Pleiku: The Dawn of Helicopter Warfare in Vietnam [Paperback]

J. D. Coleman (Author)

Book Description

Publication Date: February 1989

They were the first air assault division in the history of the U.S. Army. Their job was to test the innovative air-mobile concept and break the Army's dependence on surface transport. This is their story, told by a man who was there, at America's first victory against the Vietnamese. HC: St. Martin's.

Editorial Reviews

From Publishers Weekly

This is a history of U.S. development of the air-mobile concept; the creation of the first air-assault division; and the testing of both in the central highlands of South Vietnam in October/November 1965the Pleiku Campaign. For the first time, helicopters transported troops en masse as well as carrying organic howitzers and establishing remote fire-bases in support of a division-sized operation. The result was a stunning victory for the Americans. Retired Army Lt.-Col. Coleman (who wrote the official after-action report) had access to "three duffel bags" full of captured enemy documents and here covers both sides of the bloody affair. Highly specialized, the book will appeal primarily to only the most dedicated military buffs. Photos.
Copyright 1988 Reed Business Information, Inc. --This text refers to an out of print or unavailable edition of this title.

From Library Journal

Here is a pair of books on air power in the Vietnam War. Coleman's is a unit history of the first large-scale battle between North Vietnamese regulars and the newly reorganized cavalry of the U.S. Army, which used helicopters for troop and material movements and close-fire support. The author, who was involved and wrote the official after-action report on the Ia Drang Valley of October and November 1965, uses the traditional arrangement of order of battle, tactical conditions, and a description of the fighting. He also includes much information now available from the other side, as the 33d North Vietnamese Regiment planned a major attack against the American forces. This action in Pleiku province was the first trial in combat of the 1st Air Cavalry's helicopter tacticstactics which, in this case, rendered the North Vietnamese Army powerless. Describing the action "up North," English author Dorr has produced a heavily illustrated year-by-year narrative of U.S. air power going against Laotian, Cambodian, and North Vietnamese targets some of them more heavily defended by missiles and guns than any in history. Air Force, Navy, and Marine aircraft struggled with often arbitrary rules of engagement and equipment that occasionally malfunctioned, to demonstrate determination and courage in a dubious cause. In the end the strategy, Dorr argues, drove the Hanoi government to sign the January 1973 peace agreement. Both are well-written and illuminating histories. Mel D. Lane, Sacramento
Copyright 1988 Reed Business Information, Inc. --This text refers to an out of print or unavailable edition of this title.

Product Details

• Paperback
• Publisher: St Martins Mass Market Paper (February 1989)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 0312914687
• ISBN-13: 978-0312914684
• Product Dimensions: 6.6 x 4.2 x 1 inches
• Shipping Weight: 13.6 ounces
• Average Customer Review: 4.4 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (7 customer reviews)
• Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #1,384,393 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)

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7 of 7 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars Where to begin a study of modern U.S. Air Assault tactics, August 14, 2000

By 

Sam Damon Jr. (Fort Bragg, NC) - See all my reviews

This review is from: Pleiku: The Dawn of Helicopter Warfare in Vietnam (Paperback)

If you want to know where America's Air Assault tactics came from, how they developed in Vietnam and by implication how Army Aviation is in trouble today--begin with this book! Have your highlight pen ready when you examine the decisions and actions of the brave pioneers who created 3-D Air Assault capabilities in our Army at the behest of Secretary of Defense Robert MacNamara (he could do good things once in a while!). If you read carefully you will see that to get the drastic Army structural changes needed, the capabilities of helicopters were oversold--to get large numbers of helicopters, the ground vehicle was dismissed as a tool with the helicopter doing EVERYTHING. General Kinnard and his wizards of the 11th Airborne Division [later reflagged the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile)] went about having helicopters do everything---place troops around the battlefield, act as CAS gunships, fly-in artillery for fire bases--except stay in the "death ground" of enemy fire (re: Colonel Bolger's book: "Death Ground: America's Infantry in battle") as an armored shield and protected transportation means carrying superior levels of firepower. So while Air Assault operations could "run circles" around the enemy on the map board, once Sky Troopers left their mounts, they were vulnerable to enemy fire fighting the enemy "even" at best---as the more numerous enemy could absorb untold casualties without ill effect at home. Its interesting that the helicopter-replacing-everything hubris negated the understanding of the need to field a helicopter-transportable light Armored Fighting Vehicle (AFV) that could "Air-Mech" with Sky Troopers into battle and give them dominance from that point on in the operation. The M551 Sheridan light tank was available though 7 tons too heavy for the CH-47 Chinook; (I have seen photos of it lifted by the CH-54 Sky Crane heavy lift helicopter) why it wasn't airdropped from fixed-wing C-130 Hercules aircraft and used for 3-D maneuver fire support by the one parachute-qualified Brigade of the 1st Cavalry Division is a mystery--the French Airborne parachuted all over the countryside in the first Indo-China war. Perhaps it was the urgency of getting a force that could maneuver deep into the Central Highlands of Vietnam before the enemy cut the South into two over-rode deeper analysis and force-on-force war games to reveal structural flaws and correct them. America was at war.

As you read this superb book which should be a companion to LTG Hal Moore/Joe Galloway's "We were Soldiers once and young" account of the Ia Drang battle fought by the 1st Cav, you get a sense that we miscalculated and were thinking "big blue arrows"--operationally impressed by helicopter distance/speed 3-D maneuver capability and overly reliant on distant artillery howitzer/aircraft supporting arms and overlooked the up close "belt buckle" fight that the enemy chose to fight whenever possible because it would curtail our long-range fires since he had the advantage in RPG explosives weapons effects (ready-to-fire, doesn't need to be unfolded like a M72 LAW) while we fought him "even"; our M16s versus his AKMs, our grenades versus his grenades, our bayonets versus his bayonets, our casualties versus his numbers.

Today, the "pendulum" has swung the other way with the helicopter Air Assault delivering foot-mobile troops implies casualty risks and some Commanders are willing to surrender 3-Dimensional maneuver to the enemy and fight "heavy" only along the 2-D axis, once again over-relying on distant supporting arms fires to defeat the enemy (but its digitized and "precision" this time!) though this means you will be channelized and ambushed in ground vehicle restricted terrain. That aircraft (Aviation branch) could work TOGETHER with tracked AFVs (Armor branch) to position the latter into "go" terrain to overcome the enemy was possible then and certainly do-able today with lighter AFVs like the 3-4 ton German Airborne Wiesel which can be lifted even by the Huey's replacement, the UH-60L Blackhawk.

The solution is to read this book and put yourself in the shoes of the decision makers like a good war simulation, draw on your history and combine Airborne and Air Assault capabilities using that magnificent air-droppable M113 that was rumbling all over the countryside (Coleman mentions go/no-go for tracked vehicle terrain considerations in his book), the new M551 Sheridan light tank, and combine the best attrributes of 3-D and 2-D maneuver into one. The lesson today is to field the M8 Armored Gun System successor to the M551 and modernize the latest M113A3, buy some Wiesels for recon and create an Air-Mech 3-D capability in the U.S. Army today before we fight in another place like Vietnam again. We cannot hope to chose where/when we can fight ("We don't do mountains and we don't do jungles"), living for a replay of the open desert to stampede our heavy armored caccoons ala' Desert Storm---we must be ready to go where America sends us. When South Vietnam was in danger of being severed by the NVA in 1965-66 we sent the best we had: the 1st Air Cavalry Division and they saved the day, though at a cost so high we could not sustain the support at home for the noble endeavor. At least Kinnard's men had some time to run tests and conduct experiments, we may not be so lucky. NOW is the time to get ready, this book would be a good place to start.

7 of 7 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars Concise history of First Cav's Ia Drang Valley campaign., March 5, 1999

By A Customer

This review is from: Pleiku: The Dawn of Helicopter Warfare in Vietnam (Paperback)

Coleman chronicles the history of the Ia Drang campaign from the viewpoints of many levels of the combatants - from brigade, battalion and company commanders to platoon and squad NCO's and skytroopers. Also insights from captured NVA documents and maps on their battle plans. I found his chapters covering the LZ XRay and LZ Albany actions gripping text.

6 of 6 people found the following review helpful:

4.0 out of 5 stars Accurate, documentary-style history by one who was there., June 4, 1998

By A Customer

This review is from: Pleiku: The Dawn of Helicopter Warfare in Vietnam (Paperback)

The author makes history interesting. He covers probably the most significant transition in tactics undertaken by the U.S. Army in the 20th century--"freeing infrantry from the terrain". The First Cav tactics would later be emulated by most of the U.S. infantry units in Vietnam, and later by the ARVN, but no other units ever had anywhere near the rotary wing assets available as did the Cav. What the Cav initiated tactically in the Ia Drang Valley battles led to the evolution to their "pile on" tactics employed later in the war. Their massive airlift capability was the great equalizer in later battles with numerically- superior and well-armed NVA units--battles often (perhaps generally) initiated by Cav "Blue" Platoons of its 9th Cavalry Squadron. Readers interested in this book will find even greater detail, and a much more focused account of the battles at LZ Xray and LZ Albany in Harold Moore's and Joe Galloway's book: "We Were Soldiers Once--And Young". Other good reading is Mathew Brennan's "Brennan's War" (his personal account serving as a member of a Cav Blue Platoon in 1967-69), and his:"Headhunters" (also about Blue Platoons in the Cav), and "Hunter/Killer Teams" (about scout/cobra "Pink" teams). J.D. Coleman also wrote an excellent book about 1st Cav operations in 1969-70, including the invasion of the Cambodian "sanctuaries" in May of 1970, entitled "Incursion".