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25 of 30 people found the following review helpful:
2.0 out of 5 stars
Deep Flaws Ruin a Potential Great Read, March 24, 2007
As someone who does research in the time period discussed in the book, I pick up anything that's new to see if there's any new research. Unfortunately, there's nothing new in this book, and in all honesty, I can not figure out how this book was published by a university press, considering the poor notation and poor logic behind some of Rose's arguements.
The book sets out to be a popular narrative of the naval affairs from 1890-1918, but is spotty in its coverage. For example, the Spanish-American War gets only a skimming over, as does other significant events in World War I, such as Dogger Bank, Coronel and the Falklands, Gallipoli, and the exploits of SMS Koenigsberg and SMS Emden in the Indian Ocean. Mahan gets a brief mention, but Sir Julian Corbett gets no such love. On the other hand, expect the requisite narrative regarding Jutland, as well as chapters on the Imperial Japanese Navy and the US Navy.
However, this is not the greatest flaw in this work. It ostensibly states how it will cover social aspects of navalism, but the deepest it gets is statements about how harshly officers treated enlisted sailors and the public's reaction to the Anglo-German naval race. Rose has trouble keeping his story straight. He pumps up the role of naval fleets running up to the war, and then laments their uselessness after the war breaks out because they spent the most of their time in port. Perhaps if he had read Corbett, he would have seen their uselessness in port with regards to blockading, but I digress. He also seems to have an affinity for what-if scenarios, as he goes on for at least five pages talking about various ways in which the Germans could have sunk the British reinforcements in August of 1914, and even seriously discusses Jacky Fisher's idea regarding landing troops in Pomerania and marching on Berlin, of course without looking at trivial things like the Swedish-Danish mining of the Kattegat or what the German fleet would do this whole time.
In addition, Rose lambastes the design principles of Dreadnoughts, and in the process states how German guns were better than British guns because they were lighter than their direct British counterparts, then in the next paragraph says how German guns were inferior to British guns because they couldn't make bigger guns than the British. He never gets around to sorting that out, much like he never gets around to explaining how many British Dreadnoughts were sunk by torpedoes after stating how vulnerable they were to them. He also talks about how British ships were so vulnerable to plunging fire because of a lack of deck armour, then fails to point out that British deck armour was equal to their counterparts in other navies.
Speaking of proof, if I hear another "Well, as another scholar has noted..." without a footnote, I may just scream. Rose has a nasty habit of backing up his statements with the credentials of another scholar, without actually citing them. Speaking of citing, the notes in this book is frankly high school level. Rose goes for long sections without footnotes making statements like the ones given above, then goes through a slew of notes over the next several paragraphs covering innocuous statements. As for the bibliography, it is a useful guide to secondary sources, but it is extremely unsettling to see a statement saying how it is highly selective and how they were the works that influenced his line of thinking in writing the book. An actual bibliography covering the works he used in the writing of the book as sources would have been much better.
Rose has two more books covering the rest of the century, but at present I am rather gun-shy about actually reading them if this book is any indication of the quality of the other two. In the end, if you want a good read about the time period, especially in terms of an Anglo-German view, I would definitely go for Robert Massie's classics Dreadnought and Castles of Steel. They read just as easy, have much better notation and research, and provide the in depth coverage of the important events that they deserve.
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5 of 6 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
Analysis Over Technical Details, July 14, 2007
I really liked this book. I have to admit, I'm no expert on naval power and haven't read many of the books on the topic. Indeed, I find that my lack of knowledge of some of the technical aspects of naval warfare hurt my understanding.
But the book has some tremendous insights. At first, I had trouble deciding exactly what the book was about. Rose discusses doctrine, training, how officers act and are chosen, how the ship mates thought and acted; however, he also talked about grand admirals, naval colleges, plans, and technology.
After reading it, it is clear that the book is about EXACTLY what it is called -- naval power. And to Rose, everything matters, all of the aspects mentioned above.
In essence, Rose appears to be a great believer that naval power is profound, but it must be used correctly. The navy must be built for the purpose it is used, and leaders and sailors must be trained and work to that end.
The book begins with, perhaps, the overestimation of sea power. Mahan's theories were universally believed, and the history of fleet building before WW1 is so linked to international power politics that it first reads like a book on Political Science.
Over and over, the folly of breaking these axioms is displayed. The Germans build a powerful navy, and then don't use it. Rose agrees that Germany's building the large fleet inevitably lead to conflict with Great Britain, a horrible mistake, since Germany's natural enemies were France and Russia. Conversely, unlike many authors who make the same claim, Rose is even more critical of building the fleet and not ever using it.
Rose discusses how a large and bold use of the fleet could have worked and been decisive. But the German fleet wasn't made to fit a doctrine and wasn't used to supplement the strategies of war.
We also learn about heroes that aren't household names. The brilliant American Admiral, William Snowden Slim, and the genius of Japan, Sato Tetsutaro.
I suspect there is a lot here to disagree about, but my son and I have been talking about his theories for weeks.
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5 of 6 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
An Interesting Study of History and Sea Power, May 4, 2007
This book is a history of global sea power during the critical period from the last decade of the 19th century through World War I. Lisle Rose keeps his book manageable in length while broad in scope.
The rise of Japan to dominance in the Asian Pacific through sea power and its resulting threat to the United States share equal billing with the nation-states of Europe and the navies of the Atlantic. We are led through a review of the importance of sea power as a tool and manifestation of waning colonialism and rising industrialism. This allows for insights into the huge technological and cultural shift from the Age of Sail to the mighty dreadnaught and the new era of undersea warfare and air power.
The stubborn resistance of social stratification from an aristocratic past to the adaptations required by rapid advances in technology and industry is explored, which is to say that the common seaman is not ignored. We are continually reminded that his training and treatment were often archaic and unjust, although he was, in the final analysis, the true source of naval power. Rose leaves plenty of time for the theorists and titular leaders, egos and all, but their roles are placed in a large perspective.
There is a liberal sprinkling of anecdotes and quotations, which add interest and bring history alive. We are, for example, deftly told that the American navy had an underside along with its justifiably proud past when we learn that a young George Dewey, later to become famous at Manila Bay, once "found over a hundred men in chains between the guns and rioters in possession of part of the lower decks."
Along with the sweep of history there is technical review of naval design, production and budgeting in readable form. Rose does not exaggerate, but his engaging style serves to highlight his dramatic descriptions of the tensions, uncertainties and horrors of sea warfare. This is a thoughtful, well-written book, which will be fascinating and informative for navy buffs and historians, as well as those who just enjoy a good read.
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