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The Arming of Europe and the Making of the First World War (Princeton Studies in International History and Politics)

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While the role of the European naval arms races in instigating the First World War have been covered in a variety of sources, the role of army development and ground arms races in the period 1904-1914 have heretofore only been addressed in passing. David G. Herrmann, a history professor at Tulane University, seeks to address this gap in scholarship by addressing two inter-related issues: the transformation of European armies and the perception of military power in the decade prior to the First World War. Herrmann believes that it is crucial to understand how European statesmen perceived the relative strength of opposing ground armies in order to trace the path to war in 1914. Although this book is impeccably researched and uses historical data, at heart it is an international relations book than focuses on perceptional analysis.

The book consists of seven chapters that cover the status of European armies in 1904, the First Moroccan Crisis of 1905, military effectiveness and modern technology in 1906-1908, the Bosnian Annexation Crisis of 1908, the Second Moroccan Crisis of 1911, the Balkan Wars of 1911-1912, and the European armies at the outbreak of war in 1914. Two appendices cover the peacetime manpower strength of European armies and army expenditures of all the major powers in 1904-1914. There are also four maps (incl. One that covers the French and German war plans of 1905 and changes in Russian deployment areas in 1910) and sixteen photographs.

There is no doubt that the author succeeds in hammering home his main points about the changing perception of military power in Europe and its effect on crisis management during this period. In 1905, no European powers were expanding their armies in a race against any other power and decision-makers viewed negotiation as the favored means of resolving a crisis. Nine years later, all this had changed and the major powers were furiously building up their armies for what was perceived to be an inevitable world war. War, not negotiation, became the favored option for crisis resolution. Herrmann asserts that the change in modus operandi came about as a result of the resurgence of Russian military power following the Bosnian Crisis and the Austro-German perception of a dwindling superiority over the Allied Entente. The idea of "preventative war" was born of desperation by leaders who envisioned a grim future for the evolving European balance of power. While the author does not dispute the relevance of other factors, such as nationalism and ideology, he believes that this perceptional shift was greatly responsible for the outbreak of war in 1914.

Of course, the inherent problem with this kind of perceptional analysis is that is held hostage to cognitive bias. Just because German and Austrian leaders perceived a relative power shift in 1912-1913 did not mean that either (a) there was in fact, a significant material shift in the balance of power or (b) war was the only solution to such a shift if it was real. The actual extent of Russian recovery is debatable - indeed, if it was such a driving force in German perception why did war plans still consider France as the primary enemy? If Germany sought a preventative war to stave off eventual Russian hegemony, the Schlieffen Plan was certainly a poor device to accomplish this goal. Unfortunately, the type of input used by the author to build his perceptional analysis is often prone to self-justification for aggression, particularly by the Germans and Austrians. Indeed, any improvements that another power makes - be they quantitative or qualitative in nature - could be perceived as "destabilizing." Twice in the 20th Century, German leaders have used the perception of growing Russian power to disguise wars of aggression as regrettable necessities. The fact that German decision-makers viewed force as their only option to deal with a modernizing Russian only seems to underline the inherent poverty of German strategic thought. Thus, Herrmann successfully lays out his hypothesis but it lacks moral objectivity. Perceptional analysis can help to explain how wars start, as this account does, but it should not be used to justify those wars. In modern terms, Usama Bin Ladin views western secular values as a threat to Islam and hence, a justification for jihad. Perceptional analysis as used by Herrmann might help to understand how UBL made his decision to make war on the USA, but it does not mean that his perceptions are valid or even rational.

On the military side, this book is rather superficial and lacks anything but the crudest of quantitative force comparisons. It is rather difficult to evaluate French military power in 1905-1914 without even mentioning Colonel Grandmaison, the cult of the bayonet and "offensive a outrance" doctrine. Similarly, the impact of the Haldane Reforms of 1907 on the British Army is barely mentioned, although the improvements in training standards and marksmanship greatly increased the combat power of the British Expeditionary Force. Russian rearmament, which is crucial to the evolution of power perceptions in this analysis, is not given sufficient quantitative basis for evaluation. Indeed, the author's figures show that the Russian peacetime army barely increased in size between 1910-1913 and German military spending exceeded Russia's in 1913; exactly how Russian power had increased is unclear. Logistics, which had a huge impact on virtually all the major power war plans, are ignored. Mobilization schedules and rail capacities, both crucial ingredients of comparative European military capabilities in 1914, are also ignored. Thus, the author's comparisons of relative power seem crude and superficial.

Overall, this book is an excellent text for students of international relations. Yet as military history it is far too superficial. The author's analysis adds depth to our understanding of why Europe went to war in August 1914, but it should not obscure the fact that it was a war of aggression and not merely a rationale effort to "correct" an imbalance in the equation of international power.

In "The Arming of Europe and the Making of World War I" David Herrmann adopts the thesis that World War I occurred as a result of the creation of a "window of opportunity for war." He weaves together the development and preparedness of armies of the Great Powers against the background of repeated political crises. Herrman explains why the great war, which did not occur as a result of previous crises, became almost inevitable in July of 1914. His approach to the problem and conclusion was different from other historical treatment, and therefore makes his work a valuable study of the events leading to World War I. His work, while valuable, did include some shortcomings; for example a failure to appreciate the lag in communications technology to keep pace with weapons technology, which bound the western armies in a death grip (an excellent theory proposed by Keegan), and a somewhat superficial treatment of the land arms race. Herrmann purports to write about the land arms race that led to the war, but writes as much of the political and international developments that caused his "window of opportunity" to open. All things considered, he probably used the correct approach. I do recommend this work as an excellent addition to anyone's library of the 20th Century; I read this book "sandwiched" between reading Massie's Dreadnought and Keegan's First World War; all 3 works give an excellent sweep into the event that defined a century.

In The Arming of Europe and the Making of the First World War, author David G. Herrmann traces the roles and developments of land armies to demonstrate how World War One came to happen. His work is well written and maintains a pace that makes it an excellent read for either the serious historian or the casual military history buff. Herrmann tracks the many international crises from 1904 to 1914 to show how each contributed to national military awareness and, more importantly, perception of one's status among the greater European community.

Herrmann does not believe there was a massive arms race (vis a vis the Anglo-German naval race) until relatively late in the period in question. Rather he contends each country made moderate changes in both military and diplomatic policies in attempts to gain better positions compared to their rivals. This usually meant distinct there were winners and losers, but war itself was never really considered until 1914.

But this isn't to say war was never threaten. Indeed Germany came to use war bluffs often, beginning with the 1905 Moroccan crisis. After this event, both Germany and France began to give more serious thought to an impending war. Herrmann uses his analysis to consider the possibilities of what limited war in 1905 or 1909 (the Austro-Hungarian annexation of Bosnia) might or might not have accomplished, and this is what makes his work appear so complete. He not only covers the events, but he expands them into what might have occurred and what it might have meant. But Herrmann does not venture into the realm of "what if?" for the sake of developing alternate history. His purpose is to show why such speculations did not occur and what that in turn meant to the realities of the time. One important conclusion through this process shows that Germany had a much lesser chance of winning any general war after 1906.

Herrmann covers both Moroccan crises well, but perhaps could have done more justice to both the Bosnian crisis and the Balkan wars (the Second Balkan War gets approximately ½ sentence worth of coverage). The lines drawn during the Moroccan crises were perhaps easier to discern than sorting the Balkan imbroglio, but Balkan coverage remains the one weak point in this otherwise excellent study.

But Herrmann recovers well at the end to cover the outbreak of war thoroughly. Again he speculates on possible scenarios had war not occurred (i.e., possible Anglo-German rapprochement) but this serves his true purpose of explaining why events did occur rather than dwell on those that did not. The Arming of Europe is a very important contribution to World War One studies, and should remain so for years to come.

Very informative and thought provoking book. Imperical data such as France trying to motivate a draftee company with only 8 regulars vs Germany using 20 career soldiers for the same size unit. Good and logical treatment of how the powers did and did not adopt the Machine Gun, telephone, radio, and other developing technologies. This is a solid reading for anyone interested both in how Europe went from "No war for Morocco" in 1905, to "Germany will March," in 1914. Other books talk about the powder keg that was Europe, 1914. This guy introduces you to each keg as it goes into the pile. I've read 40 books in the last year on WWI, starting from Dreadnought and going to Keegan's latest. This book is one of the top five. You really want to read this book if you want to know the how and why of 1914.

I started reading this book about the same time I had reached chapter 20 of "Dreadnought" (by R. Massie). I found that switching between books, at appropriate sections, gives the reader a good overview of the events leading to the First World War. Mr. Herrmann has given "history junkies" like me a long awaited for work covering the arms race on land, prior to WW1. Thank you again Mr. Herrmann for completing the picture of political and military events which had occured during that critical time in our history.

David G. Herrmann has set out to confront the extraordinarily complex question of the origins of World War One in The Arming of Europe and the Making of the First World War. He has chosen to approach the problem from an international geopolitical perspective, in which he compares the developments and perceptions of the major European powers from 1904-14. Herrmann devotes much of his work to discussions of the various international diplomatic crises that plagued Europe in the decade leading up to World War One. Herrmann bases a significant portion of his analysis on the perceptions of the European powers of their rivals and allies. This theme of perception is a critical one for Herrmann. Using the successive diplomatic crises as a framework, he examines the evolutions of the various military policies / developments and how they were perceived by their neighbors. Thus, for Herrmann, World War One appears to be the outcome of a variety of factors, none of which were necessarily inevitable: the outcomes of the diplomatic crises and overall strategic and diplomatic environment; the role of various military developments and the general arms race, which had a destabilizing effect; and the perceptions surrounding both.

Herrmann shows the myriad of ways in which military strategy and foreign policy were inextricably linked in the decade leading up to World War One. The balance of military power - Herrmann is careful to distinguish this from a broader balance of power - did not cause the First World War, but it clearly had a major influence on the course of events leading up to the war and at least some impact on the decisions of the belligerents to go to war. For Herrmann, it was only after the Second Moroccan Crisis of 1911 (and not after either the First Moroccan Crisis of 1905-06 or the Bosnian Crisis of 1908-09) that the various European powers were locked into an "interdependent" set of actions and reactions involving increases in military spending and true expectations of future military conflict. This competitive arms race of 1912-13 is a major focus of Herrmann's analysis. Herrmann presents a large body of convincing evidence that the military build-ups, ostensibly for defensive purposes, were misperceived as being indicative of aggressive / offensive intentions, causing the other side to react with greater hostility and coloring their perceptions, ultimately creating a destabilized international political environment. Military force became the central concern of European international politics. Thus, Herrmann claims that the national armament acquisitions were the product of international tensions rather than internal domestic considerations and were the primary precipitant of World War One.

Aside from the major themes of the arms race and the perceived balance of military power, Herrmann also includes a number of secondary themes in his geopolitical opus. Herrmann highlights the centrality of the reserve forces and mobilization of "citizen soldiers" during wartime, as peacetime armies were largely professional cadres and frameworks on which to expand during wartime. He also discusses the coming of the age of machine warfare and the difficulties the various European powers had in integrating the new military technologies into their force structures and operational concepts. Very often, technological developments and early adoption by one or more states set off military competitions - e.g., airships, aeroplanes, quick-firing artillery, etc. - which contributed to heightened tensions and antagonism.

Methodologically, Herrmann is very successful at treating the pre-WWI European states as being inextricably linked, politically, diplomatically, and militarily. Herrmann's unit of analysis is the nation-state as a whole. He focuses on the actions of the nation, only rarely discussing the actions of individuals or divergent schools of thought within nations. He also does not focus on any one state's development to the exclusion of others, nor does he examine any in isolation. This "inter-connectedness" is crucial to Herrmann's argument and analysis, and he always comes back to discussions of the changing balance of military power (or at least perceptions of these changes). He largely builds the chapters of the book around the series of political and military crises that shook Europe from 1904-14. Within each chapter, Herrmann examines one of the crises in detail, discussing why the crisis happened, how it was eventually resolved, and what the impact of the crisis and its resolution was on each of the European powers. He also provides a description of the relevant military-technical developments during the examined period, describing how the different countries' military developments were inter-related and, in some cases, led to increased competition and perception of aggressive intent. Herrmann also provides thorough and compact summaries of the crises, developments, and implications at the start and end of each chapter.

Herrmann is careful to restrict his discussion to the military-technical and, to a lesser extent, cultural realms. For Herrmann, it is these areas that played the critical role in the outbreak of war. He does not discuss economic relationships and issues; domestic political cultures and pressures; or even the naval race between Britain and Germany (which he quickly dismisses). Herrmann presents his evidence fairly, but for him, the military build-ups and associated perceptions of intent are the key causes of the First World War. This may be a minor concern or a major problem, depending on the reader's perception of the extent to which non-military-technical factors had on the road to war. I personally would like to have seen a more significant treatment of domestic politics and parliamentary maneuverings, as we see only the barest hints of these in The Arming of Europe and the Making of the First World War. For the most part, Herrmann treats nations as unitary entities, not examining the various interest groups within nations and the roles these might have potentially played in fomenting war.

If there is a weakness in Herrmann's study of any of the major powers, it would be in his study of Russia. He fails to adequately explain Russia's interest in the Triple Entente and why it became such an enthusiastic ally of France. Herrmann is forced to confess that Russia's decision to declare war against Austria-Hungary was "mostly reactive and based upon political considerations," which weakens his overall argument that the balance of military power considerations was closely tied with the decision to eventually go to war. Herrmann also goes on to concede that "[t]he French decision to back Russia was more or less automatic, but had some basis in calculations of relative military power" and that the British apparently made their decision based on "immediate political and long-term strategic concerns rather than on fine calculations of the military balance." This has a cumulative effect in weakening the part of Herrmann's argument concerning the criticality of military power calculations.

Herrmann also does not spend a great deal of time discussing the extent to which the European powers had successfully integrated their new military forces (both in terms of new manpower and new military technology) by 1914. Since Herrmann points out that the bulk of the military acquisitions were begun after the Second Moroccan Crisis in 1912-13, it would seem to have been difficult to fully integrate all the new forces by the actual onset of war. This would appear to be an argument against the arms race being a major cause of outbreak of war in 1914, but this minor criticism simply warrants a fuller exploration and does not, by any means, seriously damage Herrmann's argument.

Because the concept of perception, particularly of the balance of military power, is so critical to Herrmann's analysis, I also would have liked to see him devote more discussion to misperception (and the pursuit of policy contrary to national self-interest based on incorrect assumptions and beliefs). Clearly, almost all the major European powers failed to correctly judge their allies and antagonists in the period leading up to the outbreak of war. As Herrmann states, by 1914, from Germany and Austria-Hungary's perspective, the balance of forces was likely to get worse in the future; Italy, France, and Russia would all likely get stronger within a few years. Therefore, 1914-15 represented a reasonable military opportunity - the situation had been better before, but it looked like it would get worse in the future. So where did Germany and Austria-Hungary go wrong in their strategic calculus? Were they simply considering raw numbers of mobilizable forces and failed to factor in the new modes of warfare that would quickly take hold once battle was joined? Did they believe that the other Entente powers would not risk war to aid their Russian ally? Why did Germany behave in such a bellicose manner, which ultimately had the effect of driving the Entente powers into closer cooperation? Herrmann offers no direct answers in his narrative.

All of these are relatively minor criticisms. Herrmann is truly to be commended for creating such a readable, scholarly narrative. He appears to have consulted at least fourteen European archives and cites works in at least four languages. While the omission of Russian, Serbian, and Ottoman sources is unfortunate, it is hard to expect more from a single scholar in any one work. Many of the works consulted are diplomatic papers, general staff reports, and intelligence assessments, some of which allow Herrmann to expose the various cultural biases and perceptions on the part of military attachés and other officials. These biased perceptions were a significant factor in diplomatic actions and military developments throughout the period and are welcome additions to the body of English language literature on the topic. Herrmann's thesis that balance of military power considerations was crucial to the decision to go to war and that the land armaments race destabilized European international relations and precipitated the war is well presented, convincing, and worthy of further discussion. All in all, Herrmann's The Arming of Europe and the Making of the First World War is a fascinating account of the geopolitics, crises, and interactions precipitating World War One.

David Herrmann has written an outstanding book: showing the ten years before the Great War as a period of miscalculations and misconceptions by diplomats, military and political leadership. All leading to a situation when diplomatic triumph was the preferred, diplomatic defeat the unacceptable outcome - and actual war the second choice. So, naturally ...

But still it is mainly a book about the land armies of the European powers. Their strengths and weaknesses, the way they try to adapt to the new technologies and get the money for them. It is not an in-depth comparison of various weapon-system or tactics, but rather an n account of the way other armies judged their rivals. Were they perceived as threats or as negliable quantities and what was the outcome of such perceptions.

From the first Morocco crisis to the Balkan Wars the crisis of this decade influenced the military and the political class of Europe. Since the book included archive material from all powers (Austria gets very often overlooked) it gives the whole picture. What it omits is the naval race.

Admittedly the battleship race had - the money aside - no influence on the land armies and for the sake of shortness it is acceptable to barely mention it. Nevertheless it played an important role concerning the decline of relations between Germany and England, but there are lots of good books on that subject.

What IMHO would have improved the book: a bit about the logistic aspects and feasibility of the various war plans. Martin Van Creveld's "Supplying War" showed the folly that was the Schliefen plan from this angle. That it omits this aspect of war - about which the contemporaries were well aware - is the only qualm I have with this book.

For the land armies, as an overview of the situation during the countdown to the Great War this short book is just brilliant!

The other reviewers are correct that Herrmann's book fails to cover a lot of the tactics and military reforms in the fifteen years before the start of World War I; it does, however, do exactly what its title says -- it talks about the land arms race in Europe, and does a fascinating job of that. Some might appreciate more technical discussion, especially in rifle design, but overall any but the most educated specialist can be sure to discover something new here. Herrmann does a solid and absorbing job of explaining the interplay between politics and armament, and how different choices resulted in an inexorable march towards war.

This book is one that any reader with a serious interest in the origins of the First World War should read. Herrmann wrote this book originally as his dissertation at Yale, so the language is more exacting than lively. Still, this is an impressive and different take on the years before the Great War.

The argument that a naval race between the UK and Germany was a contributing factor to the coming of the war is well-known. Until now the arms race on land has seen no study. Herrmann changes this and shows that technology was the biggest factor pushing budgets higher and higher. Legislature and governments were willing to spend more and more because of their perceived weakness in an unstable system. These increases made other nations in Europe feel insecure, which made them increase their defense budgets. As a result, the balance of power among land forces was constantly changing. Herrmann notes that all other factors in world affairs were static in the decade before1914 except for the varying strength of European ground forces.

The most important factor affecting all these military procurement plans during this decade, according to Herrmann was the military incapacity of Russia, wounded as it was from the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905. Germany used this absence to its advantage in diplomatic confrontation after diplomatic confrontation. The Germans had the best military in Europe, but others were banding together to confront Berlin since they had not Russian counterbalance. As a result, the Russian resurgence in 1914 and the various military alliances put Germany in a situation where its military power was fading, which was quite different from previous episodes.

This book is impressive. The Research is vast. Herrmann used documents from Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, and the Austro-Hungarian Empire. This account will make many people rethink long and hard the origins of the Great War.

David Herrmann's study found that `perceptions of military strength underwent a radical change between 1904 and 1914 and the principal reason for the change lay in perceptions of a changing balance of power in Europe ... caused the First World War to break out in large part as a `preventive war.' In a sense, the `relationship between armaments competition and international politics was one of interdependence throughout.'

In the First Moroccan Crisis 1905-1906, Germany exploited its military advantage during negotiations, and this credible threat of war against France forced the European armies to `compare their strength with that of potential adversaries in war, `drove together the Entente,' and `the consequent examination of the French army's situation led directly to the opening of Anglo-French staff talks in an attempt to redress the balance.'
Herrmann also noted the `Austro-Hungarian general staff's highly destabilizing practice of proposing a `preventive war' as a means of solving domestic and international problems.' Conrad advocated from 1906 onward `a preemptive war against Italy or a coup against Budapest.'

The Bosnia-Herzegovina Annexation Crisis did not involved ` the serious threat of a great-power war,' but the balance of power tilting against Russia spurred Germany and Austria-Hungary's `potential adversaries into competitive military expansion against them and touched off reactions on the other side that were designed to make it harder for the threateners to threaten again.' Herrmann remarked how leaders in Berlin and Vienna `did not take matters to their logical conclusion and decide to attack Russia itself while it was nearly defenseless' because `neither Conrad nor his superiors really wanted to take on a campaign against Russia and possibly risk a world war for the sake of having a better chance in the present than in a future conflict.' But, by 1914, their attitude was very different.

`Changing perceptions of the balance of military power' were instrumental in touching off the arms race. When the Entente stood firm against Germany during the Second Moroccan Crisis, German civilian leaders with a `far grimmer and more urgent view of the strategic situation' responded with the army law of 1912 `in the expectation of a future war.'

Germany reacted to the Balkan Wars with another army law of 1913 and touched off an arms race dynamic as France responded with the loi des trois and Russia the Great Program. `The result of the Balkan Wars contributed to a perception in Berlin and Vienna that the military situation was growing ever more threatening and must eventually lead to a war for survival. In the absence of successful efforts to find a political route out of the dilemma, this change in the strategic balance helped induce a mentality that made statesmen prepared to accept the risk of war in 1914.'

Herrmann further asserted the changed military balance and the prospect of future change influenced `the attitudes of statesmen toward the use of armed forces': `the speed of the escalating armaments race, as well as the mentality it engendered, made the decision to mobilize a far more likely choice than it had been in previous confrontations. The conviction among a widening circle of decision makers that a general war was inevitable contributed to this attitude. So did the growing acceptance of the notion of fighting a preventive war to forestall a worse situation in the future.' In the eyes of the leaders in Berlin and Vienna, the 1914-1915period appeared to have been the last `window of reasonable military opportunity.'

The decision to go to war in 1914 was the culmination of an evolution in attitude towards war stimulated by the armaments race in relation to strategic calculation in the balance of power. "War was no longer the worst option. It was not the optimal result for any of them: each preferred a diplomatic success without war. The worst prospect was diplomatic defeat, which all sides regarded as unacceptably disastrous, and conducive to a future war under worse conditions."