Prompt and Utter Destruction: Truman and the use of Atomic Bombs against Japan [Large Print] [Paperback]

J. Samuel Walker (Author)

Book Description

Publication Date: October 12, 2010

In this concise account of why America used atomic bombs against Japan in 1945, J. Samuel Walker analyzes the reasons behind President Trumans most controversial decision. Delineating what was known and not known by American leaders at the time, Walker evaluates the roles of U.S.Soviet relations and of American domestic politics. In this new edition, Walker takes into account recent scholarship on the topic, including new information on the Japanese decision to surrender. He has also revised the book to place more emphasis on the effect of the Soviet invasion of Manchuria in convincing the emperor and his advisers to quit the war. Rising above an often polemical debate, Walker presents an accessible synthesis of previous work and an important, original contribution to our understanding of the events that ushered in the atomic age. J. Samuel Walker, historian of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, has published six other books on the history of American foreign policy and the history of nuclear energy.

Editorial Reviews

From the Inside Flap

In this updated edition of his balanced and concise look at the still-controversial decision to use atomic bombs against Japan, Walker takes into account more recent scholarship on the topic, including new findings on the Japanese decision to surrender. --This text refers to an alternate Paperback edition.

Product Details

• Paperback: 264 pages
• Publisher: ReadHowYouWant; Lrg edition (October 12, 2010)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 1442994754
• ISBN-13: 978-1442994751
• Product Dimensions: 9.8 x 7.7 x 0.9 inches
• Shipping Weight: 1.4 pounds (View shipping rates and policies)
• Average Customer Review: 4.3 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (13 customer reviews)
• Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #1,793,639 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)

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30 of 31 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars Historiography at its Finest, July 29, 2007

By 

Roger D. Launius "Historian" (Washington, D.C., United States) - See all my reviews
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This review is from: Prompt and Utter Destruction: Truman and the Use of Atomic Bombs Against Japan (Paperback)

One of the most complex, divisive, and nuanced debates in the history of the twentieth century is the decision by U.S. President Harry S. Truman in August 1945 to drop two atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan, thereby ending World War II. A traditional conception of the decision, indeed the one most often voiced by actors in the decision, was that it was done to speed the end of the war and thereby preserve American lives that might be lost in future combat. The revisionist interpretation, often identified with Gar Alperowitz, argues that the war was almost over and that the Japanese were on the verge of surrender anyway. The reason to drop the bomb, therefore, had little to do with the ending of World War II and was aimed more at impressing and influencing future relations with the Soviet Union. Another interpretation suggests that the use of the atomic bomb had more to do with American racism, and that the U.S. would have refrained from using such a horrific weapon on other Caucasians in Europe. Other scholars condemn the use of such a weapon targeting large populations, including non-combatants, as immoral and obscene. Subsequent historians have argued various permutations of these interpretations and the debate remains far from settled.

J. Samuel Walker's "`prompt & utter destruction': Truman and the Use of the Atomic Bomb against Japan" is a superb short discussion of the merits of each of these interpretations and an assessment of the current state of understanding on the subject. He takes an exceptionally even-handed approach, pointing up the strengths and weaknesses of each major argument and assessing how they have evolved over time. In the end, as Walker documents, five fundamental considerations played into the decision to use atomic bombs in August 1945.

First, the decision makers, especially Truman, sought to end the war at the earliest possible moment. They believed this new and terrifying weapon would do so and should therefore be employed for what they considered the greater good of ending the bloodshed. Wrapped up in this argument, although Walker thinks it a bit of side issue, was a widely held belief that bringing the Japanese to the surrender table would require an invasion of its islands. This would be, as those considering it believed, a costly and lengthy campaign that might mean the loss of thousands of lives on both sides. Casualty estimates of all types exist, and they have been used in the debate since then to justify or condemn the use of the bomb. Walker finds that those estimates, which are at best educated guesses that range broadly depending on the assumptions and the perspectives of those making them, are less useful in assessing what took place than the understanding that Truman was unwilling to accept any more casualties than absolutely necessary.

Second, Walker notes how Truman and his advisors were intensely concerned that they had to justify the enormous cost of developing the atomic weapon, and a decision not to use it once it existed would open them to significant criticism. As Walker states, "The success of the Manhattan Project in building the bombs and ending the war was a source of satisfaction and relief" (p. 94). In this context, Truman expressed great concern that should he decide not to use the weapon once he had it that every American life lost thereafter would have been wasted. As he explained to Secretary of State James F. Byrnes in 1947, "I believe that no man, in our position and subject to our responsibilities, holding in his hands a weapon of such possibilities for accomplishing this purpose and saving those lives, could have failed to use it and afterwards looked his countrymen in the face" (p. 94).

Third, at least one of Truman's advisors, Secretary of State Byrnes, realized immediately and argued to his colleagues that this weapon would be useful in helping to bend the Soviet Union to American wishes in the post-war era. Truman recognized this as well, but according to Walker this was definitely an added bonus and not the primary consideration in using the bomb. Walker concluded, "Growing differences with the Soviet Union were a factor in the thinking of American officials about the bomb but were not the main reason that they rushed to drop it on Japan" (p. 95). Gar Alperowitz's "atomic diplomacy" thesis, therefore, has merit however overstated it might have been.

Fourth, Walker asserts that there was a lack of incentives among those making these decisions not to use the bomb. "Truman," Walker notes, "used the bomb because he had no compelling reason to avoid it" (p. 95). While many people since 1945 have questioned the morality of its use, Truman and his advisors did not let those scruples--and they did exist among them--outweigh their goal of ending the war as quickly as possible. Indeed, by the last year of the war conventional weaponry had laid waste to so many cities containing thousands of non-combatants--witness the firebombing of or Dresden and Tokyo--that virtually no one in a senior decision making role in the U.S. questioned the use of nuclear weapons despite their destructiveness since they believed dropping these bombs would shorten the war and save American lives.

Fifth, Walker comments that "Hatred of the Japanese, a desire for revenge for Pearl Harbor, and racist attitudes were a part of the mix of motives that led to the atomic attacks" (p. 96). Again, this was not the primary consideration in dropping the bomb on Japan, "But the prevalent loathing of Japan, both among policymakers and the American people, helped override any hesitation or ambivalence that Truman and his advisors might have felt about use of atomic bombs" (p. 96).

Walker ends "prompt & utter destruction" with a series of questions still being debated about the decision to use the bomb. These include: "(1) how long the war would have continued if the bomb had not been used; (2) how many casualties American forces would have suffered if the bomb had not been dropped; (3) whether an invasion would have been necessary without the use of the bomb; (4) the number of American lives and casualties an invasion would have exacted had it proven necessary; (5) whether Japan would have responded favorably to a American offer to allow the emperor to remain on the throne before Hiroshima, or whether such an offer would have prolonged the war; and (6) whether any of the alternatives to the use of the bomb would have ended the war as quickly on a basis satisfactory to the United States (pp. 108-109).

These historiographical questions ensure that future study of this subject will remain contested; overlaying all of it, of course, is the question of the morality of Truman's decision. Walker offers no conclusion to the debate, instead inviting further inquiry and exposition as each scholar makes a contribution to the marketplace of ideas where positions will be evaluated and accepted, rejected, or modified. This book is a must read for anyone who wants to understand the nature of the end of World War II and the beginning of the cold war.

37 of 40 people found the following review helpful:

4.0 out of 5 stars Probably the final say on the subject, May 2, 2000

By 

Pierre Weydert (Zurich, Switzerland) - See all my reviews
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This review is from: Prompt and Utter Destruction: Truman and the Use of Atomic Bombs Against Japan (Paperback)

This book is an important contribution to the ongoing (and seemingly never-ending) debate on the reasons why the U.S. chose to drop two atomic bombs on Japan. The author took it upon himself to clearly determine whether the bomb was militarily necessary - as has been suggested by many U.S. historians writing before J. Samuel Walker - or whether it might have been used for purely political reasons such as intimidating the Soviet Union.

The results he comes up with are in many ways quite remarkable. For instance it becomes evident that then president Harry S. Truman was never confronted with the categorical choice between using the bomb and invading the Japanese main islands (which might have involved heavy U.S. losses). Indeed, by the beginning of summer 1945 Japan was believed to be so weak that the war was expected to come to an end before an invasion began, and even if it had been necessary to proceed with an invasion, the resulting casualties were supposed to be much fewer than Truman and his top-level advisers claimed after the war. However, Walker demonstrates rather convincingly that whichever alternatives might have existed, the bomb nevertheless proved to be the best means to win a decisive victory at the lowest cost in American casualties. Taking into account the element of time, one begins to understand how great the temptation must have been for Truman and his cabinet to drop the bombs and thereby finish the war with a clean stroke. Although other reasons, too, played an important part in the ultimate decision, the finding that using the bomb simply provided the president and his advisers with the most convenient measure to end the war is a compelling one and without doubt the book's most valuable message.

J. Samuel Walker has to be applauded for presenting the reader with this highly readable account of the line of reasoning behind the U.S. decision to use atomic bombs against Japan. The book is both concise and completely free of any emotion otherwise detrimental to a scholarly approach to this debate: a truly outstanding work - and probably the final say on the subject!

18 of 19 people found the following review helpful:

4.0 out of 5 stars very good overview, December 9, 2001

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G. Chapman (USA) - See all my reviews
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This review is from: Prompt and Utter Destruction: Truman and the Use of Atomic Bombs Against Japan (Paperback)

This book gives a good overview but just that - an overview. The events and circumstances surrounding the use of the A-bomb simply must be addressed in greater depth for one who wishes to become truly knowledgable on the subject. However, its brevity is also a strength in that for one just getting into the subject it serves as a fabulous introduction and for those already familiar with the subject, it sums things up into a nice recap. Contrary to some reviews of the book, the author does NOT ever say or even imply that the bomb should not have been dropped. Quite the opposite, he provides compelling reasons why the decision to use the bomb was sound and wise militarily, politically, diplomatically, and morally. Nor is this book any where near a "one-stop-shop" on the subject. So while not the final say, this book would be a good addition to a collection for the reasons mentioned above. The research is credible and the arguments are as a whole very sound. Highly recommended.