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Poland 1939: The Birth Of Blitzkrieg (Campaign)

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In the heart-breaking days and weeks that the world watched as the Wehrmacht smashed mercilessly into the belly of Poland in September of 1939, the Polish armed forces fought back with largely unrecognized ferocity and courage against overwhelming odds. As author Stephen Zaloga describes so forcefully in this wonderful new book, Polish forces had been chastised and prevented through continuing European pressure into delaying any meaningful army mobilization that might have been considered provocative to the Germans, so they were unable to answer the blitzkrieg tactics with sufficient forces early enough to really stem the tide. Moreover, while it had been widely recognized that based on topography and lack of badly needed fortifications the frontiers were virtually indefensible, the political reality dictated against abandoning the frontiers in favor husbanding their limited forces into a more meaningful defense of the realm closer to centers of population, thus, the Polish forces attempted to defend an area too large, too wide, and too flat to do so effectively.

This work continues the excellent exposition begun by the same author in "The Polish Campaign 1939", extending and completing his controversial account which effectively debunks many common misconceptions regarding the nature of the Polish actions against the Germans in the all-too brief campaign. The author once more contends that many of the commonplaces regarding Polish conduct during the war are inaccurate and slanderous, including the idea that Polish cavalry actually attacked German tanks with swords drawn, or that the entire Polish Air Force was demolished on the first day of the war. According to Zaloga, neither supposition is true. And, while cavalry was used during the campaign, its application was much more clever and much more ingenious than previously believed.

This is a quite comprehensive book, with extensive coverage of every element of the campaign as seen from both sides of the conflict. Several fascinating aspects of the war emerge for further consideration, such as the fact that in the Battle of Bzura , the Poles caught the Wehrmacht with its pants down, with the Germans badly over-extended. The capability of the Polish forces to hold their own against their foe was demonstrated with the initial attack, in which the Poles slammed two German divisions backwards into retreat, capturing over 1,500 prisoners in the process. I was also surprised to discover that the Poles had deployed the advanced techniques using tungsten-core anti-tank shells, which they then used on a limited basis in the conflict. The author also shows how the cowardice and malice of the French misled the Poles into believing their allies might intervene, when historians have clearly proven the French actually never had any such action in mind. This is an intriguing book, and a wonderful addition to the growing library covering the German-Polish exchange in the fall of 1939. Enjoy!

In the Osprey Campaign series volume, Poland 1939: the birth of Blitzkrieg, Stephen Zaloga, a renowned expert on armored vehicles and eastern European military affairs, continues his tireless effort to bring the facts to Western eyes of the opening round of the Second World War. Readers familiar with Zaloga's 1985 full-length book The Polish Campaign 1939 will recognize the antecedents of this volume. Zaloga, an American who has enjoyed extensive access to Polish historical archives, seeks to de-bunk the myths about the Polish campaign of 1939 which were perpetuated by wartime Nazi propaganda and post-war ignorance caused by the Iron Curtain. Myths such as the tales of Polish cavalry charging German tanks with swords and the destruction of the Polish air force on the first day of the war are clearly exposed as falsehoods designed to boost Nazi military prowess to the world. As usual, Zaloga brings his extensive analytic skills and language skills together in concert to produce a valuable piece of research that would otherwise be unavailable to most English readers.

Zaloga begins with a short introduction, a section on the origins of the campaign and a campaign chronology. In standard Osprey Campaign series format, Zaloga then has three sections covering opposing commanders, opposing plans and opposing armies, which comprise nearly a quarter of the volume. The campaign narrative itself, covering all major air and ground operations in the Polish theater between 1 September - 6 October 1939, is fifty pages long. Zaloga concludes with a four page aftermath section, notes on the battlefield today and a rather detailed guide to further reading. Ground order of battle information for the Germans, Poles and Soviets is provided, but there is unfortunately no listing of air units. This volume has five 2-D maps (dispositions on 1, 7 and 17 September 1939 and two on the Bzura River counterattack) and three 3-D "Bird's Eye View" maps (the Polish defense of Westerplatte, the Battle of Mokra and the Battle for Warsaw). There are also three excellent color battle scenes: the cavalry defense at Mokra, a Stuka attack and street fighting in Warsaw. The overall graphic quality of this volume, including the numerous photographs, is excellent.

There are many strong points in this short volume, even if much of the research is merely a refinement from his earlier volume. In particular, the defense conducted by a Polish Cavalry brigade at Mokra against the 4th Panzer Division on 1 September demonstrates that the initial German use of armored units in combat could be clumsy and costly at times. Zaloga makes a good point that initially the German Luftwaffe was doctrinally un-prepared for close air support missions for the army and instead could only employ pre-planned strikes determined by the air staff; after two weeks of war the Germans slow introduced the close air support techniques that would be successful in 1940-1941 (does this initial inability to conduct CAS sound familiar to modern soldiers?). Zaloga also makes a good point that the Poles did have some counterattack capabilities - they were not just punch dummies - and the Battle of the Bzura on 9-14 September 1939 caught the Germans over-extended. In the initial attack, the Poles were able to force two German divisions to retreat and actually captured 1,500 prisoners! Other interesting points include the fact that the Poles were the first to deploy tungsten-core anti-tank projectiles but the ammunition was developed as a "secret weapon" and not distributed until after the invasion began, thereby limiting its use. Odd episodes, like the single Polish cavalry raid into East Prussia, a tank-versus-tank battle and a cavalry-versus-cavalry battle are also detailed.

Although Zaloga concedes that the outcome of the campaign was a foregone conclusion, particularly given Anglo-French passivity and Soviet aggression, he provides a valuable discussion on the two opposing Polish concepts of defense. The defense that made the most sense - concede the border areas and concentrate behind the Vistula River - was politically unacceptable, whereas the most politically palatable strategy - frontier defense - was militarily unsound. The Poles reluctantly adopted the latter strategy out of the necessity to avoid German "nibbling tactics" against the disputed Danzig corridor; readers should note that this was the same strategic dilemma faced by NATO planners on the Central Front in the Cold War.

There are only two weaknesses in this otherwise superb account. First, Zaloga is deficient in the opposing leaders section, as he usually is in these Osprey titles. Zaloga spends three pages discussing the German leaders, but spends three-quarters of that space discussing the German High Command: Hitler, Keitel, Jodl, Brauchitsch and Halder. The two German army group commanders in Poland - von Rundstedt and von Bock - receive only two short paragraphs. General Blaskowitz is the only German army commander who receives more than cursory mention - the other four receive no mention. Even Guderian - the pre-imminent panzer leader in Poland - receives almost no mention. This section was poorly crafted, with too much emphasis on the strategic rather than operational leaders. The other weakness in the book is that Zaloga appears to have accepted the misleading hypothesis that a major French attack might have saved Poland by causing a German collapse; this fallacious hypothesis was advanced by Ernest May in his book, Strange Victory. As I noted in my review of May's book, this hypothesis is unsupportable and deeply flawed. Even Zaloga should have noted that by the time that Gamelin promised to begin an offensive against German - two weeks after war began - the Germans had already overrun most of Poland and Soviet invasion was imminent. The Poles might have been impressed by French military prowess but they were also aware that French doctrine for "methodical battle" called for slow, carefully prepared offensives. Thus even if the French had been able and willing to honor their promise of military aid, it would have been too late to save the Polish army.

I have collected a number of books on the Polish Campaign, but I have to say that this is the best, despite its short length. It not only gives an excellent overview of the campaign, but disproves a number of widely held myths (Polish cavalry charging tanks, Polish air force being destroyed on the ground on the first day) and covers a number of small unit combats in detail. I particularly enjoyed the description of a polish cavalry brigade stopping a panzer division on the first day. Talk about standing that myth on its head!

The book also gives a good (if brief) description of the opposing forces. If there is a shortcoming, it is this last. I would have liked this section to be longer but, given the format, that would be unreasonable. There are plenty of sources on the German army; if you want to know more about the Polish forces, you can buy "The Polish Campaign 1939" by Zaloga and Madej (used) for 3 or 4 times as much. Otherwise, buy this book.

"Poland 1939: The Birth of Blitzkrieg" is written by Steven J. Zaloga and illustrated by Howard Gerrard. In this 96 page volume, the author concisely outlines the German invasion of Poland, which began WWII. This includes: opposing commanders, opposing plans, opposing armies, the campaign, and the battlefield today. Throughout the entire book, there are many black-and-white photographs and several color maps.

This is an excellent resource for those interested in the events and related issues of the German invasion of Poland in September 1939.

I was very pleased with Osprey's Essential History number 107, Poland 1939, Birth of the Blitzkrieg. Finally, an easy to read, concise, inexpensive book on the invasion of Poland by Nazi Germany, and the beginning of World War II.

I was impressed by the amount of detail that is crammed into this small book, and by the quality of the information as well.
The author puts to rest some of the "romantic myths" about the Blitzkrieg in Poland: namely the idea that the German Luftwaffe destroyed all of the Polish airforce while they were still on the ground, and that the Polish cavalry, armed with lances, would routinely take on German Panzer tanks! While many of the Polish planes were destroyed while on the ground, many survived and dogged the German planes throughout the month long conflict (even if they were outclassed by the more modern German planes). The Polish cavalry, an elite force, trained with lances, but the author rightly discusses the tactics used by them, that is that they fought dismounted as rifled infantry.

I was also impressed with the beautiful illusrations in the book as well, especially the one of the Polish artillery train blasting some Panzers!

The only information lacking in the book was that of the Polish brigade, who retreated on foot and escaped from the German and Russian armies, and retreated to Tehran and lived to fight again.

There are several excellent reviews of this book in existence, and I focus my review mostly on details not covered by them. This review is based on the 2004 hardback edition.

Industrial capacity is the key to modern warfare, and the extreme asymmetry (using modern parlance, and not Zaloga's) favoring the Germans began at that stage. Up to WWII, Germany had manufactured 1.4 million motor vehicles against Poland's 33,000 (p. 32). Germany was in a position to outspend Poland, in military matters, at 30:1 (p. 22), despite Herculean efforts by the latter.

Nominal static asymmetry in such things as airplanes, tanks, and artillery favored the Germans at approximately between 4:1 to 8:1 (p. 23, 31). But, since German weapons were more modern, the effective static asymmetry was easily 10:1 or more. Since only 65% of Polish forces had been fully mobilized (p. 39: as a result of western pressure for Poles not to "provoke" Hitler), the effective static asymmetry became even greater. Finally, owing to the fact that the German forces enjoyed greater mobility and modern communication (e. g., p. 32, 67, 70), they could use their arms more effectively than the Poles could whatever little they had. Owing to these tactical advantages, the dynamic asymmetry favoring the Germans became much greater than the effective static asymmetry already in their favor.

Zaloga discusses the failure of the British and French to live up to their treaty obligations towards Poland in 1939: "Hitler had hoped that Britain and France would abandon Poland altogether. Their timid response left the Poles to their fate. France threw away one of its great strategic opportunities, as German forces in the west were too thin to repulse any full-scale assault. German officers interviewed about the campaign after the war expressed their firm belief that if France had struck with force in September 1939, its army would have reached the Rhine in a couple of weeks, and possibly won the war. France would have faced a far different army in 1939 than the one it confronted a year later." (p. 65)

Ironic to the "Polish lancers charging German tanks" canard, the Polish cavalry had actually discontinued the use of lancers well before WWII (p. 7, 30)! Zaloga traces the origins of the German-propaganda tale (pp. 42-43), which unfortunately has proved to be so enduringly believed. (Myths survive when they meet needs. This one fulfilled the need of Poles to remember their struggle against a vastly technologically superior foe. It also met the needs of Polonophobes, as it ostensibly supported their prejudicial views of Poles as impetuous and stupid.)

'Poland 1939: The Birth of Blitzkrieg' is an excellent example of the Campaign series of books from Osprey Publishing. Written by the consistently good Steven Zaloga (an expert on this campaign) the narrative is interesting, informative and flows nicely along. He comprehensively dismisses the myths of Polish lancers charging panzers and the destruction of the Polish Air Force before breakfast on the 1st of September.

The maps are very good, the detail on the 3D views is excellent, and the photographs are judiciously chosen. The colour plates are also good, although I would rather that the accompanying captions spoke more about the action shown rather than summarizing the information available elsewhere in the book.

There are few English histories on Poland 1939. The various explanations for this are unconvincing and irritating to those of us who want to study an important campaign. The collapse of the Soviet Union has seen a plethora of books on the Eastern Front descend on the market much to the delight of eager lay historians. There has been but a trickle on Poland. What is even more surprising is that there are few German source histories on this important campaign.

One has to view this book in the light of the above. I personally will read and welcome anything as long as it will give me more insight into the Polish 1939 campaign. The major fault of this book is its concise nature. I wish it were ten time longer. One only has to compare books on the fall of France where that campaign was over quicker than Poland. The book breaks new ground in suggesting that the Poles where not so unprepared and where not such a pushover as modern myth would have us believe. Its just too lightweight to be a heavyweight read. Having said this it is very readable and the illustrations are enjoyable. Buy it before it goes out of print due to the general lethargy surrounding this campaign.

In the Osprey Campaign series volume, Poland 1939: the birth of Blitzkrieg, Stephen Zaloga, a renowned expert on armored vehicles and eastern European military affairs, continues his tireless effort to bring the facts to Western eyes of the opening round of the Second World War. Readers familiar with Zaloga's 1985 full-length book The Polish Campaign 1939 will recognize the antecedents of this volume. Zaloga, an American who has enjoyed extensive access to Polish historical archives, seeks to de-bunk the myths about the Polish campaign of 1939 which were perpetuated by wartime Nazi propaganda and post-war ignorance caused by the Iron Curtain. Myths such as the tales of Polish cavalry charging German tanks with swords and the destruction of the Polish air force on the first day of the war are clearly exposed as falsehoods designed to boost Nazi military prowess to the world. As usual, Zaloga brings his extensive analytic skills and language skills together in concert to produce a valuable piece of research that would otherwise be unavailable to most English readers.

Zaloga begins with a short introduction, a section on the origins of the campaign and a campaign chronology. In standard Osprey Campaign series format, Zaloga then has three sections covering opposing commanders, opposing plans and opposing armies, which comprise nearly a quarter of the volume. The campaign narrative itself, covering all major air and ground operations in the Polish theater between 1 September - 6 October 1939, is fifty pages long. Zaloga concludes with a four page aftermath section, notes on the battlefield today and a rather detailed guide to further reading. Ground order of battle information for the Germans, Poles and Soviets is provided, but there is unfortunately no listing of air units. This volume has five 2-D maps (dispositions on 1, 7 and 17 September 1939 and two on the Bzura River counterattack) and three 3-D "Bird's Eye View" maps (the Polish defense of Westerplatte, the Battle of Mokra and the Battle for Warsaw). There are also three excellent color battle scenes: the cavalry defense at Mokra, a Stuka attack and street fighting in Warsaw. The overall graphic quality of this volume, including the numerous photographs, is excellent.

There are many strong points in this short volume, even if much of the research is merely a refinement from his earlier volume. In particular, the defense conducted by a Polish Cavalry brigade at Mokra against the 4th Panzer Division on 1 September demonstrates that the initial German use of armored units in combat could be clumsy and costly at times. Zaloga makes a good point that initially the German Luftwaffe was doctrinally un-prepared for close air support missions for the army and instead could only employ pre-planned strikes determined by the air staff; after two weeks of war the Germans slow introduced the close air support techniques that would be successful in 1940-1941 (does this initial inability to conduct CAS sound familiar to modern soldiers?). Zaloga also makes a good point that the Poles did have some counterattack capabilities - they were not just punch dummies - and the Battle of the Bzura on 9-14 September 1939 caught the Germans over-extended. In the initial attack, the Poles were able to force two German divisions to retreat and actually captured 1,500 prisoners! Other interesting points include the fact that the Poles were the first to deploy tungsten-core anti-tank projectiles but the ammunition was developed as a "secret weapon" and not distributed until after the invasion began, thereby limiting its use. Odd episodes, like the single Polish cavalry raid into East Prussia, a tank-versus-tank battle and a cavalry-versus-cavalry battle are also detailed.

Although Zaloga concedes that the outcome of the campaign was a foregone conclusion, particularly given Anglo-French passivity and Soviet aggression, he provides a valuable discussion on the two opposing Polish concepts of defense. The defense that made the most sense - concede the border areas and concentrate behind the Vistula River - was politically unacceptable, whereas the most politically palatable strategy - frontier defense - was militarily unsound. The Poles reluctantly adopted the latter strategy out of the necessity to avoid German "nibbling tactics" against the disputed Danzig corridor; readers should note that this was the same strategic dilemma faced by NATO planners on the Central Front in the Cold War.

There are only two weaknesses in this otherwise superb account. First, Zaloga is deficient in the opposing leaders section, as he usually is in these Osprey titles. Zaloga spends three pages discussing the German leaders, but spends three-quarters of that space discussing the German High Command: Hitler, Keitel, Jodl, Brauchitsch and Halder. The two German army group commanders in Poland - von Rundstedt and von Bock - receive only two short paragraphs. General Blaskowitz is the only German army commander who receives more than cursory mention - the other four receive no mention. Even Guderian - the pre-imminent panzer leader in Poland - receives almost no mention. This section was poorly crafted, with too much emphasis on the strategic rather than operational leaders. The other weakness in the book is that Zaloga appears to have accepted the misleading hypothesis that a major French attack might have saved Poland by causing a German collapse; this fallacious hypothesis was advanced by Ernest May in his book, Strange Victory. As I noted in my review of May's book, this hypothesis is unsupportable and deeply flawed. Even Zaloga should have noted that by the time that Gamelin promised to begin an offensive against German - two weeks after war began - the Germans had already overrun most of Poland and Soviet invasion was imminent. The Poles might have been impressed by French military prowess but they were also aware that French doctrine for "methodical battle" called for slow, carefully prepared offensives. Thus even if the French had been able and willing to honor their promise of military aid, it would have been too late to save the Polish army.

A good book in the series and it gives a good overview of the invasion in Poland and its place in the events of World War 2.

It adresses a few myths and explains in a satisfactory manner how this was the testing ground of the Wehrmacht - that the German Army did make mistakes, plenty of them, but learned its lessons very well. Zaloga brings the highlights to life and brings the rest of the invasion into light. He disbands the myth of the cavalry charging into panzers - a long lived nazi propaganda lie and shows that the Germans had not perfected their tactics. He also shows that part played by the French and British and the Soviet Invasion of East Poland is well covered.

All in all this is quite impressive and complete. And that within the framework of the Osprey series.