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5.0 out of 5 stars
A thoughtful study of how judges maintain institutional power,
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This review is from: The Politics of Constitutional Review in Germany (Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions) (Paperback)
This is a wonderful study of judicial independence - from the judges point of view. Vanberg tries to show that judges require the cooperation cooperation of the other branches of government in order to enforce their rulings, and hence they are vulnerable if elites try to evade the court's decision. Vanberg shows that public opinion can be the crucial link that compels the elite to abide by the court's decision. What I really like about the book is that Vanberg combines game theoretic, statistical, and qualitative methods in making his case. While the sections on Germany did not interest me as much, Vanberg is very good about generalizing his argument so it can be applied anywhere. Highly recommended.
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The Politics of Constitutional Review in Germany (Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions) by Georg Vanberg (Hardcover - December 6, 2004)
$91.00
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