Customer Reviews

The Power Problem: How American Military Dominance Makes Us Less Safe, Less Prosperous, and Less Free (Cornell Studies in Security Affairs)

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As a long-time peace activist, I was amazed that a person who is both a Navy veteran and a member of the somewhat conservative Cato Institute could write such a thoroughly stirring indictment of excesses of military spending. Moreover, it is not only a cogent and timely update of the classic work of the likes of Seymour Melman, it is also, more importantly, a very thoughtful larger argument against our "out there" posture all over the world. While those who are big on R2P (responsibility to protect) may have a basis to argue with his conclusions in this area (I might also), this is just too great a book to pass up. I wish it could be read by everyone in congress.

A clearly written and clearly explained discussion of the problem of being the world's policeman. The USA has in fact become such and is spending its resources curiously without any compensation from the rest of the world. A sad state of affairs that needs correcting.

Christopher Preble, a former naval officer, believes that the end of the Cold War left American leaders "unconstrained by the fear" of a rival superpower and ultimately led to the costly misadventure in Iraq. "We should reduce our military power in order to be more secure" is Preble's argument in "The Power Problem." He also contends that the most important lesson of the Cold War was that strength is not merely a function of military power. Military intervention often makes a bad situation worse - eg. troops left after the 1991 Gulf War I helped lead to 9/11, and we are now accepting recruits who only a few years ago would have been turned away. Meanwhile, the defense budget has grown more than 12%/year since 2001 as we play a role both as the world's sole policeman and its armed social worker. We now spend more on the military, inflation-adjusted, than at any point during the Cold War. Over 267,000 in the military are deployed in over 100 countries, plus thousands more at sea. It's 2008 budget devoted over $76 billion to R&D, more than the entire defense budgets of France, Germany, Japan, Russia, and the U.K. We also have approximately 24 million living veterans.

The total that the U.S. spends on national defense goes beyond the Department of Defense. The request for FY 2009 was $515.4 billion, but missed the costs of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, operations related to the War on Terror, $17.1 billion in the Department of Energy for care of our nuclear weapons, Homeland Security ($40.1 billion FY 2009), the VA ($91.3 billion), military retirement ($12.1 billion) carried in the Treasury Department, and unfunded liabilities to repair and replace equipment in Iraq and Afghanistan. Preble estimates the true total as about $800 billion - about 5.5% of GDP. (One should also keep in mind that overseas military expenditures create no 'multiplier effect,' and weapons do not boost future productivity anywhere in the economy.)

Substantially reducing military spending requires reducing the ambitions it serves, not simply improved efficiency. We have already learned lately that we lack the power to tame unruly states with military occupations. North Korea, Iran, and Syria lack the capability to attack the U.S. Russia and China lag far behind us in military capability. Preble proposes cuts of $1.2 trillion over ten years, beginning with reducing the Navy to 8 carrier battle groups, eliminating 6 fighter wings from the Air Force, reducing our nuclear arsenal to as few as 500 deployed warheads, reducing the number of nuclear ballistic missile submarines from 14 to 6, reduce the active-duty Army to 360,000, the Marines from 202,000 to 145,000, terminate the V-22 Osprey, cut the Pentagon civilian workforce by nearly one-third, reduce intelligence spending by 15%, etc. This would allow building a stronger economy.

Currently, there is a great debate over the difference between military spending and defense spending. This book gives the reader some valuable insight on this debate. The thesis of the book is that we have been spending way more than we should have on our military, and that we have been taking on much more world responsibility that we have been asked to take on. It would be better for our country and we would be more secure if we were to reduce our military power and commitments.

Sarah Palin would have done well to have mastered this book before being asked about the "Bush Doctrine" by Katie Couric, as there is a great deal of documentation about the road to the military policy eventually adopted by President George W. Bush.

With hindsight, it is relatively easy to agree with the author on what the policy of our country should be relative to our military and its power and responsibilities: "We should deploy forces abroad only when there are vital U.S. security interests at stake; when there is a clear and attainable mission; when there is broad public support; and when there is a clear understanding of what constitutes victory; and, therefore, when our forces can leave."

But, as it is, and by our choice, via our ex-President George W. Bush, today, our military is clearly superior to any competitor in the world. If nothing else, we have the numbers: nearly 300 naval vessels, including submarines; more than 1,100 aircraft just under the Navy; about 336,000 men or women in the active-duty Air Force; more than 186,000 in the Marines; and nearly 600,000 in the Army. And, in 2008, we spent more just in "research, development, testing, and evaluation" than the total amount spent by several other developed countries on their entire defense budgets.

It did not have to be this way. After the Cold War, the U.S. defense budget was cut about 25%, but building war materials had become a lucrative business that attracted those who could get projects approved in Congress. The military-industrial complex that President Eisenhower warned us about became entrenched. By the 1990s, the U.S. was the sole superpower in the world, and, in effect, it was haunted by the Spiderman comic book theme of "with great power comes great responsibility."

The author sees defense secretary Dick Cheney and a document begun in 1992, entitled, "The Defense Planning Guidance," as essential to the development of the military policies of the U.S. after the Cold War. The document said that U.S. power was crucial to the functioning of the world order. The U.S. would be the "global hegemon." It would be ready to be involved any time, any place. It would strike preemptively, if need be. It would view all other countries with suspicion. And the thrust of our policy would be "to dissuade potential adversaries from pursuing a military build-up in hopes of surpassing, or equaling the power of the United States."

All this can go well, if one can afford it. But, per the author, the U.S. clearly can no longer do this. He pegs the total military costs in 2008 as about $800 billion. The Joint Strike Fighter (Jet) costs about $122 million per plane. Each F-22 Raptor cost about $356 million. And those who prosper from the sales of these planes know how to spread the business around. Per the author, for the engines of these F-22 planes, "more than 1,000 subcontractors in at least 44 states are involved in the program."

Navy ships, of course, cost huge amounts of money to maintain. And there are always new ships being built and/or planned. Then, there are the costs of military personnel. Not in the book, but well-reported is the $1 million per year cost for each soldier sent to fight in Afghanistan.

The point made by the author is that the United States has chosen to make this monetary commitment, while it has neglected things back home. For this, the author uses the term "opportunity costs." And his thesis, again, is that the U.S. military has too much power for its own good and for the good of the nation. "If we focused most of our attention on our own security, we would need less power, and we would use it less." He argues that the U.S. has little or no authority to be the sheriff of the world. He quotes George W. Bush in a 2002 address to West Point Cadets: "In the world we have entered, the only path to safety is the path of action. And this nation will act." Per the author, the U.S. has treaty agreements with at least 60 countries. Any of these treaty agreements could obligate us to act.

Per the author, this decision of being the strongest nation on earth, militarily, is not shared by the American people. He cites a survey that found only 13% of Americans "said the United States should be the single most important leader in the world." So, the author thinks that, over time, we should shrink our military forces in the pursuit of becoming more secure than before.

This does not mean that we become complete pacifists. What it means is that we "only engage in such operations when truly vital national interests are at stake; when the object is clear and obtainable; and only after we have exhausted all other options." A "right-sized" navy might have no more than 200 ships. "For the most part, Americans want to be engaged in the world without being in charge of it." The less we use our power, the greater it will be. We need to end the fool's game that we have been pursuing.

As for our dependency on oil, Preble points out that about 35% of our supply is from domestic sources, 25% is from Canada, and another 20% is from Mexico and Venezuela. Only about 20%, he would argue, of the oil consumed in the U.S. is from the Middle East.

This is a very good book, with one glaring omission: our entanglement with Israel. The idea that we are involved in other countries' affairs to our great detriment should be plain to every American since the debacle in Iraq and the mess-that-will-never-end in Afghanistan, but the author doesn't say a word about the problems our support for Israel has created for us.

Preble explains in very informative detail what it is costing us to keep bases and ships at the ready to defend a great many countries. For example, we are pledged to defend Taiwan and Japan in the event of an attack by China, and we still have troops in Korea and Germany. All these countries are able to spend a fraction of what we spend on defense because the American taxpayer is paying for THEIR defense.

The author supports his arguments with sufficient detail to be very convincing. For example, America spent $2,065 (2007) per person for defense while Japan spent $340 and Germany $430. Ask yourself what we are getting for our money. As he points out in quantitative detail, not the schools, not the roads, and not the bridges we need. Certainly, not the health care.

My problem with this book is that he avoids any discussion of our main entanglement: Israel. Our abiding support for Israel is costing us dearly in many areas of foreign relations (another war, this time with Iran?) and domestic policy. Preble certainly doesn't discuss Israel's involvement in our domestic affairs, but see the books of Grant F. Smith for detailed treatment of this subject.

The whole of the Muslim world and a good part of the civilized world hate us for ignoring the realities of Gaza. Forget the nonsense about "the special relationship" and "our shared values and and common interests" with Israel. Killing 320 children in Gaza is not an American value. Jimmy Carter and Richard Goldstone speak for American values.

We obviously have no influence over the Israelis with either the suspension of settlement construction or the two-state solution. George Mitchell is just accumulating frequent-flyer miles, as Stephen Walt points out.

What are we getting out our entanglement with Israel? The author quotes and discusses at length Washington, Madison, Adams and Jefferson, all to the same effect: what is America's interest in another foreign country? What is the benefit to the US of getting involved in another country?

Israel is the largest recipient of our foreign aid. A lot of people are waiting to hear the answer to the question: What are we getting out of our entanglement with Israel? What's in it for the US?