87 of 92 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
State of the Prisoner, May 19, 2009
This review is from: Prisoner of the State: The Secret Journal of Premier Zhao Ziyang (Hardcover)
I actually read the book before writing this review - and this is a review only of this book and is not any kind of statement about the PRC or the events of 1989.
This is a fascinating book, easily worth the five stars, if only because it is unique. The dramatic story behind its being published seems more movie script than true story.
The story of the tapes does almost defy belief. He not only secretly made them, recording over his grandchildren's tapes, but he also made copies of them. These copies were passed out to his guests piecemeal without any of them knowing who else had one of the tapes. Then the masters were placed with the grandchildren's toys and he told no one. Was he hoping someone would discover them? The only identifying marks he made on the tapes were small numbers. Then, after his death they were "discovered". And - the rest of the story is history. That is truly amazing.
What is also amazing is that he either had been squirreling away copies of documents and notes of conversations at his home or he had access to them even while under house arrest. The amount of detail (including quotes) of events more than a decade old is astounding.
The comments I below are not against this book but to comment on much of what seems to be spin by Zhao Ziyang (the key word is "seems").
This is not a "memoir" - but rather a recounting of the events leading up to and following his removal from all office in the PRC. Was he a scapegoat for the Tiananmen disaster? Probably. Was he illegally and unfairly treated? Very likely. Was he, as he makes out, innocent of any culpability in what took place? Probably not.
This is not the story of a nobody caught up in a system he doesn't understand; but rather the story of the holder of one of the most important positions in one of the most powerful nations in the world. Zhao Ziyang was a political veteran within the Communist Party and the PRC government. Even the editors admit Zhao could play politics with the best of them.
Throughout the book he always presents himself in the most favorable light. He seems to have never have been aware of any back room deals and, of course, to have never made any himself - and to have constantly been amazed that such things were happening around him (and about him). But he does slip on one occasion to admit to slyly trying to subvert a position of Deng.
Though he continues to remind those in power of the lack of legal basis to keep him under house arrest, not once does he specifically ask them what he has to do for it to end. How little would he have to bend to gain his freedom? He could then have decided whether to compromise or not.
He stubbornly continued during his house arrest to try to fight city hall (the PRC central government). I find it hard to believe he actually thought the methods he was using would have any positive affect in his treatment and status.
He doesn't seem to recognize the box the government was in. If they ever change his status, they would in effect be admitting that what they had been doing was wrong. The continuation of his losing tactics year after year makes one think he was playing a game. Since they wouldn't change - he wouldn't change. Therefore, stalemate.
The opening parts of the book reflect his legal defense arguments placed in the court of world public opinion. The rest of the book is about his participation in the economic and political events of the 1980's.
It is easy to sit where I am and criticize someone else's actions or inaction. Under the regime of the PRC at that time, serious reprisals were possible for him and his family.
He told this story, I feel, for two reasons. First, he wanted to get his side of the story out to the world. Second, he wanted posterity to look more favorably toward him than the "official" PRC records would reflect.
The editors have included very helpful footnotes to explain specific events mentioned in the book. The addition of a time-line of Zhao's life and a "Who Was Who" section of key people mentioned, were great ideas.
This is an unusual chance to get inside the head of one of the power elite of 1980's PRC. Whether absolute truth, spin or (most likely) a combination of both, this is a phenomenal read.
Help other customers find the most helpful reviews
Was this review helpful to you? Yes
No
35 of 37 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
Excellent Insights to The Hidden World of Chinese Leadership!, May 20, 2009
This review is from: Prisoner of the State: The Secret Journal of Premier Zhao Ziyang (Hardcover)
Zhao Ziyang was Premier of the People's Republic of China from 1980-1987, and General Secretary of the Communist Party from 1987-1989. Zhao appears to have been the architect of economic reform, though he acknowledges that without Deng's support it could not proceed. At the height of the Tienanmen Square protests in 1989 Zhao tried to stop the growing confrontation and instead was removed from power and placed under house arrest for the rest of his life. Zhao utilized the time to produce a written and recorded memoir - those materials provide the foundation for "Prisoner of the State." The book includes details of the crackdown, as well as the power ploys used among China's leaders, and the thinking behind their economic reforms.
The rationale behind China's economic reforms is particularly interesting. They began in an environment thick with ideological struggles, and sometimes hamstrung by missteps (eg. prosecutions of early innovators, overly one-sided demands and limits on foreign investment).
Zhao's initial interest in economic reform derived from comparing 1980 vs. 1952 statistics (the latter was the year most agreed the economy was fully recovered from the civil war). During the time span, industrial output increased by 8.1X, GDP by 4.2X, and industrial fixed assets by 26X, vs. an average consumption increase of only 2X.
Another motivator for change was that people were beginning to ask "What exactly is the advantage of socialism?" Before "liberation," eg. Shanghai was a highly developed metropolis, more advanced than Hong Kong, Singapore, and Taiwan. But after a couple of decades of socialism, Shanghai had become run-down and fallen behind. Similarly, fears of handing over Hong Kong and Macau, and reunification with Taiwan were going to be difficult to overcome without economic development. Zhao concluded was that economic efficiency had been very low, and focused his thinking on providing people with increased returns on their labor and resolving the problems with property rights. Ultimately, Deng Xiaoping (Paramount Leader 1978-early 1990s) was convinced and prioritized efforts ("Four Modernizations") in the order of agriculture, industry, technology, and defense.
Zhao then obtained a number of his ideas from overseas trips. An early lesson was that centralized decision-making created sub-optimum outcomes - eg. China tended to invest heavily in terracing and irrigation in arid areas, vs. other nations simply choosing to instead cultivate crops capable of growing without extra water. Initially the Chinese economy was quite insular. However, Zhao also learned that China would benefit from growing more sugar (less rice), and then selling the sugar and buying some rice overseas. Still another insight came from visiting Switzerland - there he found high productivity, despite small farms, because the farmers used cooperatives for expensive, specialized services and machines. This eliminated the Chinese rationale for large, collective farms.
The first area of modernization was agriculture, and within that the areas barely able to feed themselves were the first to experiment with the "Household Land Contract System" which broke up communes into family plots, reduced their production quotas, and allowed the families to sell the excess on the open market. Despite the success, ideologues opposed expanding the experiment, but Deng over-ruled them.
Industrialization was the second target for modernization. Zhao, et al, realized that relying on Chinese raw materials would create hardships for Chinese uses of those resources, and delay successful growth in final product growth. They also realized that attempting to produce technological products (third target) was both unrealistic (limited skills) and of limited employment benefit. Thus, agriculture, then simple industry (eg. steel) were the first targets. Rather than transport large quantities of China's low-grade iron ore over long distances, it was also decided to import higher-grade ore from Canada and Australia using lower-cost ships. (Focus on developing the coast land. This avoided the delays and expenses of first developing mines, improved transportation, etc.) Finally, it was recognized that enterprises conducting imports and exports must be responsible for their own profits and losses, and allowed to conduct their business freely.
Early on (1988) inflation became a problem - 7% in 1987, 18.5% in 1988. The cause, according to Zhao, was the dual-price system (eg. quota production at government-set prices vs. surplus production sold at market prices). Zhao realized eventually the market price had to rule, but in the transition China mistakenly announced price increases in advance, leading to massive hoarding. Then faced with an increasing run on the banks as savers took their money out, the authorities created value-guaranteed deposits to stop the bank runs.
Corruption became an important issue in 1988. Zhao saw increased transparency (eg. posting all the loans and rates made by a particular bank), increased pay for officials, and ending the discrepancy between subsidized Chinese product prices vs. market prices as keys to resolving the problem. (In his memoirs, he admits the problem continued.)
Finally, while Zhao saw a need for increased democratization to go along with its economic grow, Deng disagreed strongly and wouldn't even allow the topic to be discussed, primarily because of his observations how difficult it was to deal with the U.S. "There are three governments in the U.S. When we deal with them, we don't know who can actually make decisions. They balance each other out and wrangle with each other. It is very difficult to get anything done." This despite Deng's first-hand knowledge of Mao and Stalin's difficulties, and his personal experiences in the Cultural Revolution - Deng Xiaoping and his family were targeted and his son tortured and forced out of the window of a four-story building, becoming a paraplegic.
Bottom Line: China's economic turnaround wasn't the result of a sudden stroke of insight, or implementation of ideology - rather observations, research, and considerable thinking over a long period of time. "Prisoner of the State" is an invaluable source for understanding this and other aspects of modern-day China.
Help other customers find the most helpful reviews
Was this review helpful to you? Yes
No
![[Start the discussion]](http://g-ecx.images-amazon.com/images/G/01/x-locale/communities/discussion_boards/start-new-discussion-sec._V192250339_.gif){kind=small}
