From Library Journal
Cognitivism argues that psychology studies behavior to infer unobservable theoretical constructs, such as `belief,' that summarize and explain empirical observations and predict new phenomena. Here, Fodor tries to provide a scientific account of commonsense belief/desire psychology by defending a representational theory of mind. Assuming that there is no alternative to the vocabulary of commonsense psychological explanation, he proposes that we have an infinite set of mental symbols at our disposal and that a propositional attitude is equivalent to a symbol's occurring and its functioning in a particular causal role. Underlying his account is the view that mental processes will turn out to be physical processes. Highly recommended for philosophers of mind and cognitive psychologists. Robert Hoffman, Philosophy Department, York Coll., CUNY
Copyright 1987 Reed Business Information, Inc.
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(Fodor's) aim in this book is to protect folk psychology, as a solid basis for mental science, from a range of objections that have been brought against it in recent years, mainly by philosophers. He does so with verve, clarity and wit, generally getting the better of his revisionary opponents. The book is vintage Fodor: clever, stimulating, challenging, infuriating.
(Colin McGinn Nature