4 of 4 people found the following review helpful:
3.0 out of 5 stars
Interesting on Chennault & the Flying Tigers -- Much Less So on Book's Premise, January 26, 2009
This review is from: Preemptive Strike : The Secret Plan That Would Have Prevented the Attack on Pearl Harbor (Hardcover)
This work by author Armstrong is scholarly and well documented and the Appendixes are unusually strong. However, the basic theme of the book -- that the US considered a preemptive strike with B-17 bombers on Japan's vulnerable cities in 1941 prior to Pearl Harbor -- is weak and really not worth considering. That various individuals made plans to bomb Japan from China during that time is a given, but such plans could not be carried out for a number of reasons. The reader needs to keep in mind that planners attempt to put a number of plans on the table for discussion and even implementation under various circumstances and scenerios, but in reality they are worked through by decision-makers as circumstances change so that usually only a few actually become implemented in one form of another.
There are two parts of this book that are interesting and make the book worth reading -- the formation and role of the Flying Tigers, and the interplay between the various Washington bureaucracies involved in war planning. And by this I do not mean planning to initiate war, but rather what courses of action to take in the event of war.
It must be emphasized that the US has NEVER in its history conducted a preemptive strike on a likely future enemy to degrade their war-making capabilities against the US -- including Iraq and all the involvements since World War Two. In every case the first hostile act was made by the enemy, there was a declaration of war first or some government requested the US's assistance. World War Two was no exception although some have attempted to place Roosevelt's economic measures against Japan during 1941 in that category. But even then, Japan possessed options -- it could at any time withdraw from its adventure in China and renounce its aggressive intentions and the embargo would be lifted. Japan chose not to do so, and Pearl Harbor was the result of their bad choice. All other considerations such as American activity in support of China were so much hot air.
The author very correctly stresses the involvement of Laughlin Currie in the planning. We now know that Currie was one of the many Soviet agents in high places in Roosevelt's administration, and he actively sought to involve the US in military actions against Japan to relieve the pressure by Japan on the rear of the Soviet Union. Stalin assumed he would be at war with Germany sometime from 1941 to 1943, and he desired the US to draw off Japan's attention. Currie was one of the major forces pushing for the AVG (American Volunteer Group -- the Flying Tigers) but it needs to be stressed that the AVG did not begin active combat against the Japanese until December 20, 1941, AFTER the commencement of hostilities between Japan and the US.
Roosevelt nixed any idea of a preemptive bomber strike from China or anywhere else and desired that Japan initiate hostilities for political and moral reasons. Nor were the bombers available in any case. The few B-17s produced prior to Pearl Harbor were sent to Great Britain or distributed in penny packets to various Air Corps units. There was a glaring shortage of heavy bombers in the Air Corps (and these were the early types that were found to be weak defensively), and none were available for a group of civilians in China where maintenance facilities were non-existent and adequate airfields were more than questionable. In fact, even as the war progressed it was found that China was unsuitable for basing bomber groups to hit Japan.
At any rate, the story is worth telling, but it is not one to get excited about. The AVG only functioned for six months and was disbanded on July 4, 1942. A preemptive strike was never politically feasible nor was it feasible due to a lack of bombers, air crews and support. More important is the story of the AVG and the Washington infighting that produced it while at the same time the Roosevelt administration was unable to build up the US Army Air Corps adequately (along with Naval Aviation) to face the Japanese.
In short, I recommend this book to students of World War Two for its scholarship and coverage of events in the US during 1941, but one should not expect a thriller where the US narrowly decides against making a devastating and successful preemptive strike against Japan that would have precluded Pearl Harbor and our early defeats in the war.
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8 of 12 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
A Story of a Proposal to Bomb Japan First, July 6, 2006
This review is from: Preemptive Strike : The Secret Plan That Would Have Prevented the Attack on Pearl Harbor (Hardcover)
A fun book that plays 'what if' with Claire Chennault, the Flying Tigers and the attack on Pearl Harbor.
The basic concept being discussed was a proposal made by China to increase the American aviation presence in China from a hundred P-40's to 350 fighters and 150 bombers. This force was to be used to bomb Japanese forces in China and perhaps even in Japan. There was apparently some discussion, even some acceptance of the proposal in the United States.
Needless to say, this didn't come to pass, and for a lot of reasons. One problem was the availability of the bombers. As of October 17, 1941 there were 83 B-17s in the United States and another 31 overseas. Hap Arnold and George Marshall were not going to be easy to persuade to give up these planes (and the next 36 to come off of Boeing's assembly line) to a retired Army Captain (Chennault) off in China.
Another point worth mentioning is that the generally held view of the capability of a few heavy bombers to significantly change the outcome of a war was much higher before they really started bombing. It wasn't too long after this that England was doing 1,000 plane raids with planes that carried 3-4 times as many bombs as the B-17.
One of the really strong points of this book is the interplay among the powers that be in Washington. While the plan was being considered, this was the time when Roosevelt was winning an election on the theme that he kept us out of war. A preemptive strike on Japan would probably have been politically worse then than Iraq is now. And the presumption that this might have deterred the Japanese from the attack on Pearl is a bit of a stretch. The reaction of the Japanese to the Doolittle raids was to attack Midway.
Great fun read.
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