct. In doing this, they not only miss out on other possibilities of meaning, they also wander away from the ideal of a contemplative conception of philosophy. The lesson, according to Rush Rhees, Phillips' own esteemed philosophy teacher and a student of Wittgenstein, the point of the variety (in morality or religion) is not to prompt us to find its essence or fundamental unity but to remind us not to seek it. And if someone wonders at how we can possilby go on with all this moral diversity and raggedness in religious belief, Phillips reminds her, "That is how we do go on." The ideal stance of contemplation or philosophical disinterest does not mean one must be uninterested in the subject but that one should be professionally detached so that the philosopher's views do not cut him off from a clearer understanding of the world. Nor does the philosopher's detachment mean one cannot be critical of a practice or form of life. As Phillips acknowledges in his concluding chapter (**which a new-comer to Phillips' work would be wise to read first**), a philosopher's work may lead to reform in a practice while the philosopher qua philosopher is not a reformist, that is, "trying to go somewhere." For anyone who has seriously wondered at the nature of philosophy, what it's about, "Philosophy's Cool Place" would be an excellent text to read (perhaps along with Plato's "Gorgias" and "The Idea of A Social Science" by Peter Winch).