"Quiet Politics is a roaring affirmation of the intellectual power that is generated by combining impressive theoretical sophistication with enormous empirical depth and great political acumen. These days, our debates about the politics of capitalism are noisy and shallow. All serious students of political economy will benefit from some quiet hours chewing on and digesting the intellectual feast that this book offers."
Peter J. Katzenstein, Cornell University
"Professor Culpepper's insightful analysis exposes a hidden dynamic that shapes takeover regulation in a diverse group of capitalist democracies: managers make the rules while politicians are not watching. Quiet Politics will change how readers think about the buying and selling of companies, and the process of regulating the market for corporate control."
Curtis J. Milhaupt, Columbia Law School
"Why did some markets for corporate control become more active with financial globalization than others? Even though country specialists may disagree on some details in each country study, none can afford to ignore the larger message of this book. Culpepper correctly identifies the business interest as a critical ingredient in explaining differences in hostile takeover mechanisms across countries."
Ulrike Schaede, University of California, San Diego
"This is a deeply challenging and provocative book, with implications for the study of the interrelationship of advanced capitalism and democratic politics far wider than just for corporate governance - interesting and important though Culpepper's analyses are of the changing regulatory frameworks of the markets for corporate control in France, Germany, Japan and the Netherlands. Culpepper argues with detailed empirical plausibility that democracy can only impose change in technical policy debates if they are of high salience - otherwise business wins, and especially in areas of relatively informal regulation. Culpepper thus shows how governments can sometimes win but how business normally does. A subversive and very illuminating book to stir up comparative political economy."
David Soskice, University of Oxford and Duke University
"Top managers rarely own more than a fraction of a country's large stock companies, but they consistently shape the ownership rules and day-to-day practices that govern our large corporations. Pepper Culpepper illuminates this inescapable reality and advances an elegant theory of managerial power. Quiet Politics opens an important new arena in the political workings of advanced market economies."
J. Nicholas Ziegler, University of California, Berkeley
"The analysis of takeovers in Quiet Politics and Business Power provides a sophisticated analysis of the political determinants of corporate governance and constitutes the most significant contribution to the debate in the wake of the works of Mark Roe and Peter Gourevitch. It is an essential read with a sobering implication, namely that policy-makers will only care about an issue if it has acquired high political salience no matter that importance of its economic stakes."
Michel Goyer, University of Warwick, Corporate Governance
"Pepper Culpepper has written a remarkable book. Entitled Quiet Politics, it should nonetheless make quite some noise among political scientists."
Martin Rhodes, Josef Korbel School of International Studies, University of Denver, European Political Science
"The theme of this book, the power of business, is a very timely one, and recent developments with the economic downturn in large parts of the "old" Western democratic world are raising many questions in this field...Comparative studies like this one are thus very important for gaining a deeper understanding."
Marie Söderberg, Stockholm School of Economics, Journal of Japanese Studies
"Quiet Politics and Business Power is an immensely thoughtful and stimulating book that should be read by all scholars of comparative political economy, and is of particular interest to those who wish to better understand contemporary changes in corporate governance in the industrialized world."