Probability and the Art of Judgment (Cambridge Studies in Probability, Induction and Decision Theory) [Paperback]

Richard Jeffrey (Author)

Book Description

Publication Date: March 27, 1992 | ISBN-10: 0521397707 | ISBN-13: 978-0521397704 | Edition: First Edition

Richard Jeffrey is beyond dispute one of the most distinguished and influential philosophers working in the field of decision theory and the theory of knowledge. His work is distinctive in showing the interplay of epistemological concerns with probability and utility theory. Not only has he made use of standard probabilistic and decision theoretic tools to clarify concepts of evidential support and informed choice, he has also proposed significant modifications of the standard Bayesian position in order that it provide a better fit with actual human experience. Probability logic is viewed not as a source of judgment but as a framework for explaining the implications of probabilistic judgments and their mutual compatability This collection of essays spans a period of some 35 years and includes what have become some of the classic works in the literature. There is also one completely new piece, while in many instances Jeffrey includes afterthoughts on the older essays.

Editorial Reviews

Review

"Probability and the Art of Judgment is a valuable addition to the literature of decision theory for its broad presentation of Jeffrey's thought and for the stimulation and challenge it provides. Graduate students and researchers who study preference, subjective probability, or decision theory from either a descriptive or normative orientation can find it a rich source of ideas." Journal of Mathematical Psychology

Book Description

Spanning a period of 35 years, this collection of essays includes some of the classic works of one of the most distinquished and influential philosophers working in the field of decision theory and the theory of knowledge.

Product Details

• Paperback: 260 pages
• Publisher: Cambridge University Press; First Edition edition (March 27, 1992)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 0521397707
• ISBN-13: 978-0521397704
• Product Dimensions: 8.8 x 6 x 0.9 inches
• Shipping Weight: 14.9 ounces (View shipping rates and policies)
• Average Customer Review: 4.0 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (1 customer review)
• Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #2,294,672 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)

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2 of 3 people found the following review helpful:

4.0 out of 5 stars Jeffrey is right:"Experience+ Reason=Judgment"., October 31, 2004

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Michael Emmett Brady "mandmbrady" (Bellflower, California ,United States) - See all my reviews
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This review is from: Probability and the Art of Judgment (Cambridge Studies in Probability, Induction and Decision Theory) (Paperback)

Richard Jeffrey(RJ)has written an excellent book for the specialist reader.Such a reader needs to have already covered material equivalent to a bachelor's degree in philosophy plus have some familiarity with decision theory applied from a Bayesian perspective,loosely defined.The only objection I have about this book is the practically nonexistent treatment of the contributions to decision theory made by J M Keynes in 1921 in his pathbreaking work A Treatise on Probability(TP).RJ either ignores or is simply unaware of Keynes's original work on interval estimates done in chapters 5,10,15,17 and Part III of the TP.Keynes is the first scholar in history to provide an indepth analysis of an interval estimate approach.Unfortunately,Keynes called his interval estimates "nonnumerical " or "nonmeasurable" probabilities.Keynes's reasoning in using these terms is impeccable.Given that a numerical estimate of probability refers to the use of a single numeral or number,nonnumerical means that one numeral or number ,alone,is not sufficient to specify the probability relationship.In general, two numbers,not one,must be used in order to measure a probability.Naturally, if the interval estimates overlap,problems of noncomparability,nonrankability and incommensurability will occur,greatly complicating an analysis of probabilities.However, it should be clear that interval estimates are quantitative in nature.Unfortunately,F P Ramsey completely botched his two reviews of Keynes's TP in 1922 and 1926,coming up with the strange conclusion that Keynes's nonnumerical probabilities were "mysterious" entities that used NO numbers at all.It is possible that RJ is implicitly relying on these two reviews,since he quotes portions of Ramsey's two reviews at different places in his book.RJ also ignores Keynes's specification of an index,defined on the unit interval[0,1],to measure the completeness of the evidence upon which to base an estimate of a probability.Keynes's called his variable, w ,the weight of the evidence,where 0<=w<=1.Finally,RJ ignores Keynes's conventional coefficient of risk and weight,c. c incorporates nonlinear probability preferences and weight of the evidence(also called the ambiguity,vagueness,or uncertainty of the evidence)into a clearcut decision rule. Keynes's rule specifies that the decision maker seek to maximize cA,where A is the outcome.Again,Keynes was the first scholar in history to specify such a decision rule.RJ needs to include this material in a future revised edition of the present volume.