Customer Reviews

A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War (Stanford Nuclear Age Series)

5 star:		(5)
4 star:		(1)
3 star:		(0)
2 star:		(0)
1 star:		(1)

 

 

This excellent book is a very scholarly and well written analysis of the opening of the Cold War. Based on several years work in American archives and careful reading of the large secondary literature, this is the standard account of the development of American policy under the Truman administration. The major limitation, which Leffler acknowledges forthrightly at the beginning of the book, is that access to Soviet archives is limited and much of what Leffler writes about Soviet intentions and policy is based on American analyses. Leffler's comparisons of American and Soviet intentions, consequently, may be subject to revision. His analysis of American policy, however, is likely to be the standard account for the foreseeable future.

Leffler sees American policy as driven by a broad, consensual, sophisticated, and specific vision of American security needs. For the policy makers who dominated the Truman administration, the crucial experiences were the failure of Wilsonian internationalism after WWI, the failure of America to exert decisive leadership after WWI, the emergence of autarchic dictatorships in Europe and Japan, and the need for the massive American effort in WWII to defeat the most dangerous of those dictatorships. The American policy making elite, a coalition of internationalist Democrats and former Republicans, concluded that American security required friendly, prosperous democratic regimes in the industrialized sections of Eurasia - Western Europe and Japan, an open international economic order, and multilateral institutions to guarantee international economic and political security. This vision of American security was not one of narrow safety. A Eurasia in the grip of hostile dictatorships would result not only in an unhospitable political environment but also in a world of internatinal trade restricted by autarchic governments and narrow, bilateral trade agreements. American security in this world would have required the transformation of America into a garrison state with marked changes in the liberal capitalism and democratic institutions of America. Avoiding this grim future required an aggressive and far-reaching American foreign policy. Leffler is careful to point out that this vision of American security was not driven by fears of Soviet predominance per se. American policy makers perceived the Soviet State as militarily powerful on the ground but markedly limited by the weak industrial base of the Soviet Union, the ravages of WWII, absence of strategic weapons, and its brutal political system. Its wasn't so much the power of the Soviet Union as much as poverty and political chaos leading to the peoples of Europe and Japan succumbing to the false promises of Communism that was feared by American policy makers.

The primary instrument to avoid this grim vision of the future was a very active, indeed sometimes aggressive, international policy. This policy was based on and required a preponderance of American power. Preponderance meant American superiority in industrial might, American financial power, American dominance in strategic weapons, and American possession of nuclear superiority. Leffler is careful also to point out that predominance did not mean dominance. American policy makers were strongly committed to multilateral partnerships to guarantee security and their vision of a liberal international order. This required the resuscitation of, and partnerships with, European democracies and the encouragement of a democratic Japanese state. This required also the development of international institutions through which the USA could work, and cooperation with smaller powers like Britain and France to develop an international order. Like other historians, Leffler identifies Western Europe and Japan as the key 'battlegrounds' of the Cold War. Much of this book is a detailed narrative of American efforts to stablize these key regions. Leffler's narrative of these complex and difficult events is outstanding, showing well the challenges of manuevering through the complex postwar world. His treatment, for example, of the difficult problem of the role of the German state and its relationships with France and other European nations is outstanding. He shows the difficulties of balancing American goals with the needs of the Germans and easily understandable anxieties of the French.

Leffler portrays the Soviets under Stalin as cautious and essentially reactive to American policies. Leffler is very clear, however, on the difference between Soviet and American security goals and how these conflicting visions of the world led to inevitable conflict. Some Soviet actions, such as the Soviet treatment of Poland and the 1948 Soviet support of the coup in Czechoslovakia, were important influences on American policy. To be fair, some other scholars have tended to place greater emphasis on Soviet aggression, though Leffler's emphasis on relative American power and relative Soviet weakness strikes me as essentially correct.

By the end of the Truman administration, Truman's team had laid the foundations for all subsequent American Cold War policies and the eventual success of the US in the contest between the USA and the Soviet Union. This was the achievement of a very impressive group of policy makers including individuals like the great George Marshall, Dean Acheson, George F. Kennan, and many others. The treatment of Truman himself is interesting. A novice in foreign policy on his accession to the Presidency, Truman delegated a great deal and the foreign policy achievements of his administration are very much the institutional success of what might be called an Eastern Establishment elite.

Leffler is equally good on the drawbacks and errors of the American approach. The goal of preponderance required world-wide American involvement and incremental expansion of American commitments. In Europe, for example, this would lead initially to security guarantees for the British and French (defense at the Rhine border) and later to guarantees for defense of West Germany. Probably less fruitfully, this led also to American involvement as de facto policeman in much of the world, including the decolonializing Third World. The perceived need for preponderance would also generate the costly nuclear arms race. Implicit in Leffler's analysis is that American desire to avoid a garrison state led to Cold War policies that had the effect of introducing the expansion of government power and commitments that American policy makers wished to avoid.

Leffler offers 2 important criticisms of the preponderance policy. American policy makers had a strong tendency to regard the actions of local Communist parties as extensions of Soviet policy. Leffer presents this phenomenon as to some extent driven by a projection onto the Soviets of how the Americans themselves wished to behave. But it was based also in the interwar experience of the Comintern, which did act as an agent of Stalin's policies. The monolithic view of Communist actions, however, had a distorting effect on American policy, leading, for example, to serious misunderstandings of important events like the Korean War. Leffler also points out that American policy makers probably over-valued the importance of events in the Third World. American policy makers appear to have been driven by an essentially imperialist vision of the world economy. Third World nations were necessary as markets and sources of raw materials for the industrialized core. Southeast Asia, for example, was seen as crucial for the Japanese economy and this was a major factor in our long and largely fruitless involvement in Vietnam. While the role of some Third World countries, like the oil producing states of the Middle East, was very important, in general, American policy makers overestimated the importance of decolonializing nations. This led to serious errors like support for the former colonial masters of a variey of nations and long term preoccupation with events in the Third World periphery that would prove very costly for the USA and often disastrous for the Third World nations involved.

Leffler has a very thoughtful and well written concluding section on the merits of American policy. In brief summary, he sees the Cold War as inevitable and many aspects of American policy as logical and formulated well. But, given his view of the Stalinist state as essentially cautious, pragmatic, and reactive, we made significant errors. We had to fight the Cold War but probably not so vigorously.

Melvyn Leffler labored for more than ten years in official U.S. archives from the 1940s and early 1950s to research and write this book. He read diplomatic cables, parsed decision papers, and studied war plans -- in short, he marinated himself in the decision-making of the Truman Administration. The outcome of his labor was this long and beautiful history of U.S. national security strategy in the early Cold War. Anyone reading it will be gripped by the thought, "This makes sense. This is how things happened." Leffler's book is a triumph of the historian's art.

After World War II, U.S. policymakers were determined keep the industrial and human resources of Europe and Japan out of Soviet control, lest the global balance of power tilt against the U.S. No one thought that Stalin wanted to start another war. However, Washington was alarmed that instability and economic crisis could bring Communist parties to power in Italy, France, Greece and elswhere, eventually drawing them into the Soviet orbit. The U.S. took on the task of rebuilding war-smashed economies in Europe and Japan, reviving German military power in the context of a European defense system, and stabilizing "peripheral" areas such as the Middle East and South East Asia that were seen as crucial to economic recovery in the "core." Huge mistakes were made in the process -- but the strategy, as we now know, was successful. It was the most creative era in the history of U.S. diplomacy.

Leffler ties this story together with lucid prose, copious documentation, and a minimum of editorial comments. He recreates the deliberations of decisionmakers like Acheson, Kennan, and Marshall, knowing that statesmen are driven by realpolitik -- but knowing also that realpolitik can be quite unrealistic if its assumptions are wrong (Washington wrongly assumed, for example, that Communist parties everywhere were controlled by the Kremlin). Some readers of the book will hail the U.S. for rescuing Europe from totalitarianism. Others will damn the U.S. for amassing atomic weapons, propping up upopular governments in places like Vietnam, and succumbing to indiscriminate anti-Communism. But all will come away enlightened about a turning point in twentieth century history. They will also have their faith restored in the possibility of grand political history.

My only complaint is that Leffler's analysis is relentlessly centered on Washington. European leaders appear only on the margins of the story, and Japanese and Soviet leaders are almost invisible. Unfortunately, Soviet archives were still mostly closed when Leffler did his research. Moscow's view of the origins of the Cold War will have to be found elsewhere. No matter: Leffler has done enough for one scholar! Six stars.

I found this book to be very interesting and thought provoking. It captured and held my interest from the beginning. To fully understand this book it is essential to have some background about the cold war, its origin and the key players in both the Soviet Union and the Truman Administration.
Marvin Leffler does an outstanding job explaining the origin of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) one the most successful alliances that have endured while other have formed and dissolved. In A Preponderance of Power you will understand how the Marshall Plan or as some know it, The European Recovery Plan, rescued Europe from the twin specters of starvation and Communism. In the book you will learn about key players such as George C. Marshall, a five-star Army general who became the Secretary of State in some of the most critical days of the Cold War and Secretary of Defense in the Korean War. There is also Dean Rusk, a former Rhodes Scholar who possessed a substantial interest in the interlocking nature of political-military affairs.
Yes, this book is a monumental achievement. I intend to purchase Leffler's latest book, For the Soul of Mankind, The Soviet Union, the United States and the Cold War

This book is the first to take an analytical approach to the history of the era. It doesn't start out with who caused what. What it does is to look at the comparative strengths of the players and what caused the US to behave as it did.

At the end of WW2 the US had the strongest economy in the world. It had the world's largest air force with strategic bombers. It also had a large stock of nuclear weapons. The US also had a number of bases which potentially allowed it to attack the Soviet Union with nuclear weapons if war broke out. The US also had the power to win a war of attrition. They could not only out produce the Soviets but they had the ability to destroy vital sectors of their economy such as oil production.

The major threat faced by the US was not a military threat but rather the potential of major European States going communist by either internal revolution or by the election of fellow traveler governments.(As happened in Czechoslovakia) Immediately after the war the European Economy was in chaos. There were food shortages and the effect of the war was to destroy infrastructure and industry. The first move the Americans was to intervene in Europe to rebuild the economy. With a buoyant growing economy the risk of Europe going communist was reduced. The US also intervened to support anti-communist parties in places such as Italy. The US also moved re-arm West Germany and Japan as potential allies.

The response of the Soviets appears to be one of caution. It appears that the Soviet leadership did not want war and their assessment was that they would lose any hot war. On the other hand they did react to the US strategy of containment. They armed the East European satellites to bolster their conventional military forces. The book is at pains to point out that the Soviets were not unthinkingly aggressive. They allowed Finland and Austria to be independent. They withdrew their forces from Norway and Iran. They also did not push the Berlin blockade after the Americans responded with the air-lift.

The book is also somewhat critical of US policy to the third world. These criticisms have been made before. They are that the US tended to confuse nationalist and anti imperial movements with communist infiltration. The reality was that after the war the Soviets and the Chinese were two weak to be able to project their power through Asia effectively. The US ended up supporting a large number of corrupt and dictatorial regimes in the name of anti-communism.

Previous histories of the cold war have been largely chronological with large amounts of value judgments incorporated into the narrative. Early histories of the cold war saw the US as defending the world against the potential expansion of a communist system based on totalitarianism. Some revisionist histories saw US actions as precipitating the conflict as the provoked the Soviets.

This book is good as it is not laden with the moral message. The book of course agrees that the US actions in re-starting the European economy were hugely beneficial. It is also clear that containing the communist system was a reasonable goal. However it has no central moral message it is simply the account of the power balance and how that balance led to the US policy of the time and the Soviet response.

One of the most important works on the Cold War. Though I do not agree with every point made by the author, his overall thesis is incredibly insightful. Particularly helpful to understanding the era is the scheme he depicts of American grand-strategic thought, dividing the world according on a power basis, with Central Europe and Japan as the hubs and the importance vis-a-vis these hubs of adjacent areas such as the Middle East and Southeast Asia. I would not recommend it for students beginning their study of the Cold War (try John Lewis Gaddis first), but otherwise, it is a must read.

I wouldn't have thought that it was possible to write a whole book just by stringing euphemisms together, but Leffler has done it. Of course, his conclusion is that the Cold War was all our fault. We mistakenly feared the Soviets based on misperceptions. Stalin was really a cool guy. Sure, he killed tens of millions of his own people and hundreds of thousands from other countries, but, hey, that doesn't mean he didn't like puppies. Meanwhile, the evil "hardliners" in Washington imagined that the hundreds of Soviet divisions in Eastern Europe might be there for a purpose. Just because the Soviets had invaded and absorbed into their empire nearly a dozen countries didn't mean that they had any designs on further territory. Apparently, Leffler is still afraid of offending the Soviets.

Melvyn P. Leffler's work is a monumental achievement in the study of the Cold War. The book is the result of over twelve years of research. The author's access to the newly available archived materials makes the volume invaluable to students of the Cold War. The book is lengthy and sometimes difficult to read, however, it will remain, for some time as a cornerstone for the understanding of U.S.-Soviet relations during this period.