Customer Reviews

Problems of Knowledge: A Critical Introduction to Epistemology

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The subtitle, "a critical introduction to epistemology," is precisely descriptive of this volume. I'd say it is somewhat beyond an introduction -- and it is nothing if not critical (but of course any serious consideration of epistemology must be). The discourse throughout tackles the problem of skepticism, both classical (Agrippan) and modern (Cartesian). As Williams states in the introduction, "Once we become aware that even our most cherished views can be challenged, there is no going back to a pre-critical, traditionalist outlook. This is why concern with knowledge is no longer optional. . . Scepticism is the skeleton in Western rationalism's closet: an argumentatively sophisticated attack on rationalism itself. It represents the extreme case of a tradition of critical inquiry reflexively applied. From the very beginnings of Western philosophy, there has been a counter-tradition arguing that the limits of reason are much more confining than epistemological optimists like to think. . . If scepticism cannot be refuted, the rational outlook undermines itself."
Once familiar with the arguments of philosophical skepticism, it seems they are but modestly more "sophisticated" than those of mere practical, I might say "methodological", skepticism. All skepticism, practical or philosophical, is rather highly intuitive; one needn't be a stark, raving genius to understand Descartes' description of the problem of external ('objective') knowledge. As it turns out, skepticism is built on the same foundational assumptions as is the most pervasive model of epistemological theory -- Foundationalism. At first blush, the "foundational" theory of knowledge might seem like the appropriate model with which to defend knowledge from philosophical skepticism. But Foundationalism fails on two levels; it neither overcomes skepticism nor can allow for epistemological risk-taking (which can have obvious merit). It can be argued that the difficulty of foundationalism may be that it is atomistic -- might a holistic theory fare better? A holistic line of attack is the so-called Coherence theory, but this approach, while conceived as being less vulnerable than Foundationalism, appeals to the same rational underpinnings as Foundationalism and, yes, Philosophical Skepticism. The problems, in all cases, are analyzed in the first 12 chapters.
After a diagnostic treatment of the foundational assumptions of Philosophical Skepticism, the epistemology (theory of knowledge) for which Williams finally argues is the so-called Contextual theory. While Contextualism rejects the assumptions of Foundationalism and its quarreling cousins, it allows, within a "default and challenge" framework, for: immediate knowledge, a methodology of fallibilism (i.e., falsification), and epistemological risk-taking. A deflationist approach to knowledge, contextualism is neither atomistic nor strictly holistic. It is critical to notice that Contextualism is not mere epistemological Relativism, as Williams says, "the relativist, like the sceptic, is a disappointed foundationalist."

The author finally cautions that he has not offered the final word on these problems. But the treatment is obviously much more thorough than it appears in my brief review, and while I question a few of Williams assertions (very few actually), as an epistemological optimist (and a 'practical' rather than 'philosophical' skeptic), I suggest that he's pretty much gotten it right. The book is well worth your time if you are interested in the theory of knowledge (and if you have any interest in defending your beliefs/judgments, you should be).

As a doctoral candidate in philosophy specializing in epistemology I am familiar with many inductory books in the field. In my opinion, William's "Problems of Knowledge" is one of the best. The book is especially insightful on the issue of skepticism and argues for a sophisticated contextualism.

This is a superb introduction to epistemology, simply beautifully written, a real model of clarity and concision. Williams well achieves his goal of an introduction suitable for the non-specialist.

Like the phoenix or the many-headed hydra (depending on your figurative orientation) the epistemic project, despite its detractors, remains front and center in the philosophic enterprise. While most contemporary philosophers claim to be doing semantics or logic to get at the truth, the Truth is that they all seem engaged, however obliquely, in the venerable epistemic quest of the ages. However constraining the ongoing malaise of skeptical reservation seems to be (Williams neatly divies it up into two "families": Agrippan and Cartesian), we would like to believe that we have a a right, if not a claim, to know.
Williams tells us that the question of epistemic value is the most generative, if not fruitful, one we can ask at this point, and I would not challenge his expertise, which is considerable and informative.
What I like most about this rich, demanding, and yet accessible, work, is the balance between economy and comprehensiveness. While not, in my opinion, a basic primer (the subtitle 'introduction' might mislead - one really must have read a bit of philosophy the appreciate the depths which are measured), the text should be required reading for every ambitious first year philosophy grad student. Virtually every argument your instructors will discuss re: epistemology is deftly, and coherently, detailed in its relevant essentials as Williams builds his position. Williams gets to heart of every major epistemic view, without cant, confusion, and difficult citations (the book is blessedly free of them - unlike most introductory epistemology texts)- and gives you the stuff that most counts. As we are dealing with a normative science here, what "counts" is of the utmost importance. The reader must often dig to follow Williams as he elegantly connects the dots, but when done, a very useful overview of this often dizzyingly complex field emerges "ready-to-hand", with a grasp of the critical issues.
As the strength of William's position has been discussed by other reviewers here, I will only reiterate that the philosophy student will be hard pressed to find as comprehensive an "ubersicht" as deftly crafted in as slender a volume. Learn at the feet of a contemporary master.

It is amazing how much one can learn and clarify with this remarkable book. At the same time it delivers a lesson on the historical setting that shape the discussion about knowledge as a problematic issue -thus conveying with accuracy that body of concerns called epistemology- it also manages to establish a lucid position (contextualism) so to iluminate the whole of the discussion in all its relevant angles. More than a mere lesson the reader gets a bright example of critical thinking in action that, at the end, is what western philosophy is all about: a search for a self understanding of our human conundrums.

In the same extent the book demanded a lot of writing skills on behalf of the author (which no doubt is quite up to the task) it also requires a careful reading. The latter it is not because the book is not written in a fine clear prose but because the author proceeds as chess player and he seems to be a master of the game. However this does not mean that Williams see the enterprise as a setting of knock-down refutations (nothing more far away of his own philosophy) rather he manage to find a lucid perspective from where to launch critical insights and in order to do so he planned a thoughtful architecture that makes the book a solid one piece of argumentation almost seamless welded.

Williams brightly outlines how scepticism has shaped most of the current epistemological positions. As an overreaction to error -that shadow attached to everything that stems from human action and thinking- scepticism also set up the standards of the discussion to the extent that philosophical enterprises to refute it such as foundationalism or coherentism are doomed efforts insofar they are playing the game under the sceptical terms: looking after what Williams calls a Prior Grounding Requirement (either understood as a sort of an arquimedian point that links human thought with the world or as a perfect fabric where everything is interwoven with everything else in order to make sense) these attempts implicitly commit themselves to a hierarchical structured reasons only conceivable as a metaphysical object. The Cartesian influence on western philosophy didn't help either because the methodological demand it sets up front contributed a lot to forget that challenges to knowledge -far from being holistic and wholly abstract- actually came from an interplay of giving reasons and answers, social structured and historically allocated, thus giving way to an overblown demand on certainty that deflect the understanding on the phenomenology of the very human knowledge enterprise and the context that enables a given challenge or refutation to become a meaningful one.

Despite this Williams thinking on epistemology doesn't quit to its normative character or suggests it ought to be a mere history of knowledge nor reduces it to a philosophy of science for his position is that knowledge is all about justified belief, thus rejecting the so called externalist approach which only concern is that a statement is linked with the state of affairs of the world no matter how this "match" was reached. Because knowledge has a propositional content which implies concepts and invites to refutations (the very game of giving questions and answers as Wittgenstein may say) Williams remind us that knowledge is a human activity in a human setting. That's why it cannot also be naturalized in terms of cognitive psychology concerned only with processes described between entities (mind and world). At the end Williams saves the epistemological undertake in showing that is tenable in a more humble but not less sharp and intelligent terms. He truly makes good philosophy by humanizing what at some point became a blind Golem.

Well written book with lots of deep insights. The author is pushing for his own version of Contextualism but he also gives a fair presentation of the views he opposes.

Williams sees skepticism as the core epistemological problem that shapes the whole field. His strategy to attack skepticism consists in showing what kind of assumption are behind it. He identifies them in what he calls Prior Grounding Requirement ("epistemically responsible believing on the basis of adequate evidence"), which is itself based on epistemological realism. He rejects both assumption, and prefers a "Default and Challenge" model of the epistemic discourse. In doing so he rejects the "naked challenges" of the skeptics, and shifts the burden of proof on their shoulders. He ascribes the failures of both Foundationalism and Coherentist theories to reject skeptic claims in their acceptance of the Prior Grounding Requirement. He also sees epistemology as irreducibly normative, and rejects any naturalization process (e.g. Quine's).

The book is quite readable even if some passages are somewhat obscure. I would not suggest this book as a broad overview of epistemology, but more as a sophisticated review of the problems of skepticism.

Contextualism seems an attractive alternative, but it might give up too much in order to adhere to everyday's practices.

This is a CRITICAL introduction, meaning that Williams argues for his own views (but he is fair to others). I am familiar with Williams's other work (e.g., Unnatural Doubts) and I thought this might be a good way to fill the gaps in my knowledge of epistemology while at the same time being an interesting take on the issues from a major figure in the field. Not only did Williams deliver on presenting areas with which I am less familiar, but he clarified his version of contextualism and idea of "epistemological realism." The book has been valuable for my own thinking in that I now find contextualist responses to skepticism less convincing than I had initially thought (i.e., one need not agree with Williams to get something out of the book). Lastly, while this is an introduction that anyone could read, some background in epistemology is going to help. In fact, those with a background in epistemology will benefit greatly from this critical introduction.

Some books are very easy books, breezed through in a couple of days, with snatches of reading done while engaging in another hobby. This is not one of those books, and I must be clear to the prospective buyer that this is a book that will require attention and work. To me, it seems this is the nature of the subject matter, and quite often I find I simply have to close the book, think about what I've read, and potentially reread the chapter. I believe this is the only way to really get much out of the book, and it will repay effort with a huge amount of interesting perspectives on knowing.

The books moves through classical viewpoints on knowledge, it deals with relativism, it covers the Aggrippan and Cartesean challenge to knowledge, the foundationalist and coherentist response to those challenges... and that's just the first third of the book.

I would say that if you are either a student or just someone with an interest in epistemology (at an introductory level), this book will give you a huge amount to think about.

I have to agree with most reviewers that this introduction is accessible but demanding. However, I think that it would be best if the reader used this is a second book. A great first book would be Richard Feldman's introduction which discusses a lot of the issues in this book but in a more friendly (and less critical way). That said, this book is really good because the author raises very important questions regarding most schools of thought. While being short, the book is packed with argument after argument and therefore it is not a quick read (at least to me), but it is a very enjoyable one. This book shouldn't be criticized for being biased to a certain philosophy since the author made it clear from the start that he has an opinion and that he was going to build a case for it. Personally, the author wasn't able to make a believer out of me, but that doesn't take away anything from this book.

Michael Williams' project in PoK is to provide a comprehensive grounding in the concerns of epistemology, and this he achieves admirably. He sets out five principal areas of discussion:

1. The analytic problem - what is knowledge?;
2. The problem of demarcation - what are the scope and limits of what we can know about? (the external problem), and within knowledge, what is the nature and status of a posteriori - empirical knowledge vis a vis a priori knowledge - non-experiential, foundational knowledge?;
3. The problem of method - how knowledge is obtained?;
4. The problem of skepticism - is or can knowledge be secure?;
5. The problem of value - what is the goal of knowledge?

Williams goes into detail about Agrippan and Cartesian skepticism and asks whether they are ultimate defeaters of knowledge. In fact, he uses these skepticisms as a springboard to the rest of the book where he outlines other theories of knowledge. He points out that the Agrippan skeptic's commitment to the Prior Grounding commitment leads to a vicious infinite regress of justification but which can be effectively bypassed by the default and challenge model of knowledge - where knowledge is assumed for all conditions but is selectively held open to challenge.

Williams takes us on a journey exploring the ideals of knowledge and demonstration, the attempt but ultimate failure of foundationalism to stop an infinite regress of questioning, through to coherentism, which falters because it lacks an anchoring mechanism. He gives an enlightening account of the Gettier problem in probing just what is justified knowledge, and what justification is indefeasible. He goes on to discuss realism and truth, emphasizing that we as non-omniscient creatures cannot get at any absolute notion of truth - if such a notion is valid at all - and that in fact truth has much less to do with epistemology than is actually supposed: Epistemology is much more about justification.

Williams then goes on to elaborate on evidence and entitlement, knowledge in context, the difference between seeing and knowing - observation is not understanding, skepticism and epistemic priority, induction and the fallacy of the 'uniformity principle', projecture and conjecture - a look at Karl Popper's insights, relativism and objectivity. The subtlety and density of thought and Williams' sometimes difficult prose had me re-reading several chapters to pick up all the nuances. PoK really requires familiarity with a lot of basic philosophic ideas to be fluently understood so the book is not for the casual reader.

What I liked best about PoK was Williams' emphasis on having an 'elastic' approach to epistemology - unlike Quine he would not like to see it 'naturalized' as cognitive science, or Rorty, who would see it disappear altogether with all other philosophy: Rather than get tied down about defining questions to guide theory, setting out preferred methods of inquiry, having a "single, tightly integrated body of theory", Williams would have us see epistemology "as a tradition of theorizing that addresses fundamental epistemological questions". As has been pointed out by other reviewers, Williams defends a contextualist approach to knowledge and justification. He says it stays close to the phenomenolgy of everyday epistemic practices and accepts "a fallabilist conception of rationality" that recognizes the importance of background knowledge and historical context, and which "offers a principled escape from traditional skeptical conundrums". I agree.