Prelude to Tragedy: Vietnam, 1960-1965 [Hardcover]

Harvey C. Neese (Editor), John O'Donnell (Editor)

Book Description

Publication Date: November 2000

Participants in the early days of U.S. involvement in southeast Asia compelling argue alternative strategies that went unheeded by U.S. policy makers.

Editorial Reviews

Review

"...a good book for readers interested in the nonmilitary advisory and aid effort." -- Military Review, March-April 2002

"...an excellent collection of essays by American civilians and Vietnamese officials." -- Journal of Military History, January 2003

"...provides many lessons for the future." -- Vietnam Magazine, April 2003

About the Author

Harvey Neese, a recently retired specialist in international agribusiness development from the University of Idaho, served as an agricultural advisor in developing countries for forty years, fifteen of which were in Southeast Asia. He lives in Troy, Idaho.

Product Details

• Hardcover: 309 pages
• Publisher: Naval Inst Pr; First edition (November 2000)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 1557504911
• ISBN-13: 978-1557504913
• Product Dimensions: 9.2 x 6.3 x 1 inches
• Shipping Weight: 1.5 pounds (View shipping rates and policies)
• Average Customer Review: 4.5 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (6 customer reviews)
• Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #2,414,646 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)

Customer Reviews

Most Helpful Customer Reviews

4 of 4 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars Unique contribution to Viet-Nam war history, June 16, 2001

By 

John Sommer (Dummerston, Vermont USA) - See all my reviews

This review is from: Prelude to Tragedy: Vietnam, 1960-1965 (Hardcover)

Prelude to Tragedy is one of the very few books ever published that focuses on the anti-poverty and civilian development roles of the United States in Viet-Nam. It does so with information and perspectives that have been almost universally ignored in all the writing that's appeared on this sad period of history. As such, and because it is written by key leaders at a crucial early stage of the American war in that country, it makes a unique contribution to our understanding of why the American effort failed on the political plane and therefore also on the military plane. The writers are extraordinarily committed Americans and Vietnamese who proved to have a far better understanding of Vietnamese civilian realities than the higher-ranking policy-makers who refused to pay them heed. In fact, their observations and conclusions inform and reinforce from additional perspectives those reached by Don Luce and me in our own book, Viet-Nam -- The Unheard Voices. The fact that those of us with expertise that came from living and working among the Vietnamese people themselves, from hearing the concerns they raised and the causes they espoused, were not taken sufficiently seriously -- indeed, that Robert McNamara had the gall to deny the existence of anyone who understood Viet-Nam and could have informed the highest American policy-makers -- is enough to make one angry all over again. But anger is not the correct response; the point is to learn for the future. And in this sense, and even after such a lapse of time, a wide readership for Prelude to Tragedy may hopefully help prevent similar tragedies in the future.

4 of 4 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars Counterinsurgency Warfare: The Road Less Travelled, May 30, 2001

By 

Matthew B. Mixa (Coronado, CA United States) - See all my reviews

This review is from: Prelude to Tragedy: Vietnam, 1960-1965 (Hardcover)

America's strategy in the conduct of the war in Vietnam largely followed the model of attrition warfare. However, underneath the search and destroy tactics existed a sporadic application of maneuver warfare principles which were successfully manifested through counterinsurgency methods. As Marines, we should be familiar with the maneuver mindset behind III MAF's combined action program (Warfighting MCDP 1, p.39). Nonetheless, long before the Marines' adopted unconventional methods in Vietnam, government civilians effectively utilized principles of maneuver warfare. Prelude to Tragedy: Vietnam 1960-1965 is their story as told by five American and three Vietnamese field operatives who loyally attempted, but failed to inject unconventional warfare into our mainstream national strategy. The book also provides profound insights on the importance of cultural education and morality during wartime and operation other than war. Central to the authors' efforts were maneuver concepts such as: knowing the enemy, identifying his center of gravity, targeting critical vulnerabilities, and using innovative techniques in support of a properly selected main effort (Warfighting MCDP-1, Chapter 4). All eight contributing authors identify incomplete knowledge of the enemy as the foundation beneath America's strategy in Vietnam. Five of the authors specifically refer to a passage in former Defense Secretary McNamara's book In Retrospect which blames our poor understanding of the Vietnamese situation to a "lack of experts." However, the divergence between McNamara's book and Prelude to Tragedy is that the latter is an autobiographical tribute by these very "experts" about their attempts to inform the American political and military establishment of the true nature of the conflict.. Having fought with Ho Chi Minh's forces in the conflict against the French, contributing authors Lu Lan and Tran Ngoc Chau understood that the center of gravity for both sides was the rural population. A population which provided concealment, intelligence, logistics, and manpower was the only fuel which could run the communist machine. To deny Ho Chi Minh popular political support would have driven him into an unwinnable conventional war. Therefore, the communists' critical vulnerability, their rear area, and their logistical infrastructure, so to speak, was the allegiance of the people. All eight authors of Prelude to Tragedy describe creative, unconventional methods that successfully attacked enemy vulnerabilities. These weaknesses were the communist incompatibilities with the social traditions of Vietnam and inability to bring about economic progress in the countryside. The great irony is that these methods were the least employed weapons within our arsenal. The last part of Prelude's thesis regards the South Vietnamese Army. The authors contend that it should have been trained as a decentralized, counter-guerilla force. In support of this main effort would have been a United States in an advisory or logistical role. However, the authors believe that early American withdrawal of political advisor Edward Lansdale, followed by Washington's tacit approval for President Diem's assassination made this relationship impossible to attain. The result was a large American military buildup which eventually bore the brunt of the fighting. Resulting Vietnamese disunity combined with the U.S. seizure of the limelight increased enemy influence in the countryside and irrevocably changed the future of Vietnam. Countless books have been written to explain the U.S. defeat in Vietnam. Some say that more bombs would have won the war. Others regret American involvement altogether. The authors of Prelude to Tragedy do neither. They believe that their own effective methods could have, if supported on a large scale, greatly changed the outcome of the war. They contended then, as now, that a decentralized South Vietnamese government should have fought a largely political war using political means in the protection of the rural population. Tragic that this was the road less traveled.

2 of 2 people found the following review helpful:

4.0 out of 5 stars The Unknow War to Save South Vietnam, September 29, 2001

By 

COL EARL J. YOUNG (Coronado, California) - See all my reviews

This review is from: Prelude to Tragedy: Vietnam, 1960-1965 (Hardcover)

To most Americans, the war in Vietnam began in March 1965 with the arrival of the U.S. Marines across the beach at Danang...But a handful of young American civilians had entered the war five years' earlier...Thousands more followed as the entire American Governent was mobilized to "win in Vietnam"..until it became obvious only the South Vietnamese themselves could obtain a victory.. This book offers an insight into the efforts, the successes and the failures of these first Americans; and how we often were our own worst enemy...I had the privilege of serving as one of these men. PRELUDE TO TRAGEDY provides a unique insider look at how dedicated --and desperate--young Americans tried to head off the final outcome...Not a book for casual readers looking for combat stories, but a "must read" for any serious student of the Vietnam conflict.