Customer Reviews

Power at Sea, Volume 3: A Violent Peace, 1946-2006

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3 star:		(1)
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1 star:		(2)

 

 

I must agree with one reviewer that this book presents an excellent history and analysis of the US Navy from the end of the Second World War until 2006. Whether an author has a right to express political views which are as yet unsettled is a question that inspired two readers to submit highly unfavorable reviews (in and of themselves an expression of opposed political views that also remain unsettled). Personally, I had no difficulty separating out the author's opinions from his presentation of historical fact. His analysis is sound and is also easy to separate from his political views, which are, in fact, not at all unfavorable to the Navy, rather to the current administration (Bush Presidency).

Despite the impressive cover image of an open-hatched boomer, if you're a current or ex-submariner seeking validation of your contribution to national defense, you will be left a little hungry. "Power at Sea: A Violent Peace" pays heavy dues to the surface navy, especially carriers, but fails to sufficiently explore the awesome power of subs. The terms, "Polaris, Poseidon, Trident, missile and torpedo," while mentioned in text, don't appear in the index. I could have enjoyed a few more words at the nuts-and-bolts level on sub development; the major impact of nuclear propulsion on subs' mobility and forward stance; the problems and hazards overcome to put nuclear powerplants aboard navy vessels; quality control and safety issues; missiles; targeting accuracy; navigation and positioning systems; range and depth capability; stealth measures; sonar, radar, ecm, communications and special ops capabilities; and more discussion of subs' cost effectiveness in relation to the rest of the navy and broader military objectives. ASW and countermeasures as a military specialty lack attention. By the last page, these powerful machines simply don't get fair credit for their huge role in naval power projection. Admiral Rickover's unique personality rated about three pages, but if you haven't read "Rickover" you won't adequately appreciate the great scope of his contributions based on this book alone. That said, this book makes an excellent sales pitch for Tomahawk cruise missiles as readily deployable from multiple platforms; provides a worthwhile overview of naval and general war history; bemoans the impact of constantly shifting political winds; and appeals for an end to constant underfunding. Last, the bibliography is a handy pointer to other materials you might want to check out.

A monumental undertaking, unfortunately tainted by the author's unsubstantiated bias and opinion. The preface to this volume is telling:

"When 9/11 provided an overeager George W. Bush and his "neoconservative followers" with the pretext to proclaim a global imperium, the United States Navy stood ready to enforce it........"

"The current quagmire in Iraq, recalling the earlier frustration in Southeast Asia, raises once again long held questions about the pertinence and effectiveness of sea power."

The real quagmire is the frustration experienced by a reader's attempt to sort through the authors facts, fiction and political opinions.

After reading this third installment in Dr. Rose's trilogy I was initially hesitant to provide a review, but after seeing the previous reviewer's comments regarding "editorializing" by Dr. Rose I felt compelled to add my two-cents worth. I thoroughly concur with the comment regarding the interjection of personal opinions of this sort into a book's ostensibly factual narrative. Certainly any author has the right to weave personal opinion into his book but, in this case, where is Dr. Rose's substantiation for his off-the-wall comments about 9/11 and the Iraq war? This all smacks of left-wing Bush-bashing and is surprising coming as it does in an analytical review of the U.S. Navy in the Cold War and post-Cold War period. Just where exactly does the Navy fit into Rose's assertion that the Bush administration used the terrorist attacks of September 11th to "proclaim a global imperium?" This is never made clear. It certainly appears to represent the typical "blame America first" attitude so prevalent in much of the academic community.
Dr. Rose has excellent insights into the evolution of the nuclear submarine as the post-modern capital ship. His analysis of the Cuban Missile Crisis is spot-on, as is his review of social-cultural conflicts within the fleet's personnel, ship-and-shore-based alike, in view of radically altering late 20th century social changes and the climate of "political correctness" which now seems to permeate every aspect of the American military culture.
I do somewhat take issue with Rose's not-so-subliminal assertion that the USN would have been hard-pressed in a head-to-head confrontation with the Soviet navy of the 1970s and 1980s. Certainly the Soviet navy had large numbers of surface vessels and a clear superiority in numbers of both conventional and nuclear-powered submarines, but American boats were, and are, always far quieter and stealthier, which typified the overwhelming U.S. technological superiority throughout the Cold War (otherwise, why were the Societs always trying to steal our secrets, rather than vice-versa?). Then too, Soviet naval doctrine in the Cold War era was virtually the opposite of that of the USN. Gorshkov's fleet was mostly defensive in nature--even the Soviets' big missile "boomers" were kept close to home ports both to defend the homeland and to remain out of harm's way of U.S. Los Angeles-class attack subs. Conversely the USN, particularly during the 1981-87 Reagan-Lehman buildup toward the 600-ship Navy, was offensive in nature and espoused blue-water power projection as opposed to the Soviets' maintenance of the "fleet in being" concept--almost to the point of emulating the strategy of the German High Seas Fleet that rarely ventured out of port during the war of 1914-18.

Dr. Rose's third and final volume in his Power at Sea trilogy encompases some 60 years, a far longer time than the scope of either of the two earlier volumes. For that reason, it is a more difficult read but it is especially interesting because most of us lived through at least a part of that period. Dr Rose completes his excellent analysis of sea power by shining a bright light on several of the facets of this era that are not well known to the American public.

I was particularly interested in learning that the U.S. Navy fought the Vietnam War with mostly World War II ships and in learning that for a time, before the fall of the Soviet empire, our navy might well have lost a major confrontation with the Soviet Navy had it occurred.

There is much more to fascinate the reader as the U.S. Navy, inherently conservative, is forced to deal with a changing world, admit female sailors to its ranks, cope with modern youth, and search for a mission in a world that may never fight a major sea battle again. Anyone who has read the last two books of the series will definitely want to get this one.