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Power without Persuasion: The Politics of Direct Presidential Action

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Howell presents his argument on the saliency of executive powers in the face of checks and balances from the legislature and Judiciary and does so using mathematical models and empirical studies. His argument contrasts with Neustadt's view on power with persuasion where power is measured by the skills and reputation of the president to persuade Congress to carry out policies he cannot do on his own. Neustadt contends power and persuasion are synonymous. While this may be traditonal thinking even theory of the Executive Office in policy making, with modern times presidents have employed unilateral methods to enact policy, and have done so with more success than failures. The tool chest of unilateral powers includes executive orders, proclamations, national security directives, and executive agreements. Each of these are described in detail and Howell outlines categories of Executive orders using a data range of 1949 to 1984 appearing in Appendix I.

In the Unilateral Politics Model Howell contends that theory should account for the presidents first mover advantage and must anticipate the actions of congress and the judiciary. The model itself contains numerous variables and identifiers, to be exact six main players, two parameters, five player preferences, and three policy outcomes. The models are in linear and branched form with decision trees throughout. These models are better suited for graduate students and political scientists then undergraduate students. Thirteen figures are attributed to the Unilateral Politics Model and Howell uses real examples to make his point throughout the book as well as limitations of the model such as transaction costs and committee assignments. Three hypotheses are offered: the more fragmented the Congress becomes the more freedom the president has to act unilaterally; incoming presidents who are of the opposite party issue more unilateral directives; and presidents issue more significant unilateral directives during periods of unified government. Howell offers numerous supportive data and directives to support these hypotheses such as Clinton's attempt to ban permanent replacement of striking workers and Truman's order to desegregate the military. Empirical models presented in the book include a time period between 1969 and 1985 listing the number of executive orders covered in the New York Times and Congressional Record and court opinion with combinations thereof. The study supported both hypotheses 1 and 3.

Howell contends Congress is at a disadvantage in trying to limit presidental unilateral powers by the notion that the president has access to more information than congress and the President only has to interact with a handful of people with impending directives, where Congress is more than five hundred strong and faced with constituent concerns and reelection strategies. If the directive concerns national security, such discussions are confidental putting Congress at a salient disadvantage to halting an executive order. When the President issues orders related to a impending war, the War Powers Resolution allows the president free reign for ninety days before Congress can step in, and by that time sympathy can be garnered for soliders plight and immediate needs. One facet in which Congress can regulate unilateral powers is power of the purse. If the order is related to government agencies that need funding year in and year out, Congress certainly has the upper hand. When presidents are faced with stern opposition from Congress, they tend to back away from unilateral powers, such as Clinton did on Gays in the Military in 1992. Presidents also increase their unilateral powers in times of war and domestic crisis with little opposition.

Regarding the Judiciary, Brown vs Board of Education is discussed as well as Youngstown vs Sawyer. One of the restrictions the judiciary has simply by virtue of its powers is it cannot enforce decisions and must rely on the executive and its agencies to implement their decisions and will carefully analyze that concern before taking on an executive order. If the president is not exceeding discrentionary powers, the court will uphold the order. History has shown that only when Congress, interest groups and the public oppose him will the Court overturn the president. Eighty percent of cases have been upheld by the court in favor of the president. This is outlined in another empircal study 1942 to 1988 where executive orders were challenged. Howell also contends there seems to be less reliance of packing the court along party lines in regard to challenging executive orders than ensuring the president has not overstepped his bounds of the constitution and the court will rarely take on a case if they feel their decision will not be implemented.

This book provides comprehensive knowledge, arguments, theory, and empircal substance regarding judicious use of unilateral powers by the president and lays the foundation for future studies.

Howell's book is part of a recent trend towards viewing the president as more than just one player in a larger system. Instead we can better understand the presidency if we realize that the president comes in to the game with institutional advantages over Congress and the courts.

Debunking further Richard Neustadt's bargaining hypothesis (see his book Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents), Howell argues that presidents have the ability in many situations to use direct forms of action, such as executive orders, rather than relying upon persuasion and normal legislative processes.

Howell's argument is a game-theoretic model, which ultimately undermines somewhat the usefulness of his argument. He makes some interesting points, but also leaves the reader wondering whether what he says is true in practice and in history, not just in theory.

Overall, recommended for serious scholars of the presidency only.