Amazon.com: The Politics of Constitutional Review in Germany (Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions) (9780521836470): Georg Vanberg: Books


or
Sign in to turn on 1-Click ordering.
or
Amazon Prime Free Trial required. Sign up when you check out. Learn More
Sell Back Your Copy
For a $1.32 Gift Card
Trade in
More Buying Choices
Have one to sell? Sell yours here
The Politics of Constitutional Review in Germany (Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions)
 
 
Tell the Publisher!
I'd like to read this book on Kindle

Don't have a Kindle? Get your Kindle here, or download a FREE Kindle Reading App.

The Politics of Constitutional Review in Germany (Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions) [Hardcover]

Georg Vanberg (Author)
5.0 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (1 customer review)

Price: $91.00 & this item ships for FREE with Super Saver Shipping. Details
o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o
In Stock.
Ships from and sold by Amazon.com. Gift-wrap available.
Only 1 left in stock--order soon (more on the way).
Want it delivered Friday, February 24? Choose One-Day Shipping at checkout. Details
Textbook Student FREE Two-Day Shipping for students on millions of items. Learn more

Formats

Amazon Price New from Used from
Hardcover $91.00  
Paperback $29.39  

Book Description

December 6, 2004 0521836476 978-0521836470
Constitutional courts have emerged as central institutions in many advanced democracies. This book investigates the sources and the limits of judicial authority, focusing on the central role of public support for judicial independence. The empirical sections of the book illustrate the theoretical argument in an in-depth study of the German Federal Constitutional Court, including statistical analysis of judicial decisions, case studies, and interviews with judges and legislators. The book's major finding is that the interests of governing majorities, prevailing public opinion, and the transparency of the political environment exert a powerful influence on judicial decisions. Judges are influenced not only by jurisprudential considerations and their policy preferences, but also by strategic concerns. By highlighting this dimension of constitutional review, the book challenges the contention that high court justices are largely unconstrained actors as well as the notion that constitutional courts lack democratic legitimacy.


Editorial Reviews

Review

"...Georg Vanberg's book is a welcome addition to the liteature on Germany's Federal Constitutional Court...The virtue of this book is that it builds on the empirical work of comparative judicial scholars...and mainly for the purpose of offering the discipline a more systematic means of measuring the political impact of constitutional courts in both mature and transitional democracies." - Perspectives on Politics, Donald P. Kommers, University of Notre Dame

Book Description

This book investigates the sources and the limits of judicial authority in constitutional courts, focusing on the central role of public support for judicial independence. The book provides an in-depth study of the German Federal Constitutional Court, including statistical analysis of judicial decisions, case studies, and interviews.

Product Details

  • Hardcover: 208 pages
  • Publisher: Cambridge University Press (December 6, 2004)
  • Language: English
  • ISBN-10: 0521836476
  • ISBN-13: 978-0521836470
  • Product Dimensions: 9 x 6.3 x 0.9 inches
  • Shipping Weight: 14.9 ounces (View shipping rates and policies)
  • Average Customer Review: 5.0 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (1 customer review)
  • Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #2,068,873 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)

More About the Author

Discover books, learn about writers, read author blogs, and more.

 

Customer Reviews

1 Review
5 star:
 (1)
4 star:    (0)
3 star:    (0)
2 star:    (0)
1 star:    (0)
 
 
 
 
 
Average Customer Review
5.0 out of 5 stars (1 customer review)
 
 
 
 
Share your thoughts with other customers:
Most Helpful Customer Reviews

5.0 out of 5 stars A thoughtful study of how judges maintain institutional power, September 30, 2011
By 
Amazon Verified Purchase(What's this?)
This is a wonderful study of judicial independence - from the judges point of view. Vanberg tries to show that judges require the cooperation cooperation of the other branches of government in order to enforce their rulings, and hence they are vulnerable if elites try to evade the court's decision. Vanberg shows that public opinion can be the crucial link that compels the elite to abide by the court's decision. What I really like about the book is that Vanberg combines game theoretic, statistical, and qualitative methods in making his case. While the sections on Germany did not interest me as much, Vanberg is very good about generalizing his argument so it can be applied anywhere. Highly recommended.
Help other customers find the most helpful reviews 
Was this review helpful to you? Yes No

Share your thoughts with other customers: Create your own review
 
 
 
Only search this product's reviews



Inside This Book (learn more)
First Sentence:
Constitutional review - defined as the power of judicial bodies to set aside ordinary legislative or administrative acts if judges conclude that they conflict with the constitution - has emerged as an almost universal feature of Western-style democracy. Read the first page
Key Phrases - Statistically Improbable Phrases (SIPs): (learn more)
convergent court, equal chances scheme, party finance law, concrete judicial review, outside political support, relative upper limit, probability that the court, abstract judicial review, judicial selection committee, compliance threshold, judicial veto, veto threshold, guardian vision, evasion attempt, legislative majorities, governing majorities, party taxes, sufficient public support, legislative revision, diffuse support, constitutional review, party foundations, issue under review, constitutional complaints, concrete dispute
Key Phrases - Capitalized Phrases (CAPs): (learn more)
Supreme Court, Basic Law, Second Senate, First Senate, Stone Sweet, Parties Act, United States, Contentious Equilibrium, Eastern Europe, Separation-of-Powers Equilibrium, West Germany, Judicial Self-Censoring Equilibrium, Self-Censoring Equilibria, Constitutional Council, European Defense Community, Parliamentary Council, Alexander Hamilton, European Union, Federal Republic, Federation Council, Süddeutsche Zeitung, The Court's Initial Approach, Der Spiegel, East German, New Deal
New!
Books on Related Topics | Concordance | Text Stats
Browse Sample Pages:
Front Cover | Table of Contents | First Pages | Index | Back Cover | Surprise Me!
Search Inside This Book:

Citations (learn more)
This book cites 79 books:
See all 79 books this book cites
 
9 books cite this book:
See all 9 books citing this book



What Other Items Do Customers Buy After Viewing This Item?


Suggested Tags from Similar Products

 (What's this?)
Be the first one to add a relevant tag (keyword that's strongly related to this product).
 

Your tags: Add your first tag
 

Sell a Digital Version of This Book in the Kindle Store

If you are a publisher or author and hold the digital rights to a book, you can sell a digital version of it in our Kindle Store. Learn more

Customer Discussions

This product's forum
Discussion Replies Latest Post
No discussions yet

Ask questions, Share opinions, Gain insight
Start a new discussion
Topic:
First post:
Prompts for sign-in
 


Active discussions in related forums
Search Customer Discussions
Search all Amazon discussions
   
Related forums


Listmania!


Create a Listmania! list

So You'd Like to...


Create a guide


Look for Similar Items by Category


Look for Similar Items by Subject