25 of 28 people found the following review helpful:
3.0 out of 5 stars
A Perceptional Analysis Explanation for the Great War, December 6, 2001
This review is from: The Arming of Europe and the Making of the First World War (Princeton Studies in International History and Politics) (Paperback)
While the role of the European naval arms races in instigating the First World War have been covered in a variety of sources, the role of army development and ground arms races in the period 1904-1914 have heretofore only been addressed in passing. David G. Herrmann, a history professor at Tulane University, seeks to address this gap in scholarship by addressing two inter-related issues: the transformation of European armies and the perception of military power in the decade prior to the First World War. Herrmann believes that it is crucial to understand how European statesmen perceived the relative strength of opposing ground armies in order to trace the path to war in 1914. Although this book is impeccably researched and uses historical data, at heart it is an international relations book than focuses on perceptional analysis.
The book consists of seven chapters that cover the status of European armies in 1904, the First Moroccan Crisis of 1905, military effectiveness and modern technology in 1906-1908, the Bosnian Annexation Crisis of 1908, the Second Moroccan Crisis of 1911, the Balkan Wars of 1911-1912, and the European armies at the outbreak of war in 1914. Two appendices cover the peacetime manpower strength of European armies and army expenditures of all the major powers in 1904-1914. There are also four maps (incl. One that covers the French and German war plans of 1905 and changes in Russian deployment areas in 1910) and sixteen photographs.
There is no doubt that the author succeeds in hammering home his main points about the changing perception of military power in Europe and its effect on crisis management during this period. In 1905, no European powers were expanding their armies in a race against any other power and decision-makers viewed negotiation as the favored means of resolving a crisis. Nine years later, all this had changed and the major powers were furiously building up their armies for what was perceived to be an inevitable world war. War, not negotiation, became the favored option for crisis resolution. Herrmann asserts that the change in modus operandi came about as a result of the resurgence of Russian military power following the Bosnian Crisis and the Austro-German perception of a dwindling superiority over the Allied Entente. The idea of "preventative war" was born of desperation by leaders who envisioned a grim future for the evolving European balance of power. While the author does not dispute the relevance of other factors, such as nationalism and ideology, he believes that this perceptional shift was greatly responsible for the outbreak of war in 1914.
Of course, the inherent problem with this kind of perceptional analysis is that is held hostage to cognitive bias. Just because German and Austrian leaders perceived a relative power shift in 1912-1913 did not mean that either (a) there was in fact, a significant material shift in the balance of power or (b) war was the only solution to such a shift if it was real. The actual extent of Russian recovery is debatable - indeed, if it was such a driving force in German perception why did war plans still consider France as the primary enemy? If Germany sought a preventative war to stave off eventual Russian hegemony, the Schlieffen Plan was certainly a poor device to accomplish this goal. Unfortunately, the type of input used by the author to build his perceptional analysis is often prone to self-justification for aggression, particularly by the Germans and Austrians. Indeed, any improvements that another power makes - be they quantitative or qualitative in nature - could be perceived as "destabilizing." Twice in the 20th Century, German leaders have used the perception of growing Russian power to disguise wars of aggression as regrettable necessities. The fact that German decision-makers viewed force as their only option to deal with a modernizing Russian only seems to underline the inherent poverty of German strategic thought. Thus, Herrmann successfully lays out his hypothesis but it lacks moral objectivity. Perceptional analysis can help to explain how wars start, as this account does, but it should not be used to justify those wars. In modern terms, Usama Bin Ladin views western secular values as a threat to Islam and hence, a justification for jihad. Perceptional analysis as used by Herrmann might help to understand how UBL made his decision to make war on the USA, but it does not mean that his perceptions are valid or even rational.
On the military side, this book is rather superficial and lacks anything but the crudest of quantitative force comparisons. It is rather difficult to evaluate French military power in 1905-1914 without even mentioning Colonel Grandmaison, the cult of the bayonet and "offensive a outrance" doctrine. Similarly, the impact of the Haldane Reforms of 1907 on the British Army is barely mentioned, although the improvements in training standards and marksmanship greatly increased the combat power of the British Expeditionary Force. Russian rearmament, which is crucial to the evolution of power perceptions in this analysis, is not given sufficient quantitative basis for evaluation. Indeed, the author's figures show that the Russian peacetime army barely increased in size between 1910-1913 and German military spending exceeded Russia's in 1913; exactly how Russian power had increased is unclear. Logistics, which had a huge impact on virtually all the major power war plans, are ignored. Mobilization schedules and rail capacities, both crucial ingredients of comparative European military capabilities in 1914, are also ignored. Thus, the author's comparisons of relative power seem crude and superficial.
Overall, this book is an excellent text for students of international relations. Yet as military history it is far too superficial. The author's analysis adds depth to our understanding of why Europe went to war in August 1914, but it should not obscure the fact that it was a war of aggression and not merely a rationale effort to "correct" an imbalance in the equation of international power.
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17 of 18 people found the following review helpful:
4.0 out of 5 stars
A Refreshing Approach to the Cause of World War I, August 31, 1999
By A Customer
This review is from: The Arming of Europe and the Making of the First World War (Princeton Studies in International History and Politics) (Paperback)
In "The Arming of Europe and the Making of World War I" David Herrmann adopts the thesis that World War I occurred as a result of the creation of a "window of opportunity for war." He weaves together the development and preparedness of armies of the Great Powers against the background of repeated political crises. Herrman explains why the great war, which did not occur as a result of previous crises, became almost inevitable in July of 1914. His approach to the problem and conclusion was different from other historical treatment, and therefore makes his work a valuable study of the events leading to World War I. His work, while valuable, did include some shortcomings; for example a failure to appreciate the lag in communications technology to keep pace with weapons technology, which bound the western armies in a death grip (an excellent theory proposed by Keegan), and a somewhat superficial treatment of the land arms race. Herrmann purports to write about the land arms race that led to the war, but writes as much of the political and international developments that caused his "window of opportunity" to open. All things considered, he probably used the correct approach. I do recommend this work as an excellent addition to anyone's library of the 20th Century; I read this book "sandwiched" between reading Massie's Dreadnought and Keegan's First World War; all 3 works give an excellent sweep into the event that defined a century.
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10 of 11 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
The Arming of Europe, August 26, 2001
This review is from: The Arming of Europe and the Making of the First World War (Princeton Studies in International History and Politics) (Paperback)
In The Arming of Europe and the Making of the First World War, author David G. Herrmann traces the roles and developments of land armies to demonstrate how World War One came to happen. His work is well written and maintains a pace that makes it an excellent read for either the serious historian or the casual military history buff. Herrmann tracks the many international crises from 1904 to 1914 to show how each contributed to national military awareness and, more importantly, perception of one's status among the greater European community.
Herrmann does not believe there was a massive arms race (vis a vis the Anglo-German naval race) until relatively late in the period in question. Rather he contends each country made moderate changes in both military and diplomatic policies in attempts to gain better positions compared to their rivals. This usually meant distinct there were winners and losers, but war itself was never really considered until 1914.
But this isn't to say war was never threaten. Indeed Germany came to use war bluffs often, beginning with the 1905 Moroccan crisis. After this event, both Germany and France began to give more serious thought to an impending war. Herrmann uses his analysis to consider the possibilities of what limited war in 1905 or 1909 (the Austro-Hungarian annexation of Bosnia) might or might not have accomplished, and this is what makes his work appear so complete. He not only covers the events, but he expands them into what might have occurred and what it might have meant. But Herrmann does not venture into the realm of "what if?" for the sake of developing alternate history. His purpose is to show why such speculations did not occur and what that in turn meant to the realities of the time. One important conclusion through this process shows that Germany had a much lesser chance of winning any general war after 1906.
Herrmann covers both Moroccan crises well, but perhaps could have done more justice to both the Bosnian crisis and the Balkan wars (the Second Balkan War gets approximately ½ sentence worth of coverage). The lines drawn during the Moroccan crises were perhaps easier to discern than sorting the Balkan imbroglio, but Balkan coverage remains the one weak point in this otherwise excellent study.
But Herrmann recovers well at the end to cover the outbreak of war thoroughly. Again he speculates on possible scenarios had war not occurred (i.e., possible Anglo-German rapprochement) but this serves his true purpose of explaining why events did occur rather than dwell on those that did not. The Arming of Europe is a very important contribution to World War One studies, and should remain so for years to come.
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