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Plotting Hitler's Death: The Story of German Resistance

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One of the things my sons and I have in common is an interest in World War II. I am interested in the personalities, one son is interested in battle specifics, one in the political ramifications, and the other in the over all picture. But in the past, they were united "against" me in one specific. They said that Hitler's generals who plotted to kill Hitler in July, 1944, did not begin their plot until they saw that they were going to lose the war. However, after reading Fest's "Plotting Hitler's Death" my sons and I all understand better what really happened--and we are now of the same understanding of this resistance. In his book "Hitler," Fest was quite contemplative, apparently trying to make sense of Hitler, his accomplishments and failures, and Germany's responsibility in bringing him to power. This introspection is lacking in "Plotting Hitler's Death." Perhaps that is because those who tried to get rid of Hitler compensated for those who brought him to power. Perhaps it is simply because it is a different tale to be told-a tale that Fest tells well. He rehearses in clear detail the events leading up to that July 20 th, the anxious and feverish moments before the explosion, the confusion following it, and the terrifying roundup and executions that followed. Fest points out that there was not one unified group or movement of resistance against Hitler; rather there were numerous groups that acted separately and often held differing views. Fest focuses on the three groups who were the only ones able to develop a strategy that posed a genuine threat to the regime. He follows them in his usual thorough manner. But this does not keep him from characterizing the very human natures involved, their determination and their indecisiveness, their fears and their courage, their plan and their failure. "Plotting Hitler's Death" brings an important clarity to one dimension of a tormented and confused era.

The author of this book, Joachim Fest, is one of the better know of the German World War 2 historians so I was expecting a well researched and factual book. What I found was just that. Fest first takes us through a history of a number of the failed plots and people responsible before sending the second half of the book on the plot that actually got the closest with a bomb blast injuring Hitler. Fest describes the set up of the plot, what was to take place after the assassination in regards to taking control of the German government and the assumptions of what would happen with the war. We also get a chapter on what happened to the members of the plot once it failed.

Overall this is an interesting and well-constructed book. The information is laid out in an organized and easy to understand method. The writing is better then you expect from a historian, it flows through the story. The book is a good one volume accounting of the attempts on Hitler's life and, unless you are a true historian of the issues, is about all one needs to understand and appreciate it. If you are interested in World War 2 this is a good pick up.

Joachim Fest's book should be required reading of all military and political leaders. All leaders must realize that the danger of losing one's morality often happens imperceptibly slow. "Plotting Hitler's Death" is a gripping account of how the German elite attempted on numerous occasions to topple Hitler. The irony of the assasination attempts is that the German Army,never trustful of Hitler, is the institution that comes closest to killing Hitler. At the same time, Mr. Fest protrays in exacting detail the internal conflict that these men experienced: loyalty due to the oath they swore but the realization that Hitler's regime was criminal.

This book is very well-written with a lot of interesting information about major and minor members of the German resistance. In addition to good story-telling, Fest provides interesting analyses of the reasons for their failures. It is a sad story, but the moral courage of many of those in the German resistance is inspiring.

I have to concede that at first I was highly skeptical that Fest, not just any German, but a German from the Nazi generation, would write an honest account of the German Resistance (I admit to harboring prejudices against Germans; my parents are survivors of the Nazi death camps). I expected Fest to exaggerate the motives of the Resistance, asserting that they were purely on humanitarian and moral grounds. After I read the book, however, I realized that I allowed my prejudices towards Germans get in the way. Fest makes no pretenses about their motives. They were wide-ranging, a few on humanitarian grounds, some because they saw they were losing the war, and for some it was the combination of several factors. It was an interesting and informative read. One criticism I do have is that there is a serious omission. Fest fails to tell us that many in the Resistance, even such notables as von Stauffenberg, Carl Goerdeler and Martin Niemoller sympathized with the Nazi view that there was a "Jewish problem" -- a problem that required a "solution." True, they were horrified when they learned that the Nazi "solution" to the "Jewish problem" was extermination; nonetheless they did harbor a fair amount of anti-semitism. As the brother of Claus von Stauffenberg testified: "In the sphere of internal politics, we had welcomed the basic tenets of National Socialism for the most part. . .The concept of race seemed sound and very promising. . ."; their objection was merely that its "implementation was exaggerated and carried too far." [the quote is taken from Goldhagen's book "Hitler's Willing Executioners."]

Fest's book on homegrown German efforts to eliminate Hitler and undo the Nazi grip on their country and its military aggressions consists of a reprehensible first half that blames their failure on everybody else - the British, Americans and Soviets. We've seen this before when Southern historians blame the American Civil War on "states' rights" and ignore slavery altogether. The book's second "half" (only a third of its total length) is an exciting, factual account of the July 20, 1944, bomb explosion that narrowly missed Hitler and the fates of the blundering conspirators.
The unsupportable first half is a chauvinist's desperate argument that Germans were nice but stuck in an intolerable situation. Fest blames the Allies for the failure of German plans to get rid of their führer. "No help or any sign of encouragement, just a deep, persistent silence. The Allies did not even trouble themselves to reject the various attempts to contact them" (p. 209). This was in late 1942, not Chamberlain's Munich days nor the desperate days of the blitzkrieg, but after America's entry into the war. Fest doesn't blame dutiful Germans. "The sense of common ground . . . was not shared by the British, who could never free themselves of the suspicion that they were dealing with . . ." (p. 209) Those bad British, they have a memory like an elephant, they never forget anything! Fest is impatient with Churchill as Prime Minister, "Britain focused all its energy on the military effort, leaving no time for complicated political initiatives." Rationalizations in defense of German honor during the Hitler years go on: "The real reasons for the attitude of the British probably lay in their lack of flexibility, their hostility, their blindness, and a political obtuseness that for all intents and purposes represented 'an alliance with Hitler'," - the last four words quoted come from a German source, Hans somebody. America was no better, according to Fest: "It was precisely the memory of Wilson's Fourteen Points that made America so unapproachable" (p. 210). The logic here is unapproachable to me, but Americans weren't completely unapproachable; we almost got to Berlin ahead of the Russians.
The book coughs up many more self-serving pretensions - Roosevelt and Churchill's meeting at Casablanca in 1942 creates the "awkward position" for Germans who found Hitler distasteful and his behavior not nice. Germans who disliked Hitler - once they saw the war was lost - all they wanted was a promise from the Allies to retain its pre-1914 borders along with possession of Austria and Sudetenland. Live and let live. Except for those people, you know.
If you can stomach this, here's a book for you.

This scholarly work provides a history of German opposition to Hitler. Fest also analyzes the Nazi movement and its appeal, commenting: "The Nazi brand of socialism was particularly attractive because of its appeal to nationalism. This, and virtually only this, was what concealed the real nature of the Nazi revolution, encouraging the mistaken but widespread view, at the time and later, that National Socialism was essentially a conservative movement. In reality, it was egalitarian and destructive of traditional structures." (p. 19).

Although there was some anti-Hitler sentiment before WWII, it was the beginning of this war that spawned a noticeable increase of opposition to Hitler. German units murdered many thousands of Poles, and socially-valuable Poles (e. g. clergy and aristocracy) were deliberately targeted (p. 114). As a result of this, some Germans expressed opposition, whether on moral grounds or out of concern that it would bring shame to Germany. One of these Germans was General Helmuth Stieff. (p. 250).

Fest provides considerable detail on the July 20, 1944 failed assassination attempt on Hitler. He contends that, even had Hitler been killed, it is doubtful if the pro-Hitler German authorities could have been driven out of power. (p. 289). What effect, if any, the assassination would have had this late in the war is another question.

Some of the anti-Hitler plotters had religious motives, which went well beyond better-known ones such as Pastor Martin Niemoeller. For instance, after news of the failure of the July 20, 1944 attempt on Hitler became known, Henning von Tresckow fled, and went out to commit suicide out of fear that he would be captured and tortured into divulging the identities of other conspirators. He thought of how God spared Sodom because 10 righteous inhabitants were found, and hoped, in like manner, that God would see him as a righteous German and stay His hand from destroying Germany. (p. 290). Conspirator Carl Goerdeler, while sitting in prison awaiting his execution, compared himself to the Psalmist quarreling with God, complaining about the "indifference of God", the triumph of evil, etc. (p. 323).

Even distant relatives of the anti-Hitler conspirators were punished in some way. This was explicitly modeled after the ancient Teutonic concept of collective guilt, where an entire family or clan was punished for the actions of one of its members. (pp. 303-304). Interestingly, the Allies, during and after the war, scorned the anti-Hitler plotters, seeing them as little more than opportunists and traitors.

The work concludes with an extensive biography of the leading personages who opposed Hitler or were in some way related to this trend. For instance, Baron Werner von Fritsch (1880-1939), who was revolted by the Night of the Long Knives, but never expressed opposition to Hitler, was killed in combat, near Warsaw, during the 1939 German-Soviet war against Poland.

This book adds little to our understanding of this period. Yes there were many that opposed Hitler - some in thought, few in deed and almost none in action - over 300,000 people are estimated to have participated actively in the muder of the Jews - including those that sat at desks - those that drew up schedules and those that killed - so there were a few hundred that opposed Hitler after 1933 - and why didn't they succeed - because there were so few and they were fumblers. There were actually millions who opposed Hitler in Germany - they didn't vote for him but after 1933 it was too late. This book lists high ranking officials that made some attempt at plotting against Hitler. But one would barely know the context if one was not familiar with it from prior knowledge. A dull read with little added to our knowledge of why Hitler succeeded in his deeds and why no one stopped him - even when it was too late.