Powerful and Brutal Weapons: Nixon, Kissinger, and the Easter Offensive [Hardcover]

Stephen P. Randolph (Author)

Book Description

Publication Date: March 30, 2007 | ISBN-10: 0674024915 | ISBN-13: 978-0674024915 | Edition: 1St Edition

As America confronts an unpredictable war in Iraq, Stephen Randolph returns to an earlier conflict that severely tested our civilian and military leaders. In 1972, America sought to withdraw from Vietnam with its credibility intact. As diplomatic negotiations were pursued in Paris, President Richard Nixon and National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger hoped that gains on the battlefield would strengthen their position at the negotiating table--working against the relentless deadline of a presidential election year.

In retaliation for a major North Vietnamese offensive breaking over the Easter holidays, the President launched the all-out air campaign known as Linebacker--overriding his Secretary of Defense and clashing with the theater commander in whom he had lost all confidence. He intended to destroy the enemy with the full force of America's "powerful and brutal weapons" and thus shape the endgame of the war. Randolph's narrative, based not only on the Nixon White House tapes and newly declassified materials from the National Security Council, the Pentagon, and the White House but also on never before used North Vietnamese sources, re-creates how North Vietnam planned and fought this battle from Hanoi and how the U.S. planned and fought it from Washington.

Randolph's intimate chronicle of Nixon's performance as commander-in-chief gains us unprecedented access to how strategic assessments were made, transmitted through the field of command, and played out in combat and at the negotiating table. It is a compelling story about America's military decision-making in conflicts with nontraditional belligerents that speaks provocatively to our own time.

(20080401)

Editorial Reviews

Review

The climactic Easter Offensive, the last major campaign of the American war in Vietnam, serves as Stephen Randolph's focus for this fine study of Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger's foreign policy and use of military power. Using a wide range of sources, Vietnamese as well as American, Randolph convincingly details how Hanoi's armies were stopped. Powerful and Brutal Weapons is the most comprehensive history of this crucial campaign yet written. It should not be missed.
--John Prados, author of Valley of Decision: The Siege of Khe Sanh (20070401)

Stephen Randolph has produced a tour de force. He skillfully takes us inside the White House and over the skies of Vietnam. His analysis of Nixon's role in managing the war during the critical year of 1972--when the president was pursuing detente with the USSR, the opening to China, and his reelection bid--is brilliant. Randolph has produced a book that should be read not just by scholars and students of military history and foreign policy decision-making, but by anyone working at the highest levels of the U.S. government today.
--James Goldgeier, George Washington University (20070601)

An outstanding and eminently readable account of the penultimate battle of the American phase of the Vietnam War - the 1972 Easter Offensive – and of President Nixon's decisive reaction to this massive North Vietnamese surprise attack. Colonel Randolph takes the reader inside the corridors of power, the Oval Office in Washington, and the Vietnamese Communist Party Politburo's conference room in Hanoi, and explains how the decisions made at those lofty levels were translated into action at the tactical level. This book belongs on the bookshelves of every serious student of military history and Presidential leadership.
--Merle Pribbenow, translator of Victory in Vietnam: The Official History of the People's Army of Vietnam, 1954-1975 (20070519)

For all of those who long for the good old days before the Iraq imbroglio, Stephen Randolph has written a spectacular study on the dismal processes through which the United States began to disentangle itself from the Vietnam War. In effect, Randolph has done for the end of the war what H.R. McMaster managed to do for the war's beginning.
--Williamson Murray, co-author with Major General Robert H. Scales Jr. of The Iraq War: A Military History (20070901)

A detailed but lucid account. Randolph tells the tale from three sides (American, South Vietnamese and North Vietnamese) and three perspectives--military, of course, but also diplomatic and political. And it works. Randolph has done deep research--for example, into the military archives of the North Vietnamese, who candidly noted what they'd done wrong. Unlike many military writers, Randolph pays attention to the staggering importance of logistics. (He says the U.S. surge of 1972 was unprecedented and a major feat for its time.) And as a retired colonel who once flew fighters, he knows all about military culture and military turf battles.
--Harry Levins (St. Louis Post-Dispatch 20080401)

Drawing on extensive research and newly declassified materials, Randolph tells the story of how the White House overrode the objections of the Pentagon brass and the field command in Vietnam--which resulted in a display of shock-and-awe that was as impressive in the realm of realpolitik as it was on the battlefield. (The Atlantic )

[A] brilliant if scary account of a White House running its own military show.
--Tony Maniaty (Weekend Australian )

The beauty of Powerful and Brutal Weapons is that it seamlessly melds the domestic, political, diplomatic, cultural, technical, tactical, and strategic factors affecting the air war in 1972. Meticulously researched, it depends heavily on primary sources from all sides of the fight-American, North and South Vietnamese, Soviet, and Chinese. Randolph uses a chronological organizing scheme, starting with the Easter Offensive in the South and moving on to the mounting of Linebacker One.
--David R. Mets (Air and Space Power Journal )

Powerful and Brutal Weapons is far more than the story of a single big campaign. It sketches out the broad architecture of the Nixon administration’s effort to extricate itself from Vietnam and Nixon’s larger aspirations in Sino-Soviet-American affairs, making clear his simultaneous willingness to use force in ways beyond what Lyndon Johnson had allowed and his keen sense that Congressional and public patience was all but gone...Randolph has made a major and important contribution to the study of the American war effort in Vietnam, of civil-military relations, and of the interplay of war making and diplomacy. It is an indispensable part of the core literature on the place of Vietnam within the larger context of U.S. policy objectives in the 1970s.
--Donald J. Mrozek (Journal of Military History )

Randolph uses not only an impressive range of U.S. records but also some important fresh sources from Hanoi such as official histories and proceedings of the Politburo. The result is a remarkable achievement that brings together multiple perspectives...It is an indispensable part of the core literature on the place of Vietnam within the larger context of U.S. policy objectives in the 1970s.
--Donald J. Mrozek (Journal of Military History )

About the Author

Stephen P. Randolph is a former fighter pilot and a retired colonel, and currently teaches at the National Defense University.

Product Details

• Hardcover: 416 pages
• Publisher: Harvard University Press; 1St Edition edition (March 30, 2007)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 0674024915
• ISBN-13: 978-0674024915
• Product Dimensions: 9.3 x 6.1 x 1.5 inches
• Shipping Weight: 1.7 pounds (View shipping rates and policies)
• Average Customer Review: 4.2 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (4 customer reviews)
• Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #1,099,736 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)

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6 of 6 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars How the U.S. Miltiary Saved South Vietnam in 1972, December 13, 2007

By 

Lawrence R. Benson (Albuquerque, NM, USA) - See all my reviews
(REAL NAME)   

This review is from: Powerful and Brutal Weapons: Nixon, Kissinger, and the Easter Offensive (Hardcover)

Few Americans are familiar with the belated successes achieved by U.S. Air Force and Navy air power against the North Vietnamese offensive in 1972. With this definitive study, Stephen Randolph (a former USAF fighter pilot now teaching at the National Defense University) tells the full story of the crisis--tactical, strategic, diplomatic, and political. His book reveals a wealth of new information culled from the infamous White House tapes, recently declassified files of the National Security Council, available North Vietnamese records (translated by former CIA intelligence officer), and the history programs of all four U.S. armed services.

With optimistic goals similar to those in the famous Tet offensive of early 1968, North Vietnam launched a 3-pronged invasion of the south in March 1972. Employing its growing arsenal of armor and artillery, the North Vietnamese Army achieved stunning early victories facilitated by ineffective resistance by South Vietnamese forces. But the North's advances gradually stalled because of logistical shortcomings, tactical mistakes, and most significantly, "powerful and brutal weapons" that its Politburo, on the eve of operations, had feared might be used by the United States.

Even so, the North Vietnamese had seriously underestimated American technological progress in weapon systems since the end of operation Rolling Thunder in 1968 and the resolve of a different American commander-in-chief to use them. President Richard Nixon was not about to let a defeat in Vietnam undermine his diplomatic initiatives with the Soviet Union and China or his reelection in November. Although Randolph unsparingly documents the paranoia, bureaucratic back-stabbing, and dysfunctional decision-making process of Nixon and his national security advisor, Henry Kissinger, he gives them full credit for the result of these decisions.

Nixon's hopes of rescuing South Vietnam depended on the growing strategic mobility of American air power. As the crisis unfolded, several hundred USAF combat aircraft rushed to Southeast Asia, where they were joined by five U.S. Navy aircraft carriers. This rapid deployment of forces across such vast distances, explains Randolph, "demonstrated a capability never before seen in strategic affairs" and represented "a turning point in contemporary military history."

The book vividly portrays key players involved on the American side of the drama along with their various agendas. Of special interest to Air Force readers is the role of Gen. John Vogt, whose chief qualification for being given leadership of Seventh Air Force (the USAF command in Southeast Asia) was Kissinger's friendship and Nixon's trust. The two of them held most other Air Force leaders in contempt.

Randolph is generous in recognizing success and seems fair in analyzing failure. The massive impact of the US Strategic Air Command's B-52 bombers (Nixon's favored weapon) and the well-aimed firepower of Air Force AC-130 gunships were especially valuable in devastating enemy formations, as was naval gunfire along the coast. On the ground, brave and professional U.S. Army advisors stiffened South Vietnamese resistance and coordinated vital air support (some conducted by "world class" Vietnamese pilots flying A-1 Skyraiders). Often overlooked, courageous USAF cargo planes delivered essential supplies in the face of deadly hostile fire. Two combat leaders earn special praise: the legendary American counter-insurgency expert John Paul Vann in the central highlands (killed in a helicopter crash "at the highest moment of triumph in his long career") and South Vietnamese Lt. Gen. Ngo Quang Truong in the northeast part of the country ("a master in command, as fine a leader as any in the war").

Up in North Vietnam, including areas of Hanoi and Haiphong off limits during Rolling Thunder, the laser-guided bombs delivered by ad-hoc USAF strike packages ("mass gaggles") assembled from scattered bases in Thailand inflicted unprecedented damage on key targets, albeit with embarrassing losses to adaptable North Vietnamese air defenses. After closing Haiphong harbor in a flawless mine-laying operation, U.S. Navy aviators--benefiting from stronger unit integrity, better training, and shorter flying distances than their Air Force counterparts--hit a wider range of targets while achieving more favorable kill ratios against defending MiGs.

North Vietnamese forces also receive well-deserved credit, especially for their endurance, discipline, clear chain of command, and willingness to learn from their mistakes. By October 1972, pushed back in the south and suffering unexpected destruction at home, the North Vietnamese leadership signaled their desire to end the fighting on conditions acceptable to Nixon and Kissinger--terms almost identical to those they eventually signed in Paris on 27 January 1973.

Prior to that, however, resistance to these provisions by South Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu and backsliding by North Vietnamese negotiators provoked Nixon into launching the so-called Christmas bombing of Linebacker II, a chapter sadly missing from Randolph's book. (Fortunately, a concise account of this climactic air campaign can be found in a comprehensive history of USAF operations against North Vietnam from 1966-1973, To Hanoi and Back, by Wayne Thompson.)

In the end, however, the battles of 1972 proved to be only speed bumps in the road toward the unification of Vietnam under a communist regime. The errors North Vietnam made in the crucible of 1972 "provided a rich menu of lessons learned" for its easy victory in 1975. Without continued American support (undermined by war-weariness and Watergate), the uninspired government of the Republic of Vietnam had little chance against what Randolph characterizes as "probably the most thoroughly mobilized society in humankind's long and violent history."

At a time when many, including our current President, have been comparing the war in Vietnam with that in Iraq, and the long term effects of the latter on U.S. military readiness is a major issue, Randolph reminds us that "[t]his final splurge of the Vietnam war contributed greatly to the hollow military of the late 1970s."

With intimate conversations in the Oval Office no longer being recorded, it is highly unlikely that the wartime deliberations and decision-making of any subsequent commander-in-chief will ever be so thoroughly described and analyzed as in this important and informative book.

1 of 1 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars Comprehensive story of Nixon and the Easter Offensive, July 21, 2009

By 

Stephen Bang (Overland Park, KS, USA) - See all my reviews
(VINE VOICE)    (REAL NAME)   

This review is from: Powerful and Brutal Weapons: Nixon, Kissinger, and the Easter Offensive (Hardcover)

The title, Brutal and Powerful Weapons, does not give much insight into what kind of book this is. It comes from a North Vietnam Politburo cable sent March 27, 1972, the eve of the Easter Offensive. It does, though, point to the diversity of sources that Randolph uses to tell a complete story. The book is well documented and carefully adheres to the truth.

Randolph skillfully weaves several related threads into a fabric that tells many aspects of the Vietnam War during the 1972 Easter Offensive. There is the thread of Nixon and Kissinger interacting with the North Vietnamese politburo Paris negotiators. Nixon and Kissinger working for détente with the USSR and the Peoples Republic of China. Nixon interacting with cabinet members (or not interacting, but rather bypassing them) and generals. Another three threads are the North Vietnamese attacks on Quang Tri (and nearby Hue), Kontum, and An Loc. Two more are the air operations in South Vietnam in support of the ARVN and the Linebacker air operations against North Vietnam.

The book shifts, somewhat abruptly, from the diplomatic processes between the United States, North Vietnam, the U.S.S.R, and Red China, to the combat in South Vietnam, to the air war in North Vietnam, then repeating the cycle. The combat chapters are essential for understanding the diplomacy chapters, and they are all mixed about as well as could be done. But at times I felt like I was reading two separate books.

I was stunned to learn that Nixon and Kissinger were so dissatisfied with the Air Force and Navy aviation. Thousands of pilots and crewmembers died or were taken prisoner, and they weren't satisfied with what was accomplished. Part of why Nixon was dissatisfied was that Kissinger was deceiving him. The Air Force would ask for permission to bomb the buildups in the North Vietnam panhandle, then Laird and Kissinger would deny the request, then Nixon would throw a temper tantrum because the Air Force wasn't bombing the panhandle. Nixon also threw a tantrum because the Air Force could not bomb effectively in bad weather. He argued that the Army Air Force bombed effectively in bad weather during World War II at the Battle of the Bulge, so why couldn't they do it in Vietnam. Well this just wasn't true. The Army Air Force was limited by weather during the Battle of the Bulge. Where did Nixon get this idea? Nixon and Kissinger were just terribly out of touch with the realities of what the military was doing, what was feasible for them to do, what it was like for the soldiers and pilots, and what the limitations were. General Haig and Admiral Moorer should have done a better job of explaining military realities to Nixon and Kissinger. (My conclusions, not Randolph's, who just presents the facts.)

I was personally interested when I read that an A-37 was shot down near An Loc on May 11, 1972, and for a couple of hours the air operations were focused on rescuing the pilot. (p 246) One B-52 strike was diverted. This caused "anger", "disgust", and "rankle" among the Army advisors. Randolph does not mention the name of the pilot, consistent with his practice throughout the book of not naming junior officers. It was Michael Blassie, an acquaintance and classmate of mine from the Air Force Academy. His remains were later recovered but not identified until many years later, and he was interred for many years in the Tomb of the Unknowns in Arlington National Cemetery, until he was identified.

I was surprised to learn that some members of the Nixon administration (e.g. Melvin Laird) did not support Nixon's policies, and Nixon thought some of the generals (Abrams) were either incompetent or just not aggressive enough, but Nixon didn't think he could fire them. Most Vietnam War books written in the past 30 years are very positive on Abrams. Nixon thought Abrams was ineffective with the Lam Son 719 offensive. But that was a South Vietnamese operation, not under Abrams' control.

Stephen Randolph was a fighter pilot, and gives adequate and accurate attention to the Air Force and naval aviation roles in the campaign. Dale Andrade's excellent book, America's Last Vietnam Battle, gives much more detail to the role of the U. S. Army advisors on the ground in Quang Tri, Hue, Kontum, and An Loc. Randolph's book is more accurate and complete on the air operations and the diplomacy.

Only one sentence (P 330) is devoted to Linebacker II, the Christmas bombing of North Vietnam. For more on Linebacker II, see Marshall Michel's fine book, The 11 Days of Christmas. The final chapter analyzes the lasting effects of the Easter Offensive and the eventual defeat of South Vietnam. It is painful to read how Watergate weakened the presidency and made it impossible to help South Vietnam as the communists broke the treaty.

2.0 out of 5 stars good big picture, not so good in details, August 28, 2010

By 

Arrigo Velicogna "Military Historian and warg... (Budrio, Bologna Italy) - See all my reviews
(REAL NAME)   

This review is from: Powerful and Brutal Weapons: Nixon, Kissinger, and the Easter Offensive (Hardcover)

First of all I think the book is a boradsolid overview of the Easter Offensive. Yet it does not provide the same level of informations as America last Vietnam Battle by Dale Andrade. The book gave a very good good high level account of the offensive but it is marred by several inconsistencies.

It defines the Sa-7 a threat to high altitude drop to An Loc... now the Sa-7 is a low altitude MANPADS and high altitude drops were made in asnwer to them and conventional AAA threat. It says the recapture of Quang Tri destroyed the ARVN strategic reserve: Paratroopers and Marines. The Airborne division was in constant combat from the start of the offensive at An Loc Kontum and then on the I CTZ and thus suffered accordingly; one battalion had to be rebuilt after being overrun near An Loc at a place called Windy Hill. Yet the same battalion performed a bayonet charge to reapon the land link to An Loc. The Marines were in combat in the I CTZ from the staert of the offensive. Yet as formations the two division survived in a combat capable state. Those are not the only military errors in the books. Countless of small one and some bigger ones creep in several areas.

No mention to the fact that the attempts to reopen the road to Kontum were made by Republic of korea troops. No mwention to the consistent tank battle on the cua viet and on the recapture of quang tri. Actually the books seems to gloss over the fact that the NVa was relying on tank as striking power and often if the tank support was destroyed by ARVN or US troos attaxck faltered.

The book has also a strong shortcoming underlining it. IT tell you the american and northvietnamese story, not the south vietnamese one. You do not get anything about colonel Ba insipred leadership at Kontum, General Truong creative tactics or twhat colonel Battreal defined tthe "easter save" at Dong Ha. It ocncentrates on ARVN shortcoming rather than positive aspects and tend to pin every success on US air support.

It has also an annoying "format" aspect: it lacks a bibliography. You have endnotes but not a bibliography.

I will recommend the book for it insights and opinions on Hanoi objective and planning (yet I think Andrade analysis is much more accurate and certinaly deeper) and for its description of America's inner working. But If you want a military history of the offensive go to "America Last Vietnam Battle" or "The Battle of An Loc". For the air war "Clashes" is much better and for Linebacker II (only barely mentioned in the book) go to "11 Days of Christhmas". I feel the book is actually two. A well organized political histoerty oof the offensive and a pretty bad military one. It is not "overly" wrong, but the military part felt more grafted on. I would have much more appreciated just the political and diplomatic side, maybe as an article rather than the actual unsatisfying final mix.