In the conclusion of /Public Religions in the Modern World/, Jose Casanova states his thesis concisely: "It is my contention that the rejection ... of the privatized role [of religions] to which they were being relegated by secularist modernization theories ... can no longer be viewed as simply antimodern critiques of modernity." (221) In other words, "theories" are being imposed on religions from without; the "rejection" comes from within, and is therefore more relevant to the worldview of the religious community; in fact, they need not deny the secular idea of modernity. There's nothing wrong with this thesis. It's just executed badly, with heavy helpings of unacceptably obscure writing and blindness to important aspects of the topic at hand.
First, compare the conclusion to the way the question is initially posed by quoting Wolfgang Schluchter, which Casanova seems to consider an equivalent statement of the hypothesis he affirms even though the resemblance is only superficial: "Is there a legitimate religious resistance to secular world views that is more than a refusal to accept the consequences of the Enlightenment?" (38) The way Schluchter words this question, a secular modernity is being taken for granted before religion has a chance to reject it! The word "consequences" implies necessary effects, and the phrase "refusal to accept" implies stubbornness and willful ignorance of the facts. Even when Schluchter attempts to suggest some alternative to refusal, his use of the word "resistance" instead of "rejection" is a passive acceptance of secularization. Consider a parallel situation where a musician is told that "music is meaningless in modern society." If he laughs off this statement as absurd, he is rejecting it. It is only if the statement is true and he sees that as a problem that he finds a need to resist it. When Casanova meekly says "My answer to [this question] is an unconditional yes" without challenging the very language by which the question is posed it betrays a flaw in the way he is looking at his question, despite his careful reading of various critics.
Notice also Schluchter's use of the Enlightenment as the primary instrument of secularization. This is the second notable problem with the framework Casanova uses for his thesis: an assumption that one is discussing either Europe or the United States. Throughout most of the world, the primary force of secularization is either colonialism (e.g., India) or globalization (e.g., the Middle East). These are very good examples for talking about public religions in the modern world because the external nature of the secularizing force is far more clear. Yet not only does Casanova focus on Christianity, he proclaims that were he to study other religions, "such an immense task would have required a modification and expansion of my typology ... of the theory of ... differentiation, and of the general analytical framework employed in this study." (10) Such a disclaimer does not really reassure me about the stability of his thesis. Furthermore, his brief mentions of religions other than Christianity betray a lack of knowledge about non-Christian religions. One of his examples of other cases for further study is "the deprivatization of Hinduism in India" (10), but Hinduism is a category invented by India's British visitors, so that deprivatization may be more like an invention. One of his examples of the public role of religion is Brazil, one of the most fascinating examples of religious diversity and non-secular society in modern times, but his chapter is devoted almost entirely to the Catholic Church, with other religions dismissed only as a "problem" for church development. (129) More telling, he cites Japan as an example of a nation where religion shows no decline (27) due to widespread enrollment in temples, whereas in reality (according to a 2008 study) only 10 percent of Japanese think religion is important to their lives, compared to 59 percent of Americans. In a footnote to this statement he displays little recognition that official membership in a Buddhist temple in Japan, unlike membership in a Christian church, is a formality with no religious aspect. (242-3) It appears that his working definition of "religion" is simply a mapping of the world's various and complicated relationships between religious society and secular society onto the framework of Christianity.
Thirdly, his insistence on using sociology's traditional dichotomies of religious organizations limits his view of even the issues he discusses. The idea of resistance to secularization that goes beyond mere denial of religious pluralism is exemplified by the debate within Catholicism over the language of the liturgy. The key players of Casanova's chapter on Catholicism in America are here: the current Pope Benedict and his lay supporters, who wanted a "Catholic Restoration", and the liberal pastors with their supporters. Casanova is probably talking about this when he mentions "restorationist policies" (187), but it is interesting what exactly the conservatives wish to restore. Vatican II introduced a vulgar mass, that is, a mass delivered in the language of the laity, with room for liturgical variation according to local practices. Cardinal Ratzinger (in his more political role before he became Pope) and the traditionalists wished to restore the Tridentine Latin Mass, which was delivered in the same language and manner throughout the world before Vatican II. Both sides would claim their mass is truly "universal", but for different reasons. Liberals feel a universal mass is the one that is intelligible to the greatest number of people; to use the words of Berger, a mass that delivers "relevance" and "results" to its participants. For conservatives, the universal mass is more simply the mass that is performed in the same manner and with the same words throughout the world. Clearly the traditionalists reject Berger's "relevant", result-bringing, and psychology-focused religion, and for reasons that (without getting too involved here) are unrelated to anything secular.
But Casanova does not get into this debate. Why not? It could simply be an oversight on his part; perhaps the liturgy debate was not as prominent in the 1990s. Or maybe it would have been too hard to fit into his predetermined categories of religious organizations. For in this particular example, the traditionalists are clearly on the side of the "church type" with their definition of universality, and the liberals lean towards the "sect type" or "denomination type" with their Bergeresque acceptance of secularization, but the roles one would expect to be naturally issued from these types are not present here. The church type is meant to be an obligatory faith that belongs to the masses, no matter their level of education, but the traditionalists want a liturgy that only the most educated or religiously involved of the laity will be able to understand in its intended form. The sect type is supposed to be the community of "saints", to use Casanova's term, who have a special devotion, but the liberals want the liturgy to be (to put it bluntly) dumbed down from the unintelligible Latin so that anyone, no matter their level of devotion, can take it in somehow. Even if the liberals are aiming more towards the denomination type, they ought to have a focus on specific, institutionalized rituals. This debate just doesn't fit into the paradigm Casanova sets up for Christianity in the public world, and his argument is weaker for his insistence on these restrictions.
