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The Presidency in a Separated System

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Jones (1994) moves away from the responsible parties model of government which sees a strong president, coupled with a strong party working together to develop and implement programs while an opposition develops alternatives for the next election. Jones (1994) contends that such a system is unlike in the US due to the many competing interests - competition between the branches of government, etc. Jones (1994) calls this system of competing interests one of "diffused responsibility," one in which "responsibility is not focused, it is diffused. Representation is not pure and unidirectional; it is mixed, diluted, and multidirectional...credit will be take and blame will be avoided by both institutions and parties" (17). In such a system, presidential power can vary over time, under changing political circumstances, policy environments, and various institutional settings. The president is subject to a number of variables that may affect his influence; "the election itself and how it was interpreted, the number of House and Senate seats held by the president's party, public and media support, and the nature of the agenda" (15). When the president has more of these resources, he will likely be more powerful. When he lacks these resources, it is likely power will lie with Congress. Depending on such variations in power, we are likely to see government dominated by the president, dominated by Congress, or more balanced.
Jones (1994) contends that the way a president comes to power - nominated and elected, elected as heir apparent, elected vice president, etc. - coupled with the president's background - political, professional, and party experience - affect the variation in advantages and disadvantages of a president, and the particular governing strategies a president may adopt. The president may maintain a significant amount of advantages to pursue aggressive, assertive strategies, or if lacking advantages, they may need to adopt a more compensatory strategies, i.e. "with significant disadvantages and particularly lacking and electoral edge, the president devises ways supplementary means for authenticating his leadership" (49). Ultimately, what Jones (1994) is arguing is that "the political and policy strategies of presidents in dealing with Congress depend on the advantages they have available to them at any given time" (19). Jones (1994) contends that presidential advantages and disadvantages are also shaped by the organization of the executive branch, the public standing of the president, and agenda setting.
The executive branch - executive office of the President - serves as the contacts with Congress, the bureaucracy, parties, the public etc. Because of the potential power in this institution, it is imperative that the president maintain control. The organizational model of this institution can vary. It can fluctuate from a continuous and stable organization to one requiring major restructuring and many new appointments. Such changes can occur over the course of a presidency. "The variation has implications for the president's strategic position and functioning in a separated system; it affects public standing, influence in agenda setting, and status in the law making process" (66). In short, it shapes the advantages and disadvantages.
In regards to public standing, Jones (1994) grants popularity and public support less credence than do Neustadt (1990) and Kernel (1997). Many contend that president's are able to translate popular approval into congressional influence. Jones (1994) contends that this is often not the case. He contends that government is always working, regardless of presidential approval ratings, and the separated system grants enough institutional autonomy that increasing presidential approval doesn't grant that much influence to the president. Unlike Neustadt (1990) and Kernel (1997), Jones (1994) contends that the White House has little power to sway approval rating, and members of Congress will usually support the will of the constituency over the president (Kingdon 1992). In short, presidential approval must be combined with other things happening in the political arena. The political process was operating prior to a given president and will be operating after. Jones (1994) contends that in a separated system, the president is but "part of a large and complex working government" (121).
Additionally, Jones (1994) questions the president's ability to shape policy through agenda setting. A traditional perspective posits that the president has certain advantages - especially electoral mandate - which allows him to set the agenda or otherwise steer government. In part, Jones (1994) rejects the above perspective as it is aligned with the "responsible parties" model. Rather, Jones (1994) contends that (a) elections do not elect office holders with the same policy perspective, and (b) voters may not be granting the president a mandate so much as rejecting the alternative. Jones (1994) contends that "the president's agenda - his list of priorities - is influenced by, and must be fitted into a larger set of ongoing issues" (165). Much of what the president has to address is inherited from previous administrations. (This diverges from Baumgartner and Jones 1993, and Kingdon 1984).
Jones (1994) also examines the president's ability to influence law making. The president - contrary to the "responsible parties" model - is not the only actor in the law making process. There are committees, subcommittees, interest groups, bureaucrats, and others that influence the process. As such, the process is "often one of `legislation together' as Edwards puts it" (187). Furthermore, the structure of the separated system is such that it is different for the president to fulfill campaign promises. Partly, this is because legislation is often long in the making in Congress. The "president's role is one of designating or certifying an issue or proposal as worth of further attention" (190).

Jones does a marvelous job in brining into to the harsh light the problems in using the rational party, strong president analysis to examine the relationship between Congress and the President. A must read for those with an interest in either the process of lawmaking or the interaction between the President and Congress.