Customer Reviews

Pregnable Fortress - A Study in Deception, Discord and Desertion (Teach Yourself)

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Writing comfortably from Singapore (where indeed I myself live), the previous reviewer lambasts Peter Elphick's "poor research" and "lack of factual content". And whilst Elphick draws on the weight on official communiques, War Cabinet and Colonial Office documents, as well as eye witness accounts by those at the top and close to the military and civil establishment of wartime Singapore, on what basis does David Rew base his thesis that Elphick's account of Singapore's fall is "fiction dressed as history"? On some accounts in the Singapore National Library archives.

If David Rew actually takes pains to read Peter Elphick's exceptionally well-researched and lucid account of the events leading up to the fall of Singapore, he will note that the author delves quite far into Singapore's administrative history in the 1920's and 1930's to explain the reason for the inadequacy of Singapore's northern fortifications. In simplistically attributing the error to General Percival and his staff, Mr. Rew overlooks the fact that the failure to adequately fortify "Fortress" Singapore was the fault not only of Sir Shenton Thomas, the colonial Governor since 1935, but of the local War Committee which presided over the immediate outbreak of hostilities in the West and the imminent threat of Japanese invasion in the East. The indecisiveness of the War Committee was further compounded by the infighting between the General Officer Commanding Malaya, General Bond (Percival's predecessor) and the Air Officer Commanding Malaya, General Babbington and the situation was not in the least ameliorated by the presence of Air Vice Marshall Brooke Popham, the GOC Far East or such key players as Sir Archibald Wavell. Indeed, the root of Singapore's false sense of security seems to have been Churchill himself, a well-known fact which Elphick alludes to. All in all, Elphick devotes considerable pages and chapters to explaining the complexity in terms of Colonial office directives, Cabinet policy and local infighting at the pinnacle of the settlement's very leadership itself which contributed to the unpreparedness which was a decisive factor in the disaster.

But to attribute everything to the lack of guns facing Johore is equally simplistic. The agreed strategy had been to defend the Malayan peninsula in the first instance as it contained valuable tin and rubber resources which couldn't simply be handed over to an occupying force. One must therefore also consider other contributory factors such as the Allies' shilly-shallying over the execution of Operation Matador - the plan to oppose any Japanese landings in Thailand by invading the nation first, a move which would have outflanked the Japanese operations on Peninsula Malaya & made life more difficult for them. Another factor is the failure of the Royal Air Force to secure enough servicable aircraft to successfully oppose the arriving Japanese fleet at sea - in spite of the fact that the air strategy had been agreed as taking precedence over contesting the landings primarily by land. The intervention of collaborators and fifth columnists also added to the confusion of the Allies, as the premature evacuation of several Northern airfields bears testimony to.

As to the ill discipline and mutinous behaviour of (some of) the Australian soldiers, this is a well-documented and generally accepted fact which is borne out by both civilian and military eye witness accounts.

Having said this, Elphick credits the Australians, Indian and British soldiers who fought so doggedly to defend mainland Malaya and Singapore despite the incompetence of their senior officers, notwithstanding that that incompetence had resulted in a situation of near zero morale amongst the Allied troops from the very outset. I don't feel Elphick has any "hidden agenda" above & beyond the urge to definitively explain the whole complex comedy of errors which, beginning well in the 1920's, continued into the critical months and weeks before the actual Japanese landings at Kota Bahru. The Pregnable Fortress is a veritable mine of factual information and one of the most gripping stories of military strategy-gone-awry that any reader is likely to come across.

I bought and read Elphick's book while living in Singapore. Initially, I felt ashamed as an Australian about what it said about my countrymen.

But on seeing the author's own comments made on the 60th anniversary of the fall of Singapore, I question Elphick's efforts as an historian to thoroughly research his material, and even to make the simplest check on the veracity of his secondary sources.

On that basis, I am forced to question his entire posture in the book, with its claims that the Australians deserted in great numbers.

For example, in the book Elphick said that some Australian deserters had allegedly boarded a ship, the "Empire Star". They were led, he wrote, by a Australian officer: Captain Blackwood. However, there's no record of a Captain Blackwood in the Australian 8th Division. When asked about this, Elphick answered: "Er, well, maybe they got the name wrong."

Elphick also named a "Roy Cornford", as an Australian soldier whom Elphick says deserted by his own admission. Cornford denies this. In fact, Cornford not only easily explains his whereabouts and activities, but his record goes on to show that he returned to the frontline only to be later captured in Java, and nearly killed when his prisoner-of-the-Japanese ship was sunk by US submarines.

When asked if it was wrong to call Cornford a deserter, Elphick answers: "No, if I am wrong then so was the author of the book who actually interviewed Roy Cornford. And HE said that Roy Cornford, on his own admission, was a deserter. And I took that verbatim from the book."

Elphick admits he never spoke to Roy Cornford. When pressed again as to why not, particularly given that Elphick was prepared to name Cornford as a deserter, Elphick replied: "Well -it's a moot point. Would it have been worth my while to journey out to Australia to interview one man? I don't think so." Perhaps a simple telephone call could have turned ruinous and wrong "hearsay as history" into valid research.

On the casual responses above alone, I began to question what else Elphick was so lackadaisical about in his tome. In the end, I've concluded that if you want to read a history, a real history, on the Fall of Singapore, perhaps seek out a work by someone prepared to check the facts of what they write under their name, rather than using hearsay. As for me: I have thrown "The Pregnable Fortress" on the rubbish heap for, based on Elphick's own statements, I find it to be garbage.

This book is a familiar style of writing. Seductive in approach. It tells those still clutching the myth of British infallibity in the East what they've always wanted to hear. That Singapore did not fall as a result of a meticulously planned attack by an experienced Japanese force with full control of the air. Nor did Singapore fall because of the refusal of the British Commander to prepare the island for an adequate defence- a decision that is still numbing in it's implications, more than fifty years later. Rather, according to Peter Elphick, Singapore fell due to a lacklustre performance by the British rank and file. The troops failed their officers. Thus exonerating the British Command. This message is clear in the book. And clearly, wrong. To make his case the author has to denigrate the troops as much as possible. The author does this with accounts ranging from the credible right through to spurious invective- all eagerly accepted by Elphick and passed on as fact. Regardless of the enormous disrespect this shows to men who died struggling in appalling circumstances during the battle, and in the following years of degradation and slavery. The disrespect Elphick shows towards the fallen is quite callous. Peter Elphick catalogues other events as contributing factors to the fall of Singapore. All these factors fall away in significance when compared with the more visceral reality of flanked and outmanouvered British troops attempting to hold unfortified positions without air support or adequate communication.

The contemporary observer would note that had these events occured in this day and age, the British Commander would have eventually faced charges of negligence.

The surprises for the British Command during this dark period were many and varied. Some impossible to anticipate. Others were more obvious. The world had changed. The British mentality in the Far East had not. The most contentious surprises? These three amongst them: 1. Troops from a conquered and oppressed nation (India), with aspirations for self rule, did not make willing cannon fodder for British colonial interests. The reluctance of some Indian troops to die for British interests is not hard to understand and should have been anticipated.

2. The first Australian military action in World War 1 was the famous British led debacle at Gallipoli resulting in a great loss of Australian lives for no gain. In Singapore, the Australian troops anger at finding themselves involved in another World War 1 style debacle cannot be underestimated. The Australian soldiers outright refusal to take orders from English officers was hardly a surprise. Which citizens of a foreign nation would? Strangely, Elphick wrestles with this simple fact.

3. This was the 20th century, not the 19th. No more excuses please.

The disaster which followed the fall of Singapore is a well documented horror. So appalling were the consequences for the captured soldiers and the brutalized citizens that 50 years later our historians are still trying to deflect the blame away from those responsible. This book is another embarrassing attempt. Some British historians regard the fall of Singapore as a blot on the record and occassionaly attempt, in the style of Japanese war historians, to 'rewrite' the record.

History has established that the British 'public service style' military command of the time failed to prepare Singapore for any kind of realistic defence against a determined aggressor. The recent release of Generals Wavells and Percivals desperate excuses at the time of the fall of Singapore, to save their reputations, sheds light on the unenviable situation they found themselves in facing the consequences of their terrible decision not to fortify the northern shores of the island. Despite the earnest advice of their own strategists, they pointed their guns the wrong way.

Those well aquainted with the layout and sequence of the battle for Singapore will find the book poorly researched and lacking in factual content.

Detailed eyewitness battalion records, available in The Singapore National Library, show massive sectors where much of the heaviest fighting took place have been described in this book as being 'undefended' and, ludicrously, as 'deserted.' Contemporary battlefield monuments, featuring maps and detailed descriptions for visitors, mark the sites of many bitterly defended positions in sectors the author descibes as 'undefended'.

Australian historians will find the book wildly innaccurate and possibly even repugnant. The fighting ability of the British soldier during World War 11 is a moot point. The Australians in particular were the only troops in the Malayan campaign to slow the Japanese advance and the first Western troops to defeat and stop the Japanese in their push into the Pacific. The authors desperate attempt to deflect blame for the fall of Singapore away from the inadequate British Singapore Command and onto it's fighting men brings into sharp focus the kind of petty 'British public service mentality' and 'backbiting' that contributed much to the fall of Singapore in 1942. The 'dischord' and the 'deception' surrounding the unfortunate British officers of 1942 is alive and well in the graceless tone of the writing in this book.

Giving the reader this unintended insight into the mentality of mediocre officers, petty 'backbiting' and British 'public service style' blame-switching is this books most notable achievement.

Another book by this author, 'Odd Man Out' uses the story of the British traitor, Captain Patrick Heenan, as a vehicle to promote the same line of thought.

As a resident of Singapore I have read and researched both The Singapore National Archive and the Singapore National Library extensively. The most extraordinary book I have found regarding eyewitness accounts of operations in the Far East is titled 'The Forgotten Ones' by Captain C.G. Taylor. Published by Arthur H Stockwell Ltd. It details fighting behind the lines in Burma.

The author makes great play of the chaotic arrival in the city, during the battle, of stragglers. Who this author has labelled 'deserters'. Particularly the numbers of Australian troops. The troops retreated, some in disorder, some not. There is no mystery here. The numbers that retreated were in proportion to the positions that had been outflanked by Japanese. Australian troops faced the brunt of the attack. In the first days, more Australian troops were overrun. Producing more stragglers.

The author also delights in accounts of Australian stragglers seen without boots and weapons. This is because groups of Australian soldiers had to swim through swamps and reservoirs in the Kranji district to escape. Discarding equipment in order, obviously, to float.
Looting (mostly of alcohol) is a subject the author examines, finding more fault with the troops. Elphick does so without mentioning that the Anglican Archbishop of Singapore asked his driver to pull over, during the battle for the city, and remove all four wheels of a car, stating "these will come in handy"... Nor did he mention that Singapore's Fire Chief himself 'saved' a crate of fine whisky from a burning warehouse, which he took home and offered the same night to visitors..

This book is a deeply flawed 'revision' of the fall of Singapore. Some would say an asinine account. Some of the author's sources have been queried, for verification. The author is on public record as admitting he is unable to verify them, exposing a publisher with a good reputation, to ridicule.

Today, the most beautiful street in Singapore runs around Fort Canning Hill. It is called Percival Avenue. The street sign there describes General Percival, English commander of WW2 Singapore, "as a capable administrator, but an inefficient soldier". Revisionists like Elphick live in denial and continue to attempt to find other 'reasons' for the fall of Singapore. Simply, the Japanese, who planned the attack meticulously for years, were a better fighting machine on the day.

Like the second reviewer, I bought the book in Singapore and read it on the plane after becoming facinated with the history of the region. (I visited everything from Ft. Canning to Changi Prision to Raffles). I disagree with the first reviewer in that Elphick doesn't say that the only cause of the fall of Singapore was the only the result of Capt. Patrick Heenan's spying for the Japanese. (He was indeed shot for spying). While the book is slow reading to follow the cast of characters, it is well worth it. Elphick lays out 100 years of stupidity and arrogance of the British...when personal relationships among military and civilian appointees determined the fate of the area. It leaves the reader wondering 2 things (1) if more competent professionals were in positions of authority would Singapore have fallen as early in the war as it did and (2) if better intelligence and understanding of the peoples/history/customs of the entire region...from the then Indochina (Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia) through Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia prevented the chaos following WWII and the events that led to the war in Vietnam? In a strange way, it reminded me of "The Pentagon Wars"...no one trusted anyone, everyone had a personal agenda, no one would take any responsibility....information to the contrary of an individual's position was buried, along with the career of anyone who got in the way.

I bought this book while in Singapore and read it on the plane trip home. Incredibly well researched and written. If you are looking for it, email me

The author of this book seeks to explain the fall of Singapore by relating it to the existence of traitors and espionage. Thus the initial landings in the north of the peninsula at Kota Bharu are said to have been made possible by a spy who tipped off the Japanese as to when the British planes were on the ground. This allowed the Japanese to destroy the planes with ease and thus advance down the Malayan Peninsula, backed by the superiority of the Japanese Army Air Force.

Such a suggestion is pure nonsense. If an agent tipped off the Japanese as to what was happening at an air base, the lead time to send over an attack was hours. The Japanese planes were at this time based in Indo-China. As the attack of an air field was something which tends to happen in war time, it would be the mark of a competent military commander to take some precautions about it.

Further, the notion of control of the air in a campaign being critical, should not be accepted at face value. The German Army in the Italian and European Campaign fought against overwhelming allied air superiority. However, they were able to resist against numerically superior forces with considerable success.

The Malyan campaign after all, saw an invasion by a Japanese Army which was smaller than the Allied Forces. The Japanese also had a limited supply of ammunition and heavy weapons. At the time of the surrender of Singapore the Japanese had in fact run out of ammunition and were considering a retreat so they could re-supply. The surrender, to say the least, surprised them.

The fall of Singapore is to be explained by a combination of the courage(or as it was called at the time - fanatism)of the Japanese Army, the intelligence of its commanders, and the incompetence of the allied command.

This book adds nothing to the history of the period but muddies the waters by a series of bizarre, paranoid allegations about espionage and agents.

I have read Elphick's book. Initially, I felt ashamed about what it said about my countrymen. But on seeing the author interviewed (see below) I question Elphick's efforts as an historian to research his material, and even check the veracity of his secondary sources. I am forced to question his entire posture in the book. I have thrown "The Pregnable Fortress" on the rubbish heap for, based on Elphick's own statements, I find it to be garbage.

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If you want to read a history, a real history, of the Fall of Singapore, perhaps seek out a work by someone prepared to check the facts of what they write under their name, rather than hearsay.