Customer Reviews

The Power of Ideas

5 star:		(2)
4 star:		(0)
3 star:		(1)
2 star:		(0)
1 star:		(0)

 

 

First, let me say that this is a selection of Berlin editorials, arranged by Henry Hardy.
The title is a quotation from Heine, who warned the French not to undervalue the power of ideas, since philosophical concepts nurtured in the peace of a library can destroy a civilization.
Under this auspices, it seemed a very interesting theme: how the history of ideas has reflected upon, challenged and ultimately changed reality. The unseen code of reality.
But the outcome is not par to the expectations. Well, Berlin is a first class philosopher and always highly entertaining. But the arrangement made here is at least a little haphazard: an attempt of intellectual autobiography (written in old age), editorials about history of philosophy, about the Russian late `800 intellectual environment, about socialism and Marxism, some incomplete considerations about freedom, editorials about Zionism and the birth of the State of Israel.....
Too much indeed and too many themes.
The best parts are the one dedicated to history of philosophy, since Berlin is one of those rare writers who is able to cast an entirely new light on the arguments he decides to investigate: the appraisal of Enlightenment is excellent (especially as Age of Mechanics opposed to the Age of Mathematics in the XVII Century), as well the essay about the purposes of Philosophy and one on the essence of European Romanticism (on this argument the best book is still his "The Roots of Romanticism", I warmly recommend). But, these are pearls scattered here and there with no apparent order.
Better would have been to focus it much more on a restricted number of arguments.

I'm a curious and voracious reader. If you have suggestion for further readings, better still... you don't agree with what I write, or just want to say hallo... feel free to write.

This book contains essays on a diverse set of topics by the great modern master of the History of Ideas, Isaiah Berlin.
The opening essays in which he traces his intellectual path as a philosopher are of the highest possible interest. For we learn how Berlin came in the thirties to meet with those purists who insisted a a statement to be meaningful had to be verifiable. Berlin traces his own reservations from a narrow Logical Positivism into the broad study of the History of Ideas. He tells the story of how commissioned to write a work on Karl Marx he came to investigate his predecessors, and was led to those European Enlightentment thinkers the interpretation of whose work became one central contribution of his own to modern thought. Helvetius, Holbach, de Maistre, Condorcet, were the subject of explorations in understanding passionate thinkers whose ultimate models for Ideal Political Reality he would have reservations from, but who generally he would have great sympathy for.
Another important section of the work has to do with Berlin's relation to the rise of modern Israel, to Zionism, and to his own great mentor, the great scientist and first President of Israel, Chaim Weizmann.
Berlin's writing is characterized by vigor and human insight, by sudden sweeps of thought which dazzle and brighten. He is a wonderful writer and thinker.
There is not a work of his I would not highly recommend. And this is no exception.

I read this book years ago when I was reading a lot of Isaiah Berlin. Once you have read his works there is a certain sameness of approach, but it doesn't matter, because it is always interesting. But the overarching factor is that his works were proof that the history of ideas can be done at a very high standard. That means, to my mind, always being based on something, and not on hearsay. And especially not based on the sort of reasoning that goes like this: "well, it must have been so, otherwise that would that would mean..... and that is untenable for what I (we) believe." . That is often the sort of thing one gets from hidebound religionists who don't like the many contradictions that the study of the history of ideas produces. Of course, some philosophers have scoffed at the very idea of "intellectual history" because it is only tangentially involved with univocal systems. And as far as it goes, that is a worthy objection. But philosophy per se is only worthy in analyzing the distinct realm of one philosophical system or legal theory whose parameters must be accepted first before the analysis can even begin.. For instance, to take a current example of internet effluvia, the Catholic "Mirror of Justice" site is committed to analyzing everything from one conceptual system. And that is their business to do so. But when they try to apply their "insights" into the law or philosophy to the wider world outside Catholic parameters they hit a road-block. There assertions make little sense in terms of the wider world of intellectual history. This is not a matter of opinion, but of overwhelmingly cumulative thematic facts. Thus, philosophies are generally only good for explicating the coherence of an idea for one system. Step outside of that system -- and by definition everything is outside a system in the public square -- and you need intellectual history to put together the vexing bits. But there is a telling exception to this, and that is the ultimate sanction of law. Certain things, no matter how one might construe them intellectually are against the law. It is a fact of the intellectual history of ALL societies that they make a single exception for the swirl of ideas. And that is assent to the strictures of law. What is intellectually extremely interesting about this is that the more "highly developed" a society becomes the more further away those ideas categorized as "religious" are identified with that special realm of "law". And this then becomes also a very telling heuristic by which to analyze the perennial political reactionary mindset that the perennially disgruntled seem to fall into. They hanker for the identification of "law" with "religion". If they knew some of the real historical contours of intellectual history they would quickly see that religion can never again have that sense of specialness for all of society, and that it would be dangerous for it to have it. The safe place for religion is simply that it be personally special. And that is special enough surely if one truly embraces the dignity of the individual.