As the title suggests, Linz and Stepan examine democratic transition and consolidation. Linz and Stepan argue that a democratic transition is completed when the relevant actors agree on the "the rules of the game." These rules include those regarding elected government: when and how the government is formed through free and fair elections, when and how the government has de facto authority to create new policies, and when the branches of government no longer have to share power with other bodies. When the government abides by the rules developed, Linz and Stepan would argue that it has become a democracy. Consolidation is achieved when the democratic system is viewed as "the only game in town," and the majority of the public subscribes to those institutions. Additionally, Linz and Stepan see a consolidated democracy as not simply a regime, but rather a system of interaction parts. These parts include civil society, political society, rule of law, bureaucracy, and an institutionalization of economic society.
The authors use a number of explanatory variables when examining democratic transition and consolidation. These variables are divided into three categories. The first, macrovariables, include stateness, and prior regime type. The second, actor variables, includes the leadership base of the prior regime type, and who initiates and controls oppositions. Lastly, context variables include international influences, the political economy of legitimacy, and the constitution-making environment.
Linz and Stepan argue that "democracy requires statehood." Without a state' ability to use coercive force, tax, and implement a judicial system, the five arenas of a consolidated democracy will not be achieved. However, it must be noted that state and nation are two different concepts. If there is conflict between the state and nations under its control, achieving democracy will be difficult. This leads to problems of legitimacy for the state. In order to address this, the concept of citizenship is imperative. The author's write, "there can be no complex modern democracy without voting, no voting without citizenship, and no official membership in the community of citizens without a state to certify membership" (28).
The authors also suggest that the role played by prior regime type shape the paths available for transition, and what tasks remain to achieve consolidation. The authors move beyond the classic three regime typology and examine authoritarian, totalitarian, post-totalitarian, and sultanistic regimes. L & S argue that the ways in which the previous regimes structured pluralism, ideology, leadership, and mobilization affect the paths available to democratic transition. Linz and Stepan see five paths with can be taken towards democratic transition: the formation of pacts, defeat in war, interim government created after regime termination but not brought forth by the old regime, a military led coup, and some regime specific transition paths. Depending on the previous regime type, some paths are more likely than others.
Additionally L & S suggest that the character of the state elite affects democratic transition and consolidation. They examine four types of elites: hierarchal military, nonhierarchal military, civilian elite, and sultanistic elites. A hierarchal military (authoritarian) may be usurped by the military-as-institution who views extrication from the military government as in their best interests - a return to civilian rule. However, during the consolidation phase, the old regime elite may enforce "reserve domains" of control which will not allow the new regime to consolidate. A nonhierarchal military elite is better for both transition and consolidation. They are likely to fall to a democratic transition when they come into problems running the country. Also, they are likely to be seen as operating outside the military sphere which means they are likely to be punished by the state/military hierarchy. In the case of civilian leadership (post-totalitarian), they are in possession of the symbolic and institutional capacities to initiate and manage ad democratic transition. In the consolidation phase, they are likely to see the benefit of working within the new system as opposed to fighting it. In sultanistic leadership, the regime is so personalized, that the overthrow of the sultan quickly destroys the regime. However, unless democratic elections are held quickly, and democratic institutions developed, the chances of consolidation are weak.
Under the actor variable category, L & S examine the impact of who initiates and controls the transition on democratic transition and consolidation. Transitions initiated by civil society, armed revolution, or a nonhierarchal military led coup tend to see the ruling institutions taken over by an interim government. This interim government can either have a democratic or nondemocractic agenda. If elections are held quickly, democracy can arise. If the interim government simply makes decreases based on an assumed mandate, democracy is unlikely. Because interim governments often don't appear from a hierarchal military, or through regime led changes, democracy is unlikely to appear.
Linz and Stepan also examine the context within which the transition occurs. Of particular interest are various international influences. One international factor which can influence transition and consolidation is the use of force. A nondemocractic country can militarily overthrow a weaker democratic state, or a regional hegemon can crush democratic uprisings in its periphery. The hegemon (democratic or nondemocractic) can also use incentives or sanctions to shape the political path nations in the periphery undertake. Outside of force, the "spirit of the times," i.e. democracy / communism, or diffusion can shape political transitions.
The political economic context can also shape transition and consolidation. For example, extended periods of economic prosperity can weaken nondemocractic regimes. Prosperity may make the coercive system unnecessary. Also, economic prosperity expands the middle class which leads to increased political demands. Although economic prosperity doesn't weaken the democratic regimes, economic downturns affect both. Still, because the democratic regime has a greater level of legitimacy then the nondemocractic regimes, it is more insulated from down turns.
Lastly, Linz and Stepan see the constitution-making environment leads to the success or failure of democratic transition and consolidation.
